Italy during the Suez Crisis: the Defence of the

Italy during the Suez Crisis: the Defence
of the Atlantic and European solidarity
by Elena Biondi
The choices made in the first decade of the postwar period transformed Italy into a part of the continental safety frame and they modified its Mediterranean aspirations. The Italian ambition to play a
leading role in international politics was frustrated
by the limits set by the peace treaty signed in 1947.
The Atlantic and the European options implicated,
therefore, the restoration of national dignity in the
framework of security and western economic development, and finally the recovery of a decisionmaking role leaving behind the subordinate one. In
fact, in 1955, the Italian government took the initiative to relaunch in Messina the European process,
interrupted after the failure of the EDC. It collaborated, also, to find a solution for the crisis regarding
the management of the relationships within the allies in which the Atlantic Alliance was incurring.
The Foreign Minister Martino, co-opted in the
Committee of the “Three Wise Men”, preceded to
the examination of the possibilities of a renewal of
co-operation, considered the intensification of the
consultations as the resumption of the solidarity
among allies. This involvement in the western initiatives brought Italy to a slow but decisive reintegration in the international community: the admission
to the United Nations took place on December 14,
1955. From the allies’ point of view, Italy, from that
moment, recovered enough freedom of action to
allow itself the exploitation of potentialities that had
to be submitted to vigilant control1. Under some
aspects the clauses of the peace treaty, that were a
considerable conditioning, had also favoured an
original evolution of Italian politics, especially in the
Mediterranean. Up to then the Mediterranean politics had been an indisputable priority for Italy and
the renunciation of the colonies, also to the prefascist ones, had been lived in dramatic way. Therefore, that circumstance, differently from what could
have been imagined, had ended up in facilitating
Rome’s government by allowing the development
of friendly and commercial relations far from any
colonialist connotation2. Particularly, the relationships with Egypt showed to be more satisfactory
and were also strengthened after Colonel Nasser’s
coup. And the fact that the Italian government entertained relations especially with the countries that
freed or were freeing themselves, not without contrasts, from the Franco-British control, produced
among the European allies a climate of distrust towards Rome. In particular, the suspect fell on the oil
activity of Enrico Mattei, that showed to be able to
supplant the more seasoned competitors: the important contract for the realisation of the SuezCairo pipeline had been won by ENI over a French
offer. The increasing economic affairs in Egypt
made believe that the Italian dissent for the AngloAmerican decision to withdraw the financing of the
project of the Aswan dam was an expression of a
more and more pro-Egyptian politics. Actually, in a
letter addressed to the US Secretary of State, Dulles,
on July 25, 1956, Minister Martino expressed worry
for the consequences of the missed financing, stating that such action risked to take away Egypt and
the whole Middle East from Italian and Western influence3. Moreover, with the same letter he asked,
the Department of State, for information or useful
indications to prepare Nasser’s visit in Italy programmed for the following autumn. This witnessed
the interest for the Egyptian situation, an interest
that, besides, coincided with the inauguration, in the
presence of Nasser and Mattei, of the Suez-Cairo
pipeline. The fact that such a circumstance occurred
on the eve of the Egyptian decision to answer to the
missed American financing of the dam with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, fed the suspicion
that Italy had profited by an anticipation of the manoeuvre and had actually supported it4.
The Egyptian initiative provoked negative reactions in most of the countries interested in the transit in the important maritime way. On the contrary,
the Italian position showed a less exasperated point
of view. In fact, Segni’s government distinguished
the nationalisation issue from the right of freedom
of navigation, and showed to share only proposals
inspired to international law and not to force, an
hypothesis that, on the contrary, was not put aside
by the Anglo-French5. Also in the awareness to affirm contradictory interests, the prevailing choice –
the Atlantic one– was still the reference framework
and did not prevent from accrediting a “moderator”
position, which could express itself, with a certain
elasticity but “always in the framework of western
solidarity”6, as an autonomous diplomatic choice.
The usual and blamed routine of the preliminary
consultations of the western “directorate”, in which
Italy was not included, led to this choice7. The spirit
with which the government of Rome agreed with
the conference in London - summoned for legally
confirming the international management of the
Canal, thus taking it away from the Egyptian administration - was inspired by a closer western collaboration, that was joined to the intention to mediate between the opposite theses8. Minister Martino
envisaged to present to the London government a
proposal that considered the Egyptian point of view
as well, hence creating an opening in the AngloFrench intransigent position9. The risk was that this
autonomous position, as other signs of dissent, were
interpreted as a substantial breaking in the western
front: confirming the signal of a “crisis of the Alliance”10, pre-existing to the Egyptian crisis. Actually,
the Italian government stuck to foreign politics priorities fixed a long time before: facing divergent
demonstrations of opinion, for which, in London,
Italy worked to favour an approach, “in an extreme
case” the solidarity with the western countries
would have prevailed11. With these presuppositions,
Italy was ready to follow the American line and
consented to temporarily set aside its own proposal
of “international supervision” over the Egyptian
management of the Canal, that was certainly not in
conformity with the desires of London and Paris12.
This “reserve” amendment had to be useful, in Italian intentions, in the following phase of the negotiation that was opening in Cairo13. Despite Italy not
being included in the Canal Users’ Association
(S.C.U.A.), that was sent in the Egyptian capital to
present London’s resolutions, the Italian diplomatic
action, with Washington’s agreement, came to being
with the Egyptian government in a parallel initiative
to the mission guided by minister Menzies14.
But, the support to a dialogue between the parts
badly reconciled with the military preparation, preliminary to an action of force, that the European
allies were openly preparing15. A choice that shattered that solidarity so many times invoked: the absence of Martino from the ordinary session of the
Atlantic Council of September 4 was immediately
interpreted by the French government as an Italian
reservation to Anglo-French military measures, reservation that after all was not a surprise as in London the Italian position had perfectly been understood16. Around this event, that by itself had a relative meaning, a number of conjectures on the Anglo-French intention to exploit the authority of the
Atlantic Council was instigated, that is attributing an
extraordinary character to the Atlantic meeting,
hence, threatening, somehow, the negotiations in
progress in Egypt17. The ambassador Pietro
Quaroni saw in this, the will “to jeopardise” the allies in the action of pressure against Nasser. And in
Rome there was agreement on the fact that “to give
the impression to the Afro-Asian countries that a
possible Anglo-French Strafexpedition in Egypt was a
direct emanation of the NATO as a whole occurring under its order, was not in the West’s interest”18. By doing so, Italy exposed itself to the
pointed remarks of the English press that condemned the presuppositions of a politics exclusively
finalised to oil and commercial affairs19. This was a
prevailing opinion also at an official level. In fact,
Selwyn Lloyd, collaterally to the Atlantic Council,
announced, to the Italian representative, the intention of his own government to bring up, together
with Rome’s, the matter of the payment of the
rights of transit of the Canal. Italy –as well as the
United States– had consented to pay for the transit
in the Canal to the Egyptian corporation, thus jeopardising the perception of a western front that was
unanimously hostile to Egypt’s management20. The
Italian ambassador in Washington, Manlio Brosio,
did not see any contradiction in the Italian behaviour and declared without uncertainty that Italians
were showing to be “faithful Westerners and Atlantics”21, as the alignment with the American government was evident. But also under this aspect, Italian
politics exposed itself to the disapproval of Paris in
particular: despite the fact that the matter of the
tolls was part of the Italian trade relations routine
with Egypt, ruled by a system of clearing22, it
showed –from the Anglo-French point of view– not
to be fully in agreement with the finalities of the organisation of international management, the
S.C.U.A., launched after the failure of the Egyptian
negotiations. Hence, Italian fidelity was measured
on this further discrepancy. The distrust for its proArab attitude brought again to the explicit accusation to want “to sabotage” London’s resolutions23.
As the Italian circles found themselves at the centre
of the polemics, it was not difficult for them to understand to be the target of a resentment that had
an anti-American character24.
This character also seemed to pervade the relaunch of Europe: the Egyptian crisis ended up having the effect of a driving force for the negotiations
in progress25. If until then, the negotiation had run
up against the French preliminary question of the
Overseas Territories26, the Egyptian crisis, as a “favourable circumstance”27, had increased the pressures towards the integration effort. Unlike Rome’s
government, the other European cabinets had
shown to understand the Anglo-French worries
concerning the “Egyptian danger” and they trusted
that the integration was the solution to an Atlantic
crisis, which was at that time clear to the whole
world28. The European solution was an alternative
choice to the Atlantic pole, shaping itself as an
“autonomous force”29. At the end of September,
considering the repercussions derived by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the Mollet government underlined the urgency to conclude the Euratom treaty 30. But, the Italian judgement of this
French demonstration of European “relance” was
not very flattering; it was only a political expedient
to distract the French public opinion from the recent diplomatic failures31:
“For the French, today, the Atlantic solidarity and the European solidarity mean this. Egypt has challenged the supremacy
of the west: it must be put back in its place… (…) The
French think that if today there was Europe there would be
also Italian and German troops next to theirs in Algeria and
Cyprus. A crusade atmosphere in which Europe and the Atlantic community should globally oppose itself to the whole
world that is called coloured.” 32.
Despite the presuppositions, the meeting in Paris
(October 20, 1956) of the six countries of the
“Small Europe” did not disclose any certain European perspective yet, as at that moment, on the
Egyptian horizon, French priorities came first.
While the European negotiation was still suspended,
the French government, together with Great Britain, secretly met the Israeli representatives in Sévres
on October 22, to plan the military intervention in
the Canal area33. The Anglo-French action took
place without any consultation, without taking into
consideration the bonds of the alliance for which
the Atlantic solidarity had been invoked for the
whole summer. Facing these circumstances, the Italian government assumed a prudent but firm behaviour, thus finding in the dramatic situation the primary need, that is that of “uniting the three Great
Powers that today are deeply separated.” The Soviet
threat was such to justify solidarity also in case of
dissent.
For the first time Italy participated at the proceedings of the United Nations Assembly, but in
extraordinary international circumstances: the Egyptian crises showed to be linked to the Hungarian
one, and Italy had to play the role of “full moral responsible of the West”34. The Italian delegation
supported the “cease-fire” resolution (November 2)
and sustained the creation of the “United Nations
emergency force” (UNEF). The negative experience
of the Middle-East crisis and the concomitant
drama of the Hungarian situation brought to a request of prompt restoration of western solidarity. In
this sense, the conviction of the Soviet repression of
Hungarian democratic aspirations was supported,
with strong interventions. The Anglo-French ag-
gression too, was the object of blame: context and
motivations, however, distinguished the two crises,
and no solidarity was given to the Egyptian cause35.
The Italian diplomatic initiative was carried on in
frequent contacts with the different delegations,
while the American administration delayed the
normalisation of the relations with the two allies,
thus dangerously amplifying their isolation36. Martino had the aim “to look beyond Suez”37 and not
to exasperate the already deep contrast: for this
purpose as well, the Italian delegation at the United
Nations denied its support to the November 24
motion promoted by the Afro-Asian countries38, in
which the persistent Anglo-French breach of the
November 2, recommendation was deplored. The
“invigorating effects of fear”, that made the Atlantic
solidarity the only “factor of peace, security and
progress” - Martino wrote to Dulles - had to be
used for the consolidation of the tie39. The same
conclusion was reached at the Italo-German summit
(December 6-9), during which the two parts recognised to be united in an “active neutrality”, as the
events of the Middle East crisis had shown. The
awareness of the necessity of a “unanimous cooperation” among all the allies grew and it underlined the urgency and the opportunity to proceed
towards an integrated Europe that had to be a
“moral” force, more than an economic and military
one. This Europe had the duty to bring balance
within world politics – not as a “third power” - and
to contribute to the maintenance and to the spread
of western principles40. With this wish “to look towards the future rather than towards the past”, the
interallied meetings of the so-called “diplomatic
week” in Paris were, therefore, important appointments. Together with the promotion of the WEU
reform41, Italy also asked for an intensification of
European and Atlantic consultations, as demanded
by the Committee of the “Three Wise Man”, too.
This contribution, destined to clear up the relations
and to eliminate the fears on the break-up of the
Atlantic alliance, was sincerely appreciated by the
American administration42. The co-ordination of
western politics, as the French ambassador Fouques-Duparc noticed as well, was only the premise
to underline “the need for an European relaunch”43:
this represented the real purpose of the Italian initiative, which was also an answer to a public opinion sufficiently awakened by recent events44.
The EEC formula, approved and launched in
Rome in March 1957, aimed to fill the hiatus provoked by the colonial crisis both in terms of continental relationships, and as in the French case, in
reference to the new power relations. Therefore, it
was a new situation from which to start, in order to
face the consequences that the Suez crisis had emphasised in the Mediterranean, in the East-West re-
lationship and in the relations with Washington, in
the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as well.
Betteloni (Bonn) a MAE, telespr. 15891/2263 del 24 settembre
1956, in: ASMAE, DGAP, Egitto, b. 1061. Cf. also H. J. Küsters,
The origins of the EEC Treaty, in: Il Rilancio dell’Europa e i Trattati di
Roma, cit., p. 226.
28 Alessandrini a MAE, telegr. del 6 settembre 1956, cit.
29 Grazzi a MAE, telespr. 15979/2294 del 28 settembre 1956, in:
ASMAE, DGAP, Egitto, b. 1061.
30 P. Guillen, op. cit., p. 513.
31 Quaroni a Martino, rapp. ris. 1642 del 3 ottobre, in: ASMAE,
DGAP, Egitto, b. 1062.
32 Quaroni a Martino, lett. ris. 1716 segreto del 19 ottobre 1956,
ibidem, b. 1062.
33 H.J. Küsters, op. cit., p. 225.
34 See the interview with Martino in “Il Punto” (3 November 1956),
in Stampa e Documentazione (from now on SD), a.c. MAE, a. IX
(1956), pp. 927-928. E. Ortona, Anni d’America. La Diplomazia:
1953-1961, vol. II, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984-1986, p. 209. La posizione dell’Italia nel momento internazionale, in: Relazioni Internazionali (from
now on RI), Milano, ISPI, fasc. 45 (1956), p. 1363.
35 Martino’s declaration to ANSA on November 23, SD, p. 981.
36 The Department of State refused to meet with the allies until
their total withdrawal from Egypt:: Brosio a MAE, telespr.
16509/4109 del 15 novembre 1956, in: ASMAE, DGAP, Italia, b.
479 (Nuovo incontro tra Grandi 1956).
37 G. Martino, Per la libertà e per la pace, Florence, Le Monnier, 1957,
p. 388.
38 Resolution 1120 (XI) of 24 November 1956 adopted with con 65
votes in favour, 5 against (Australia, France, Israel, New Zealand,
United Kingdom) and 10 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, China,
Cuba, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Dominican Republic, South African Union).
39 B. Vigezzi, op. cit., p. 26. Martino a Dulles, lett. del 26 novembre
1956, in RI, fasc. 49 (1956), pp. 1550-1551.
40 RI, fasc.52 (1956), p.1635. See also the interview with Martino by
Die Welt of Hamburg (5 December 1956), in: SD, pp. 1043-1044.
41 From December 10 to 16, WEU, NATO interallied councils and
the European Council took place in Paris. Appunto riservatissimo
di Magistrati del 17 dicembre 1956 sulla conferenza della Nato, in:
ASMAE, DGAP, Italia, b. 1539. Cf. Schema di protocollo per la
modifica dell’art. 5 del Protocollo di Parigi del 23 ottobre 1954,
allegato ad appunto ris. sulla riunione del Consiglio dei Ministri
dell’UEO ibid., b. 479.
42 Appunto di conversazione Dulles-Martino del 14 dicembre 1956,
in: ASMAE, Carte di Gabinetto, b. 66.
43 Fouques Duparc à Pineau, télégramme du 6 décember 1956, in:
Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1956, tome III (24 octobre- 31 décembre 1956), Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1987-1989, p. 476.
44 E. Serra, Il rilancio dell’Europa, cit., p. 557.
27
1
B. Bagnato, La politica “araba” dell’Italia vista da Parigi (1949-1955),
in: Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 1, V, 1989, p. 155.
2 See: G. Rossi, L’Africa italiana verso l’indipendenza, 1941-1949,
Varese, Giuffrè, 1980.
3 Martino a Dulles, lettera personale 40/12165/509 del 25 luglio
1956 in: Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (from
now on ASMAE), raccolta Direzione Generale Affari Politici 195057 (from now on DGAP), fondo Egitto, b. 1050.
4 Fornari (Il Cairo) a MAE, telespresso 2118/966 del 25 luglio
1956, ASMAE, DGAP, Egitto, b. 1048.
5 Verbale Consiglio dei Ministri (31 luglio 1956), cf. B. Vigezzi, Italy
and the Problems of “Power Politics” –From the EDC Failure and the Suez
Crisis, in: Power in Europe? II. Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy
and the Origins of the EEC, 1952-1957, edit. by E. Di Nolfo, BerlinNew York, W. de Gruyter, 1992, p. 123.
6 Fornari a MAE, telegr. 16563/239 del 3 agosto e Folchi a Fornari,
telegramma 8778 dell’8 agosto 1956, ASMAE, DGAP, Egitto, rispett. b. 1062 e b. 1050.
7 Appunto del 10 agosto 1956, ibidem, b. 1058.
8 Appunto di Martino sulla riunione al Quirinale del 9 agosto 1956,
ibidem, b. 1058.
9 Appunto D.G.A.P. del 13 agosto 1956, ibidem, b. 1052.
10 Grazzi (Bonn) a MAE, telespr. 14496/1922 del 16 agosto 1956,
ibidem, b. 1061.
11 Appunto sulla conversazione telefonica tra il Presidente del Consiglio Segni e Martino, 17 agosto 1956, ibidem, b. 1053.
12 Appunto sulla proposta italiana non presentata (18 agosto 1956),
ibidem, b. 1058 and appunto sul colloquio Dulles-Martino del 20
agosto 1956, ibidem, b. 1053
13 Martino (Londra) a MAE, telegrammi 18318/214 del 20 agosto e
18225/215 del 21 agosto 1956, ibidem, b. 1062.
14 Cf. Zoppi (Londra) a MAE, tel. 19237/227 del 31 agosto 1956,
ibidem, b. 1062; Martino a Brosio (Washington), telegr. segr.
10054/408 del 6 settembre 1956, ibidem, b. 1050; Fornari a Martino,
lett. pers. 2591/1204 dell’8 settembre 1956, ibidem, b. 1062; Brosio
(Washington) a Martino, telegr. 20125/763 del 9 settembre 1956,
ibidem, b. 1063.
15 Permission was given to the French contingent to stop in Italian bases but not for war uses: Appunto sul colloquio Badini Winkler del 21 agosto 1956, ibidem, b. 1050.
16 Quaroni (Parigi) a MAE, telegr. segr. 19737/615 del 5 settembre
1956, ibidem, b. 1062.
17 Rossi Longhi a Quaroni, telegr. segr. 9989/495 del 5 settembre
1956, ibidem, b. 1050.
18 Quaroni a MAE, rapporto 1521 del 4 settembre 1956 and telegr.
segr. 19915/620 del 6 settembre 1956, ibidem, b. 1062; appunti sul
colloquio Cagiati-Le Quesne and sul colloquio Cagiati - Winkler,
del 4 settembre 1956, ibidem, b. 1053.
19 Zoppi a MAE, telespr. 4629/2847 del 6 settembre 1956, ibidem, b.
1062.
20 Alessandrini (NATO-Parigi) a MAE, telegr. segr. 19900/340 del
6 settembre 1956, ibidem, b. 1062.
21 Brosio a MAE, rapp. segr. n. 13620 del 9 settembre 1956, ibidem,
b. 1063. Cf. Zoppi a Martino, lett. del 14 settembre 1956, ibidem, b.
1062.
22 Martino a Quaroni, telegr. segr. 11436/555 del 4 ottobre, ibidem,
b. 1050.
23 Appunto di Rossi Longhi per Martino su colloquio telefonico
con Zoppi, Brosio e Quaroni del 1° ottobre 1956, ibidem, b. 1053.
24 Appunto riservatissimo s.d. [22 settembre 1956], ibidem, b. 1052.
Cf. A. Brogi, L’Italia e l’egemonia americana nel Mediterraneo, Florence,
La Nuova Italia, 1996, pp. 230-231.
25 Martino a Brosio, lett. 4/531 del 10 ottobre 1956, in: ASMAE,
DGAP, Egitto, b. 1050 e Brosio a MAE, rapp. ris. 14433 del 27
settembre 1956, ibidem, b. 1063.
26 P. Guillen, Europe as a Cure for French Impotence? The Guy Mollet
Government and the Negotiation of the Treaties of Rome, in: Power in
Europe?, cit., p. 508 and R. Girault, La France entre l’Europe et
l’Afrique, in: Il Rilancio dell’Europa e i Trattati di Roma, (ed. by E.
Serra), Milan, Giuffré, 1989, pp. 352-353; 368-370.