Children`s conceptions of name - Gruppo di Ricerca sullo Sviluppo

In: J. Brockmeier, M. Wang & D.R. Olson (eds., 2002), Literacy,
Narrative, and Culture. Curzon Press, Richmond (pp. 199-214).
Children’s conceptions of name: a study on metalinguistic awareness in Italian
children1
Ilaria Grazzani, and Veronica Ornaghi
“ For each child the most important issue is to position
himself in the physical and social world. Without
interpretation through oral language this enterprise
would not be possible.”
(Mario Groppo, 1996, pag. 191)
Names and words are the simplest linguistic entities by means of which, from the end of the first
year of life, children start to construct a shareable and meaningful world with people who take care
of them. Nevertheless, the awareness of words and names as signs that exist independent of the
objects they signify is acquired only along the childhood, the adolescence and beyond. This must not
surprise since only with Locke, in the XVIth Century, words came to be considered as arbitrary signs
(Olson, 1994).
In developmental psychology at least three theoretical areas of research have contributed to this
analysis: cognitive development, development/construction of concepts, and metalinguistic
development (at the level of metalexical/metasemantic competence).
The area of cognitive development is the Piagetian one. The Geneva’s author turned an old
philosophical problem into an empirical investigation. Piaget (La représentation du monde chez
l’enfant, 1926) was the first psychologist to investigate how, for children, words, more specifically
names relate to the world. Piaget, following a stage conception of cognitive development, and
believing in a linear and self-referential cognitive process, identified four phases from nominal realism
to nominalism. These stages can be summerized as follows:
1. Children (5/6 years old) believe that names and objects coexist (nominal realism);
*
Data presented in this paper are from a cross-cultural programme by D.R. Olson, J. Brockmeier, B. Homer, D.
Kamawar (Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto), and I. Grazzani, M. Groppo, V.
Ornaghi, L. Carrubba (Università Cattolica, Department of Psychology, CRTI, Milano, Italy). This research was
supported in part by a grant (98.02357.CT08) to Mario Groppo from the CNR (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche).
2. Children (7/8 years old) start to abandon the nominal realism; they think that
God/Adults/Important
people/Inventors of objects gave names but once given, names can not
be changed;
3. Children (9/10 years old) understand the nature of names as social convention passed on from
generation to generation;
4. Children (11/12 years old) believe that names are entirely arbitrary signs.
Since the English translation of Piaget’s works several studies examined children’s conception of
word. Brook (1970) used a standardized version of Piaget’s nominal realism tasks with children who
ranged in age from 6 to 10. Although she confirmed the Piagetian developmental trend, she
discovered that there were children at all levels of nominal realism at every age. Downing and Oliver
(1974), similarly, found that all of the children (4.5 to 8.0 yrs. of age) regardless of age confused
isolated phonemes and syllables with spoken words; moreover, children between the ages of 5.6 and
6.5 years tended to exclude long words from their conception of the spoken word, but both younger
and older kids did not. Papandropoulou and Sinclair (1974) were the first to speak of ‘metalinguistic
awareness’, underlining that language is a means of expressing knowledge and, at the same time, an
object of knowledge. The authors showed that the youngest children (at the age of 4/5 years) do not
appear to make any differentiation between words and things; only when they are 9-10 years old, do
words acquire a clear autonomy becoming meaningful units. More precisely, Papandropoulou and
Sinclair showed that while children initially confuse words and things later they become capable of
conceiving the word both as being composed of smaller units (phonemes) and as combining into
larger units (phrases and sentences).
A second research area concerns the concept formations, since understanding what names and
words are (word meanings) can be seen in terms of development of concepts. This is a line of
research introduced by Vygotskij (1934) who used both words and names as ‘mediators’ to
investigate the formation of concepts. Vygotskij noted that children of pre-school age, when asked
to explain the names of objects, rely on their attributes (for instance colour and shape). Werner
(1953) and Werner and Kaplan (1963) studied children’s and so-called primitives’ concepts of names
and words, claiming that both believe in the dynamic properties of the words and have a clear
preference for the physiognomical language- the language of onomatopoeias and the so called ‘sound
symbolism’. The authors, maintaining that language is the most sophisticated among the human
representational modes, argued that it is the daily, concrete naming activity that allows us to reach
the levels of abstract concepts. Both Vygotskij (underlining the role of socio-cultural factors in
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cognitive development) and Werner & Kaplan (with their attention to the transaction between the
organism and its environment) distanced themselves from the Piagetian conception of linear and self
referential cognitive development (see Brockmeier, Grazzani, 1999).
The third area, the metalinguistic one, is actually the most rich and dynamic area of research on
children’s concepts of “word”. Studying names in this perspective means, following Gombert (1992),
to investigate one aspect of metasemantic or metalexical awareness - namely the subject’s ability ‘on
the one hand to isolate the word and identify it as being an element of the lexicon, and on the other
to endeavour to access the internal lexicon intentionally’ (pag. 63). iThere are new aspects that, in
this third perspective, have come in focus. A first one deals with children’s difficulty to switch from
‘thinking through language’ to ‘thinking about language’ (see Markman, 1976, in the wake of
Papandroupoulou’s works). At a basic level children quite readily learn arbitrary referential
relationships. Always at a basic level they differentiate the linguistic symbol from its referential, that
is to say words and things. On the contrary, word-referent differentiation questions are difficult
because they require that children reflect upon aspects of the referential realtionship that they have
mastered.
A second aspect is given by the necessity to distinguish, theoretically and empirically, between
‘name’ and ‘word’ (e.g., Gombert, 1990; Ferreiro, Vernon, 1992; Ferreiro, Pontecorvo, Moreira,
Garcia Hidalgo, 1996). Ferreiro and Vernon (1992), for instance, found that for 4-5 years old
children (who have not learnt to write and read yet) it is much easier to answer to questions
formulated with the term ‘name’ than with the term ‘word’. Moreover, Ferreiro (1997) has
underlined that children learn names as social properties of objects and, probably, in virtue of their
affective importance as well (Grazzani Gavazzi, Carrubba, Groppo, 2000).
A third aspect deals with the role of cultural and social factors and, in particular, the role of
writing and literacy in children’s conception of language (Olson, 1994). Literacy, even if with
different emphasis, is considered one of the most important factors allowing one ‘to think about
language’ - to conceive language as an object that is different from the non-linguistic objects to
which it refers.
Finally, a fourth aspect has recently come out: the importance of studying the daily, discursive
practices of children’s naming experience in order to understand their construction of name. A
recent Italian study (Grazzani Gavazzi, Brockmeier, Groppo, Carrubba, Confalonieri, Ornaghi,
1997)ii even if conducted with a traditional experimental approach showed that the practice of giving
names to things is related to specific family language games and to local cultural habits (e.g., reading
books, wathcing TV, playing with oral and/or written language). That study showed also that
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children cope in different way with diverse classes of nouns; more precisely, their answers were more
conventional with proper nouns, and more realist with common nouns.
Each of these three areas on children’s understanding of word and names carries with it a
particular methodology. It is well known that over last twenty years a sort of dissatisfaction has
emerged towards the task-oriented methods (e.g., Dunn, 1990; Bruner, 1990). Tasks based on a
series of ‘yes/no questions’ addressed individually to children in the artificial setting of laboratory
have shown to be inadequate for investigating reasoning underling children’s answers. Moreover, as
Siegal (1997) has pointed out there is often a clash between the conversational worlds of children
and the adult-sponsored world of psychological testing (see also Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, Sims,
Jones, Cuckle, 1996). A clash that is particularly evident in metalinguistic tasks.
For this reason, we carried out a study adopting a more naturalistic approach which is presented
here. First, we investigated the discursive practice of naming through a conversational and
argumentative approach, and secondly, we re-created ‘ad hoc’ situations for eliciting naming
practices. More precisely, we created a setting where small groups of children could ‘naturally’
discuss the origin and modifiability of names of target objects. This discursive and conversational
approach has been found to be a suitable tool for implementing and at the same time studying the
process of knowledge construction (Pontecorvo, 1993; Resnick, Levine, Teasley, 1991).
The main hypothesis was that the transition from realism to nominalism was not as linear as Piaget
claimed and that it was, therefore, possible to find different forms of realism and nominalism at every
age, as a function of various other factors including different types of name, and different status of
name.
The Research
We studies sixty children, divided into three age groups, coming from Milan, Italy. There were
twentytwo 6-year-olds, eighteen 8-year-olds and twenty 10-year-olds. They were divided into 11
discussion groups (4/5/6 subjects for group) in which males and females were equally distributed.
The materials used in the study were, in part, similar to the one used by Homer, Brockmeier,
Kamawar, Olson (1998) and by Grazzani, Brockmeier, Groppo, Carrubba, Confalonieri, Ornaghi,
(1997). Kamawar and Homer (1998) summarized the different categories of objects to which names
refer in terms of two variables: type (inanimate things, animate entities and persons) and status
(proper vs common nouns). In addition, they distinguished the types of objects according to whether
they were known, unknown or invented/constructed together with the research subjects.iii In order to
avoid an overload of discussion, we limited the discussion to the use of five different target objects: a
puppet, a ruler, a photo of a cat, a photo of a child and an invented marble-grabber (Table 1).
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TYPE
THINGS
ANIMATE ENTITIES
PERSONS
STATUS
PROPER
COMMON
PROPER
COMMON
PROPER
COMMON
known
-
ruler
-
-
-
-
unknown
-
puppet
-
photo of a cat
photo of a
-
child
invented
-
marble
-
-
-
-
grabber
Table 1.Research material classified following Kamawar and Homer (1998)
Children, grouped in a play room of their school, were collectively asked two questions,
counterbalancing the order of objects. Questions were: 1) Where does the name of x (e.g., ruler)
come from? Why do we call it x? (Origin Question); 2) When x was first discovered/invented, could
it have been called y? (Modified Question, intended as support for discussion and for nominalist
thinking). Each group was recorded and videotaped during the material presentation and the
discussion (lasting from 20 to 25 minutes), and the conversations were entirely transcribed.
The Origin Questions were scored as nominalist, intermediate and realist answers. The Modified
Questions were scored as ‘pass’ if the participant gave a nominalist answer. Answers were classified
as nominalist if they said they were made up/conventional, or as incorrect/realist if they referred to
properties of objects. Since questions were not asked individually, the score procedure was
sometimes difficult and an inter-rater agreement was necessary.
Children at all ages gave a preponderance of nominalist answers. A comparison was made
between nominalist scores for Proper and Common nouns, controlling for the Status of Name. For
proper names only nominalist answers were given at every level of age (100% of correct answers).
On the contrary, for Common Nouns realist and intermediate answers were produced as well.
Controlling for Type of Name, differences emerged since intermediate and nominalist scores were
more frequent with persons, then with animate entities (50%), and finally with things (48%). Among
things, nominalist answers were uncommon with known object (40%), and more frequent with
invented objects (60%).
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The qualitative analysis represents the most original and interesting part of our research. It reveals
as discussion and argomentation amomg peers is a powerful tools ………….
Let’s start from the Proper Nouns. As we wrote, children are nominalist at every age, since the
child of the photo could, in their opinion, have been called Marco (Marc), Carlo (Carl), Andrea
(Andrew) and so on. The identity of the ‘object’ does not change by modifying its name, as shown in
the following examples.
Example 1 - GRADE I
R. (reasercher): Da dove gli deriva il suo nome? (How did he get his name?)
Francesca: La sua mamma e il suo papà (From his mother and father)
R.: E la sua mamma e il suo papà potevano scegliere di chiamarlo Luca? (Well, could his parents
have called him Luca?)
Francesca: Sì (Yes)
All: Sìììì!!! (Yessss)
Andrea: Anche Carlo (Carl, too)
.....
R.: E Maria? Potevano ... (And Maria, Could...)
All: No!!! E’ un nome da femmina (No!!! [Maria] is a female name)
Example 2 - GRADE III
R.: ... si chiama Alberto, chi gli ha dato questo nome? (Alberto, how did he get his name?)
All: I genitori (His parents gave him the name)
Davide: Mamma e papà (Mummy and daddy)
R.: E potevano decidere di chiamarlo Marco? (Well, and could they have called him ‘Marco’?)
All: Sììììì (Yessss!!!)
R.: Possiamo dire: si chiama Alberto, ma poteva chiamarsi in modi ... (We could say: his name is
Albert but they could have given different ....)
Davide: ..tanti modi (.... names)
R.: Quindi potevano dargli altri nomi ... (So they could have given him other names...)
All: Sì (Yes)
R.: Tutti quelli che vogliamo?) (All the names that we like?)
Cinzia: Tranne quelli da femmina (All the names, but the female names)
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The discussion is generally more articulated with Common Nouns. When the target object is the
ruler (Type: Thing/known), the realist answers are frequent at every level of age. The function of the
object is taken into account for explaining the origin of name. Nevertheless, an exception is given
even in Grade 1, where Magda (6.5 yrs. old) does not take in to account the functionalist
explanation, as shown in the following sequence:
Example 3 - GRADE I
R.: Da dove gli proviene questo nome? [righello] (How did it get its name?) [ruler]
Gloria: Glielo avrà dato chi l’avrà fatto! (People who made it!)
Magda: Gli Uomini... Per la scuola (People... for school)
Gloria : Uhmm...
R.: E se io invece di righello lo chiamassi ‘palla’? (‘Ball’ instead of ruler?)
Gloria: NO!
R.: No?
Gloria: Non sarebbe il nome giusto (It would not be the ‘correct word')
R.: Non posso chiamarlo palla ... (So I cannot call it ‘ball’...)
Magda: Sì che puoi (Yes, you can!)
Gloria: ma il nome più giusto è righello perchè si fan le righe e non i cerchi ... (But the most correct
name is ‘ruler’ because it draws lines, not circles...)
....
Magda: Sì, ma è lo stesso un nome (Yes but it is still a noun)
R.: (rivolta ad altri b.ni) Questo è un righello perchè serve a fare le righe. Allora non poteva
chiamarsi ‘palla’? (towards the other kids) This is a ruler because it draws lines, isn’t it? ... So it
could not have been called ‘ball’, could it?)
Matteo A.: No
Matteo B.: No
Andrea: Sì (Yes)
R: Perchè? (Why?)
Magda: Perchè è lo stesso un nome (Because ‘ball’ too is a noun)
Gloria: per me non è giusto perché se si doveva chiamare palla, allora era a forma di palla (For me:
no, because to be called ‘ball’ it has to be round)
...
Magda: E’ la stessa cosa.... (It doesn’t matter, it is the same)
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R.: E’ sempre... (It is always...)
Magda: E’ sempre un righello (It is still a ruler)
We can note here an important aspect neglected by the Piagetian tradition: the fluctuation
between a stage and another. Children are not clearly distinguishing two quite different questions.
Gloria wavers between stage 1 and stage 2 (following the Piaget’s schema) since a ruler cannot be
called ball because of its form and its function but, at the same time, its name derives from people
who made it (see above).
The following discursive sequence with the puppet target (Type: Thing/Unknown) shows that
even 6 years old children have a sort of awareness that ‘puppet/pupazzo’ is the common noun of an
object that, in children’s everyday life, gets a ‘proper name’. The discussion, the language game,
goes on on the basis of this sort of pre-comprehension, with children not having the language to
make it explicit:
Example 4 - GRADE I
... un pupazzo (a puppet)
R.: potevo chiamarlo ‘Alberto’? (Could it have been called ‘Alberto’?)
Emanuele: No!
R.: Perchè no? (Why not?)
Emanuele: Possiamo chiamarlo Alberto, ma il suo ‘vero nome’ è pupazzo (We can call it Alberto,
but its real name is ‘puppet’)
R.: il suo vero nome è pupazzo... E allora potevamo chiamarlo Alberto sì o no? (Its real name is
‘puppet’... Well, could we call it Alberto or could we not?)
All: Sì (Yes!!!)
Emanuele: [possiamo chiamarlo] Alberto solo se vuoi che usiamo il nome per dire che è il tuo
pupazzo preferito (Well, it can be called Alberto only if you mean that it is your favourite puppet).
The picture changes with 8 years old children who use explicit grammar concepts (namely, the
distinction between common and proper nouns) to distinguish among different word classes. Since
our research sample did not contain second graders, it is not clear at what age children start to take
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full possession of the grammar language - much depends, we do believe, to the specific school
practices:
Example 5 - GRADE III
R.:... Chi può aver dato questo nome a questo oggetto? (Where did it get its name?)
Davide: L’uomo (From human beings)
Cinzia: Quelli che lo hanno creato (From those who made it)
Matteo: (Secondo me un pupazzo è un pupo-pazzo (A puppet is a crazy baby [an Italian pun:
pupazzo-->pupo-pazzo=crazy baby]
R.: Avrebbero potuto dargli un altro nome? (Could it have been called in another way?)
All: Sì (Yes)
Matteo: Orsacchiotto (Teddy bear)
....
R.: E potevano chiamarlo ‘sole’? (...could it have been called ‘sun’?)
All: No!!!
Davide: Perché il sole ha i raggi (No, because of the rayes)
Cinzia: No, ma magari come nome proprio (No, but... maybe as a ‘proper name’)
Davide: Se lo dici con l’espressione del nome proprio: ti presento ‘Sole’, il mio amico, si può dire (If
you say Sun as a ‘proper name’, as when you say: I introduce Sun to you, my friend, ...you can...)
Here we note Davide’s change of point of view from an initial realist to a more nominalist
position, since the discussion with Cinzia helps him to argue in her same right direction.
Another example comes from the following discourse sequence:
Example 6 - GRADE III (puppet)
Marco: Potevano decidere di chiamarlo ‘macchinina’ appena lo avevano inventato, l’avevano appena
inventato e potevano dare il nome che volevano (They could call it ‘little car’ when it was invented,
when just invented it could get every name)
Luca : Per ogni cosa ci vuole un bel po’ di tempo per decidere il nome (It takes time to give a name
to things)
Gloria: Anche adatto deve essere no? (The name has to be appropriate too)
...
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R.: Quindi quando lo hanno inventato potevano chiamarlo come volevano... anche ‘bambino’?
(...therefore... once invented they could call it as they liked ... also ‘child’?)
Marco: Sì (Yes)
Gloria: Sì (Yes)
R.: Perché? (Why?)
Marco: Se al bambino gli avevano dato un nome diverso da ‘bambino’, un nome al posto di
‘bambino’, un altro nome, allora sì, potevano darglielo, se no ... che confusione (If the child had a
different name - not ‘child’ - another name, then... yes, it [puppet] could have been called ‘child’,
otherwise ... what a mess!!!)
Interesting enough is Marco’s awareness (8.7 yrs. old) that two different categories of object have
to get different names in order to make communication work. In some other sequences of our corpus
of data, children refer to names as 'just occupied', as names that cannot be used.
The use of the marble-grabber (Type: Thing/ invented, ad hoc constructed) created a situation for
observing the process of giving/constructing names. Initially, children tended to attribute a name by
guessing the function of the unknown object. When a ‘meaningless name’ was proposed (‘rovegià')
only one group of first graders accepted the language game of giving non-sense names.
The third and fifth graders found it difficult to leave aside the ‘meaning problem’. The following
sequences show what happened when the researcher proposed to give the invented name ‘rovegià’ to
the invented object:
Example 7 - GRADE III
Jenny: Ma ‘rovegià’ penso che sia un nome di persona (‘rovegià’. I think it is a person name)
Nicola: ... rovegià, non ha significato (‘rovegià’, it is meaningless)
R.: E’ un nome inventato ora (It has just been invented)
Mattia: Secondo me i nomi sono dati perché hanno un significato, non è che si danno così, si sparano
a caso ... Cioè hanno un significato (In my opinion names are given because they have a meaning;
one cannot give names superficially, randomly... Names do have meanings)
R.: E tu, Nicola, come lo chiameresti? (Nicola, how would you call it?)
Nicola: ‘Porta palline’perchè ci metto le palline (I’d call it ‘small balls holder’ because I put inside
my small balls)
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R.: E se lo chiamo ‘rovegià? Non ci posso mettere lo stesso le palline? (But if I’d call it ‘rovegià,
couldn’t I put my small balls in it anyway?)
Nicola: Sì ma ‘rovegià’ non sai il significato di ‘rovegià’ è una parola inventata, non sai che cosa
vuol dire (Yes, but ... ‘rovegià, well, you don’t know the meaning, it is an invented word)
Giulia: Sì, ma se dai un significato a ‘rovegià’ puoi capirlo cosa vuol dire (Yes, but if we attribute a
meaning to ‘rovegià’, you understand what it means).
Giulia concludes by taking a more nominalistic position, arguing that names are ‘conventions’ and
their meaning has to be shared. Note that Magda, the child of the first example (Grade I) tended to
argue similarly: ... “ ... rovegià, we don’t know what that word means but if you do explain it, we
will know”.
In the following conversation Giovanni recaps the other children’s statements as Giulia did in the
previous sequence:
Example 8 - GRADE V
R.:... Io pensavo di chiamarlo ‘rovegià’ (I was thinking to call it ‘rovegià...)
Valeria: Che cosa vuol dire? (What does it mean?)
R.: E’ un nome inventato, non ha un significato particolare. Posso chiamarlo ‘rovegià’? (It has been
invented just now, no particular meaning ... can I call it ‘rovegià’?)
Giovanni: Sì (Yes)
Antonella: No
R.: Perché no? (Why not?)
Antonella: Perché non ha senso (Because it is meaningless)
Giovanni: Può darsi che abbia proprio il significato di quell’oggetto ... (Maybe it has exactly the
meaning of that object)
In the case of cat as a target object (Type: Animate Entity/Unknown) children are very clever, both in
term of assigning a proper name and in term of the standard task ('cat' as a common noun). In fact,
the language game consists at a certan point in assigning and changing the proper name of the cat.
Example 9 - GRADE I
....
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Marco: Potremmo chiamarlo Baffo, come il gatto di una mia amica (We could call him Baffo, it is
also the name of a cat of a friend of mine)
....
R.: Il gatto, non chiamiamolo più Baffo, ma chiamiamolo Pietro ... Possiamo, anche se è un nome da
bimbo? (Let’s change his name, let’s call him Pietro ... instead of Baffo, can we do that?)
All: Sì (Yes)
R.: Perché si può? (Why can we do that?)
Stefano: Perchè i nomi... (Because names ....)
Valentina: ... si decidono ( ... are decided)
Stefano: Si decidono (... are decided)
...
Example 10 - GRADE I
...
R.: ... allora Dio i cani non poteva chiamarli ‘gatti’? (Therefore God, could call dogs ‘cats’...)
Cristiana: No
Costanza: No
Federico: Sì, poteva fare il contrario: il cane gatto e il gatto cane (Yes, God could reverse names:
calling dogs ‘cats’ and cats ‘dogs’)
Stefano: Poteva chiamarlo anche dinosauro (He could also call the cat ‘dynosaur’).
The construction of the name ‘cat’ is an easy task for fifth graders:
Example 11 - GRADE V
...
R.: ma chi ha deciso che si chiama ‘gatto’? (Who decided the name ‘cat’?)
Giulia: Hanno inoziato a chiamarlo così (At the beginning, someone...)
R.: ... e se volevano chiamarlo in un altro modo? (Those persons, could they decide for another
nae?)
Jenny: Sì (Yes)
R.: Per esempio? (For instance?)
Jenny: Cane (Dog)
R.: Potevano chiamarlo cane? (Could they have been called cat ‘dog’?)
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Giulia: Tu una cosa puoi chiamarla come vuoi, però devi dirlo agli altri che quello è il nome (You
can call a thing as you like, but you have to make an agreement with the other people)
R.: Intendi dire che la cosa importante è mettersi d’accordo? (You mean that the important thing is
the agreement...)
Giulia Sì! (Yes!!)
Marco: Potevano anche mettersi d’accordo e chiamarlo ‘pesce’ (It could have been called ‘fish’ as
well)
All: Sì!! (Yes!!)
Discussion and conclusions
Summarizing, these findings from the analysis of data described above which are only a part of the
larger project carried out with a multi-method approach (e.g., Grazzani, Carrubba, Ornaghi, Groppo,
Brockmeier, 1999) and tend to conform to the findings that have obtained in other contexts.
First of all, differences have been found as a function of the status of name (proper versus
common nouns). Naming babies is a frequent practice of children’s everyday life. Following
Wittgenstein (1953) it is a 'family game' - a language family game - that allows children to catch
easily the arbitrary feature of the proper nouns. For proper names even the youngest children are
nominalist.
Common nouns are a complex class, and children seem to cope differently with the diverse
research objects since differences emerged as a function of type of name. In order to catch the
arbitrary nature of signs it seems easier to deal with unknown objects (such as a never-seen-before
puppet) than with a well known object with a clearly estabilished function (see the ruler).
Interesting enough, children’s fluctuations from one stance to another have been found as a
function of the target name, since the same child can be realist in some cases and conventionalist in
some others; however, what all the children share is the same difficulty with the same target object.
Moreover, we found that at the age of 8 years children frequently use grammar language and take
into account different languages (e.g., English, the most common second language for Italian
children) to make their arguments clear. Literacy, intended in a large sense (for instance, including
the wide spectrum of verbal and nonverbal communicative practices that refer to different
languages), seems to be an important factor to explain the metalinguistic awareness here implied.
In addition, there are individual differences regarding the ability to reach a nominalist thinking.
Such differences seem sometimes more important than the factor age itself. It remains to be seen
whether they are explained by cultural factors (for instance, communication in Magda’s family
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[example 3] was based on dialogue and conversation; TV was not present at home) and, in the
affermative, in which measure and together with what factor.
Finally, arguing with peers, as many examples have showed, often allows children to modify their
own point of view (see for instance Davide, [example 5]). In addition, discussion among children
gives the researcher the chance to better understand the reasoning beyond words.
The role of literacy in this development remains obscure and needs of further analysis. Certainly,
talk about words is enhanced by literacy but wheter or not one sees them as conventional or as realist
…God-given names may not be. After all, as Olson (1994) underlines, it was only in the 16 th that
John Locke sustained [assumed] the coventionalist view that words are arbitrary signs
….and its link with the local language game, will be further investigated within the research
programme that is still in progress.
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An
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i
Regarding the distinction between the two types of metalinguistic awareness Gombert writes (1992, p. 63): ‘Since the
elements of the lexicon constitute minimal units of meaning, it is very difficult to dissociate the two aspects in the
observation of real linguistic behaviour’ - that is to say the metalexical from the metasematic awareness.
ii
This research was conducted with 114 children, aged between 4 and 11, following in part the procedure by Homer,
Brockmeier, Kamawar, Olson (1998) who asked questions of the following types: Origin question (e.g., How did dogs
get their name?), Standard Change question (e.g., Could dogs be called cats?) and Modified Change question (e.g.,
When dogs were first discovered, could they have been called plaps?). Whereas Piaget described a linear development
from a realist to a nominalist model we found that children use both models from the very beginning in a combined
way, as a function of different type of name; in fact, even 5 year old kids are nominalist when they are asked about
proper nouns.
iii
Kamawar and Homer (1998) proposed the following ontology of the status and type of possible ‘objects’:
Type
Things
Status
Known
Unknown
PN
Child’s school
Photo of lake
Invented
Toy
Town
Animate Entities
CN
Pencil
Lemon
Zester
Novel
lego
building
Persons
PN
Mickey Mouse
CN
Dog
PN
Child’s Friend
New
Doll
Novel
Creature
New
Baby
CN
The temptative feature of this ontology is evident. For instance, a doll is not the same animate entity as a cartoon
character; moreover, a doll becomes animate for a child on the basis of its affective and transitional properties. A
possible, simpler classification could be made following the grammar definition of what a noun is. The Devoto and
Oli’s Italian Dictionary offers the following definition: ‘part of the discourse that in the Western languages is
generally opposed to the verb category... Nouns are divided in common and proper nouns. The Proper ones can be
distinguished in names of person (e.g., John), place (e.g., Toronto) and people (e.g., Canadians). Common nouns are
divided into the following types: concrete (e.g., horse), abstract (beauty), collective (e.g., Upper House) and singulative
(e.g., senator)’ (1996, p. 1283).
On the basis of this definition a research including several target objects has been conducted by means of a
questionnaire (Grazzani, Carrubba, Ornaghi, Groppo, Brockmeier, 1999).
16