FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY

Transcript

VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Manuel Tornago
ITALY AND THE 2011 LIBYAN CRISIS:
A DISPLAY OF INCONSISTENCY AND INEFFECTIVENESS
Master Thesis
Diplomacy and International Relations, State Code 621L20004
Political Science Study Field
Supervisor
prof. dr. Andzej Puksto
Defended
prof. dr. Šarūnas Liekis_____________________
Kaunas, 2015
CONTENTS
pag. 4
Abstract
pag. 5
Introduction
pag. 10
1. Theoretical framework
1.1 Theories in international relations
pag. 12
1.2 The theoretical framework: neorealism
pag. 16
1.3 Main vectors of Italian foreign policy from 1945 to the present and
their relations with the Libyan case
pag. 21
2. Analysis of the pre-crisis relations between Italy and Libya
2.1 Contextualisation of the upheaval
pag. 24
2.2 Economics interests of Italy in and with Libya
pag. 26
2.3 General dangers of the disruption
pag. 29
3. The first part of the crisis: commitment to a regime change
3.1 Sub-phase n° 1: the initial cautious reaction
pag. 33
3.2 Sub-phase n° 2: the quest for a multilateral approach
pag. 38
3.3 Sub-phase n° 3: the full support to the international effort
pag. 42
3.4 Findings on the first part of the crisis
pag. 45
4. The second part of the crisis: questioning of the rebel front
4.1 Sub-phase n° 1: concerns about the campaign and the NTC reliability
pag. 50
4.2 Sub-phase n° 2: the renewed backing of the NTC
pag. 55
4.3 Sub-phase n° 3: the unsolved uncertainties
pag. 58
4.4 Findings on the second part of the crisis
2
pag. 60
Conclusion
pag. 62
Recommendations
pag. 64
Bibliography and references
pag. 76
Annexes
3
Tornago, M., Italy and the 2011 Libyan crisis: a display of inconsistency and ineffectiveness:
Final Thesis / Supervisor Prof. Puksto, A.; Vytautas Magnus University, Faculty of Political
Science and Diplomacy, Department of Political Science. Kaunas, 2015. 60 pages.
ABSTRACT
The Italian foreign policy is the topic of the present research; more precisely, the policies pursued in
relation to the Libyan crisis of the year 2011. The most recent events taking place in the African
country bring along the necessity of shedding a new light on the role of the Western state that most
interests had to defend in Libya, and that is still very much concerned by the latter situation at a
time when a new possible military intervention is considered.
The object of the research is the Italian foreign policy considered from the beginning of the Libyan
crises in 2011, namely from when protests against the government started in Benghazi and clashes
with the police took place in mid February, until the end of the NATO mission Operation Unified
Protector in Libya on October 31 of that same year, following the death of Col. Gaddafi and the
defeat of the loyalist forces. The goal of the research is to identify the Italian postures and their
consistency with its actual behaviour during the Libyan crisis, evaluating if the Italian foreign
policy has been capable of serving the national interest.
The tasks of the research are to justify the choice of the neorealist theoretical framework
introducing the main vectors of Italian foreign policy from 1945 to the present and their relations
with the Libyan case, to assess the status of the relations between Italy and Libya at the end of the
year 2010, to trace the Italian diplomatic and political rhetoric related to the crisis understanding the
rational behind the Italian formal positioning, to check it against the actual Italian actions along the
crisis, and to assess the results achieved. Document analysis is the research method employed, and
the results indicate that Italy displayed a negligent management of the crisis since non-linearity,
inconsistency and ineffectiveness were recurrent features to be found in its behaviour, sided by a
lack of understanding of the overall Libyan situation. The Italian stances and actions were taken
into account through a neorealist theoretical framework.
The conclusion of the work is that the Italian foreign policy in relation to the Libyan crisis of 2011
have showed strong signs of non-linearity and inconsistency during the last phase of the crisis, and
that the results achieved can not be considered satisfactory in any of the two phases, whilst in both
of them an important lack of knowledge on key elements related to the issue has been displayed.
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INTRODUCTION
The topic of the research is the Italian foreign policy, more precisely the policies pursued in relation
to the Libyan crisis of the year 2011. In that respect, therefore, it is useful to highlight from the very
beginning of the paper that only the initial part of the still on-going events in the North African
country are taken into account here, and that the specific focus is addressed on the Italian
perspective and actions regarding the issue. From now on, when referring to the “Libyan crisis”, it
will be intended exclusively the part of it going from its beginning, in February 2011, to the end of
October of that same year.
Novelty and relevance of the topic
The novelty of the topic results from the fact that, although critiques from many sides have been
moved to the Italian foreign policy stance during and afterwards the events of the Libyan crisis,
there is still a lack of comprehensive analyses able to address the events in a clear and defined
perspective that privileges the Italian foreign policy itself as the core of the research, instead of
focusing either on the Italian domestic dynamics possibly influencing it, on the events per se, or on
the other major international powers involved and their mutual interactions.
The topic relevance stems, in primis, from the fact that four years after the start of the disrupting
Libyan events the situation is still a long way from being recomposed. Conditions have been
deteriorating at a point that, at present, the Libyan state could hardly been considered de facto
existent. Implications of the issue extend well beyond the country's contended territories: a new
international military intervention could possibly materialised against the threat posed by the
Islamic State alleged presence in some Libyan cities, towns, and territories. The unsolved instability
in the country suggests that a renewed attention to the identities, choices and actions of the domestic
and international actors that first dealt with the Libyan issue, with all of its strong repercussions on
the Mediterranean and global scene, is needed. More specifically, larger attention has to be given to
the country that most leverage had on the Libyan economy and that, in turn, had the highest stakes
in the Libyan issue. Nor is the research intended as useful exclusively with regards to the Italian
stance concerning the crisis here considered: instead, as the problematics analysed reflects the limits
of the more general Italian foreign policy vision and action, the topicality of the events taken into
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account is sided by the relevance that a critical appraisal of the Italian foreign policy deficiencies
may embrace.
Thesis problem
Since it results that there is still a lack of analyses regarding the Italian behaviour during the part of
the Libyan crisis here considered, the main problem analysed in the thesis is indeed the uncertainty
regarding the line and effectiveness of Italian policies during that period alone. The thesis is an
attempt to understand whether Italy manage to pursue a successful political line through the events
here taken into account.
Object, goal and tasks of the thesis
The object of the paper is the Italian foreign policy considered from the beginning of the Libyan
crises in 2011, namely from when protests against the government started in Benghazi and clashes
with the police took place in mid February, until the end of the NATO mission Operation Unified
Protector in Libya on October 31 of that same year, following the death of Col. Gaddafi and the
defeat of the loyalist forces.
The goal is to identify the Italian postures and their consistency with its actual behaviour during the
Libyan crisis, evaluating if the Italian foreign policy has been capable of serving the national
interest.
The tasks are:
to justify the choice of the neorealist theoretical framework introducing the main vectors of Italian
foreign policy from 1945 to the present and their relations with the Libyan case;
to assess the status of the relations between Italy and Libya at the end of the year 2010;
to trace the Italian diplomatic and political rhetoric related to the Libyan crisis, understanding the
rational behind the Italian positioning;
to check the Italian formal positioning against the actual Italian actions along the crisis;
to assess the results achieved, with a clear grasp of the Italian short, medium and long term interests
defended.
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Research method
The research has been implemented through the document analysis of the Italian foreign policy line,
taking into account the statements and speeches of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco
Frattini on the Libyan issue, which were reported in form of quotations by the official website of the
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and represent therefore primary sources. It should be
emphasised that all of the statements and speeches considered were released by the Minister in his
official and public capacity of member of the Government, and that the intended recipient was
firstly and foremost the international community of states. Being the Libyan crisis a sensible topic
for the Italian diplomacy, Frattini's positions were expressed under virtually any relevant
circumstance and occurrence of the Libyan crisis affecting the Italian interest.
To test the Italian positions with the actual behaviour of the State, to assess the status of the
relations between Italy and Libya at the end of the year 2010, and the results achieved by Italy
along the crisis, both primary and secondary sources had been used.
In order to confer coherence, comprehensibility and validity to the research, the 2011 Libyan crisis
has been divided in two different main phases, with their relative three sub-phases. An attempt has
been made in order to determine if there is an internal linearity and coherence within each of these
single main phases, as well as an overall general consistency along all of the crisis period, and if the
Italian goals of the main phases have been accomplished. To that effect, the periodisation of the
crisis in phases and sub-phases helps in facilitating the identification of the Italian policy stances,
and therefore their contradictions and their internal and overall coherence or incoherence. Albeit
artificial as any process of periodisation can be, its arbitrariness has been limited as much as
possible by choosing as turning points some of the main events that took place during the crisis, and
that strongly influenced the Italian stance and action.
Research source base
The literature consulted during the research includes numerous Italian language sources, which
have been widely used and constitute the main part of the author readings. Newspapers, academic
papers, scientific community works and official documents and treaties account for the bulk of the
material employed, beside an intense consultation of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.
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Concerning the theoretical framework and its relation with the crisis object of the thesis, Waltz'
“Theory of International Politics” and Mearsheimer's “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” have
provided the basis of the international relations' chosen theory, whilst Pirani's “The way we were:
continuity and change in Italian political culture” and Ratti's “All Aboard the Bandwagon?
Structural Realism and Italy's International Role” were functional in giving a confirmation of the
Italian foreign behaviour consistency along the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with the
neorealist framework proposed. Brighi's “Europe, the USA and the 'policy of the pendulum': the
importance of foreign policy paradigms in the foreign policy of Italy (1989-2005)” arguments
according to which different political parties in government would be able to shape the Italian
foreign policy along different direction appeared instead fairly unconvincing.
Regarding the Libyan crisis, the Italian Ministry of foreign affairs website has been the object of a
constant consultation, as many of its sections offer thematic synthesis of the Government initiatives,
reactions and declarations, with wide space left to quotes of the Italian officials themselves.
The two main Italian newspapers and their on-line versions, Il Corriere della Sera and La
Repubblica, provided a quite deep description of the Italian interest in Libya. Those ones are the
two most authoritative newspapers in Italy, both domestically and internationally, and they provide
news and analysis organised within a huge variety of different sections: foreign policy and
international events are certainly prominent. Two other minor newspapers, namely Il Fatto
Quotidiano and L'Unità, instead, criticised in an extensive way the government foreign action that
had preceded and followed the outburst of the Libyan crisis. Fornario's article “What they have
been able to say to Gaddafi” (“Cosa hanno saputo dire a Gheddafi”) perfectly exemplify the Unità's
hyper-critical stance concerning the Government positions.
International newspaper and magazines with a strong reputation of independence and a dedicated
attention to global events, as the Economist and the Guardian, have been useful in gathering critical
readings of the Italian foreign action from a non-Italian perspective. Their analytical eyes should
balance the information cut of the national sources mentioned above, which sometimes appeared to
be biased although critical. More specifically, their faded pro-UK positions are useful in
highlighting where the Italian position may have conflicted with the UK's, as clearly showed in the
Economist's “Italy's shame in Libya” as well as in The Guardian's “Diplomats discuss Libya's future
as Italy plots Gaddafi's escape route”.
The Italian think-tank IAI (Institute of International Affairs) wide literature on Mediterraneanrelated topics boasts numerous works with a specific focus on the Libyan crisis; moreover, they
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tribute a specific attention to the Italian perspective and role in the issue. Their validity, and the
massive number of references to which they are object in the research, stems from the high level of
experts contributing to the writings. Paoletti's “Italy between alarmism and realpolitik” (“L’Italia tra
allarmismo e realpolitik”), Mercuri's “The Libyan exception” (“L’eccezione libica”) and Varvelli's
“Libya heading the brink” (“Libia verso il baratro”), to only name few contributions, proved highly
useful during the author research. Moreover, the IAI offered a detailed chronology of the Italian
foreign policy during the year 2011.
Al Jazeera and BBC websites have been consulted since able to offer an allegedly first hand
description of the Libyan events, whilst the UN, the Council of the EU and NATO's websites
displayed the institutions' official documents in their integral versions. ISTAT offered data and
statistics concerning the Italian trade with Libya.
Finally, Gaub's “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: reviewing operation Unified
Protector” provided an interesting assessment of the campaign in Libya, which was to a certain
degree put in relation to the political background of the crisis.
Structure of the paper
The paper starts with a description and justification of the theoretical framework adopted, followed
by a rapid review of the status of the relations between Italy and Libya at the moment when the
crisis was about to start. In order to properly asses the Italian reaction and its overall behaviour
appears indeed of the utter importance to understand which interests the Italian nation had to defend
in Libya, which economic and political capitals had accumulated there, and which perspectives it
had before the disrupting events unfolded. With regard to the Libyan crisis itself, it has been here
divided in two main parts, and further sub-divided according to narrower variations in the Italian
positioning following major events. The first main part is related to the Italian stance regarding the
possibility and degree of its own intervention in Libya, whilst the second part concerns more
specifically the Italian doubts over the effectiveness of the NATO-led campaign and over the NTC
cohesion. Their relative sub-phases highlight how the policies' transitions unfold. Finally, ending
the paper, the results of the research and the recommendations are drawn.
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1.1 Theories in international relations
Theories are lenses able to allow us to look at the real world from an angle that provides structure
and sense to an otherwise disordered multitude of things, individuals, groups, believes, institutions
and actions. At the same time, their purpose is not to overlap with reality itself, the only possible
way to obtain such a result being forcing a theory within the limits of a historical and contingent
series of facts, perverting therefore not only its abstract features, but its structure as well (it would
not be possible to refer to it as a theory any longer).
Intended as simplifications of the real world1, theories are useful and actually necessary as far as the
researcher fully acknowledges the limits of the chosen framework itself. Its compared advantages in
front of the other possible options have not to hide the unavoidable shortcomings that every single
theory involves. A theory can only be considered as more appropriate than other ones in portraying
and explaining a real situation or event, according to the objects set for a specific research, and not
in an absolute sense. The explanation of a theoretical choice should be intended, in that sense, also
as a justification of the same, namely as an explicit self-critique beneficial to the validity of the
epistemological and methodological bases of the research process.
More specifically, when considering the science of international relations, three are the groups of
schools that can be considered the most relevant in the field, as they effectively managed to impose
themselves within the academic communities and most of the scientific research follow their
theories patterns. Realism, with its derivations, stresses the importance of material capabilities and
competition; liberalism, with its subdivisions, emphasises the importance of institutions, norms and
cooperation; and constructivism, in its plurality of versions, underlines the variability of meanings
and the importance of social constructions and behaviours. The strength of the first two groups of
theories consists in their being allegedly universal, since they propose patterns of structure,
behaviour and predictability that would be valid at any time and place. Consequently, they would be
capable not only to provide explanations of past events, but to account for what is still to come.
Those models share the feature of attributing “motive and action to the states rather than to the
decision-makers within them”2, therefore placing the state at the core of the international relations'
1
2
Sutch P. and Elias J. International Relations, the Basics, New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 47.
Mowle, Thomas S. Political Psychology. Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External
10
life as well as conferring it an autonomy of behaviour detached from the concrete people acting on
its behalf. Systemic and situational factors would have a higher degree of cogency than domestic
patterns. The third group of schools proposes instead a different range of literature that actually
displays signs of mistrust towards the more generally applicable frameworks 3: constructivist
theories, with their insistence on the social construction of reality and meanings, are particularly
useful in accounting for the perceptions and ideas that explain psychological, social and cultural
behaviours of individuals and groups alike, and that concur to finally shape the form of international
actors and actions allowing place for changes in the rules of the international scenario.
For the purposes of the present paper, however, states are placed at the core of the international
system, and considered to be unitary actors having decision-making patterns intrinsically similar to
each other. Moreover, it is maintained that competitive, and not cooperative, patterns of behaviour
are the more likely to be found in the world of international relations, and that institutions and
norms have actually only a secondary importance compared to material capabilities. Therefore, the
factors to be taken into account for the research analyses are inserted within a theoretical framework
belonging to one of the schools of the first group depicted above. Its peculiar features are described
in greater detail in the next paragraph.
3
Conflict. Sep2003, Vol. 24 Issue 3, p 561.
Walt, S.M. International Relations: One World, Many Theories, Foreign Policy, 110 (Spring 1998), pp. 29–46.
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1.2 The theoretical framework: neorealism
The theoretical framework selected for the research draws its features from one of the main
derivations of what is considered to be, historically, the first school in international relations'
theories: realism. One of its modern version, neorealism, present very specific features that appear
to fit the purposes of the research, and they are here closely analysed.
It is assumed that the “international structure emerges from the interaction of states and then
constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others” 4. So that states
are considered to be the main agents and “primary political units” 5 of such a system, determining in
giving it the shape and rules it assumes, while at the same time subjected to the constraints imposed
by the system itself once the latter is in place. An approach focusing exclusively on the states'
patterns as determinants of the international system would be at odd with the constraints the global
system itself exerts on the actors performing in the regional arena considered for the purposes of the
research6. The deductive neorealist logic is consequently preferred to the inductive realist logic7: in
such a way, the apparent contradiction consisting in similar behaviours performed by pretended
different actors is considered solved8.
States, the basic units of the system, have an undifferentiated character, as they all appear to be
functionally alike, disregarding their respective domestic orders. Because of the continuous pressure
exerted by the system on the states and of the dangers posed to their security and survival, domestic
factors are maintained to be less relevant than the international constraints and therefore not to be
decisive in determining the states' international behaviour. States are considered to be rational units,
namely to follow decision-making patterns, operating decisions and acting or reacting according to
4
5
6
7
8
Waltz, K. “Realist thought and neorealist theory”, Journal of International Affairs; Vol. 44 Issue 1,
Spring/Summer90, p. 29.
Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, US, 1979, p. 91.
That is particularly evident as the state object of this study can by no means be deemed the major actor involved in
the Libyan issue, and therefore the fact that its possibilities of action are constrained by external factors result
particularly evident.
“For realists, the world addressed is one of interacting states. For neorealists, interacting states can be adequately
studied only by distinguishing between structural and unit level causes and effects. Realists think of causes running
in one direction, from interacting states to the outcomes their acts and interactions produce”, Kenneth Waltz,
“Realist thought and neorealist theory”, Journal of International Affairs; Vol. 44 Issue 1, Spring/Summer90, pp. 32,
33
“Over the centuries, the texture of international life has remained impressively, or depressingly, uniform even while
profund changes were taking place in the composition of states which, according to realists, account for national
behaviour and international outcomes. Realists cannot explain the disjunction between supposed causes and
observed effects. Neorealists can”; in other words, states tend to behave similarly provided their power capability is
similar. Kenneth Waltz, “Realist thought and neorealist theory”, Journal of International Affairs; Vol. 44 Issue 1,
Spring/Summer90, p. 34
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and respecting the constraint exerted by the systemic structure thoroughly considered and by the
single other actors individually taken into account in order to safeguard the very interest of the state.
Without considering and inquiring the multitudes of believes, institutions, and decision-makers that
are part of and contribute to the formation of a foreign policy within a state apparatus, as the state is
here considered as an overall unitary actor, for the aims of the research it is instead stressed that a
country does not always adopt a behaviour that maximises the results of the defence of its national
interest, as their agents may not be in possess of the sufficient amount of information required in
order to operate a rational choice, or may interpret a set of information according to incorrect
criteria. Indeed, if a country foreign policy resulted incapable of serving the national interest, that
would be despite, and by no means because, the inherent rationality of the actors involved in the
decision making.
Whilst undifferentiated in character, states differ in their order of capabilities9, which are evaluated
in terms of hard power, intended as "the combined capability of a state (knowing that) its
distribution across states, and changes in that distribution, help to define structures and changes in
them”10. Hard power is maintained to be mainly equal to military and economic capacities, whilst
soft power is considered as an emanation of the hard power, and necessarily ineffective in case it
should not be backed by the latter. What has to be particularly emphasised is that states are
concerned about their own relative power11, as the distribution of capabilities is defined in relative
and not in absolute terms, being the result of considerations concerning the whole international
structure and not the single entities as such. Power is in that sense always a relative, and never an
absolute, concept. Concerning the structure of the system, that is to be put in relation to the number
of centres of main power: one single hegemon power gives origin to a unipolar structure, two
hegemon powers to a bipolar structure, three or more hegemon powers to a multipolar structure.
Structures certainly affect the behaviour of states within the international system.
The ordering principle of the system is anarchy, as if we consider the global scenario of interacting
agents, we can with a high degree of certainty consider it not governed by any organism able to
include the units or to give the structure an overall order dictated from above or from a centre 12.
9
Kenneth Waltz, “The differences are of capability, not of function”, Theory of International Politics, AddisonWesley, US, 1979, p. 96.
10 Kenneth Waltz, “Realist thought and neorealist theory”, Journal of International Affairs; Vol. 44 Issue 1,
Spring/Summer90, p. 36.
11 According to Mearsheimer, states are “power maximisers”; Mearsheimer, J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
W. W. Norton & Company, US, 2001.
12 “International systems are decentralised and anarchic”, and whilst concerning hierarchical systems we can refer to
degrees of coordination, regarding anarchical system the term “interaction” should be preferred; Waltz, K. Theory
of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, US, 1979, p. 88
13
Instead, states act as self-helping units struggling on a horizontal level, knowing that, in the final
analysis, their survival is not guaranteed by other agents, but is instead the product of the
combination, on the one side, of the selfish considerations of the other states13 (which could deem
functional the destruction of such an entity), and on the other side of its own capacity of defending
and fostering its security14. In that respect anarchy, namely in this case the absence of a pre-defined
hierarchy, is not synonym of systemic disorder but simply means that all level units have similar
needs and answers to satisfy them, and that accordingly they are self-interested and tend to see
concepts as morality or justice in relation to the defence of their position within the system where
they struggle in order to, first of all15, survive16.
The ordering principle of the system and the distribution of capabilities among units constrain the
states within certain actions' patterns, according to their main goal and derivatives; for neorealist,
therefore, the security competition is caused by the ordering principle of the system, and not by the
human nature or by the domestic orders, deemed to be irrelevant in that respect. Units are expected
to enact similar behaviours being their capabilities and the threats they face similar. However,
within the neorealist tradition itself there are notable differences concerning the expected states
actions. According to defensive neorealist, “balancing (...) is the behaviour induced by the system,
(as) the first concern of states is not to maximise power but to maintain their positions in the
system”17: states check opponents who threaten to disrupt the balance of power in order to maintain
the status quo. Therefore, acquiring an excessive amount of power would be always negative in the
medium or long term. For the offensive neorealist, instead, acquiring a dominant power represents
the best means of ensuring the state's survival, and therefore great-powers offensive behaviour
would tend to be recurrent18. Consequently, status quo powers would virtually never be found,
unless in the unlikely presence of a unipolar structure, where the hegemon state would be satisfied
with maintaining its dominating position. However, it should be notice that similar considerations
13 That is the third assumption of Mearsheimer, regarding the organisation of the international system: states can
actually never be certain that other states does not have hostile intentions towards them, therefore opting for acting
as if states had hostile intentions towards them; Mearsheimer, J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton
& Company, US, 2001.
14 “Whatever those units live, prosper, or die depends on their own effort”, Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics,
Addison-Wesley, US, 1979, p. 91.
15 “Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and power”, Waltz, K.
Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, US, 1979, p. 126
16 “Political structures can be organized in two ways. They can be centralized and hierarchical (like domestic political
structures) or they can be decentralized and anarchical (which is clearly the case in international politics). The fact
of anarchy necessarily implies that the units that populate the system (in this case states) must be treated as
fundamentally similar”, Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, “International Relations, the Basics”, New York, Routledge,
2007, p. 51.
17 Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, US, 1979, p. 126.
18 Mearsheimer, J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, US, 2001.
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tend to concern mainly the major powers of a system, the potential hegemons, and that both
defensive and offensive neorealists agree in that states are sometimes forced to adopt more
defensive tactics whilst sometimes more offensive ones. With regard to those states unable to
acquire a superior degree of domination, bandwagoning, namely a state's alignment to the source of
a perceived threat, is a very recurrent strategy aiming at limiting the damages coming from a hostile
state or group of states19. In sum, given certain particular circumstances and taken into account the
distribution of capabilities in the system, states will be expected to show three main recurrent
behaviours: defensive ones, in order to balance a threat; aggressive ones, in order to acquire a
dominant position; and submissive ones, making no effort to confront the threat.
A final remark concern the international institutions and rules artificially created by the main units
of system themselves. International organisations are regarded to be functional to the states in the
pursuit of their respective self-interests, and to be able to bound those same states' actions only in
case the latter deem convenient not to contrast the organisations' prevailing line. A similar
supposition is made with regard to the international law: states obey to the international community
rules in case they consider that the costs implied in their breaching would outrun the benefits of
acting otherwise. Consequently, the infringement of the supra-national legal framework is not
considered negative or detrimental per se, neither for the transgressor state nor for the international
system balance. It is therefore not worth of considerations intrinsically related to the legal
assumptions of the disputes.
Now, the peculiarities of the Italian case and of its involvement the Libyan crisis can be put in
relation with the chosen theoretical framework.
19 Mearsheimer defines it as “strategy for the weak”, since it shifts the distribution of power against the bandwagoning
state which does not make the effort to contain the aggressor; Mearsheimer, J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
W. W. Norton & Company, US, 2001.
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1.3 Main vectors of Italian foreign policy from 1945 to the present and
their relations with the Libyan case
The adoption of a neorealist framework appears to satisfactorily match the study of both the
traditional conduct patterns of the Italian foreign policy as well as its approach to the more recent
Libyan crisis, as showed in the present paragraph.
Considering the foreign policy of the country object of the research, it results that from the end of
World War II Italy has been forced to band-wagon and align itself with the US, in what was a
bipolar world that actually left a fairly small space to Western European nations to act according to
independent policies (either unilateral or multilateral ones), even within their geographical
proximities. A notable exception was the project of a more united Western Europe, that would have
eventually led to the creation of the European Union in the nineteen-nineties, and that saw Italy
highly committed from its very first formulations. Pro-Atlantic as well as pro-European positions,
and a peculiar interests for the Mediterranean geopolitical area, came to characterise the Italian
stances in the sector of foreign policy during the second half of the twentieth century, along with a
very pragmatic approach that tends to be more visible when considering medium and small powers
rather than big ones, but actually distinctive of the latter as well.
The increased complexity in international relations that followed the collapse of the USSR did not
increase the weight of Italy within the European scene, and it chose “not to embark on power
politics (…); on the contrary, it has shown a certain level of continuity in its foreign relations since
the end of the Cold War”20. In a way, the decreased military danger from the East actually increased
the peril of a tougher competition among European states21, given that the necessity of balancing the
second pole of the global system had ceased to exist and therefore the US could have expectedly
withdrawn, at least partially, from the Old Continent22.
20 Pietro Pirani , “The Way We Were”: Continuity and Change in Italian Political Culture , 2008, p. 2,
http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/2008-joint-P3-Pirani1.pdf
21 “L‟indebolimento (...) della capacità di penetrazione del sistema globale e (...) di correzione degli squilibri
regionali, produce un effetto (...) di smascheramento: (…) la gerarchia di potere e prestigio all ‟interno delle
rispettive regioni ha già acquistato nuova importanza, col risultato di aumentare la sensibilità degli attori per i
vantaggi relativi a discapito di quella per i vantaggi assoluti”, (The weakening of the capacity of penetration of the
global system and of correction of the regional unbalances, produce an effect of exposure: the power and prestige
hierarchy within the respective regions has already acquired a new importance, with the result of augmenting the
actors' sensibility for the relative advantages at the expenses of the absolute advantages); Alessandro Colombo e
Ettore Greco, “L’Italia e la trasformazione dello scenario internazionale”, 04/2012, IAI, p. 10,
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1203.pdf
22 “The United States’ growing reluctance to carry the main burden of security provisions for its European allies and
NATO’s changed nature from a self-defence military organization to an institution devoted to crisis management
16
The prolonged crisis of the Balkans highlighted the limit of a Western Europe made of states with
different, when not contrasting, interests, and having a worrying deficit in the fields of security and
defence. The position of Italy appeared to be particularly delicate: located in the middle of the
Mediterranean Sea, few tens of nautical miles away from the countries once part of Yugoslavian
Republic, and few hundreds of miles from authoritarian North African states, many were the
dangers that could have heavily affected its security. In particular, many soft security threats,
ranging from illegal migration and organised criminality to traffics of arms and human beings. And
although the Italian foreign policy principles had not changed with the end of the Cold War, with
some authors even maintaining they had always been preserved constant since the formation of the
Kingdom of Italy23, during the nineteen-nineties its actions' options were at least as constraint as
they used to be before 1989. However, on the other side, the US “reluctance to carry the main
burden of security provisions for its European allies, and NATO’s changed nature from a selfdefence military organization to an institution devoted to crisis management, forced Italy to assume
the major responsibility in conflict management”24, which was acknowledged by the international
community and the European partners25. Nonetheless, albeit its status switched from a security-taker
to a security provider, its role within NATO remained limited, and it did not undertake the changes
required in order to reform and enhance the performances of its defence diplomatic sectors 26, even if
23
24
25
26
forced Italy to assume the major responsibility in conflict management”, (Pietro Pirani , “The Way We Were”:
Continuity and Change in Italian Political Culture , 2008, p. 5,
http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/2008-joint-P3-Pirani1.pdf), as “la regionalizzazione della
sicurezza ha già comportato un aumento delle responsabilità politiche, economiche e militari nelle aree di interesse
primario (Balcani e sponda sud del Mediterraneo in testa)”, (the regionalisation of security has already caused an
increase of the political economic and military responsibilities in the areas of primary interests (first of all, Balcans
and Southern shore of the Mediterranean see); Alessandro Colombo e Ettore Greco, “L’Italia e la trasformazione
dello scenario internazionale”, 04/2012, IAI, p. 9, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1203.pdf
Which took place in the year 1861 and represented the first united Italian state and therefore the beginning of a
political Italy strictu sensu; Ratti, Luca. “All Aboard the Bandwagon? Structural Realism and Italy's International
Role.” Diplomacy & Statecraft. Mar2012, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p. 87-109
Pietro Pirani , “The Way We Were”: Continuity and Change in Italian Political Culture , 2008, p. 5,
In fact, it has been argued that the main fears of the Italian foreign policy are “il timore (...) di perdere posizioni e la
ricerca spasmodica di riconoscimento, sia che questa avvenga attraverso la partecipazione alle missioni
internazionali, o l'attribuzione di cariche di primo piano negli organismi internazionali (...) o (...) attraverso la
ricerca di approvazione da parte dei propri maggiori partner europei o transatlantici”, “The fear of loosing position
and the spasmodic search for , either from participation in the international missions, from the attribution of
important positions in the international organs, or through the search of from its major European and Transatlantic
parteners”, Alessandro Colombo e Ettore Greco, “L’Italia e la trasformazione dello scenario internazionale”,
04/2012, IAI, p. 8, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1203.pdf
The Italian trends indicate actually the opposite, even with specific regard to the time of the Libyan crisis.
Concerning the “percentage of state budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (it) has come down from 0.27
percent in 2009 to 0.26 percent in 2010, plumbing the lowest levels in the last fifteen years; (and) despite the fact
that the existing allocations for foreign affairs in Italy are already below those of its major European allies”, whilst,
regarding instead the Defence, “in terms of percentage of GDP the Italian allocation is less than one percent, lower
hence than the European average (about 1.4%), and lower than the 2% that Italy had committed to giving at the
17
it was manifest already at that time that decided reforms alone would have boasted Italian
reputation and effectiveness in the field of defence and foreign policy27.
With the years 2000s and the Berlusconi's governments 28, the executives' rhetoric concerning the
Italian foreign policy suffered a shift that apparently contested the traditionally strong pro-European
stance of the country in favour of a more marked pro-Atlantic position 29. Nonetheless, despite some
marginal changes30, it can be maintained that variations in the government public discourse did not
brought an actual change in the overall country's foreign policy, especially when confronting
Berlusconi's governments' foreign action with the second Government led by Prodi, leader of a leftwing coalition from May 2006 until May 2008. In that respect, the fourth and last right-wing
Berlusconi's Government in charge from May 2008 to November 2011, which covered the whole
length of the crisis here considered, did not display any particular foreign policy innovation
neither31. That had been very visible considering the Libyan case as well; in fact, a not very well
hidden pragmatism remained, and remains, peculiar of the Italian foreign policy orientations and
style.
Indeed, along the crisis Italy has showed to instrumentally call for the respect of the international
law, as well as interpreting it and forcing improbable meanings according to its changeable needs,
whilst being ready to disregard it if necessary to the needs of its national interest: from the Security
Council Resolution 1973 and its limits, to the non-interference principle, these are two examples
27
28
29
30
31
NATO”, Gianni Bonvicini, Andrea Carati, Alessandro, Colombo, Raffaello Matarazzo and Stefano Silvestri,
“Italian Foreign Policy in 2010: Continuity, Reform and Challenges 150 Years After National Unity”, IAI, May
2011, p. 9, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1106e.pdf
“Memories of the failed attempt to bypass the French and British veto against the Italian participation to the Contact
Group in September 1995, and the mild support received by its NATO allies during the Albanian crisis in 1997,
instilled in the Italian political elite the fear that Italy’s interests in NATO, such as the Southern Flank, the European
role in NATO, and Russia’s future role in the Euro-Atlantic security system, would never have been addressed if
Italy had not raised its profile in the alliance”, Pietro Pirani , “The Way We Were”: Continuity and Change in Italian
Political Culture , 2008, p. 7, http://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/2008-joint-P3-Pirani1.pdf
With the exclusion of the first Berlusconi's Government, in charge from May 1994 to January 1995, all of the other
Governments he led were in power during the new millennium. Specifically: his second Government, from June
2001 to April 2005, his third one, from April 2005 to May 2006, and his fourth and last one, from May 2008 to
November 2011.
See Morisi, Paolo. “The Second Berlusconi government, the parties and the president: a new European policy?”,
Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans. Dec2006, Vol. 8 Issue 3, p327-341; and Missiroli, Antonio. “Italy's
security and defence policy: between EU and US, or just Prodi and Berlusconi?”. Journal of Southern Europe & the
Balkans. Aug2007, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p149-168.
See Brighi, Elisabetta. “Europe, the USA and the 'policy of the pendulum': the importance of foreign policy
paradigms in the foreign policy of Italy(1989-2005)”, Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans. Aug2007, Vol. 9
Issue 2, p99-115; CARBONE, MAURIZIO; CORALLUZZO, VALTER. “The Politics of Italy's Foreign Policy in
the Mediterranean.” Mediterranean Politics. Nov2009, Vol. 14 Issue 3, p429-435; and Marzano, Arturo. “Italian
Foreign Policy Towards Israel: The Turning Point of the Berlusconi Government (2001-2006)”. Israel Studies.
Spring2011, Vol. 16 Issue 1, p79-103
Osvaldo Croci, Marco Valigi, “Continuity and change in Italian foreign policy: the case of the international
intervention in Libya”, Contemporary Italian Politics, Volume 5, Issue 1, 2013, p. 38-54
18
among the many available. Similarly, its recurrent appeals for multilateral action and for the
involvement of inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations and the African Union,
to only mention two of the most remarkable names among others, were functional in pursuing its
own goals, and not rooted in particular idealistic believes in world-governance, or similar. However,
the defence of its national interests had to face major constraints deriving from a relative weak
position in terms of military power: albeit economically and financially dominant in its penetration
of Libya, major disruptions in the country would not have allowed Italy a full space for
maneuvering as it had deemed more convenient. Systemic constraints proved stronger than its
ability to implement its own original intentions and, in fact, it had to repeatedly accept and follow
other powers' decisions being unable to confront them, bandwagoning several times in the course of
the crisis.
Considering the possible domestic constraints the Italian executive could have had to face
concerning the Libya issue, they were actually fairly limited, and never sensibly altered its foreign
action. Two were the main eventual limitations to the implementation of the Government diplomatic
and political line. The first obstacle was to be found within its own ranks, since the position of one
member of the Government coalition, the Northern League, on migration issues and foreign
interventions sensibly differed from those of the People of Freedom, the Prime Minister's and
strongest party. But eventually the Northern League, albeit initial signs of disapproval, constantly
followed the main Government party line without hampering or substantially affecting it. The
second potential threat to the governmental action concerned a possible opposition of the
Parliament towards the executive decisions, especially since according to the Italian Constitution
“the Chambers declare the state of war and confer to the Government the necessary powers” 32. But
actually, since the participation to the military action against Libya had to be “carried out within the
limits imposed by the resolution 1973, it can not be technically be defined as a war, (…) which is
characterised by a macroscopic use of the armed force”33. Therefore, it would have been incorrect to
refer to the Art. 78 of the Constitution in order to limit the executive action, and although the
Parliament was required to allow the Government to apply the UN Resolution 1973 in Libya, a
bipartisan convergence of the two opposite political poles took actually place. Even when the
Government decided to participate in the coalition air strikes, it was acting within the limits of the
32 “Le Camere deliberano lo stato di guerra e conferiscono al Governo i poteri necessari”; Italian Constitution, Art. 78,
https://www.senato.it/1025?sezione=127&articolo_numero_articolo=78
33 “Svolgere nei limiti imposti dalla risoluzione 1973, non può neppure essere tecnicamente definita come guerra, (…)
caratterizzata da un uso macroscopico della forza armata”; Il conflitto in Libia e il ruolo del parlamento, Natalino
Ronzitti, Affari internazionali, 02/05/2011, http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1745
19
UN Resolution and consequently no further approval of the Parliament was required.
Regarding the comparatively low attention given to the topic of the illegal immigration in the
course of the paper, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs himself affirmed that “we have very few
Libyan clandestine immigrants”34, and the Italian stances on the issue had often appeared to be
functional to unfold their effects on the country's domestic politics, without actually being meant to
have a major role in the conduct of its foreign policy regarding the Libyan affair 35. Moreover, the
issue had more to deal with the Tunisian revolution than with the Libyan unrest, and was however a
soft-security concern. Finally, in any case, the negative consequences of illegal migration from the
Libyan country would have been dwarfed by the economic considerations that the lost of the
partnership with the Gaddafi's Government would have implied36, relying de facto the migration
issue to a secondary role. Similar considerations lead to affirm that the domestic institutional and
political life of the country could not exercise a major influence on the Government freedom of
action in establishing and implementing its foreign policy.
Having justified the research theoretical assumptions, and having reached the conclusion that a
neorealist framework can adequately provide the bases for this study, the paper now proceeds into
the consideration of the merits of the Italian position and interests immediately before and during
the Libyan crisis.
34 “Di clandestini libici ne abbiamo pochi”; the declaration was issued at the time when the Libyan ruler had already
been killed and the end of the NATO mission about to finish; Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
21/10/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/10/20111021_libia_impedire_vendette.html
35 See, for instance, the agreement between Italy and France concerning the latter support for a proposed reform of
Schengen.
36 Lombardi, The Berlusconi Government and Intervention in Libya, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of
International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011, pp. 31-44
20
2. ANALYSIS OF THE PRE-CRISIS RELATIONS
BETWEEN ITALY AND LIBYA
2.1 Contextualisation of the upheaval
The Libyan crisis erupted at the beginning of the year 2011 and was gravid of important
consequences for both the people of Libya and those many regional and global powers which, in
fact, immediately perceived that such a disruption in the domestic order of the African country
could have had affected their interests, either in a potentially positive or negative way.
The events unfolded at a time when also the two neighbouring states, Tunisia and Egypt, were
undergoing dramatic changes. The so-called Arab Spring hit Libya almost at its very beginning,
coming as a surprise for many of the world governments and experts along. In fact, “just like all of
its European and American partners37, to Italy as well the epidemic of revolts that overwhelmed first
Tunisia and Egypt, to spread afterwards to Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrein, and in a less strong
degree, to other Arab countries, came as a total surprise” 38. However, in the case of Libya the
governmental repression of the popular protests was not stopped by domestic dynamics coupled
with international pressures, as it had occurred in the two neighbouring states 39. If considering some
of the countries involved in the Arab Spring it is possible to a certain extent to talk of a popular
revolution, in the Libyan case (as well as in the Syrian case) it would be more appropriate to refer to
a civil war, since an overall ordered transition of power at the highest state's levels did not take
place, either following lawful or unlawful procedures. Instead, a strong contraposition between
armed forces loyal to the legitimate government and rebel forces disputing its authority quickly
37 “There was little intelligence preparation of the area of conflict. (...) The U.S. Intelligence Community hadn’t
viewed Libya as a potential adversary for years”; John A. Tirpak, “Lessons From Libya,” Air Force Magazine,
December 2011, p. 36.
38 “Come tutti i suoi partner europei e americani, anche l'Italia è stata colta completamente di sorpresa dall'epidemia
di rivolte che ha travolto dapprima Tunisia ed Egitto, per propagarsi subito dopo alla Libia, alla Siria, allo Yemen, al
Bahrein e, in misura minore, ad altri paesi arabi”, Gianni Bonvicini, Andrea Carati, Alessandro, Colombo, Raffaello
Matarazzo and Stefano Silvestri, “Italian Foreign Policy in 2010: Continuity, Reform and Challenges 150 Years
After National Unity”, IAI, May 2011, p. 9, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1106e.pdf
39 “La situazione Libica e quella egiziana e tunisina) non c'entrano assolutamente nulla tra loro. Forse c'è stato un
effetto d'imitazione, ma nulla di più. Probabilmente è stata più una proiezione nostra”, (“The Libyan situation and
the Egyptian and Tunisian ones) do not have anything to do among them. Perhaps there has been an imitation
effect, but nothing more. Probably, it was our projection”); Intervista a Lucio Caracciolo (Limes): «La guerra in
Libia? Un caso riuscito di disinformazione» -, MarxXI,28/04/2011;
http://www.marx21.it/component/content/article/42-articoli-archivio/21104-intervista-a-lucio-caracciolo-limes-laguerra-in-libia-un-caso-riuscito-di-disinformazione.html
21
developed and escalated40. Consequently, almost from the very beginning of the crisis, the
international actors concerned had to face a situation of important instability, especially as the
rebels managed to quickly take control of the main city of the East of the country, Benghazi, and to
receive the support of a consistent part of the regular army, which defected.
The country with the highest economic interests among the international actors involved, and the
one with more to lose from the considered events, was Italy. Having evaluated the situation leading
to the earthquake of the Arab Springs as bad as the other major international and regional actors 41,
the geographically closest European country to Libya had to deal with unexpected fast-developing
events at short notice and without being able to actually predict with certainty the consequences of
any of its moves, as the volatility of the events did not allow rational calculations to provide
definitive answers. In fact, the defence of the Italian national interests in a country considered as a
faithful and stable partner had suddenly to face unpredicted and, to a certain extent 42, unforeseeable
events questioning the bases of the Italian foreign policy towards Libya. The regime stability had,
until the year 2011, provided predictability to the moves of the Libyan leadership, and Italy had
shown to treat the Libyan state as a rational actor. Moreover, the tight control Col. Gaddafi had over
the country economic and financial institutions, as well as over the political life 43, have suggested
that once the Libyan government had deemed profitable an intense collaboration with its Italian
counterpart, it would have been fairly simple managing the partnership. As far as it had proved to be
mutually beneficial, it was argued, Libyan institutions would have ensured the conditions necessary
in order to meet their commitments with Italy.
The popular uprising in the beginning of 2011 and its aftermath heavily contested similar
assumptions. Several decades of Col. Gaddafi rule over his people might have actually hidden to the
eyes of the Italian diplomacy the inherent instability to be found in autocratic regimes 44. The lack of
democratic institutions and of a representative system have been compensated by a very strongly
centralised state able to gain strength in front of the different peoples of Libya in order to establish a
40 Libya Civil War Fast Facts, CNN, 16/04/2014, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/libya-civil-war-fast-facts/
41 “Italian Foreign Policy in 2010: Continuity, Reform and Challenges 150 Years After National Unity”, Gianni
Bonvicini, Andrea Carati, Alessandro, Colombo, Raffaello Matarazzo and Stefano Silvestri, IAI, May 2011, p. 9,
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1106e.pdf
42 Marco Thomas Picardi, “What's at Stake for Italy in Libya”, Heartland , 03/03/2011, http://temi.repubblica.it/limesheartland/whats-at-stake-for-italy-in-libya/1697
43 Breve e terribile storia della Jamahiriya di Marcella Emiliani, Le rivoluzioni a metà,Rivista n. 52 - April 2011,
Aspenia, p. 110-117.
44 Libya could be considered to belong to a category of “regimes whose strategy is focused foremost on their own
regime/systemic security, and whose geopolitical codes are defined by reference to such an understanding,
sometimes blended with wider counter hegemonic visions and populism. ”; James D Sidaway,, “Subaltern
geopolitics: Libya in the mirror of Europe”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 178, No. 4, December 2012, p 296-297.
22
non-liberal order45. Nonetheless, it did not help in creating a solid institutional framework able to
endure violent changes of the political leadership, which would have put the bases of an almost
certainly chaotic transition in such an eventuality. Indeed, that is how events unfolded, as “Libya
emerged from its revolution in the fall of 2011 with no capable State institutions to speak of. Most
notable of all, Police and Army were largely absent”46.
Concerning the relations between the two countries, at the time when the dramatic events began to
unfold the official representatives of the Libyan states appeared to have been the only interlocutors
of the Italian diplomacy, exposing the latter to the peril of been partially or entirely entirely cut off
from communication's channels in the case of a domestic transition of power other than a
succession overseen by the leader of Libya himself 47. That was due to a multiplicity of factors
related to the peculiarities of Libya: the lack of an organised civil society and of a private business
sector with their own representative and institutions; the direct or indirect state control of the major
local companies dealing with the Italian firms; and, finally, the willingness of the regime of
positioning itself as the sole valid and recognisable interlocutor of foreign actors, being they public
or private.
Indeed, that was true considering the economic relations with Italy as well, on which the Libyan
state had a total supervision and control through its public and nominally private agents and
institutions. For the purpose of the analysis, it is relevant having now a close look to those two
countries' very specific trading and financial ties, in order to understand how they mattered to Italy.
45 L’eccezione libica, Michela Mercuri, Affari Internazionali, 20/04/2011,
http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1734
46 Jean-Louis Romanet, “Libya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards”, Heartland, 30/09/2014,
http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartland/libya-one-step-forward-two-steps-backwards/2040
47 On similar limits and possible solutions of the US diplomacy concerning the action towards non-democratic
countries, see, for instance, Italian Embassy in Washington DC, “Foreign Policy in Stereo | Digital Diplomacy
Series at the Italian Embassy”, Youtube, 05/02/2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E2c3RoRw0I4
23
2.2 Economics interests of Italy in and with Libya
Many were the economic and financial ties linking Italy to its Mediterranean neighbour in the wake
of the crisis, and important the perspectives the two countries had regarding their partnership
evolution before the disrupting events unfolded. That was the case as, in the years preceding the
crisis, political relations among the two states had been growing stronger in relevance 48, with Italy
even assuming a pivotal role in re-conducing Libya within the international community of states
during the years 2000s49.
The first reason of the importance Italy gave to the partnership with Libyan was certainly the latter
abundance of natural resources, especially of oil. Its crude high quality, low recovery costs, and
extent of reserves (estimated in 44 million barrels), as well as Libya's geographical proximity to the
European market50, made of Libya a privileged ENI's partner. Such a company, an energy
multinational and Italy's largest industrial company with a 30% golden share belonging to the
Government, was in fact “the main foreign energy operator in the country, that on its turn represents
the main source of production of hydrocarbons for the Italian giant”51, and of oil supply to Italy
(27% of the country's total consumption), as well as the third supplier of natural gas (12,5% of the
country's total consumption) again to Italy.
Beside the trade in oil and gas, Libya positioned itself as the fifth supplier country of Italy, with the
4,5% of the total Italian import, whilst Italy represented the first exporter to Libya, covering the
17,5% of the overall Libyan import; moreover, Italy was the third investor among the European
countries and the fifth in the world (without considering the oil market), as indicated by the stable
48 With the 2008 “Treaty of friendship, partnership and cooperation between Italy and Libya” as climax; see The
Treaty of friendship, partnership and cooperation between Italy and Libya: new prospects for cooperation in the
Mediterranean?, Natalino Ronzitti, IAI, 2009, http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/IAI0909.pdf; A. Varvelli, Il Trattato
Italia-Libia e il nuovo contesto economico libico, ISPI Med, Brief no. 8, Milan, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica
Internazionale, 23/09/2008, http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/Med_Brief_8_2008.pdf; and Kashiem, Mustafa
Abdalla A., The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Libya and Italy: From an Awkward
Past to a Promising Equal Partnership, California Italian Studies, 2010. See annexes n° 1 and 2.
49 See, for instance, Carbone, M; Coraluzzo, V. “Italy's Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean.”, Mediterranean
Politics. Nov2009, Vol. 14 Issue 3, p429-435
50 La crisi libica e il legame energetico con l’Italia, Nicolò Sartori, Affari internazionali, 25/02/2011,
51 “Il principale operatore energetico straniero nel paese, che a sua volta rappresenta la principale fonte di produzione
di idrocarburi per il gigante italiano”. Moreover, “Il 14% (244.000 milioni di barili equivalenti) della produzione
totale di petrolio e gas di Eni viene estratto in Libia, (…) e a conferma dell’interesse nel mercato libico nel 2008
Eni ha siglato accordi di esplorazione e produzione di durata più che ventennale, per un valore di 28 miliardi di
euro” (the 14% (244.000 million barrels) of the ENI's total production of oil and gas is extracted in Libya (…) and
to confirm its interest in the Libyan market in 2008 ENI has signed treaties of exploration and production with a 20
years length, for a value of 28 billion Euros ); La crisi libica e il legame energetico con l’Italia, Nicolò Sartori,
Affari internazionali, 25/02/2011, http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1677
24
presence of more than one hundred Italian companies on the Libyan soil52. Particularly importance
had, in that respect, the projects and investments of Bonatti, Garboli-Conicos, Maltauro 53, Anas,
Progetti Europa & Global, Talsocotec54, Impregilo and Gruppo Trevi in the sector of infrastructures;
of Agusta-Westland, Alenia Aermacchi, Mbda Italia, and Finmeccanica in the sector of armaments;
and of Telecom, Alitalia, Edison, Grimaldi and Visa businesses55.
Considering the financial significance that the relationship with Libya had for Italy, shares worth
billion of Euros were held either by the Central Bank of Libya or by the Libyan Investment
Authority in some of the main Italian companies quoted on the stock exchanges. FIAT,
Finmeccanica, ENI e Unicredit, Olcese, Juventus, Triestina56 provide some remarkable examples in
that sense.
As seen, therefore, both the commercial and financial relations among the two countries had a very
strong relevance for the Italian interest, with the oil business reaching a strategic prominence among
the other deals that the the two countries, and their respective companies, entertained.
52 Libia: Impregilo, Finmeccanica, Eni e non solo. Tutti gli interessi in gioco, Il Fatto, 20/03/2011,
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2011/03/20/libia-impregilo-finmeccanica-eni-e-non-solo-tutti-gli-interessi-ingioco/98970/. See annexes n° 1 and 2.
53 Ecco tutti gli interessi dell'Italia in Libia, Il Giornale, 22/08/2011, http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/ecco-tutti-interessidellitalia-libia.html
54 Libia: Impregilo, Finmeccanica, Eni e non solo. Tutti gli interessi in gioco, Il Fatto, 20/03/2011,
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2011/03/20/libia-impregilo-finmeccanica-eni-e-non-solo-tutti-gli-interessi-ingioco/98970/
55 Petrolio, armamenti, appalti. Il dossier sugli interessi italiani, Il corriere, 26/02/2011,
http://www.corriere.it/esteri/11_febbraio_26/petrolio-armamenti-appalti-il-dossier-sugli-interessi-italiani-fiorenzasarzanini_290dfbc2-417e-11e0-b406-2da238c0fa39.shtml
56 Petrolio, armamenti, appalti. Il dossier sugli interessi italiani, Il corriere, 26/02/2011,
http://www.corriere.it/esteri/11_febbraio_26/petrolio-armamenti-appalti-il-dossier-sugli-interessi-italiani-fiorenzasarzanini_290dfbc2-417e-11e0-b406-2da238c0fa39.shtml
25
2.3 General dangers of the disruption
Many were the initial dangers posed by the sudden disrupting Libyan events to the Italian economic
and financial interests, and the set of alternatives offered to the Government in Rome did not
actually envisage positive scenarios.
Being political channels alternative to the official ones provided by the Gaddafi establishment
unavailable, the Italian diplomacy had to face the double peril of losing the interlocutor to which it
had dedicated so much time and efforts (both politically and economically), whilst having to find
the new de facto counterparts and then establish very new links and forms of political entente. As if
such a task had not been hard enough, in the eventuality of a civil conflict the Italian diplomacy
would have had to deal, at the same time, with the burden of being identified as an ally of the
previous regime establishment by the new potential formal or de facto authorities. The negative
consequences steaming from a similar dissonance could have ranged from covered mistrust to open
opposition. Especially since the Italian Prime Minister personal diplomacy style57 had tended, over
time, to present partner countries' leaders as personal friends 58, in violation of more sober rules of
traditional diplomacy. If a similar strategy, when dealing with leaders of democratic countries, could
perilously radicalise domestic oppositions while at the same time produce diplomatic anomalies and
blur the differences between official role and private behaviour, at a time when dictators are the
object of particularly careful attentions the consequences could actually be much worse. Not only
domestic and international public opinions could contest the form of similar approaches to leaders
with doubtful records in respect of human rights or loyalty to democratic institutions: the people
under the rule of an autocrat, and the alternative leadership that might come next, would certainly
notice such an unusual posture, and might accuse its counterpart of complicity with a leadership
perceived as traitor59. That is not to say that the “enmeshed state of the Italian and Libyan
economies also highlights the political and economic risks attached to excessively strong links with
autocratic governments”60, since very strong links can be necessary given certain geopolitical and
economic reasons, and in many parts of the world autocratic rulers and states prove to be perfectly
57 Giacomello, Giampiero; Ferrari, Federica; Amadori, Alessandro. “With friends like these: foreign policy as personal
relationship ”, Contemporary Politics. Jun2009, Vol. 15 Issue 2, p247-264.
58 Dal baciamano all'elmetto Italia guidata da avventurieri, p. 10, 21 March 2011,
http://cerca.unita.it/ARCHIVE/xml/2015000/2013068.xml?key=libia+2011&first=171&orderby=1&dbt=arc
59 See, for instance, Marco Thomas Picardi, W”hat's at Stake for Italy in Libya”, Heartland , 03/03/2011,
http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartland/whats-at-stake-for-italy-in-libya/1697
60 Marco Thomas Picardi, W”hat's at Stake for Italy in Libya”, Heartland , 03/03/2011, http://temi.repubblica.it/limesheartland/whats-at-stake-for-italy-in-libya/1697
26
reliable partners61. Simply, on the contrary, it could be suggested that “prudence (…) is the expected
diplomatic protocol when dealing with such (undemocratic) regimes”62: not because of the
difference in the form of state or government between the two dealing countries, but since a more
radical opposition is likely to be found in those autocratic regimes.
Moreover, almost paradoxically, the situation delineated above, which presupposed two antithetical
entities struggling for the control of the institutions of a state and the monopoly of the use of the
legitimate force, can be identified as a second best for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Practically, old and new interlocutors could have overlapped within the same span of time, making
it incredibly difficult for the Italian Government to privately communicate with both of them while
publicly giving credits and granting recognitions, either formally or de facto ones. An additional
level of complexity can be added, as not necessarily all of the oppositions to an adversed regime
aggregate around a same focal point. In such an eventuality, an international actor could be required
to choose not only if keep granting recognition to the legitimate government or siding the
opposition: selecting a specific party within the whole of the opposition may become an
unavoidable must. In fact, “ unity in dissent against a common enemy hardly ever translates in unity
of consent to new governance arrangements (and) the risk of division and violence is all the more
serious the less there are institutions to structure interaction and sanction violators”63. For the
purpose of the present analysis, however, the opposition to the Gaddafi regime is considered as a
unitary actor, also because within the period of time object of the paper its internal contrast had not
yet exploded and fully highlighted its heterogeneous, and sometimes irreconcilable, features.
Given its exposure in Libya, Italy was the state that most was required to assume a precise political
line in order to limit the damages deriving from the upsetting developments and all of their
inauspicious consequences. The necessity of operating urgent choices could have been hardly
avoided in a similar eventuality, as the costs of a prolonged neutrality would have certainly outrun
the ones inherent in siding with one or the other (or others) party (or parties): a faltering action
would have resulted in important short and long term damages for the Italian national interest. That
does not necessarily implies that Italy should have taken a particularly strong stance and sided one
party or the other from the beginning of the crisis, neither that it should have renounced to that kind
61 Or at least not less reliable than pretended democratic ones. For instance, the Gulf monarchies have proved to be
valid and reliable allies for the US, at least for three whole decades up to now. In a different measure, Italy itself has
entertained very friendly and economically advantageous relations with Algeria since the year of its independence,
and this can be an indicative case as Algeria its a very important partner for Italy in the energy domain.
63 Jean-Louis Romanet, “Libya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards”, Heartland, 30/09/2014,
27
of pragmatic behaviour so much characteristic of most of its 150 years old foreign policy 64, and
particularly suitable to its positioning within the international system. What is being argued here is
that a clear analysis of the event should have suggested Italy which position to assume and which
directions to follow, showing the necessary ability to adapt to the recently changed conditions in
Libya without forgetting its relative weight within the international scene.
Having delineated the Italian economic and financial interest related to Libya, and highlighted its
reasons of concern regarding the country's domestic disruptions, the focus is now turned to the
specific moves that Italy undertook along the crisis, and to the early signs of uncertainty that the
Italian foreign policy strategy revealed.
64 Which represents the first united Italian state and therefore the beginning of a political Italy strictu sensu; Ratti,
Luca. “All Aboard the Bandwagon? Structural Realism and Italy's International Role.” Diplomacy & Statecraft.
Mar2012, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p. 87-109
28
3. THE FIRST PART OF THE CRISIS: COMMITMENT TO
A REGIME CHANGE
3.1 Sub-phase n° 1: the initial cautious reaction
The first week of the Libyan crisis presents peculiarities that are worth a close and specific
attention, as it represents the span of time within which a first and provisional Italian political line
emerged.
Few days after the beginning of the protests in Benghazi on February 16, and of the violent
governmental repression started two days later, the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi kept the
lowest possible profile on the issue stating that "the situation is evolving, therefore I don't dare
bothering anybody"65, clearly referring to the Libyan leader Gaddafi. When the first rebel city had
already been taken by the insurgent forces, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Frattini declared
to be “worried for the hypothesis of divisions between Tripoli and Cyrenaica as well as for the
consequences that the on-going crises could have on the migratory flux in the Mediterranean Sea
and for the hypothesis of Islamic Emirates in the East of Libya”, adding that Europe should have
not interfered in the domestic affairs of the Libyan state 66. Certainly, the possibility of a
radicalisation of the protests in other Libyan cities and a hypothetical major disruption within the
internal stability of the country (a partition of the same in two or three separate autonomous regions
representing the extreme case) would have strongly damaged the several Italian economic interests
in Libya, and a wave of illegal migration steaming from the Libyan shores to the close Italian
islands would have burdened Italy with part of the humanitarian problem arising from such a
conflict. A hint was also given to the spaces that radical Islam could have gained from a generalised
chaos, further destabilising the regional security scenario and hampering the unity of Libya 67.
65 "La situazione è in evoluzione e quindi non mi permetto di disturbare nessuno"; Libia, la repressione fa più di 100
morti-Berlusconi: "Non disturbo Gheddafi", La Repubblica, 19/02/2011
http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2011/02/19/news/libia_hrw-12640156/
66 “Preoccupato per le ipotesi di divisioni tra Tripoli e Cirenaica nonché per le conseguenze che le crisi in atto
possono avere sui flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo (…) e per ipotesi di emirati islamici nell'est della Libia”; Nord
Africa: Frattini, no a imposizione di modelli da parte dell’Europa, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
21/02/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/02/20110221_frattini_nordafrica.htm
l
67 “In Libia, in Cirenaica, come è noto, ci sono le tribù: noi non abbiamo idea di chi siano quelli delle tribù. (…) Lì ci
sono componenti di Al Qaeda”, “In Lybia, in Cyrenaica, as it is known, there are tribes: we do not know whom
those tribes are (...). There are Al Qaeda components among them. ”; Interviste, Archivio comunicati e notizie,
Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 23/02/2011,
29
Assessing similar threats, a measured degree of caution was showed by the Italian Government in
this very first stage of the crisis68, as the Libyan establishment appeared to still hold the monopoly
of legitimate power in the almost totality of the national territory, albeit the armed opposition had
managed to take control of the second city of the country 69. Nonetheless, it does not seem that
“during the first week since the beginning of the Libyan crisis, the Italian government has
confirmed a foreign policy line based on very limited interests”70. On the one hand, it could have
hardly been argued, already at that time, that it was in the medium or long term Italian interest
supporting a democratic change in the Libyan political regime, especially one deriving from a
sudden and disordered insurrectionary outbreak, the components of which where actually unclear to
the Italian diplomacy71. On the other hand, the international pressure that had started to mount on
the possibility of condemning the regime repression was based on uncertain information, that was
hardly verifiable72. Furthermore, the times of diplomacy are usually rather slow, and in its first
moments the Italian reaction to the Libyan conflict was consistent with the one of the majority of
states of the international community, albeit not with the French and the British ones73.
Beside the condemnation of the violence from the part of both the Italian Foreign Minister and
Prime Minister74, a call on Gaddafi to step down from power was made, although no precise
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/02/20110223_il_dopo_gheddafi_e_un_incog
nita.html
That was the same stance that countries as Czech Republic, Cyprus and Malta took, in contrast to the positions of
France and England; Giordano Merlicco, Stephanie Locatelli, Emiliano Alessandri , Osservatorio transatlantico
[n.s.6] : le relazioni transatlantiche : gennaio-marzo 2011 / a cura di Istituto affari internazionali. - Roma : Istituto
affari internazionali, 2011., p. 6-7, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/pi_f_0006.pdf
See annexe n° 3.
“Nel corso della prima settimana dall’inizio della crisi libica, il governo italiano ha confermato la linea di politica
estera preesistente fondata su interessi molto ristretti”; L’Italia tra allarmismo e realpolitik, Emanuela Paoletti,
Affari internazionali, 04/03/2011, http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1681
“Il problema della Libia è che a parte Gheddafi non conosciamo niente altro. Nessun altro politico, partito. E adesso
ci è impossibile immaginare un futuro, dopo di lui. La natura enigmatica di questo Paese ci impedisce di fare
ragionamenti analoghi a tutti gli altri del Maghreb pure sconvolti dalle rivolte. Lo impedisce a noi, ma anche a tutti
gli altri Paesi fratelli” (“The problem of Libya is that, Gaddafi aside, we do not know anything else. No other
politician, party. And now It is impossible for us imagining a future after him. The enigmatic nature of this Country
does not allow us to reason similarly to how we do concerning the other Countries of the Maghreb who are upset by
the revolts as well. That block us, as well as all of the other Brother countries”); Archivio comunicati e notizie,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/02/20110223_il_dopo_gheddafi_e_un_incog
nita.html
Serious doubts have been cast over the veracity of the news reported from Libya along the conflict, and especially
in its initial days, by the Qatari broadcaster Al Jazeera, that could have possibly obeyed to the Emir's political
needs. Allegedly, similar manipulations would have led to the “collapse of the information” related to the Libyan
events. See, for instance, Lucio Caracciolo, Il collasso dell'informazione, Limes, 13/04/2011
http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/il-collasso-dellinformazione/22590; or Daniele Raineri “Libia: la guerra di Al
Jazeera”, Media 2.0 Potere e Libertà Rivista n. 54 - ottobre 2011, Aspenia, p. 217-220
Italy's shame in Libya, The Economist, 25/02/2011,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/02/europe_and_libya
“La situazione in Libia è «molto grave, sull'orlo di una guerra civile» e Tripoli deve ascoltare «la richiesta forte
30
comment on which consequences there would have been otherwise followed75. The offer of
humanitarian aid within an internationally agreed framework came at the same time, with particular
reference to the importance of the involvement of the Arab countries and of the African Union in
the process76. Historically closer to sub-Saharan countries rather than to its Arab partners, Gaddafi
saw often these latter as agents acting on behalf of imperialist powers: it is not surprising that, if a
diplomatic and political solution had to be found, the African Union should have been one of the
major mediators involved on the road to peace 77, albeit its strength on the international scene
appeared to be far less important than the Arab League's. The willingness of involving, right from
the outset of the crisis, actors potentially able to defuse the crisis is indicative of the Italian stance
and of its strong interests in a rapid cease of the unrest in the country. In that same speech, Frattini
referred to the possibility of a no-fly zone for the first time, maintaining that “a political decision
from the UN security Council is needed” 78. In line with what have been previously stated, Italy
appears to try to gain time in order to better assess the Libyan situation: especially when
considering the employ of the use of force, the extrema ratio necessary only when all of the
diplomatic means fail, caution is required. Particularly since that would have represented an
escalation of the crisis, eventuality Italy did want to avoid.
Finally, in order to balance what had been a fairly guarded approach to the issue until then, Frattini
declared that “only Italy has made contacts” with the new Libyan national council 79 since "we have
75
76
77
78
79
dell'Europa» e fermare le violenze sui civili, una richiesta a cui l'Italia si associa «senza se e senza ma», and “Silvio
Berlusconi che, in una nota, si è detto «allarmato per l'aggravarsi degli scontri e per l'uso inaccettabile della
violenza sulla popolazione civile»", “The situation in Libya is «very serious, on the edge of a civil war» and Tripoli
has to listen to «the strong call of Europe» and stop the violence on civilians, a request to which Italy participates
«without any esitation»”, and “Silvio Berlusconi that, in a note, described himself «worried for the worsen of the
clashes and for the inacceptable use of violence against civilians»”; Libia: Frattini, Tripoli ascolti la richiesta
dell’Europa e fermi la violenza sui civili. Il Ministro oggi al Cairo, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
22/02/2011, http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/02/20110222_libia.html
“La richiesta (arriva quando abbiamo visto Gheddafi sparare sul suo popolo”, “(The request to step down from
power) arrives when we have seen Gaddafi shooting on his own people”; Interviste e articoli, 28/02/2011, Ministero
degli Affari Esteri,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/02/20110228_libia_disposti_uso_forza.html
Libia: Frattini, l’Italia pronta a sostenere corridoi umanitari, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
28/02/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/02/20110228_frattiniginevra.html
Interviste e articoli, Approfondimenti, 26/03/2011, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/03/20110328_mediazione_successo_italiano
.html
“Serve una decisione politica del Consiglio di sicurezza dell'Onu”; Interviste e articoli, Approfondimenti,
26/03/2011, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
.html
“Solo l'Italia ha contatti” with the new Libyan national council, best know as National Transitional Council of
Libya, or simply as National Transitional Council; Interviste e articoli, Approfondimenti, 26/03/2011, Ministero
degli Affari Esteri,
31
the best network”80, clearly hinting at the fact that a role as mediator in the crisis should have
definitely pertained to Italy as well, had Gaddafi not refrained from the use of force against his
population. Such a possible Italian privileged position would have been granted not only by its
traditional and consolidated links with the Libyan and Gaddafi's establishment, but also by its
contacts among the representatives of rebel forces. The Italian goal being a rapid cease of the
hostilities, as already suggested during the first week that followed the insurrection in Benghazi,
approaching the rebels was a necessary step in order to contribute to find a negotiated solution.
During the first week of the conflict, Italy appeared not to be prone to a total condemnation of the
Gaddafi regime, albeit it did condemn its actions of violence against protesters, ask the Government
to refrain from keeping implementing a similar repressive line, and call on Gaddafi himself to step
down from power. The offer of humanitarian aid and the attempt to immediately involve the African
Union in the issue account for the Italian search for an early compromise capable of avoiding
escalations of the domestic crisis, especially possible foreign interferences. The Italian Government
even boasted alleged exclusive contacts within the rebel council, affirming its desire of being in the
first line of the effort to mediate between the conflicting parties. An extremely cautious line was
intended as the most effective way in trying to help recomposing a fast-deteriorating situation, and
equidistance between the sides seemed to prevail.
.html
80 "Abbiamo conoscenze migliori di altri”, with particular reference to the “ex Ministro della giustizia che ora è a
capo del Consiglio provvisorio di Bengasi e quella rete di ambasciatori libici che ha detto che da ora loro sono al
servizio del popolo e non del regime” (“former Minister of Justice that now is the head of the Provisional Council
in Benghazi and to that net of Libyan ambassadors that had said that now they are at their people's service”), FocusLibia: operativa la missione italiana, rimpatriato primo gruppo egiziani. Frattini, l’Italia aderira’ a sanzioni Onu ed
Ue, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 04/03/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110304_libia_napolitano.html
32
3.2 Sub-phase n° 2: the quest for a multilateral approach
During the month of March, Italy was instead forced to take a more clear stance on the Libyan
issue, as the international community started to react more and more vigorously to the events in
order to, allegedly, protect the civilians victims of Gaddafi's repression. Equidistance between the
parties seemed not to be an available option any longer.
At the very beginning of March, Frattini committed Italy to comply with “all of the kinds and
categories of sanctions that will be decided by the UN and by the EU including the case of
stocks”81, the reference being made to the sanctions imposed against Libya by the UN Security
council and by the EU, on February 26 and 28 respectively 82. Instead, regarding the no-fly zone it
was “very difficult thinking” to the hypothesis of “Italian military planes involved on the Libyan
ground, but our Euro-Atlantic loyalty makes us say that we could not deny our bases and the
logistic support”83. As it can be noticed, a more marked step in the direction of an acceptance of the
no fly zone had been finally taken, as the use of the military bases on Italian soil was one of its
preconditions. In fact, a military mission in Libya was unthinkable in case Italy would have not
granted the use of its soil, or even only of its airspace, for that military purpose. Moreover,
committing itself to enforce the sanctions decided by the UN and the EU, Italy pressed the Libyan
regime through a means of hard power for the first time since the start of the crisis.
A violent, albeit indirect, critique to France and the UK was moved by Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs when he stated that “the only thing we should have not done (…) was a unilateral action,
outside the UN Security Council or regional framework” 84, and he insisted again on the importance
81 “Tutti i tipi e categorie di sanzioni che verranno decise dall'Onu e dall'Unione Europea, anche nel caso riguardino
partecipazioni azionarie"; Focus-Libia: operativa la missione italiana, rimpatriato primo gruppo egiziani. Frattini,
l’Italia aderira’ a sanzioni Onu ed Ue, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 04/03/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110304_libia_napolitano.html
82 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1970”, 2011, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2B57BBA2-07D94C35-B45E-EED275080E87/0/N1124558.pdf, and Council of the European Union, “Libya: EU imposes arms
embargo and targeted sanctions”, Brussels, 28/02/2011,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/119524.pdf. Those sanctions were later
reinforced, as showed by the Council of the European Union “Libya: EU imposes additional sanctions following
the adoption of UNSCR 1973”, Brussels, 24/03/2011
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/120220.pdf
83 “Assai difficile pensare” to the hypothesis of “aerei militari italiani coinvolti sul terreno libico, ma la nostra lealtà
euro atlantica ci fa dire che le basi militari, il supporto logistico non potremmo negarlo”; Focus-Libia: operativa la
missione italiana, rimpatriato primo gruppo egiziani. Frattini, l’Italia aderira’ a sanzioni Onu ed Ue,
Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 04/03/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110304_libia_napolitano.html.
See annexe n° 4.
84 “L'unica cosa che non avremmo voluto fare (...) e’ un'azione unilaterale, fuori da un contesto di Consiglio sicurezza
e fuori da un contesto regionale”; Focus-Libia: appello dei Ministri esteri G8 all’Onu. Frattini, urgente il “cessate il
fuoco”, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 15/03/2011,
33
of the Arab League and of the African Union's role. The French government, in fact, at the time of
Frattini's declarations had already received a rebels' delegation, formally recognised the CNT (it
was the first state to act in that sense) and offered its availability to drive air strikes against the
Libyan loyalist forces, carrying everything out without any previous consultation with supranational institutions or other sovereign states85. Similarly, he UK Prime Minister had stated that
“Col. Gaddafi would face «consequences» for his actions and that «no options» should be ruled out
if internal repression in Libya continues”86. Fairly distant from the French and British approach,
Frattini synthesis in identifying the Italian interest was striking in its completeness: “we back all of
the actions leading to a cease-fire, provided they take place in a multilateral framework" 87. Namely,
the Minister excluded that Italy could participate to a “coalition of the willing”88, and instead
reaffirmed its firm stance for a negotiated solution capable of stopping a further escalation of the
crisis, albeit not categorically excluding its backing to a multilaterally agreed armed intervention.
The possibility of finding a negotiated solution with the regime took an important hit after the UN
Security Council approved the Resolution 1973, on March 17, which authorised the establishment
of a no-fly zone and the international coalition to take "all necessary measures" to enforce it in
order to protect civilians under threat of attack from the Libyan regime 89. France, Great Britain, and
the US undertook military actions shortly thereafter, carrying out air and missile strikes, and
“considerations to hand the mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged
within days of the operation”90. "Gaddafi has to leave the power" 91 and “we will go on until when
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110315_libia_cessateilfuoco.ht
ml
Giordano Merlicco, Stephanie Locatelli, Emiliano Alessandri , Osservatorio transatlantico [n.s.6] : le relazioni
transatlantiche : gennaio-marzo 2011 / a cura di Istituto affari internazionali. - Roma : Istituto affari internazionali,
2011. p. 8, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/pi_f_0006.pdf
Timeline: UK's road to action in Libya, BBC, 15 April 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12821505
“Tutto quello che porta a un cessate al fuoco lo sosteniamo, purché avvenga in un quadro multilaterale"; FocusLibia: appello dei Ministri esteri G8 all’Onu. Frattini, urgente il “cessate il fuoco”, Approfondimenti, Ministero
degli Affari Esteri, 15/03/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110315_libia_cessateilfuoco.ht
ml
"Coalizione dei volenterosi"; Focus-Libia: Frattini, evitare un bagno di sangue, serve il cessate il fuoco,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110316_libia_vertice.html
Resolution 1973 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011 ,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011)
Florence Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: reviewing operation Unified Protector”,
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, June 2013, Introduction, p. 7, Douglas C. Lovelace,
JR., http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1161.pdf
"Gheddafi deve lasciare il potere"; Focus-Libia - diplomazia in movimento: Ministri esteri Ue a consulto,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110318_libia_noflyzone.html
34
the regime will have collapsed”92, were the conclusion that Frattini drew form those developments,
albeit the UN Resolution was not making a direct allusion to those eventualities. It was actually
expected that, in case Gaddafi would have not laid down his weapons, the international mission
could have last at most “more days, at most more weeks”93, and that a successful protection of
civilians would have finally result in the fall of the regime itself. An important factor to be
considered was that, after the escalation of the conflict represented by the foreign powers'
intervention in the Libyan domestic conflicts, hardly would have the rebels negotiated with the
Gaddafi's government, even supposing that the latter had been seriously interested in that. Italy
perceived that limiting the Italian responsibilities on the issue at the time when the international
community was decidedly tackling it would have seriously endangered its position and brought
about its international marginalisation, as well as damaged its reputation vis à vis the NTC. One
negative effect that could have derived from a potential Italian passive stance was related to the
migration wave expected to follow the socio-economic and humanitarian disruptions that were
hitting the Tunisian and Libyan population, as Italy could have had to face it on its own 94.
Nonetheless, a fast negotiated ceasefire being the Italian goal, the strong backing to the rebels
diminished the real possibilities of reaching a political solution, increasing the weight of the
military factor95 and of a possible isolation of Gaddafi coming from his own closest circle96.
According to Frattini, the mission should have passed under NATO command as that was “a
political issue, we can not imagine (...) that there be separate commands from which decisions
depend”97, with Italy having accepted “of being part of the international coalition just in order to
92 “Andremo avanti fino a quando il regime non verrà rovesciato»; Interviste e articoli, Approfondimenti, 20/03/2011,
Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/03/20110320_intfr.html
93 “Più giorni, magari più settimane”; Interviste e articoli, Approfondimenti, 20/03/2011, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
94 Interviste e articoli, Approfondimenti, 20/03/2011, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
95 “Ma quale potrebbe essere questa soluzione dal momento che abbiamo posto come precondizione a qualsiasi accordo la resa di
Gheddafi e il suo trasferimento presso la Corte penale internazionale? Al momento, non se ne vede l'ombra”, “But which one
could the solution be, since we established as a precondition to any deal the yield of Gaddafi and its transfer to the International
Criminal Court?”; Lucio Caracciolo, La Libia non esiste più, Limes, 15/04/2011, http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/la-
libia-non-esiste-piu/22647
96 See Interviste e articoli, Approfondimenti, 27/03/2011, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/03/20110328_frattinipianolibia.html; and
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/04/20110426_libia_vertice_francia.html
97 “È una questione (...) altamente politica, non possiamo immaginare (…) che ci siano comandi separati da ciascuno
dei quali dipendano alcune scelte”; Focus-Libia: la Nato in campo e il ruolo dell'Italia, oggi Frattini al Senato,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110322_foclibnap.html
35
make respect the cease-fire, to stop the violence and to protect the civil population”98. As very
clearly stressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the problem was political in nature: Italy had to
be sure to have a say in the deciding of the military operations, especially given the ambiguous
wording of the UN Resolution 197399. The Resolution respect was considered functional to bring
about the end of the hostilities in Libya, therefore being perfectly sensible the positioning of Italy as
its defender and guardian. On March 22, “NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya;
2 days later, it announced it would take over all military aspects of UNSC Resolution (UNSCR)
1973”. Finally on March 31, “Operation Unified Protector (OUP) began”100. Italy participated to
such a mission, albeit without taking part into the air strikes of the coalition.
Already before the start of the OUP, “efforts appear to be under way to offer Muammar Gaddafi a
way of escape from Libya, with Italy saying it was trying to organise an African heaven for him;
(...as it) offered to broker a ceasefire deal in Libya, involving asylum for Gaddafi in an African
country” hoping that the “African Union can find a valid proposal" 101. The removal of the regime
leader from power was understandably deemed functional to a rapid cease of the hostilities, whilst
the official Italian position on the possibility of arming the rebels was that such an occurrence
would have not ensured the results envisaged by the UN Resolution 1973 and that using the
instruments already at the allies' disposal, namely “the no-fly zone and humanitarian corridors to
solve the situation on the ground”102 could have granted a higher international cohesion. Actually,
the Italian opposition derived by reasons of political opportunity to what would have been a further
escalation of the conflict not directly related to the protection of civilians, and that could have upset
some of the international actors unhappy with the strong interventionist line of the international
98 “Di fare parte della coalizione internazionale proprio per fare rispettare il cessate il fuoco, fare fermare le violenze e
proteggere la popolazione”; Focus-Libia: Frattini, non deve essere “guerra’’ ma rispetto Risoluzione Onu. Ministri
esteri Ue a consulto, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 21/03/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110321_libia_risoluzioneonu.ht
ml
99 The protection of civilians being the goal to achieve, the Resolution did not specify which kind of measures an
international force could have undertaken in order to fulfil the commitment, leaving a wide space for different and
controversial interpretations on the point.
100 Florence Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: reviewing operation Unified Protector”,
101 Julian Borger and Richard Norton-Taylor, Diplomats discuss Libya's future as Italy plots Gaddafi's escape route,
The Guardian, 29/03/2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/28/diplomats-meet-italy-gaddafi-escape;
and Interviste e articoli, Approfondimenti, 20/03/2011, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
102 “La no - fly zone e i corridoi umanitari, per risolvere la situazione sul terreno”; Focus - Libia: “Gruppo Contatto”,
le ipotesi emerse. L’Italia conferma, usiamo gli strumenti Onu a disposizione, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli
Affari Esteri, 30/03/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/03/20110330_focuslibia_contatto.ht
ml
36
coalition. In fact, only few days later, the same Minister affirmed that he could not exclude “the
possibility of supplying weapons to the rebels, albeit as extrema ratio”103, and Massari, the Foreign
Minister's spokesman, later reminded that it was the same UN Resolution 1973 that foresaw “the
possibility of exceptions regarding the weapons' embargo as an extrema ratio measure in order to
protect civilians”104. The only options the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept excluding were
instead the possibility of troops on the ground, as well as its own participation to the air strikes of
the coalition.
Italy, after the hesitations of the crisis' first week, seemed to adopt a more decided approach to the
Libyan issue. Not only it sided the international community in implementing the economic and
financial sanctions adopted against the regime, but it also participated to the international military
mission, led by NATO, that had as its stated goal the protection of civilians. Nonetheless, as with
the enforcement of the UN resolution 1973 the margins to find a negotiated solution with Gaddafi
had virtually disappeared, the Rais removal from power was deemed to be the only way to a
permanent cease of the hostilities. Committed into such a mission, Italy showed an unprecedented
strong support for the rebel cause, always reiterating its position on the importance of a rapid
ceasefire reached through a multilateral and agreed framework that could have counted on the
support of Arab and Sub-Saharan states.
103 “La possibilità di fornire armi ai ribelli (...), seppure come estrema ratio”; Focus- Libia: Frattini, per l’Italia Cnt è
unico interlocutore, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 04/04/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110404_focuslibia_frattini_cnt.
html
104 “'La possibilità di eccezioni rispetto all'embargo di armi' come misura di extrema ratio per proteggere i civili”;
FOCUS-LIBIA: Martedì a Roma Frattini incontra il presidente del Cnt Jalil, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110408_marcnt.html
37
3.3 Sub-phase n° 3: the full support to the international effort
After the important change in the Italian positioning that took place in March, during the months of
April and May the Italian line of support to the rebels reached its climax and placed the country on
a level of parity with the main partners of the international coalition concerning its efforts in the
campaign.
It was restated that, in order to began a process of national reconciliation, “Gaddafi has to leave the
power”: that was the "first point of this road-map"105, which excluded possible partitions of the
Libyan state, as well as any eventuality of military actions on the ground from the part of the
international coalition. Furthermore, when referring to the Italian possibility of joining the NATO
air bombings, Frattini declared that "the Italian colonial past in Libya is an element that can not be
forgotten106, in case an Italian plane would bomb Libya and accidentally wound civilians, then the
interventions would be counter-productive”107. It clearly results that had Italy decided to implement
bombings in Libya and the mission had not had a positive and overall satisfying outcome, the
Italian position in the country would have turned to be very week. Moreover, the Italian prestige in
the Arab world and its possible position as a mediator in future crisis would have turned to be more
fragile. Nonetheless, only two days afterwards, the Italian stance was sensibly different: "we will
see what the NTC president Abdul Jalil will ask us: if there were a reassuring request, our
reluctance, which is strong, could be revised”108. Indeed, the decision of “increasing the operational
flexibility of (...) aircraft related to actions against specific military targets spotted on the Libyan
soil, in order to contribute to protect the civil population of Libya (… and) to participate on a same
plan to the operations of the allies”109 was taken less than two weeks after those declarations, and
105 “Gaddafi deve lasciare il potere”; that would have been the "punto numero uno di questa road map"; FOCUSLIBIA: intensa settimana di consultazioni per Frattini, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 11/04/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110411_intensa_settimana.html
106 See for instance Mark Mazower, Libya remembers, we forget: these bombs are not the first, The Guardian,
25/03/2011, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/25/libya-remembers-bombs-not-first
107 "Il passato coloniale dell'Italia in Libia è un elemento di cui non ci si può dimenticare, nel caso in cui un aereo
italiano bombardasse la Libia e incidentalmente colpisse dei civili allora l'intervento sarebbe controproducente";
FOCUS-LIBIA: Frattini, cessate il fuoco solo senza Gheddafi 1, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
11/04/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110411_cesfuoc.html
108 "Vedremo cosa ci chiederà il presidente del Cnt Abdul Jalil: se vi fosse una richiesta tranquillizzante in questa
situazione, la nostra riluttanza, che è forte, potrebbe essere rivista"; Libia: Gruppo di contatto a Doha, partecipa il
Cnt, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 13/04/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110413_cnt.html
109 “Aumentare la flessibilità operativa dei (...) velivoli con azioni mirate contro specifici obiettivi militari selezionati
sul territorio libico, nell'intento di contribuire a proteggere la popolazione civile libica (…e) partecipare su un piano
di parità alle operazioni alleate”; Focus-Libia: Azioni mirate, la decisione dell’Italia dopo richieste Alleati e CNT,
38
described as the "the natural development”110 of the Italian line followed since March111. Experts
argued that the accuracy of the Italian armament would have minimised to a point close to zero the
risk of collateral damages, and that the training quality of the Italian military crews would have
allowed a high degree of coordination with the allied force, and even doubled the offensive
potential at the coalition disposal112. However, once again, the point to emphasis appears to be
political in nature: Italy agreed to participate to the Libyan campaign on a de facto equal bases with
its major partners considering113 that the isolation the regime had suffered until that moment had
already compromised Gaddafi's position114. Given the NTC demand of a stronger participation of
the international coalition in the military operations, the Italian diplomacy considered wise to
increase its support to it.
Another controversial issue concerned the possibility of supplying weapons to the rebels: more
specifically, material useful to the opposition's self-defence. That would have meant "not only
weapons, but also communications' tools and instruments able to intercept the regime's
communications", in order to "give to the opposition the possibility of defend itself in every corner,
where NATO can not intervene"115. According to Frattini, on that point there was not "a unanimity
of perspectives and every country will be in a condition of assessing how to help", but it should
have been "established, as I think, if such an intervention does not violate the UN resolution, or if it
does"116. Regarding the specificity of the Italian political position on the point, as anticipated by the
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110426_azionimirate.html
110 "Il naturale sviluppo"; Frattini, azioni mirate per fermare uccisione civili, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari
Esteri, 27/04/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110427_azionimirateuccisionici
vili.html. Ministero della difesa, “Audizione del: 27 aprile 2011”, Rome, 27/04/2011,
http://www.difesa.it/Ministro/Compiti_e_Attivita/Audizioni37/2011-04/Pagine/ComunGovernosviluppiLibia.aspx
111 According to Frattini, the decision was taken during Jalil visit to Rome, when he affirmed that Libyans would have
not considered Italians as invaders in the case of an Italian participation to the air strikes; 26/04/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/04/20110426_libia_nato.html
112 Libia, l’aviazione italiana può fare la differenza, Vincenzo Camporini , Affari Internazionali, 30/04/2011,
http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1744, and Il minimalismo autolesionista dell’Italia in Libia,
Vincenzo Camporini, Affari internazionali, 14/04/2011 ,http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1728
113 See annexe n° 5.
114 Especially since Gaddafi had refused any possibility of a mediation that would have involved his departure from
power, as the Italian diplomacy found out through indirect contacts with the Government in Tripoli itself; see
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/04/20110428_cirsi_siriana_e_unifil.html
115 “Armi ma non solo, anche strumenti di comunicazione e apparati per l'intercettazione delle comunicazioni radio del
regime", in order to "dare all'opposizione la possibilità di difendersi strada per strada, dove la Nato non può
intervenire"; FOCUS-LIBIA: Gruppo di Contatto, sì a finanziamenti al Cnt, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110413_gcont.html
116 "Una unanimità di previsione ed ogni Paese potrà valutare come aiutare", but it should be "stabilire, come ritengo,
se questo intervento non violi la risoluzione ONU oppure sì"; FOCUS-LIBIA: Gruppo di Contatto, sì a
finanziamenti al Cnt, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 13/04/2011,
39
legal opinion expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, "the supply of heavy weapons"
was excluded whilst "there is an ongoing assessment of the possibility of a support of military kind,
even if not involving lethal equipment, as telecommunications' tools, vehicles, night vision
equipment"117 capable of specifically implementing self-defence capacities. The affair of the
investigation, blocked by the Italian government, “into the whereabouts of a massive consignment
of weapons removed (between 18 and 20 May) from a military depot in the Mediterranean amid
speculation that the cargo was secretly supplied to Libya”118 might have cast doubts about the
reliability of the Government's statement on the issue. Nonetheless, beyond the truthfulness of
similar speculations, the support offered to the NTC through the supply of non-lethal equipment
signalled clearly enough the further increase in the backing of the rebels from the Italian side.
Frattini went as far as to declare that he intended “to explain to the other countries in Europe and in
the world why they too will have to soon recognise the NTC from which the new Libya will be
born'', and that same CNT guaranteed that ''all of the international treaties will be respected, starting
with the Italo-Libyan Treaty of Friendship that will keep operating when the security conditions on
the territory would allow that”119. Reassured by the new Libyan authorities on the economic front,
Italy had lost interests in maintaining any form of equidistance between the Gaddafi Government
and the NTC. One additional reason that Italy had to support the latter was given by the fact that it
would have been “more difficult for the regime to organise refugees fluxes towards Europe as a
means of retaliation (…); the NTC of Benghazi indicated us how and where the regime tries to
organise this horrible traffic and strongly committed itself to block the immigration originating from
its shores"120.
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110413_gcont.html
117 "La fornitura di armi pesanti" whilst "c'è invece una riflessione in corso sulla possibilità di un sostegno di tipo
militare, ma non letale, come strumenti di telecomunicazioni, veicoli, attrezzatura per la visione notturna"; FOCUSLIBIA: NATO, avanti fino alla fine delle violenze contro i civili, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
14/04/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110414_focuslibia_nato.html
118 John Hooper, Italian government blocks investigation into missing arms cache, The Guardian, 19/07/2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/19/italy-blocks-investigation-arms-cache
119 ''Spiegare agli altri paesi europei e del mondo perché anche loro dovranno presto riconoscere il consiglio nazionale
transitorio libico da cui nascerà la nuova Libia'', and that the same CNT had guaranteed that ''tutti i trattati
internazionali saranno rispettati, a cominciare dal trattato di amicizia italo libico che potrà continuare ad essere
seguito quando le condizioni di sicurezza sul territorio lo permetteranno”; FOCUS-LIBIA: L’Italia lavora al
riconoscimento internazionale del CNT, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 19/04/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110419_italia_cnt.html
120 "Più difficile per il regime organizzare flussi di profughi verso l'Europa come mezzo di rappresaglia (…); il Cnt di
Bengasi ci ha indicato come e dove il regime tenta di organizzare questo orribile traffico e si è impegnato
fermamente a bloccare l'immigrazione proveniente dalle loro coste"; Frattini, azioni mirate per fermare uccisione
civili, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 27/04/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/04/20110427_azionimirateuccisionici
vili.html
40
Similar positions were backed by the firm persuasion that "the time plays in our favour and against
Gaddafi"121. Consequently, cease-fire agreements would have been of no utility, or even detrimental,
as they would have represented tools through which “the regime could strength its part of territory”,
and a break of the hostilities “does not have to be finalised to a partition of Libya in two different
entities"122. Already in March, Frattini had stated that it would have taken weeks, not even months,
for the rebels to prevail on the battlefield, as the Rais “does not dispose anymore of the air force,
and the ground force are composed only by mercenaries”123. Gaddafi's capacities seemed to have
been reduced to their minimum terms, and the General Secretary of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen
declared that “the operation in Libya is reaching its goals”, and consequently the “kingdom of
terror” of Gaddafi has come to its end124.
With its supply of military equipment to the rebel forces, and especially thanks to its participation to
the coalition's air strikes, Italy managed to position itself on an equal footing with the other major
participants of the mission. Having realised that the margins of a peaceful recomposition of the
conflict that would have involved the Gaddafi Government had dramatically shrunk, it chose to
further increase its line of support to the rebels and to agreed to set as a precondition for a ceasefire
agreement the forced ousting of Gaddafi from power, acknowledged its unwillingness to step aside.
Given the importance of a similar commitment, hardly could have Italy refrained from keeping the
line adopted in April, when it started its bombings in the Libyan soil, and negative results of the
military campaign could have caused very serious setbacks in the country's political strategy.
121 "Il tempo gioca a nostro favore e contro Gheddafi"; FOCUS-LIBIA - Gruppo Contatto alla Farnesina - Frattini,
verso una soluzione politica, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 05/05/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/05/20110505_bilateraleitausa.html
122 “Il regime potrebbe rafforzare il suo pezzo di territorio”, and a break of the hostilities “non deve essere finalizzato a
dividere la Libia in due"; FOCUS LIBIA: Frattini, il cessate il fuoco non deve dividere il Paese, Approfondimenti,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/05/20110513_focuslibia.html
123 “Non dispone più dell'aviazione, le forze di terra ormai sono solo mercenari”; Interviste e articoli,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/04/20110426_libia_vertice_francia.html
124 “L'operazione in Libia sta raggiungendo i suoi obiettivi”, and consequently the “regno del terrore”; Focus-Libia:
Frattini a Bengasi per incontri con il presidente del CNT, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
31/05/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/05/20110531_focuslibia_frattini_a_b
engasi.html
41
3.4 Findings on the first part of the crisis
Although the possible consequences of a radicalisation of the conflict between rival domestic forces
was a reason of serious concern for Italy, the Government stance at the very beginning of the crisis
privileged a non-interventionist line in the Libyan domestic affairs. A possible division of the
country, with the economic confusion that would have followed it, beside illegal migration
problems and Islamist threats, was at first countered by appeals to the Libyan government to
moderation, followed by a call on the international community to act in concert, stressing the
importance of a multilateral approach able to give a particular relevance to the voices of the African
Union and of the Arab League. An involvement of strong regional actors was envisaged as positive
in striking a balance among the parties in conflict. Moreover, offers of humanitarian aid echoed
since the very first moments of the crisis, and were destined to remain a constant of the Italian
foreign action along the whole conflict span time. It is not surprising that, during the first week
from the revolt of Benghazi, the hypothesis of a no-fly zone was not regarded very enthusiastically,
and that the Italian contacts with the rebel forces were always displayed maintaining a low profile:
Italy appeared to believe that a major direct involvement of foreign powers in the Libyan issue
would have been detrimental to the already damaged, but not compromised, stability of the country,
and that a sudden disruption in the Libyan political leadership would have been disastrous for its
own interests. The crisis' solution to be found should have been political in nature, as early attempts
to put an excessive pressure on one of the sides could have geopardised the possibility of finding a
constructive balance among the opposite poles in a very short term.
Following the UN Security Council and the EU economic sanctions, Italy was forced to implement
a stronger political line vis à vis the Gaddafi regime, joining the two institution in their
condemnation of it and complying with the determined economic pressure on the regime.
Eventually, it was the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that led the Italian Foreign Minister to
translate into facts its declaration according which Gaddafi should have left the power, and to
implement an interventionist line in the issue. The constant feature of the Italian effort remained the
call for a multilateral action, expressed in the form of the advocacy for a NATO-led command of the
military operations. Nonetheless, siding indirectly with one of the two contenders, Italy moved
away from its support towards a negotiated solution.
Once the major international powers involved had started pushing with vehemence towards a
change in the country's political leadership, and had employed military power, Italy was forced to
42
align its stance to theirs. At that point, what it did was trying to position itself at the forefront of the
international effort to oust the Libyan dictator: its supply of military equipment to the rebel forces
and its participation to the coalition's air strikes were intended to indicate an uncompromised
support for the rebel cause, and the completion of its original positions' turnaround.
Closely looking at the apparently contradictory Italian behaviour during the first months of the
crisis, it could seem that Italy was actually “forced by unfavourable circumstances to progressively
take the field against its own national interests” 125; namely, to act according to other states' and
international bodies' directives in order not to be isolated and suffer negative consequences in the
medium and long run, although a short-term defence of its interests should have pushed it towards
other choices. Albeit during the very first part of the Libyan crisis Italy tried to avoid an escalations
that would have involved international actors, its early attempt to move towards a de-escalation did
not produce any valid results and its relative low power forced it to eventually align with those
states supportive of a more intrusive action that supposed a radicalisation of the conflict, and that
were the most willing to act in order to defy Col. Gaddafi's leadership and establishment. Actually,
the Italian position changes appeared to be the answer to decisions and actions taken by other states
or international institutions. And if perhaps “the strength of bilateral relations between Rome and
Tripoli should have given Italy some more leverage (…), in the ensuing narrative of what steps to
take in response to turmoil the international community has sidelined Italy” 126 or, even better, the
international community had preceded Italy in taking the steps it eventually was forced to follow.
Even if ‟Italy tried to stick to its own imaginary role of mediator”, it did not have “nor the power
neither the authority to exercise effectively a mediation” 127: neither it was capable of convincing the
Libyan leader to refrain from using the force against his own people, nor of convincing the Gaddafi
entourage to quit him and de facto sink the regime. In that respect, the Italian action can be
considered ineffective. However, it must be also acknowledged that the Italian position moved
constantly towards one very clear direction, namely the increased condemnation of the regime sided
by the stronger support for the rebel side. In fact, at the time of the fall of Benghazi in rebels' hands,
on February 20th, the Italian position was in defence of the non-interference in the Libyan affairs,
125 “Costretta da circostanze sfavorevoli a scendere progressivamente in campo, armi in pugno, contro i propri interessi
nazionali”; Il rebus della pacificazione in Libia, Mario Arpino, Affari Internazionali, 05/09/2011,
127 ‟L'Italia si è sforzata di aggrapparsi a un proprio ruolo immaginario di mediatore”, it did not have “né il potere né
lautorità per esercitare efficacemente una mediazione”; Gianni Bonvicini, Andrea Carati, Alessandro, Colombo,
Raffaello Matarazzo and Stefano Silvestri, “Italian Foreign Policy in 2010: Continuity, Reform and Challenges 150
Years After National Unity”, IAI, May 2011, p. 14, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1106e.pdf
43
whilst after the beginning of the NATO operation in Libya and the participation of Italy in the air
strikes the only option the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept excluding was the possibility of
having troops on the ground. Moreover, Italy did back its declarations with concrete facts: firstly,
implementing economic and financial sanctions against the regime, and secondly participating in a
campaign that contrasted it with significant military means. Similar efforts were carried out with a
fairly high intensity, placing the country on a level of parity with the main international coalition's
partners, and in that respect Italy can not be considered totally ineffective, neither inconsistent.
44
4. THE SECOND PART OF THE CRISIS: QUESTIONING
OF THE REBEL FRONT
4.1 Sub-phase n° 1: concerns about the campaign and the NTC
reliability
Despite the optimistic forecasts of Italy and of the NATO-led international coalition itself, already
from the month of April a deadlocked situation started to been acknowledged by the fighting forces
conflicting in Libya, and by the international powers involved. In fact, “Qaddafi’s holding on to
power, the comparable weakness but surprising resilience and adaptability of the armed forces, and
the apparent passivity shown by the population of Tripoli, whose uprising was expected, were all
features of a terrain widely misunderstood”128 by those who embarked in the military intervention in
Libya. The months that preceded the liberation of the capital were therefore marked by a growing
apprehension from the Italian side.
"It is not a situation of stalemate, nobody thought to sweep away opponents throwing bombs, this
was not the goal, to kill Gaddafi and its family was not the goal (...and) now a political solution is
needed to the departure from the scene of this regime” 129 was Frattini's position, although a
contradiction was implied in believing that through political means Gaddafi could have been forced
to voluntarily relinquish power, since he had more than clearly proved its willingness to keep
fighting until its own end, and as his inner circle had remained close to him along many months,
and there were no indications that he would have been handled by its supporters any soon. Actually,
“concerns about these (rebel) forces’ capacity to gain and hold territory rose in the early days of the
operation” because “there was virtually no command-and-control system, and basic military
structures such as hierarchy, communication technology, and standard operating procedures were
non-existent”130. The international coalition could not openly intervene in that aspect, owing to the
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, June 2013, p. 18, Douglas C. Lovelace, JR.,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1161.pdf
129 “La situazione non è di stallo, nessuno pensava di fare piazza pulita a colpi di bombe, non era questo l'obiettivo,
(…) di uccidere né Gheddafi né la sua famiglia (...e) ora occorre una soluzione politica per l'uscita di scena di
questo regime"; Focus-Libia:Frattini, ora soluzione politica, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
14/06/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/06/20110614_frattiniorasoluzionepol
itica.html
45
fact that “the implementation of the resolution’s three military elements—namely, the weapons
embargo, the no-fly zone, as well as the 'protection of civilians'—was (...) limited to air and naval
power”131, and the presence of Western military personnel on the ground was therefore limited to
very small teams of advisors132, as direct contacts between the Alliance and the rebels were not
allowed133. The worst of the possibilities for Italy was then apparently materialising: a Libya divided
in two main parts, with the old regime controlling the capital and its Tripolitania region, in a
scenario of general socio-economic instability and of radicalised opposition between the conflicting
sides; furthermore, after having committed itself as strongly as it had.
Concerning the Italian participation to the alliance bombings, Frattini stated that "there is a very
clear limit: the limit of September, established by NATO, but I think that, beside the bombings, a
solution has to be found well before than in September” 134. Since it was actually unclear which kind
of negotiated solution could have been achieved from the distant positions of the two parties
directly involved in the fightings, a similar statement could have been intended as a sign of mistrust
towards the concrete possibilities of the international mission in reaching the end of the hostilities
before September, and accounted for the Italian unwillingness to remain involved in a no-win
situation potentially lasting for many more months than what had been originally expected.
Moreover, whilst the Italian Foreign Minister “had suggested that Nato's credibility was at risk after
a number of civilian casualties in air raids”135, Britain and France rejected the Italian call for a pause
in NATO's bombing of Libya in order to allow humanitarian aid to reach civilians. That may be
interpreted as an additional sign of the doubts Italy had about the possibility of reaching a rapid
close of the hostilities, as otherwise it is unlikely that a call for a pause in the bombings would have
been made.
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, June 2013, pp. 4, 10; Douglas C. Lovelace, JR.,
132 The official position of the Italian Government was that “in base agli accordi con la Nato abbiamo inviato da tempo
un team d'istruttori, oltre che di tecnici per le telecomunicazioni ma i nostri militari non sono sul campo a fianco dei
combattenti”, (Following NATO's agreements we have sent long ago a team of instructors, beside communications'
technicians, but our soldiers are not on the ground siding the fighters); Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 25/08/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/08/20110825_libia_europa_sia_unita.html
134 “C'è un limite molto chiaro: il limite di settembre, fissato dalla Nato, ma credo che al di là dei bombardamenti una
soluzione si debba trovare molto prima di settembre”; Frattini, lavoriamo per una soluzione politica,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/06/20110620_lavoriamo_per_soluzio
ne_politica.html
135 Black, Ian. UK and France dismiss Italy's call for pause in Nato bombing of Libya, The Guardian, 22/06/2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/22/libya-nato-bombing-uk-france-italy
46
Considering its stance towards the rebel side, it is possible to argue that Italy started harbouring
serious doubts about the results a military solution would have implied given the disorganisation of
the opposition to the regime. "It is the Libyans who have to identify the negotiations and the
political course for the new Libya, it is not us who can negotiate in their place", was said by
Frattini, adding that "this welter of denials gives an idea of an unclear situation" 136. Actually, at least
since the month of May experts had been talking about “multiple secessions” 137 occurring in the
country and concerning important realities as Benghazi, Derna, Beida and Misrata, de facto
hampering the possibility of a unitary, democratic and ordered transition even in the case of a rapid
regime fall. Two parallel wars have been actually unfolding on the Libyan soil, in that sense 138:
beside the rebel fighters sided de facto by the international coalition against the regime, an internal
struggle within the rebellion to determine the balance of power in the post-Gaddafi scenario took
place. On the background, structural differences between the two major Lbyan regions that cast
doubts regarding the possibility of peaceful compromises139. The way the crisis had been unfolding
reinforced the position of those who thought that “military action was started because of a false
hope or, better, of a wrong calculation regarding a rapid regime fall and in the underestimation of
the consensus the regime still gathers in wide parts of Tripolitania” 140, namely that the opportunity
of the military intervention was at least doubtful. It was actually known from the beginning of the
operations' military planning that the lack of an internationally transversal political commitment to
topple the regime could have actually worsened the general Libyan situation 141. In fact, Western the
interventions of the coalitions of the willing in scenarios of crisis were based on the contemporary
136 "Sono i libici che debbono individuare negoziati e percorso politico per la nuova Libia, non siamo noi che possiamo
negoziare sostituendoci ai libici", was said by Frattini, adding that "tutta questa ridda di smentite e contro smentite
dà l'idea di una situazione non chiara”; Focus-Libia - Frattini, ai libici negoziati e percorso politico,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/07/20110705_focuslibiafrattinimassa
ri.html
137 Libia al collasso, Karim Mezran, Affari Internazionali, 13/05/2011, http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?
ID=1755
138 “Le due guerre di Libia” di Lucio Caracciolo, La Repubblica 23.08.11
139 Lucio Caracciolo, La Libia non esiste più, Limes, 15/04/2011, http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/la-libia-non-esistepiu/22647
140 “L’azione militare è nata in realtà nella falsa speranza o, meglio, nella valutazione errata, di una rapida caduta del
regime e nella sottovalutazione del consenso che il regime raccoglie ancora in ampia parte della Tripolitania”; Libia
verso il baratro, Arturo Varvelli, Affari Internazionali, 26/07/2011,
141 “The Alliance’s neutrality and agenda quickly became a point of discussion. As military personnel bemoaned, the
resolution did not lend itself to military planning: the protection of civilians does not indicate an end state to be
achieved, nor does it identify an enemy. For a mission to be planned and executed properly, its outline needs to be
more precise”; Florence Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: reviewing operation Unified
Protector”, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, June 2013, p. 19, Douglas C. Lovelace,
47
presence of three different elements142: a political and diplomatic action, and a relentless ground
action enacted by local forces (although sided by a restricted number of intelligence members). It
appeared with strong evidence that without a clearly defined agreement on the political and
diplomatic level, namely regarding the aims of a mediation, hardly a solution to the crisis would
have been found in reasonable times.
Italy limited itself to reaffirm “the necessity of the unity of Libyan, which has not to stay divided
between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and the importance of the action line drew by the African
Union”143. In particular, it was considered as a step ahead the African Union official position “that
foresees an opening of the negotiations without the participation of Gaddafi”, and boasted once
again its privileged connection with "the friends of the NTC of Benghazi" and the fact that it never
“had and never will have direct contacts with Tripoli” 144, although it did have indirect ones via
African Union, as officially the role of liaison belonged to the UN special envoy. That had been the
decision of the Contact Group gathered in Istanbul, who had named the Al Khatib exclusive
negotiator between Tripoli and Benghazi, and whose role included the definition of the points to
implement in order to reach the stop of the hostilities, namely a ceasefire and the formation of a
provisional government145. The Italian position concerning the solution to the conflict kept being
consistent in time, as according to Frattini, “Gaddafi «has to leave the power» but the choice on a
possible obligation to abandon Libya «is an option that it is up to the Libyans to evaluate»”146. A
similar stance derived from the fact that, as “only one of the two parties wants to negotiate, namely
the NTC, confronted to the continuous denials of the regime, (...), the only way (to find a solution)
is to spot people of the Tripoli's Government ready to sit at the table and forcing Gaddafi to leave
142 Lacune e ambiguità dell’intervento in Libia, Giuseppe Cucchi, Affari Internazionali, 29/03/2011,
143 “La necessità dell'unità della Libia, che non deve rimanere divisa tra Tripolitania e Cirenaica, e l'importanza delle
linee di azione tracciate dall'Unione Africana”; FOCUS-LIBIA: Frattini, soluzione politica è la sola alternativa,
144 “Che prevede un'apertura dei negoziati fra le parti senza la partecipazione di Gheddafi”, and boasted once again its
privileged connection with "gli amici del Cnt di Bengasi" and the fact that it never “ha avuto e non avrà mai contatti
diretti con Tripoli"; FOCUS-LIBIA: Frattini, a Istanbul proposta italiana per negoziati, Approfondimenti, Ministero
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/07/20110713_frattiniistanbul.html
145 Libia: IV Contact Group - Frattini, Inviato ONU negoziatore esclusivo, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari
Esteri, 15/07/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/07/20110715_libia_iv_contact_group
.html
146 “Gheddafi «deve lasciare il potere» ma la scelta sul fatto che debba abbandonare o meno la Libia «é un'opzione che
spetta ai libici»”; Libia: Frattini, la scelta sulla destinazione di Gheddafi spetta ai libici, Approfondimenti, Ministero
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/07/20110721_frattinilibia.html
48
the power”147: as forcing the Libyan leader to put down its arms and negotiate the end of its own
rule did not appeared a valid option at least since the UN Resolution 1973 of March 17, it was
argued that defections alone could have forced the pro-Rais establishment to sit at the table.
Unfortunately, no signs had been given in that sense, and on the ground the rebel forces were not
able to prevail over the regular army, its militias and mercenaries.
Although Italy started manifesting impatience regarding the lack of decisive military results able to
infringe the resistance of the Gaddafi regime, as well as in consideration of the rebel front's
fragmentation, no significant new actions were taken in order to mark a sign of discontinuity with
the political line adopted at the beginning of March, that had seen the Italian support for the rebel
constantly mounting. Instead, mere statements referring to the necessity of a political solution and
to the Italian criticality towards the NATO operation followed one another, beside the call for the
African Union involvement and for the necessity of rapidly finding a precious help in the inner
Gaddafi circle, provided that he was not interested in a negotiated solution related to its departure
from power. Facing the possibility of having being involved into a campaign unable to reach the
short term goals envisaged, Italy appeared not to have the capacity to formulate and implement
alternative policies capable of limiting the damages ensuing from the status quo, which it did
consider unsatisfactory.
147 “Solo una delle due parti vuole negoziare, ossia il Cnt, a fronte delle continue smentite del regime(...), l’unico modo
è individuare persone del Governo di Tripoli disponibili a sedersi ad un tavolo e porre Gheddafi nelle condizioni di
dover lasciare il potere”; Libia - Incontro Frattini-Isawi: Italia rinnova sostegno a CNT, Approfondimenti, Ministero
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/07/20110722_libia_frattini_isawi.ht
ml
49
4.2 Sub-phase n° 2: the renewed backing of the NTC
In mid-August, when the rebel forces managed to enter in Tripoli meeting a low resistance from the
regime side, and eventually took the capital148, the awaited transition of power in Libya could
finally take place, since the Gaddafi regime had de facto been toppled149 and the fate of the dictator
himself was unknown.
Regarding the prospects of the new Libyan leadership, Frattini immediately reminded that “the ex
Libyan premier, Abdelsalam Jalloud, is a character that has played a balanced role in Libya, and
never committed crimes", and, concerning the leading members of the NTC, "Jibril and Jalil had
showed so far great qualities of wisdom and balance, even in delicate moments" 150. It should be
noted that Jibril was a key man in the Gaddafi system 151, along with Jalil in his quality of Minister
of Justice152. When the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs affirmed that the Allies should not “turn
what the Westerns like into what Libyans like" 153, and avoid “a paternalistic attitude towards Libya
(since) the political future of the country has to be determined only by the Libyan people” 154, he
actually implied that the strong links of the new political leadership with the old establishment
should have not damaged its international reputation, and that of the NTC. In fact, Italy had strong
148 See annexe n° 6.
149 Few weeks later the amount of territories held by the loyalist would have further shrunk; see annexe n° 7.
150 “L’ex premier libico, Abdelsalam Jalloud é un personaggio che ha svolto in Libia un ruolo equilibrato, e non si è
macchiato dei delitti", whilst, concerning the leading members of the NTC, "Jibril e Jalil hanno dimostrato finora
grandi doti di saggezza ed equilibrio, anche in momenti delicati"; Focus Libia: Frattini, raccordo stretto Gruppo
Contatto e Cnt, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 23/08/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/08/20110823_focuslibia_raccordo_st
retto.html
151 According to Frattini, “Mahmud Jibril è un uomo di valore. Conosce il mondo, ha lavorato e insegnato negli Stati
Uniti, parla perfettamente l'inglese. E poi è una persona pulita, uno lontano anni luce dalle corruttele del vecchio
regime”, “Mahmud Jibril is a man of value. He knows the world, he worked and taught in the US, he perfectly
speaks English. Moreover, he is a clean person, light-years away from the old regime corruption”; 26/08/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/08/20110826_pdl_non_rinuncia_suoi_punti.
ht
152 “Abbiamo scoperto Mustafa Jalil (attuale capo del Cnt n.d.r.) quando nessun altro ne aveva sentito parlare”,
Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/09/20110919_frattiniturchia.html; Partita a
scacchi sulla Libia, Giampiero Gramaglia, Affari Internazionali, 26/08/2011,
153 “Trasformare quel che piace agli occidentali in quello che piace ai libici”; Focus Libia: Frattini, raccordo stretto
Gruppo Contatto e Cnt, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 23/08/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/08/20110823_focuslibia_raccordo_st
retto.html
154 “Un atteggiamento paternalistico verso la Libia (poiché) il futuro politico del paese può e deve essere deciso solo
dal popolo libico”; Libia: L’Italia alla Conferenza internazionale per confermare gli impegni presi,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/09/20110901_italialibiaconferenza.ht
ml
50
interests in keeping dealing with whom used to be known to the Italian political class, in their
capacity of representative of the Governments operating under the Gaddafi leadership.
That was proved, for instance, by the “joint coordination board that will soon gather at the highest
political level in Tripoli, to reactivate the Italo-Lybian Treaty of Friendship: an instrument that
serves as absolutely unique the Italian position in that country. The ENI has meanwhile resumed its
own activities"155. Apparently, the NTC would have granted Italy a privileged economic position in
the country, since the Treaty of Friendship and ENI's activities could have ensured Italy to remain
one of the main, if not the main, economic player in the country. It was boasted that if Italy could be
confident about the prospect of resuming profitable relations with Libya, that was due to “the action
and to the international positioning of the Italian government during the crisis, strongly appreciated
by the new Libyan political forces” although “awaiting the formation of a transitional government,
(…) the new Libyan interlocutors could not subscribe any specific formal commitments with any
state”156. Moreover, it was emphasised how “the conditions of a limited international presence in the
immediate post-Gaddafi phase has to be considered together with and with the full participation of
the NTC”157. Perfectly aware of the NTC stance on the matter, Italy perceived to be in its interest
limiting as much as possible an eventual international presence on the Libyan soil, in the hope of
seeing the treaties adopted during the Gaddafi era re-established as soon as possible by the new
Libyan Governments. Nonetheless, a similar stance implied a NTC capable of imposing the
monopoly of power on a liberated Libya that was socially, politically and militarily fractionated158.
Counting on the NTC influence, Italy reminded how numerous and timely had been its official
steps: “it was the first European country to open a Consulate in Benghazi, Minister Frattini was the
155 “Comitato di coordinamento congiunto che si riunirà presto al più alto livello politico a Tripoli, per riattivare il
Trattato di amicizia italo-libico: uno strumento che mantiene assolutamente «unica» la posizione dell'Italia in quel
Paese. L'Eni ha intanto riavviato le proprie attività”; Missione di Frattini in Libia - L’Italia conferma il ruolo di
“principale player” del dopo-Gheddafi, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 29/09/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/09/20110929_missionelibia.html
156 “All'azione ed al posizionamento internazionale del governo italiano nella crisi, fortemente apprezzati dalle nuove
forze politiche libiche”, although “in attesa della costituzione di un governo di transizione (...)i nuovi interlocutori
libici non hanno potuto per ora sottoscrivere specifici impegni formali con alcuno Stato”; Libia: Frattini, Italia
resterà partner storico - Tutelati gli interessi della comunità imprenditoriale italiana, Approfondimenti, Ministero
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/10/20111003_italia_partner_storico.h
tml
157 “I termini di una limitata presenza internazionale nell'immediato post-Gheddafi devono essere considerati insieme e
con la piena partecipazione del Consiglio nazionale di transizione”; Libia: L’Italia alla Conferenza internazionale
per confermare gli impegni presi, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 01/09/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/09/20110901_italialibiaconferenza.ht
ml
158 The inability of the NTC in that sense certainly concurred to the poor results in terms of commercial relations
between Italy and Libya during the year 2011; see annexes n° 1 and 2.
51
first European Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit Benghazi, and Ambassador Buccino has been the
first European Head of Mission to been accepted by the Libyan authorities” 159. In sum, although
“now everybody is a father of this victory”160, the chief of the Italian diplomacy maintained that he
was the one who "believed in it since the first moment, that was our hope, that was our
commitment”161. And with reference to the fact that Frattini's visit to the liberated Libya came two
weeks after British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy travel to
that country162, the Italian Minister suggested that “our discretion did not limit the efficiency of our
action (…), we intend to continue relying above all on our soft power (...), we managed to remain
diplomatically and militarily on the first line in the international coalition and to position ourself for
a role of main player in the after-Gaddafi” 163. That would have been especially due to the fact that
"the Italian recognition of the NTC (...) was the quality leap for the Libyan revolution: Gaddafi
understood that he could not count on anybody anymore" 164, even if beyond soft power
considerations a turning point can actually be perceived in the Italian consent to participate into the
coalition air bombings. The increased international isolation that followed such a move caused the
regime to be aware that a return to the status quo ante was by then virtually unrealisable165;
nonetheless, as seen, Italy participated in the bombings only after important hesitations, since it still
believed that the Gaddafi regime could have had a role in a pacified Libya. The participation in
those air bombings, and not the fast recognition of the NTC 166, marked a point of no return in the
159 “È stato il primo Paese europeo ad aprire un Consolato a Bengasi, il Ministro Frattini è stato il primo Ministro degli
Esteri europeo a recarsi in visita a Bengasi, e l' Ambasciatore Buccino è stato il primo Capo Missione europeo a
ricevere il gradimento dalle Autorità libiche”; Assemblea Onu: fitta agenda per l’Italia a New York,
Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 16/09/2011
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/09/20110916_assembleaonu.html
160 “Ora tutti sono padri della vittoria”; FOCUS-LIBIA - Incontro Frattini-Jibril, confermati i legami Italia-Libia,
161 “Ho creduto fin dal primo momento, era la nostra speranza, era il nostro impegno”; FOCUS-LIBIA - Frattini, ora
all’Onu sventola la bandiera della libera nuova Libia, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 21/09/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/09/20110921_nuova_libia.html
162 On September 15; Libya Civil War Fast Facts, CNN, 16/04/2014, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/libyacivil-war-fast-facts/
163 “La nostra discrezione non ha limitato l'efficacia della nostra azione (…), intendiamo continuare a puntare
soprattutto sul nostro soft power (...), siamo riusciti a restare in prima linea diplomaticamente e militarmente nella
coalizione internazionale e a posizionarci per un ruolo di principale player nel dopo-Gheddafi”; Missione di Frattini
in Libia - L’Italia conferma il ruolo di “principale player” del dopo-Gheddafi, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/09/20110929_missionelibia.html
164 "Il riconoscimento italiano del Cnt (...) è stato il salto di qualità per la rivoluzione libica: Gheddafi capì che non
poteva contare più su nessuno"; Missione di Frattini in Libia: le nostre priorità sono aiutare i feriti e costruire
scuole, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 30/09/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/09/20110930_fratlibia.html
165 Libia, l’aviazione italiana può fare la differenza, Vincenzo Camporini , Affari Internazionali, 30/04/2011,
166 Italy has been the third country in the world to recognise such an entity, already in April.
52
Italian line regarding the Libyan issue as well.
According to the Italian Ambassador to Tripoli Giuseppe Buccino Grimaldi, concerning the
concrete possibilities of seeing the NTC granting order in the aftermath of the fall of Gaddafi, “we
have the right (...) of being optimist (...) because the Libyan transition for many reasons is not as
complex as it could seem if confronted to other realities” 167. Actually, the intertwined socio-political
scenario suggested already at that time that a unitary solution close to the degree of centralisation of
the Gaddafi regime was unlikely to be successful, and that at least strong autonomies should have
been granted to the different entities of the new Libyan state, without having any of them assuming
a leading role in order to avoid further contrasts 168. Moreover, should the factions that had fought
against the Gaddafi regime have refused to hand their weapons to the NTC, an external imposition
could have come only from a hardly thinkable UN Security Council agreement sided by an unlikely
NTC approval and terms169. And in fact the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected
any military personnel on the ground, as even UN observers. Since the regime’s security forces had
virtually imploded, Libya’s security therefore “fell into the hands of the multiple militias, which
continued to proliferate”170. Indeed, whilst the Libyan operation “was a military success, its political
outcome (was) yet to be determined (as) where military planning is not followed by thorough postconflict planning, the successes of the former might be easily supplanted by more challenges 171.
That was particularly true since “the Alliance paid very little attention to Libya's cultural terrain”
even if “given that the ground component was crucial to the mission’s success, cultural advice
would have made an important contribution to the general understanding of the situation within
Libya as the operation evolved”172. A similar assessment appears to be not related exclusively to the
tactical and strategical military side of the campaign, since it resulted that Italy and its partners
“tried to exorcised the (insurrection) surprise behind the democratisation rhetoric and the
167 “Noi abbiamo il diritto (...) di essere ottimisti (...) perché questa transizione libica per vari motivi non è così
complessa come potrebbe apparire rispetto ad altre realtà”; FOCUS-LIBIA: A Tripoli il nuovo ambasciatore
italiano, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 15/09/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/09/20110915_nuovoambitaliano.html
168 Scenari per il dopo Gheddafi, Vincenzo Camporini, Affari Internazionali, 26/08/2011,
169 Le priorità dell’Italia nella nuova Libia, Vincenzo Camporini, Affari Internazionali, 25/10/2011,
53
satisfaction for the absence of Islamist symbols and anti-Western slogans” 173 without a sufficient
understanding of the political and military forces within the NTC.
With the revolt of Tripoli sweeping away the last regime's resistances and the conflict coming
quickly to its close, Italy emphasised its proximity to the NTC and tried to put it in good light in
front of the international community. Motivated by the relations it entertained with some members
of the Council which used to belong to the Gaddafi establishment, Italy appeared nonetheless to
overestimate the capacities of such a body in affirming its political will and its authority and
legitimacy in the very complex socio-political Libyan environment, and also to lack the means in
order to effectively enforce its action.
173 “Ha cercato di esorcizzare la sorpresa (dell'insurrezione) dietro la retorica della democratizzazione e il
compiacimento per l'assenza di simboli islamisti o di slogan anti-occidentali”; Gianni Bonvicini, Andrea Carati,
Alessandro, Colombo, Raffaello Matarazzo and Stefano Silvestri, “Italian Foreign Policy in 2010: Continuity,
Reform and Challenges 150 Years After National Unity”, IAI, May 2011, p. 14,
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1106e.pdf
54
4.3 Sub-phase n° 3: the unsolved uncertainties
At the moment of the killing of Gaddafi in his native Sirte, on October 20, the Libyan conflict could
have been considered approaching its finish, as showed by the fact that the NATO mission came to
its predefined end few days later, on the last day of the month 174. The Italian eyes could then fully
move from the necessity of defeating whom was perceived as the major obstacle to a political
transition, to the issues concerning the reliability of the new main Libyan political actor: the NTC.
Concerning the death of the Libyan leader, according to Frattini "it has been an operation of the
NTC and of nobody else”, even if from the Italian side there has been a constant logistic support:
"even on the ground, our intelligence activity has always been present, not operatively but as a
support to the NTC activities"175. An attempt of national reconciliation deemed possible only in the
case of a Gaddafi's departure from power, Italy was understandably relief by his definitive exclusion
from the political life of the country, albeit it was acknowledged that the contrasts between the NTC
based in Benghazi and the regime based in Tripoli were due, among other factors, to the profound
differences of interests of the Cyrenaica and Tripolitania regions, and that blaming on Gaddafi alone
the causes of the conflict and of the country fragmentation would have been simplistic and
misleading. Frattini remembered also that, albeit not directly implicated in the Rais death, Italy had
played a major role in his ousting from power through intelligence support and military equipment
supply, and not just because of its participation in implementing the no-fly zone.
As it was anticipated before the death of Gaddafi, but when Tripoli had already been liberated, the
Italian line implied that “you can not miss a dictatorship but you can neither accept to have to face a
choice among two unacceptable options. The solution is only one and it is the road to
democracy”176, the latter being put in contrast against certain Islamist orientations present within the
NTC itself. Solutions that would have aimed to replicate a Gaddafi political scenario, in which the
Government should have relied on the use of force in order to preserve its power, as well as
174 Already in in the month of September the spiral drawing the regime to its total annihilation was becoming more and
more apparent; see annexes n° 7.
175 “È stata un'operazione del Cnt e di nessun altro", even if from the Italian side there had been a constant logistic
support to the rebels: “anche sul terreno, la nostra attività di intelligence è stata sempre presente, non
operativamente ma di supporto alle attività del Cnt”; Libia: Frattini, uscita di scena Gheddafi grande vittoria popolo
libico, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 20/10/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/10/20111020_libia.html
176 “Non si possono rimpiangere le tirannie ma non si può nemmeno accettare di trovarsi davanti a una scelta con due
ipotesi entrambi inaccettabili. La soluzione è una sola ed è quella della strada verso la democrazia”;
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2011/09/20110919_frattiniturchia.html
55
theocratic forms of state adverse to Western values, were categorically excluded by Italy as deemed
unfit to ensure an institution building process based on the democratic participation of the Libyan
people, which presupposed a NTC leadership backed by wide popular support. That was the only
transition considered able of bringing socio-political stability in the medium term, and therefore the
international and Italian support for the NTC was directly related to its posture in the domestic life
of the liberated country. Emphasising such a point, regarding the reintroduction of the Sharia Law
in the Libyan legal system Frattini commented that "what really matters is that the Sharia allows
freedom (…) of religion; (...) we think that the domestic choices of these countries have to be
respected, so that these choices don't run against fundamental rights as the dignity of the human
being of the rights to life. In that case, we would have the duty to manifest our positions” 177. Once
again, the principle of non-interference in a country's domestic affairs was bound to the NTC
compliance with the democratic rules in its provisional administration of the state. Had the
transitional Government acted otherwise, the consequence would have been a strong opposition
from the part of the international community, as implied by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs
with an unusually strong vocabulary. Perhaps, the peculiarities of the Libyan society, as already
highlighted by the way events had unfolded following the revolt in Benghazi and by the distance
they took from the developments of the Tunisian and Egyptian situations, should have advised
caution in imagining smooth democratic ways of life being implemented in the country and new
institutions operating with the backing of a wide popular consensus and legitimacy. In fact, similar
plans could have unlikely been implemented through repressive measures, even in the case of an
effective monopoly of the legitimate power from the part of the NTC, which was of course an
eventuality far from the reality already in the wake of the rebels' taking of Tripoli and of the death
of Gaddafi. Moreover, that would have been in contrast with the idea of Western democracy
considered the medicine against instability.
Two months after the liberation of the capital, and after having displayed a strong optimism regards
the prospect of the NTC managing the provisional power in Libya, the death of Gaddafi seemed to
put Italy in front of an undesired situation, as the hoped transition towards democracy could have
proved harder than expected. Concerned by some of the NTC orientations, Italy tried to warn it
about what it was expected from such a body, with particular emphasis on the the values that should
177 “La cosa che conta è che la Sharia lasci la libertà (…) di religione; (...) riteniamo che si debbano rispettare le scelte
interne di questi paesi, affinché queste scelte non si pongano contro i diritti fondamentali quali la dignità della
persona umana o i diritti alla vita. In quel caso avremmo il dovere di farci sentire”; Libia: diritti umani, quale ruolo
nel futuro del Paese nordafricano?, Approfondimenti, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 24/10/2011,
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/10/20111024_libia_dirittiumani.html
56
have inspire its actions and conduct. However, Italy could not possibly alter the real weight that
such a body had in the severely fragmented country, and limited itself to try to suggest the line the
NTC should have adopted.
57
4.4 Findings on the second part of the crisis
As the unprecedented and very strong Italian support to the rebels had to face an inconvenient
military situation, with the regime forces being able to hold their position, the country started
questioning the international intervention validity as well as its own strong steps taken against the
regime. In particular, its participation into the NATO mission, and its involvement in the
international coalition air bombings. But although Italy manifested its impatience regarding the lack
of decisive military results able to infringe the resistance of the Gaddafi regime, as well as in
consideration of the rebel front's fragmentation, no significant new actions were taken in order to
mark a sign of discontinuity with the political line adopted at the beginning of March. It appeared
therefore that Italy was facing an inconvenient situation without the capacity to formulate and
implement alternative policies.
With the revolt of Tripoli sweeping away the last regime's resistances and the conflict coming
quickly to its close, Italy moved from the criticism of the NATO-led operation and of the rebel front
towards an emphasis on its proximity to the NTC, trying to put it in good light in front of the
international community. Motivated by the relations it entertained with some members of the
Council which used to belong to the Gaddafi establishment, Italy appeared nonetheless to
overestimate the capacities of such a body in affirming its political will and its authority and
legitimacy in the very complex socio-political Libyan environment, and also to lack the means to
effectively enforce its action.
Finally, after having displayed a strong optimism regards the prospect of the NTC managing the
provisional power in Libya, the death of Gaddafi seemed to put Italy in front of a controversial
situation, as the hoped transition towards democracy could have proved harder than imagined.
Concerned by some of the NTC orientations, Italy tried to warn it about what it was expected from
such a body, with particular emphasis on the the values that should have inspire its actions and
conduct. However, Italy was not in a condition to alter the real weight that such a body had in the
severely fragmented country, and limited itself to indicate the NTC the line it should have adopted.
The several changes in stances that Italy undertook did not result to be backed by actions suitable to
satisfy its rhetoric. The doubts about the campaign, and its concern for the lack of decisive military
results, did not lead to concrete alterations of its policies and line, whilst the revived support for the
NTC did not confer it any particular additional capacity in managing the dramatically intertwined
Libyan situation. Therefore, beside a constantly drifting political stance suggesting per se
58
ambivalence and incertitude, the continuous Italian changes of position appeared to be marked by a
strong inconsistency between what was stated and what was then effectively done. The outcomes
were not satisfactory for the Italian interest: if the Gaddafi regime was eventually defeated, albeit in
a far longer time than had been originally expected, its departure from power and later the leader
death did not help in simplifying and solving the extremely complex Libyan socio-political
scenario, and its military divisions. If it is possible to assess that “although the Alliance’s
contribution very likely saved a large number of civilian lives, the role it played in this respect
might well be obscured by other, negative, developments 178”, a similar assumption can be arguably
made in respect to Italy as well, since “political capital was (...) squandered by the inconsistency
between the political and military levels”179. The second part of the Libyan crisis highlighted
particularly well the limits of the Italian action, and the lack of the positive outcomes the country
had awaited. Having the NATO-led mission come to its end and Gaddafi lost his power, namely the
goal of the first part of the conflict having being lately achieved, the overall situation in Libya did
not seem to allow space for any optimism from the Italian side, as that country domestic scenario
appeared to be more unstable than ever.
59
CONCLUSION
Assessing the Italian behaviour during the Libyan crisis, a deficit of understanding of the situation
as well as important lacks of linearity and numerous inconsistencies have been detected. Beside the
fragile general architecture of the Italian policies towards Libya, due to an insufficient knowledge
on the topic the reflexes of which are to be found along the whole crisis period, the Italian policies
proved to be overall ineffective.
Conclusion n° 1.
Regarding the Italian diplomatic and political rhetoric related to the Libyan crisis, the regular
pattern of its first part was replaces by an erratic one, which lasted until the end of the period of
time here considered.
It was found that during the time span running from February to May, the Italian repositioning
followed a very linear pattern. In fact, its initial cautious position was soon abandoned in order to
follow the movement of some major powers and of the international community, which imposed an
increase condemnation of the regime while at the same time an increase backing of the rebel front:
from an almost totally non-interventionist line, the Government came to implement highly
challenging decisions in order to back the Libya regime change.
However, when considering the time span running from June to October, strong non-linear patterns
characterised the Italian rhetoric. The country moved from a critical stance on the NATO-led
mission and on the rebel conduct, to a praising of the NTC structure and potentialities, for finally
openly warning it about the opposition it would have face had it disregarded the line Italy, with the
assent of the international community, wanted it to adopt and to follow in the liberated country.
Conclusion n° 2.
When considering the actual Italian actions along the crisis in relation to the country official
position, an initial consistent behaviour gave the way to a more incoherent one.
It appears that during the first part of the crisis Italy did back words with facts. Indeed, its
condemnation of the Libyan regime were followed firstly by an implementation of economic and
financial sanctions against it, and subsequently by its participation in the campaign that de facto
contrasting it, moreover with significant military means.
Regarding the the second part of the crisis time span, instead, stance changes were not supported by
60
actions suitable to satisfy their corresponding rhetoric. The doubts about the military campaign, and
the concern for the lack of decisive results, did not lead Italy to concretely modify its policies.
Instead, the country apparently awaited for developments of the situation in order to then assess a
proper reaction. When finally the rebels managed to gain the upper hand in the struggle, Italy
revived its public support for the NTC in light of the guarantees it had been given by the latter, but
was however unprepared to deal with the strong limits of the NTC itself and with the overall
unfavourable situation.
Conclusion n° 3.
Assessing the results achieved by Italy, both of the proposed subdivisions of the crisis show a lack
of understanding of the Libyan situation from the Italian side, which brought the country to
undertake commitments without obtaining the hoped outcomes.
During the first part of the crisis, the Italian willingness of positioning itself as a mediator did not
achieve any positive outcome, and soon the country was forced to opt for siding with one of the
conflicting parties; the backing of the rebels, for its part, brought neither a rapid cease of the
hostilities nor a regime fall in the short term.
Concerning the second part of the crisis, the support for the NTC actually concurred to lead to the
fragmentation of Libya, or at least was not functional in preventing it. Especially since the death of
Gaddafi and the de facto defeat of the loyalist forces, the limited preparation for a post-regime and
post-war scenario came to the light, casting a shadow on the overall Italian role in the crisis.
61
RECOMMENDATIONS
Albeit for the purpose of the present paper only the first ten months of the Libyan conflict were
taken into account, it would be appropriate to coherently link the analysis of the country's following
events with those first domestic disruptions, as in those moments the current conflicting forces of
Libya started building up a consensus basis and acquiring the necessary means to be involved in the
struggle for power that would have followed the definitive fall of Gaddafi from power. A similar
undertaking would be especially precious since a second international intervention in the country,
four years after the one that successfully helped to oust the Rais from its leading role but that led to
a prolongation of the civil war, is being insistently considered.
Another important feature of the conflict, that has probably been in part neglected by Western
analyst, had been the role and weight that the Arab countries had. Fears of a contagion of the Arab
Spring that could have potentially caused major disruptions even in the most powerful states of the
Middle East may have affect the behaviour of such players in very peculiar ways. Once again, a
thoroughly understanding of similar aspects are all the more important since a possible new
intervention in Libya should take into account those countries' positions.
Retaking Italy to the centre of the analysis, in the present domestic political conjuncture decisions
concerning foreign policy appear to be more controversial than when the first intervention in Libya
took place. The pro-European Democratic Party and its majority in the Parliament, as its coalition
Government, has to deal with strongly anti-European parties in the opposition, namely the Northern
League and the 5 Stars Movement, and can not stably rely on the then Government party, led by
Berlusconi (the People of Freedom changed its name in Forza Italia, and has in the meanwhile lost
most of its original weight in the Italian political scenario, having lost the majority in the Parliament
and the Government shortly after the end of the Libyan crisis here analysed, and without being able
to reach those positions again). Moreover, the Democratic Party leadership might be unwilling to
undertake major foreign policies' steps in a moment of severe economic crisis which sees the
electorate more disinterested
than ever in international-related issues. Arguably, a theoretical
framework willing to properly assess which steps Italy is likely to take in relation to the Libyan
question could not disregard the Italian changed political conditions that would provide the
background of, perhaps, a new military international campaign.
Finally, having the assessment of the cultural and societal Libyan situation and conditions mislead
the Italian calculations many times during the ten months analysed, the one mistake the Italian
62
diplomacy should try to avoid, even at the tremendous cost of inaction, appears to be taking
impulsive interventionist and invasive decisions. Without, first of all, a clear grasp of the actors
involved and of their inter-relations, of their capacity of gathering support and of their potential and
actual means, hardly could Italy try to predict which consequences a foreign action would produce.
Moreover, several additional variables related to the regional and international environment would
concur to influence the outcomes of possible further interventions on the Libyan soil. Nonetheless,
the point heavily stressed here is related to the understandings of the peculiar Libyan scenario,
beyond other contingent factors such as the possible international allies in the eventuality of a new
military campaign: a comprehensive knowledge of the Libyan social structure, as well as of its old
and new actors alike, is essential and indispensable and represents a priority for the definition of the
future Italian political action related to its Mediterranean neighbour.
63
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ANNEXES
Annexe No. 1: Italian Exports to Libya, 2006-2011
(Source of the data: ISTAT. Author of the graphic: Manuel Tornago)
76
Annexe No. 2: Italian Imports from Libya, 2006-2011
(Source of the data: ISTAT. Author of the graphic: Manuel Tornago)
77
Annexe No. 3: Libyan Frontlines, March 2011 (Source: NATO)
78
Annexe No. 4: NATO main airbases (Source: Flightglobal)
79
Annexe No. 5: Coalition forces and sorties flown (Source: The Guardian)
80
Annexe No. 6: Libyan frontlines, August 2011 (Source: NATO)
81
Annexe No. 7: Libyan frontlines, September 2011 (Source: NATO)
82

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