Cofelice A., Il ruolo del Consiglio diritti umani nelle crisi internazionali

CONSIGLIO DIRITTI UMANI




Istituito dall'Assemblea Generale con Risoluzione 60/251 del 15 marzo 2006
Organo sussidiario dell'Assemblea Generale, di natura intergovernativa, composto da
47 Stati membri eletti dall'Assemblea Generale a maggioranza assoluta
Mandato: “promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all” (Res 60/251 par. 2)
Funzioni:
 standard setting
 monitoraggio dei diritti umani (Special procedures: esperti tematici e per Paese)
 ricezione di reclami (claims) inerenti a specifici casi di violazione dei DU
 assistenza tecnica: a partire da Risoluzione 906 del 14 dicembre 1995
 affrontare situazioni di crisi:
■ “[...] the Council should address situations of violations of human rights,
including gross and systematic violations, and make recommendations
thereon” (Res 60/251 par. 3)
■ “respond promptly to human rights emergencies” (Res 60/251 par. 5 f)
CRISI IN LIBANO (12 luglio – 14 agosto 2006)
RISPOSTA DEL CONSIGLIO DIRITTI UMANI





11 agosto 2006: il Consiglio convoca una sessione speciale al fine di considerare la situazione in Libano ed
eventuali misure da adottare
Alto Rappresentante per i diritti umani: “There have been pressing calls for a comprehensive, high-level
inquiry into reports of serious violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law in Israel
and Lebanon to be led by internationally renowned experts. [...] Within a human rights framework, the
inquiry should be primarily concerned with the plight of the victims. It should address all violations by all
parties, and lay the foundation for possible measures of reparation and accountability”.
Approvata la Risoluzione A/HRC/S-2/1 “The grave situation of human rights in Lebanon caused by Israeli
military operations” (27 voti a favore, 11 contrari e 8 astenuti)
Par. 7: “Decides to urgently establish and immediately dispatch a high-level commission of inquiry
comprising of eminent experts on human rights law and international humanitarian law”
Decisione di 5 Special rapporteur di istituire una missione di fact finding in Libano e Israele:
■ Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions;
■ Paul Hunt, Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health;
■ Walter Kälin, Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights of internally displaced persons
■ Miloon Kothari Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate
standard of living
■ Jean Zigler, Special Rapporteur on the right to food
MANDATO
COMMISSIONE DI INCHIESTA



To investigate the systematic targeting and
killings of civilians by Israel in Lebanon;
MISSIONE DI FACT FINDING DI RAPPORTEURS

To examine the types of weapons used by Israel
and their conformity with the international law;
To assess the extent and deadly impact of Israeli
attacks on human life, property, critical
infrastructure and the environment;
14. [...] The Commission considers that any independent, impartial
and objective investigation into a particular conduct during the
course of hostilities must of necessity be with reference to all the
belligerents involved. Thus an inquiry into the conformity with
international humanitarian law of the specific acts of IDF in
Lebanon requires that account also be taken of the conduct of the
opponent.
15. That said, taking into consideration the express limitations of its
mandate, the Commission is not entitled, even if it had wished, to
construe it as equally authorizing the investigation of the actions by
Hezbollah in Israel. To do so would exceed the Commission’s
interpretative function and would be to usurp the Council’s powers.


to assess, from the perspective of international
human rights and humanitarian law as covered by
their respective mandates, the impact on the
civilian populations of the armed conflict that
affected southern Lebanon and other parts of the
country and northern Israel between 12 July and
14 August 2006;
to advise the authorities on fulfilling their
responsibility to protect and assist affected
civilians in accordance with their human rights
obligations and in light of the challenges faced by
the respective Governments
to make recommendations to United Nations
agencies and other relevant actors on how best to
address the protection needs of the people
concerned, especially the most vulnerable among
them.
CONSIDERAZIONI PRELIMINARI
Precondizioni per l'applicazione delle norme di diritto internazionale umanitario:
1. esistenza di un conflitto
2. qualificazione del conflitto (parti in causa)
1.
Un conflitto armato esiste quando: “[...] there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State” (Prosecutor v. D. Tadic, ICTY, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction of 2 October 1995, para. 70).
2. Natura sui generis del conflitto: ostilità aperte solo tra IDF e Hezbollah >> Libano è parte del conflitto?
Commissione sottolinea tre aspetti:
a) in Libano Hezbollah è un partito politico legalmente riconosciuto, con rappresentanti in Parlamento e
nell'Esecutivo: partecipa agli organi costituzionali dello Statoil comportamento di Hezbollah nel sud
del Libano suggerisce un legame implicito con il Governo libanese.
b) In assenza dell'esercito regolare libanese al sud, Hezbollah costituisce (ed è percepito dalla
popolazione) come un'espressione della resistenza per la difesa del territorio libanese parzialmente
occupato da Israele
c) lo Stato libanese è stato direttamente colpito da atti ostili perpetrati da Israele (es. blocco navale
aereo) anche se il suo esercito regolare non ha opposto resistenza: rileva l'art 2 par 2 comune alle 4
Convenzioni di Ginevra del 1949: “La Convenzione si applicherà parimenti in tutti i casi di
occupazione totale o parziale del territorio di un'Alta Parte contraente, anche se questa occupazione
non incontrasse resistenza militare alcuna”
CONSIDERAZIONI PRELIMINARI
Conclusione:
The Commission considers that both Lebanon and Israel were parties to the conflict. They remain bound by
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and customary international humanitarian law existing at the time of the
conflict. Hezbollah is equally bound by the same laws. For completeness, and as mentioned earlier, both
Israel and Lebanon are parties to the main international human rights instruments, and they remain legally
obliged to respect them.
Qualifica di Hezbollah:
In its military expression and in the light of international humanitarian law, Hezbollah constitutes an
armed group, a militia, whose conduct and operations enter into the field of application of article 4,
paragraph 2 (b), of the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949
Trattamento dei prigionieri di guerra
4. Sono prigionieri di guerra, ai sensi della presente Convenzione; le persone che, appartenendo ad una delle
seguenti categorie, sono cadute in potere del nemico: [...] 2) i membri delle altre milizie e degli altri corpi di
volontari, compresi quelli dei movimenti di resistenza organizzai, appartenenti ad una Parte in conflitto e
che operano fuori o all'interno del loro territorio, anche se questo territorio è occupato, sempreché queste
milizie o questi corpi di volontari, compresi detti movimenti di resistenza organizzati, adempiano alle
seguenti condizioni: [...] b) portino un segno distintivo fisso e riconoscibile a distanza
NORME APPLICABILI
Assunto della Commissione:
While the conduct of armed conflict and military occupation is governed by international humanitarian
law, human rights law is applicable at all times, including during states of emergency or armed conflict.
The two bodies of law complement and reinforce one another.
●
●
ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, advisory
opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 106;
ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, para. 25:
25. The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in
times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a
time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not
arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life,
however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which
is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life [...] is to be considered an arbitrary
deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed
conflict [...].
Condotta di Hezbollah:
In addition to the international treaty obligations, rules of customary international human rights and
humanitarian law bind States and other actors. In other words, all of the parties to the conflict are also
subject to customary international humanitarian law. As a party to the conflict, Hezbollah is also bound to
respect international humanitarian law and human rights.
DIRITTI UMANI NON DEROGABILI IN CASO DI CONFLITTO ARMATO
1. Diritti civili e politici
a) Patto sui Diritti civili e politici – Art. 4
1. In caso di pericolo pubblico eccezionale, che minacci l’esistenza della nazione e venga proclamato da un atto
ufficiale, gli Stati Parte possono prendere misure le quali deroghino agli obblighi imposti dal presente Patto
a) nei limiti in cui la situazione strettamente lo esiga;
b) purché tali misure non siano incompatibili con gli altri obblighi imposti dal diritto internazionale;
c) non comportino una discriminazione fondata su razza, colore, sesso, lingua, religione od origine sociale.
2. La suddetta disposizione non autorizza alcuna deroga agli articoli (tra gli altri)
6 (diritto alla vita)
7 (proibizione di tortura o altre punizioni o trattamenti crudeli, inumani o degradanti) [...]
15 (principio di legalità nel campo del diritto penale)
16. (diritto al riconoscimento della personalità giuridica) [...]
3. Ogni Stato Parte del presente Patto che si avvalga del diritto di deroga deve informare immediatamente,
tramite il Segretario Generale delle Nazioni Unite, gli altri Stati Parti del presente Patto sia delle disposizioni alle
quali ha derogato sia dei motivi che hanno provocato la deroga. [...]
Ambito territoriale di applicazione: art. 2 “Ciascuno degli Stati Parte si impegna a rispettare ed a garantire a tutti
gli individui che si trovino sul suo territorio e siano sottoposti alla sua giurisdizione i diritti riconosciuti nel
presente Patto [...]”
ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (para 111): “En
définitive. la Cour estime aue le Dacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques est applicable aux actes
d'un Etat agissant dans l'exercice de sa compétence en dehors de son propre territoire”.
(Cfr anche Comitato sui diritti civili e politici:General Comment No. 32, 26 Maggio 2004, para. 10)
DIRITTI UMANI NON DEROGABILI IN CASO DI CONFLITTO ARMATO
1. Diritti civili e politici
b) Comitato sui diritti civili e politici (Comitato diritti umani): General Comment No. 29, State
of Emergency (article 4), 31 August 2001, paras. 13-14:
13. In those provisions of the Covenant that are not listed in article 4, paragraph 2, there are elements
that in the Committee’s opinion cannot be made subject to lawful derogation under article 4. Some
illustrative examples are:
a) all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person.
b) taking of hostages, abductions or unacknowledged detention
c) the international protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities includes elements
that must be respected in all circumstances.
d) deportation or forcible transfer of population
e) propaganda for war, advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that would constitute
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.
14. Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant requires a State party to the Covenant to provide
remedies for any violation of the provisions of the Covenant. This clause is not mentioned in the list
of non-derogable provisions in article 4, paragraph 2, but it constitutes a treaty obligation inherent in
the Covenant as a whole. [...]
DIRITTI UMANI NON DEROGABILI IN CASO DI CONFLITTO ARMATO
2. Diritti economici, sociali e culturali
a) Patto sui diritti economici, sociali e culturali – Artt. 4 e 5
Articolo 4
Gli Stati Parte del presente Patto riconoscono che, nell’assicurare il godimento dei diritti in
conformità dal presente Patto, lo Stato potrà assoggettarli esclusivamente a quei limiti che
siano stabiliti per legge, soltanto nella misura in cui ciò sia compatibile con la natura di tali
diritti e unicamente allo scopo di promuovere il benessere generale in una società
democratica.
Articolo 5
1. Nessuna disposizione del presente Patto può essere interpretata nel senso di implicare
un diritto di qualsiasi Stato, gruppo o individuo di intraprendere attività o di compiere atti
miranti a sopprimere uno dei diritti o delle libertà riconosciuti nel presente Patto ovvero a
limitarlo in misura maggiore di quanto è previsto nel Patto stesso.
DIRITTI UMANI NON DEROGABILI IN CASO DI CONFLITTO ARMATO
2. Diritti economici, sociali e culturali
b) Comitato sui diritti economici, sociali e culturali: General Comment No. 14, The right to the
highest attainable standard of health (article 12), 11 August 2000, paras. 28-29:
28 [...] The Committee wishes to emphasize that the Covenant’s limitation clause, article 4, is
primarily intended to protect the rights of individuals rather than to permit the imposition of
limitations by States. Consequently a State party which, for example, restricts [...] on grounds such
as national security or the preservation of public order, has the burden of justifying such serious
measures in relation to each of the elements identified in article 4. Such restrictions must be in
accordance with the law, including international human rights standards, compatible with the nature
of the rights protected by the Covenant, in the interest of legitimate aims pursued, and strictly
necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a democratic society.
29. In line with article 5.1, such limitations must be proportional, i.e. the least restrictive alternative
must be adopted where several types of limitations are available. Even where such limitations [...]
are basically permitted, they should be of limited duration and subject to review.
PROTEZIONE DELLA POPOLAZIONE CIVILE DURANTE IL CONFLITTO
Principi
Protocollo I addizionale alle convenzioni di Ginevra del 12 agosto 1949, relativo alla protezione
delle vittime dei conflitti armati internazionali (1977)
A) In capo a chi “attacca”
1. principio di distinzione
2. principio di proporzionalità
3. obbligo di assumere misure precauzionali
- Obblighi cumulativi
- La violazione di uno di questi principi da parte
di un contendente non cambia la natura degli
obblighi che incombono sull'altra Parte
1. Principio di distinzione - Art. 48
A l l o sc o p o d i assi c u ra re i l r is pett o e l a p r o te z i o n e d e l l a p o p o la z i o n e c i v i le e d e i b e n i d i ca rattere
c i v i le, l e Pa r t i i n c o n f l i t t o d o v r a n n o f a re, i n o g n i m o m e n t o, d ist i n z i o n e f r a l a p o p o la z i o n e c i v i l e
e i c o m b a t te n t i, n o n c h é f r a i b e n i d i ca ratte re c i v i l e e g l i o b i ett i v i m i l i tar i, e, d i c o nse g ue n za,
d i r i g e re l e o p e ra z i o n i so l ta n t o c o n t r o o b i e tt i v i m i l i t a r i.
b e n i c h e p e r l o r o n a t u ra, u b i ca z i o n e, d est i n a z i o n e o i m p i e g o c o n t r i b u is c o n o ef fett i v a m e n te
al l ’az i o n e m i l i t a re, e l a c u i d ist r u z i o n e t o ta le o p a r z i a le, c o n q u ista o n e u t ra l i z za z i o n e o f f r e, n e l
cas o c o n c ret o, u n v a n ta g g i o m i l i t a re p r e c is o. (art 52 p ar. 2)
PROTEZIONE DELLA POPOLAZIONE CIVILE DURANTE IL CONFLITTO
Principi
1 . Principio di distinzione
I m p l i ca d i v i e t o d i atta c c h i i n d is c r i m i n a t i (art 5 1, p a ras 4-5) c o n c u i si i n te n d o n o:
a) q ue l l i c h e n o n so n o d i r ett i c o n t r o u n o b i et t i v o m i l i ta re d eter m i n at o;
b) q u e l l i c h e i m p i e ga n o m e t o d i o m e z z i d i c o m b a t t i m e n t o c he n o n p oss o n o essere d i r ett i c o n t r o
u n o b i e tt i v o m i l i t a re d e te r m i n a t o; o
c) q u e l l i c h e i m p i e g a n o m e t o d i o m e z z i d i c o m b a t t i m e n t o i c u i e f fett i n o n p oss o n o essere
l i m i ta t i, c o m e p r esc r i v e i l p rese n te P r o t o c o l l o, e c h e so n o, d i c o nse g ue n za, i n c iasc u n o d i ta l i
casi, att i a c o l p i r e i n d ist i n ta m e n te o b i e t t i v i m i l i ta r i e p e rs o ne c i v i l i o b e n i d i ca rattere c i v i l e.
Sa ra n n o c o ns i d e rat i i n d is c r i m i n a t i, f r a g l i a l t r i, i se g u e n t i t i p i d i attac c h i:
a) g l i atta c c h i m e d i a n te b o m b a r d a m e n t o, q u a l i c h e sia n o i m e t o d i e i m e z z i i m p i e gat i, c he
tratt i n o c o m e o b i e t t i v o m i l i t a re u n i c o u n ce r t o n u m e r o d i o b iett i v i m i l i tar i c h ia ra m e n te
d ista n z i a t i e d ist i n t i, sit uat i i n u n a c i t tà, u n p aese, u n v i l l a g g i o o i n q u a ls ias i a lt ra z o n a c he
c o n te n g a u n a c o n ce n t ra z i o n e a na l o g a d i p e rs o n e c i v i l i o d i b e n i d i carattere c i v i le; [...]
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLA Z IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
Principi
2. Principio di proporzionalità – Art 51 para. 5(b)
S o n o v i e tat i g l i atta c c h i c o n t r o o b i et t i v i m i l i ta r i l e g i t t i m i d a i q u a l i c i si p u ò atte n de re c he
p r o v o c h i n o i n c i d e n ta l m e n te m o r t i e f e r i t i f r a l a p o p o l a z i o ne c i v i l e, d a n n i ai b e n i d i ca rattere
c i v i le, o u n a c o m b i n a z i o n e d i p e r d i te u m a n e e d i d a n n i, c he r is u l tere b be r o ec cessi v i r is pett o al
v a n ta g g i o m i l i ta re c o n c r et o e d i r e tt o p r e v ist o.
3. Misure precauzionali – Art 57
C o l o r o c h e p r e pa ra n o o d e c i d o n o u n atta c c o d o v r a n n o:
i) f a re t u t t o c i ò c h e è p r a t i ca m e n te p oss i b i l e p e r ac ce rta re c he g l i o b i ett i v i da attac care n o n so n o
p e rs o ne c i v i l i n é b e n i d i ca rattere c i v i l e, m a c h e si t ratta d i o b i ett i v i m i l i ta r i;
i i) p re n d e re t u t te l e p re ca u z i o n i p r at i ca m e n te p o ssi b i l i n e l la sce lta d e i m e z z i e m e t o d i d i
attac c o , a l l o sc o p o d i e v i ta re o, a l m e n o d i r i d u r re a l m i n i m o i l n u m e r o d i m o r t i e d i f e r i t i tra la
p o p o l a z i o n e c i v i l e, n o n c h é i d a n n i a i b e n i d i ca rattere c i v i l e c he p o t re b be r o essere
i n c i d e n ta l m e n te ca usat i; [...]
Nel caso di attacchi che possono colpire la popolazione civile dovrà essere dato un
avvertimento in tempo utile e con mezzi efficaci, salvo che le circostanze lo impediscano.
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLA Z IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
Principi
B) In capo a chi difende:
● Art. 51 para 5(7)
L a p r ese n za o i m o v i m e n t i d e l l a p o p o l a z i o n e c i v i l e o d i p e rs o ne c i v i l i n o n d o v r a n n o essere
u t i l i z za t i p e r m e t te re d e te r m i n a t i p u n t i o d e ter m i n a te z o n e al r i pa r o d a o p e ra z i o n i m i l i tar i, i n
p a r t i c o l a re p e r ce r ca re d i m e t te re o b i et t i v i m i l i t a r i a l r i p a r o d a attac c h i, o d i c o p r i r e, f a v o r i re o
ostac o l a re o p e ra z i o n i m i l i ta r i. L e Pa r t i i n c o n f l i t t o n o n d o v r a n n o d i r i g e re i m o v i m e n t i de l la
p o p o l a z i o n e c i v i l e o d e l l e p e rs o n e i n m o d o d a ce r ca re d i m e t tere d e g l i o b iett i v i m i l i tar i al
r i pa r t o d a g l i atta c c h i o d i c o p r i re o p e ra z i o n i m i l i t a r i.
●
Art. 58
I n t u t ta l a m i s u ra p r at i ca m e n te p o ssi b i l e, l e Pa r t i i n c o n f l i t t o:
a) [...] f a ra n n o o g n i s f o r z o p e r a l l o n ta na re d a l l e v i c i na n ze de g l i o b i ett i v i m i l i ta r i l a
p o p o l a z i o n e c i v i l e, l e p e rs o n e c i v i l i e i b e n i d i ca rattere c i v i l e c he si tr o v a n o sott o i l l o r o
c o n t r o l l o;
b) e v i te ra n n o d i c o l l o ca re o b i e tt i v i m i l i ta r i a l l ’ i n te r n o o i n p r oss i m i tà d i z o ne d e nsa m e n te
p o p o l a te[...]
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLA Z IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
A) Libano
Se c o n d o la C o m m i ss i o n e: “Israel set certain limits on the conduct of its hostilities with Hezbollah.
The mission was informed by IDF representatives that Israel followed its practice of drawing up
lists of potential targets, with each individual target, as well as the type of weapon to be used, being
reviewed by an IDF expert in humanitarian law.”
tuttavia
“despite Israel’s stated goal of conducting hostilities within the parameters set by international
humanitarian law, the actual practice fell short in various respects, including:
1. A refusal to consistently distinguish Hezbollah fighters from civilians, including civilian
members of Hezbollah;
2. An approach to vetting targets that appears to have treated entire categories of dual-use objects
as legitimate military objectives; and
3. The reckless, perhaps even deliberately reckless, use of cluster munitions”
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLA Z IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
1. Attacchi contro la popolazione civile e altre categorie protette
●
Israel’s targeting policies:
“Targets belonging to the Hezbollah infrastructure which support the terrorist-operative
apparatus in the Shi’ite neighborhoods of south Beirut (e.g., Dahiya) and other locations in
Lebanon [are]: headquarters, offices, buildings serving Hezbollah’s various branches, leaders’
residences and the bunkers they are hiding in, as well as the organization’s ‘information’
infrastructure (Al-Manar TV) and offices of the organization’s social and financial
infrastructure”
Commissione: “Such an enumeration of permissible targets is inconsistent with the principle of
distinction. While Hezbollah was in conflict with Israel, it does not follow that every member of
Hezbollah could be justifiably targeted. Individuals do not become legitimate military objectives
unless they are combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities. Many members and
supporters of Hezbollah do not meet either criterion.[...] Various Israeli targeting decisions
operationalized this failure to distinguish military from civilian objectives”
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLAZ IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
1. Attacchi contro la popolazione civile e altre categorie protette
●
Attacchi contro convogli di civili
a) Posizione di Israele: “Israel has generally not disputed that these strikes occurred or that deaths
resulted, but it has argued that if civilian convoys were attacked it was justified by Hezbollah’s abuse
of civilian convoys to move around fighters and materiel”
b)
Commissione: “The mission could not carry out any significant fact-finding to assess whether
Hezbollah did in fact misuse the Marwahin or other convoys in this way. But it is important to note
that the answer to this question would not by itself resolve the matter. To do so Israel would need to
detail:
● how many fighters were estimated to be among the civilians,
● the kind of materiel they were transporting,
● what precautions were taken to limit the impact of the strike on the civilians in the convoy,
● the concrete and direct military advantages anticipated at the time of attack,
● how did they outweighed the expected civilian casualties, and
● whether full consideration was given to other options designed to obtain the desired military
effect.
Conclusione della Commissione: The Commission notes that civilian convoys have repeatedly been the
target of military attacks. It is clear that IDF must have known that these convoys were not a legitimate
military target, as they either had asked the civilian population to leave (Marwaheen) or were present when
the convoy left (Marjayoun). Even if there were Hezbollah members among the civilians who left the
villages in convoys, this does not justify the attacks as they would be utterly disproportionate and beyond
any concept of military necessity or the principle of distinction.
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLAZ IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
1. Attacchi contro la popolazione civile e altre categorie protette
●
Misure precauzionali
To the people of Lebanon
Pay attention to these instructions!!
The IDF will intensify its activities and will heavily bomb the entire area from which rockets are being launched
against the State of Israel.
Anyone present in these areas is endangering his life!
In addition, any pickup truck or truck travelling south of the Litani River will be suspected of
transporting rockets and weapons and may be bombed.
You must know that anyone travelling in a pickup truck or truck is endangering his life.
The State of Israel
Conclusione della Commissione:
To be truly “effective”, the message should also give the civilians clear time slots for the evacuation linked to
guaranteed safe humanitarian exit corridors that they should use. Military staff should ensure that civilians
obeying evacuation orders are not targeted on their evacuation routes. [...] A warning to evacuate does not relieve
the military of their ongoing obligation to “take all feasible precautions” to protect civilians who remain behind.
By remaining in place, the people and their property do not suddenly become military objectives which can be
attacked. The law requires the cancelling of an attack when it becomes apparent that the target is civilian or that
the civilian loss would be disproportionate to the expected military gain.
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLAZ IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
1. Attacchi contro la popolazione civile e altre categorie protette
●
Sfollati (internally displaced persons)
Conclusioni della Commissione:
“Much of the displacement in Lebanon was the result, either direct or indirect, of indiscriminate attacks on
civilians and civilian property and infrastructure, as well as the climate of fear and panic among the civilian
population caused by the warnings, threats and attacks by IDF. Furthermore, in many cases, the attacks
were disproportionate in nature and could not be justified on the basis of military necessity. Taking into
account all of these facts, the Commission notes that the displacement itself constitutes a violation of
international law.
The Commission further recalls that displaced persons are entitled to the full protection afforded under
international human rights and humanitarian law. At the same time, they have specific needs distinct from
those of the non-displaced population which must be addressed by specific protection and assistance
measures.The Commission notes that, throughout the period of the conflict, IDPs often did not have access
to humanitarian assistance to meet their needs.
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLAZ IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
1. Attacchi contro la popolazione civile e altre categorie protette
●
Attacchi contro personale medico e operatori umanitari
Conclusioni della Commissione:
[...] LRC was carrying out protection activities, as defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The vehicles used
were clearly marked with the Red Cross emblem and their operations were done in full respect of international
humanitarian law rules. The Commission did not find any evidence showing that these attacks were linked in any
way to Hezbollah military activities. The Commission finds, therefore, that all these incidents constitute a
deliberate and unjustified targeting of protected medical vehicles and personnel.
The Commission understood from all testimonies it received from a wide range of actors that free access for
humanitarian assistance for people in need had not been guaranteed during the conflict:
● First, the concurrence system adopted to satisfy IDF requirements was not adapted for an efficient
humanitarian assistance. Indeed, this procedure required from humanitarian agencies that they adapt their
work to the way in which military operations were carried out, instead of giving priority to providing
humanitarian assistance. On many occasions this meant that clearance for convoy movements was not
granted at all, or was given with such delay that the operation was no longer possible.
● In addition, on a number of occasions IDF conducted hostilities either directly against relief assistance
movements or indirectly, so that free and safe movement of humanitarian relief personnel was no longer
guaranteed.
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLAZ IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
1. Attacchi contro la popolazione civile e altre categorie protette
●
Attacchi contro i peacekeepers delle Nazioni Unite
Conclusioni della Commissione:
State practice treats United Nations peacekeeping forces as civilians because they are not members of a
party to the conflict and are deemed to be entitled to the same protection against attack as that accorded to
civilians, as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities. [...] Under the Rome Statute, (art 8 (2)(b)
(iii)) intentionally directing attacks against personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations constitutes a war crime as long as they are entitled to the
protection given to civilians and civilian objects under international humanitarian law.
The Commission has found no justification for the attacks on United Nations positions by IDF. Each United
Nations position was clearly notified to IDF. In any case the locations have been in place for many years;
they are easily recognized and built on prominent hilltop positions. There can be no doubt that both ground
and air forces of IDF would have been fully aware of their locations. Firing of rockets by Hezbollah from
the vicinity of these bases might explain the large number of “close firings” described above. However,
from an international humanitarian law perspective of military necessity, and bearing in mind the principle
of distinction, the Commission does not see how IDF can possibly justify the 30 direct attacks on United
Nations positions and the deaths and injury to protected United Nations personnel.
The Commission finds that Hezbollah fighters were using the vicinity of United Nations positions as shields
for the launching of their rockets. This is an obvious violation of international humanitarian law and also
put the United Nations forces in danger. However, “the vicinity” does not mean from within the bases [...]
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLAZ IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
1. Attacchi contro le infrastrutture civili
●
D u a l use o b je c ts
Israele: “In characterizing objects, in particular objects that serve primarily civilian purposes, as
legitimate military objectives, Israel relies heavily on the “list of categories of military objectives” included
in the ICRC Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of
War (1956).”
Commissione: “The list is relevant, but it cannot be seen as the end point of an analysis. The current legal
rule, adopted in Additional Protocol I and recognized as customary, not only requires that the targeted
objects, due to “their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action”, but
also demands that their “partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, [offer] a definite military advantage” The law in force thus imposes a test that requires an objectspecific and context-specific assessment of each target rather than a test based on an object’s generic
classification.
By using this argument, IDF simply changed the status of all civilian objects by making them legitimate
targets because they might be used by Hezbollah [...]”
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLAZ IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
3. Cluster bombs
●
●
Israele: “[...] they were the most effective weapon against Hezbollah rocket launch sites”
Conclusioni della Commissione:
This argument is, in the abstract, compatible with a military rationale for the use of anti-personnel cluster
bombs, as the radius of damage extends to the size of a football field and thus is able to neutralize mobile
rocket launchers. [...]
Regardless of whether the military rationale was sound, the use of cluster munitions was inconsistent with
principles of distinction and proportionality. Israel could not reasonably have been ignorant of the fact that
the sub-munitions dispersed by cluster munitions have a high failure (dud) rate. [...] The impact of these
bomblets would obviously be indiscriminate and the incidental effects on civilians would almost certainly
be disproportionate.[...] The mere fact that cluster munitions are not a banned weapon should not have led
Israel to overlook other requirements of international humanitarian law.
Moreover, one government official acknowledged that cluster bombs were used in part to prevent
Hezbollah fighters from returning to the villages after the ceasefire. As these sites were often located in
civilian built-up or agricultural areas, the long-term effect on the civilian population should have been
obvious.[...]
PROTEZ IONE DE L LA POPOLAZ IONE C I V I L E DURANTE I L CONFLITTO
B) Israele
●
V i o l a z i o n i d a p a rte d i H e z b o l l a h i n c l u d o n o:
a) v i o l a z i o n e d e l p r i n c i p i o d i d ist i n z i o n e (attac c h i i n d is c r i m i n a t i)
b) v i l a z i o n e d e l d i v i e t o d i ra p p resa g l i a n e i c o n f r o n t i d i c i v i l i
c) us o d i sit i c i v i l i p e r att i v i tà m i l i ta r i
It is clear that Hezbollah made at least some use of houses and other civilian sites to hide or conceal
military activities. [...] This conduct was a violation of international humanitarian law obligations.
The question of whether Hezbollah used human shields is more complicated, and the mission did not
receive clear evidence on that issue. Under international law, the term “human shield” is appropriate when
there is “an intentional collocation of military objectives and civilians or persons hors de combat with the
specific intent of trying to prevent the targeting of those military objectives” (cfr International Committee of the
Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds.),
Cambridge University Press, 2005)
This relatively precise definition of the term should be maintained, especially in light of the distinction
between war crimes and other violations of humanitarian law.
CONCLUSIONI
The mission concludes that serious violations of both human rights and humanitarian law have been committed
by Israel. Available information strongly indicates that, in many instances, Israel violated its legal obligations to
distinguish between military and civilian objectives; to fully apply the principle of proportionality; and to take all
feasible precautions to minimize injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
As a consequence, the question of its international responsibility arises. It is worth recalling that the obligation of
a State responsible for an internationally wrongful act to put an end to that act is well established in general
international law, and the existence of such a duty has been reiterated by ICJ
In many instances, Hezbollah violated the applicable principles of humanitarian law, in some cases by targeting
the civilian population in northern Israel and in others by disregarding the principle of distinction.
Inoltre:
The Commission draws the attention of the Council to the serious lacunae in international law, international
humanitarian and human rights law as regards the possibility of victims to seek and obtain reparations and
compensation. In this regard, the Commission proposes that the Council could explore possibilities aimed at the
creation of a commission competent to examine individual claims;