The biological foundations of culture and morality | SpringerLink

Rendiconti Lincei 19, 189 – 204 (2008)
DOI: 10.1007/s12210-008-0011-y
Giovanni Felice Azzone
The Biological Foundations of Culture and Morality
Received: 15 October 2007 / Accepted: 5 November 2007 – © Springer-Verlag 2008
Abstract Two aspects are discussed: first, the mechanism of learning, and
second, the generation of culture and morality. Both aspects are analyzed in
relation to the evolution of the mind-brain system. As to the first aspect, I
suggest that the use of the concept of innatism requires a re-examination of
the genome-dependent effects on the mind-brain system particularly for what
concerns the time scale of these effects. The reason is that the information in
the genome of the parents is transmitted to the embryo during fertilization of
the egg and then into the structures of neuronal cells at the very early stage of
ontogenesis, whereas organization of the mind-brain system occurs at a much
later time and after an extensive reorganization of the brain structure. The
problem is, then, that while during the early stages of the ontogenetic development the neuronal cells maintain their genome determined properties, the full
expression of these genome properties within the mind-brain organization undergo fundamental changes which depend not on the properties of the genomic
information but rather on the evolution of the operational conditions which are
generated in the brain organization and which determine the expression of the
genomic potentialities. These operational conditions may become markedly
different because of a number of on-going processes due to the formation of
new synapses, axons, dendrites and neuronal networks; these phenomena are,
to a large extent due to interaction with the environment. Using the Fodor’s
language, the effect of the innate properties over the horizontal neuronal networks (the innatism that operates during the whole ontogenesis) assumes a
much more important role in the mind-brain than in all other physiological
systems.
G.F. Azzone (B)
Dipartimento di Scienze Biomediche Sperimentali, Via G. Colombo 3, 35121 Padova, Italy
Tel.: +3904 98276052, Fax: +39 0498276049, E-mail: [email protected]
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G.F. Azzone
As to the second aspect, I suggest that the development of cultural and moral
worlds are products of the histories of human minds and societies, and depend
on the evolutionary nature of these histories. To explain the generation of these
worlds I shall discuss a basic problem. How can the neuronal networks of the
mind-brain system – usually dealing with phenomena of the natural world
and being themselves natural structures obeying the principles and rules of
the natural phenomena, where no transition from is to ought or from facts
to values is allowed – be able to generate cultural and moral concepts and
generate moral behaviours? The solution here proposed is that some sort of
modularity dominates in the whole structure of the mind-brain system and that
the effect of this modularity is that the neurophysiological processes dealing
with the processes of human cultural, moral and social life are structurally
associated with emotions, intentions and values. In brief, it is suggested that
the mind-brain systems contain, in addition to the division introduced by Fodor,
other innate types of neurophysiological processes: some types of processes
and of neuronal networks deal with the problems of the natural world and
provide answers which are right or wrong, wheras other types of processes
and neuronal networks deal with problems of human cultural and social life
and provide answers which are adapt on non-adapt. The latter types of neuronal
networks are suited to generate the cultural and moral worlds in the course of
development and evolution of the Homo sapiens sapiens species and of the
single individual.
Finally, in view of recent findings on the patterns of mental diseases and
the relations of these patterns with alterations of the frontal lobes of the mindbrain system, I suggest that the particular types of processes responsible for
the moral behaviour of human beings are localized in the frontal lobes. The
consequence is that alterations of this type of neurophysiological processes
lead to the development of various types of mental diseases.
Keywords Neurosciences, Philosophy of mind
Subject codes B18006, L25066, V23000, L13009, E31000
1 The processes of learning and the nature of culture and morality
In the present essay my attention is on two problems: the first is that of the nature
of the processes responsible for learning and for the generation of information
in the mind-brain system, whereas the second is that of the mechanisms by
which cultural and moral worlds are generated by the human mind.
The debate on the mechanisms of learning has led to conflict between the
two approaches of empirism and innatism. Is the human mind of the newborn
a tabula rasa or does the human mind use in part an innate type of knowledge?
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How do these innate types of acquisition of knowledges operate? Is there
enough information in the human genome to account for the different types
of innate knowledges? To what extent can the different types of innate human
knowledges – to be utilized in both the areas of humanities and sciences – be
attributed to the informational content of the human genome and what is the
time course of the generation of this knowledge?
For many centuries, the religious and social-cultural explanations of the
nature and development of moral principles and behaviours have been the
object of bitter discussion. The explanation by monotheistic religions is that the
nature of moral principles and behaviours depends, to a large extent, on being
human beings made at imago dei. The alternative, non-religious, explanation
aims to relate the development of moral principles and behaviours to the natural
history of human societies and individuals. I have concentrated my attention not
on the contents of culture and morality, but rather on the biological mechanisms
which underlie the cultural and moral developments of human beings and
societies: these mechanisms are the main interest of biologists as well as of
epistemologists and historians of natural sciences (Azzone GF 1999, 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005).
2 Learning of the mind-brain system: empirism or innatism?
Two lines of thinking have been developed in the last two centuries on the
mechanisms of the acquisition of human knowledge. The first line – the main
proponent of which has been the Swiss psychologist, J. Piaget – has been
indicated as the empiristic, or the tabula rasa mechanism: it is based on the
gradual acquisition of knowledge from other human beings or from the environment (Piaget J 1955; Kohlberg L 1971). In the second half of the last century,
however, a non-empirist view has obtained a considerable consensus after the
formulation of the new elaborations of Chomsky NA (1975, 2000) and Fodor
JA (1988). An important support to the innatistic theory of acquired knowledge
has been provided by the philosophers of sciences who have demonstrated the
weakness of inductivism in generating epistemology and the principles of scientific theories. This contribution has led to the general conclusion of illusion
of inductivism as a method for acquiring scientific knowledge.
Chomsky indicated that the human language is largely the result of genetic
information present in a brain structure thereafter named as the organ of language. This biological structure is responsible for the generation of universal
grammar responsible in all human beings for the learning of different types of
language. This is not incompatible with the present, generally accepted, notion
that the specific type of language, learnt by each human being, depends on the
social environment where its life and development takes place. The innatistic
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interpretation of the mechanism of language learning is in agreement with the
discovery of the anatomical area of the organ of language.
The success of Chomsky’s explanation for the mechanism of language has
favoured the elaboration of a much more complex view of the organization
of the whole mind-brain system. According to this view, this system is not at
birth a tabula rasa but is rather characterized by a variety of multiple cognition
dominia or modules. Fodor JA (1988) has suggested the presence in the mind
of two types of structures (or organizations). The first types are the vertical
structures (also denoted as the input modules), operating as Turing machines,
to which belong the organ of language, the motor systems and the perceptivesensitive systems. Each of these modules has specific and well distinguished
properties, completely isolated and independent from those of the other modules, and obey rules that are specific for each module. The scheme of the brain
modularity has become now an accepted model of the structure of the mindbrain system. More recently, it has been suggested that separation among the
modules may not be so clear cut as originally proposed and that there may
occur some sort of gradual transition from one module to another.
The second type are the horizontal systems which do not have a specific
localization in the topography of the brain because their activity is that of connecting the various input systems made by neuronal networks. The horizontal
systems deal with the more general properties of the mind, such as memory,
attention, intelligence, evaluations, conscience, and many other mental faculties. The horizontal systems are responsible for the elaboration of new ideas
and concepts based on the information provided by the modules.
The question arises as to how and when the mental structures responsible
for the innatistic properties may be utilized during development: only during
intra-uterin life or also during whole ontogenesis (and then also much later in
life)? The answer to this question may be different for the vertical and horizontal systems. In the case of the vertical systems, it is very probable that the
genomic information is transmitted very early in life and is fully in operation
during the first years of life. This is in agreement with the fact that all human
beings are capable of managing, in their basic aspects, most of the functions
of the vertical systems within the first three years after birth. The situation is
very different for the horizontal systems which must develop their much more
complex functions, such as those of memory, attention, intelligence, evaluations, conscience and many others, during life. Thus, in this case, the products
of the horizontal innatism need to be expressed during life in a very flexible
manner. This is also in agreement with the fact that the great personalities of
culture, such as artists, musicians, writers, philosophers or scientists, develop
rather slowly. The products of the horizontal systems require a suitable and
constant integration of the information coming both from outside and inside of
the mind-brain system. This integration occurs in parallel with, and is largely
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responsible for, a complex development of the personality of each human being.
3 The effects of horizontal innatism during phylogenesis and ontogenesis
The idea that biological sciences and living organisms: a) are areas of strictly
deterministic nature, b) use mechanisms not very different in principle from
those used in physics or chemistry, and c) are opened to exact predictions as
in the case of most physical processes is partially incorrect. Or, better, it may
be partially correct when the term biological sciences is used to indicate the
operations of most physiological and biochemical systems of living organisms,
for example those of the heart or kidney: but certainly is incorrect for the case
of the mind-brain system. In this case I have suggested, already several years
ago, (Azzone GF 1991, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003) that, particularly in the case
of human beings, it is important to introduce the concept of dual biological
identity in order to indicate dualism between the properties of the mind-brain
(and the immunological system) on one side and those of the other physiological systems on the other. The question arises, then, as to the implications of the
concept of dual biological identity during the various periods of development
of the mind-brain system.
The most traditional criticism to a role of innatism during the development
and evolution of mind-brain system originates from the view that the concept
of innatism implies an essentially static process which hardly fits with the
great dynamism of an organ such as the mind-brain system. Both in common
and scientific cultures, genes have often been described as fixed and static
structures, a sort of photograph of the future structural organization of the
human body and functions, capable of providing an outlook of what each
human being would become, as well as a detailed program of what are going
to be their living qualities, talent and inclinations. If one considers carefully
the origin of this view, it is easy to realize that this outlook is, however, based
on the view that the genome is a system which begins to operate immediately
after fertilization, continues its operation during pregnancy and then stops its
performance soon, or immediately after birth: in any case the genome largely
stops its operation once its information has been completely transmitted to
the newborn. Innatism is then associated with everything which takes place
mostly before birth and largely stops after birth, with the implication that what
is not completely specified by the genome before birth cannot be considered
as really innate, or completely innate. But this view is largely incorrect when
the mind-brain system is taken into consideration. First, in the case of the
mind-brain system, it is necessary to distinguish between the effects of the
genetic information on the generation of neuronal cells and the implications
of the genetic information on development of neuronal networks. Second, it
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is necessary to distinguish between the effects of innatism on the vertical and
horizontal structures of the mind-brain system, in that the concept of the role
of the genome as a rigid program is largely valid in the case of the vertical
structures (the Fodor’s modules) but not in the case of the horizontal neuronal
networks.
In brief, in the mind-brain system there are three different types of utilization of the genomic information. The first part of the information is utilized for
the generation of neuronal cells. The second part is utilized for the generation
of vertical systems, i.e. for the generation of modular systems. The third part
remains, on the other hand, in a standby situation. The reason for this delayed
effect depends on the fact that there is very little information in the DNA transmitted from the parents as to how and when the genomic information can be utilized for later development of the mind-brain system. In the mind-brain system,
from the innate point of view, what is most important for the newborn is not the
information which is transmitted at birth from the genome to all neuronal cells,
but the information which will be generated and utilized much later, say at the
moment of acquisition and development of cultural and moral knowledge. The
reason is that the information transmitted by the genome for the construction of
neuronal cells is not relevant with respect to the development of the organization of the horizontal network of the mind-brain system. The organization of the
whole neuronal network occurs at a much later time, and precisely when human
beings enter in contact with the environment; the suggested subdivision of the
whole process into several subsequent and independent stages reflects the view
that global neuronal organization is dependent partly on genomic information
and partly on specific events which take place, later in life, in the mind structure.
The interpretation of innatism in the case of development of the mind-brain system must, therefore, take into account the whole history of what has happened
not only within neuronal cells but also within their environment during the development of the brain. The problem is that, although neuronal cell properties
(genome determined) may have remained the same in principle, the potentiality
of their expression may have undergone important changes. I use the term expression in order to indicate that the operational conditions for the development
and organization of neuronal networks may have become completely different
in the time interval comprised between birth and the subsequent twenty years of
biological and, most important, cultural and moral developments. What must
be pointed out is the large amount of delayed effects because of both the interaction and transmission of information from the environment and the formation
of a very large number of new synapses and of other neuronal networks.
In brief, although the concept of innatism depends in principle on the utilization of information of genomic origin, in the case of the organization of
the mind-brain system, attention should be directed, also, toward the changes
which slowly occur within the general organization of the mind-brain system
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and which may strongly affect the expression of potential properties of the
genome. Among these changes are to be mentioned the number of synapses,
the growth of axons and dendrites which may lead to further connections
among neuronal cells, the parallel and gradual selection of various synapses
and neuronal networks and so on.
Of particular importance are also the selective processes of the neuronal
network. The generation of new synapses and neuronal networks causes in the
first phase an increase in the amount of uncertainty in the neuronal system
due to the fact that it offers a multiplicity of alternatives which may slow
down the rates of neurophysiological events. However, as it is well known, an
increase in the amount of uncertainty will tend rapidly to disappear because
of elimination of those synapses and networks which are not, or only poorly,
used during subsequent mind activity (cf also Edelman GM 1987, 1993). This
two step process - first of generation of new neuronal networks and second
of elimination of the poorly used neuronal networks – generates a mind-brain
system which tends gradually to become a very important and efficient system
of generation and selection of information.
It is easy to agree with the conclusion that the formulation of the relativity
theory elaborated by Einstein at the age of 25 years was the result of his
exceptional, innate, mental capacities (Einstein A 1950). But these capacities
were not present at birth and presumably were not present also in Einstein’s
younger age, but have been expressed only later as the result of two types of
events: one was the continuous and spontaneous reorganization of the mindbrain structures, and the other was new acquired or developed knowledge.
4 Development of the moral world: the mechanisms
Up to now the debate on nature and the consequences of evolution has been
mostly concentrated on the natural world and little attention has been paid to
the transformations of the most important evolutionary system ever, namely
that of the human mind. Only recently has attention moved from the evolution
of the natural world to that of the mind-brain system, and in particular to the
evolution of the mind-brain system which has taken place in human beings
during phylogenesis and ontogenesis. The questions requiring answer are the
following: how has evolution of the structure of the mind-brain system during
evolution of the human species occured (Gibbard A 1990)? How has it occurred
during development of the cultural and moral content of human society and
of each human being? How does it occur, during education of children, the
transformation of the mind-brain organization from a natural world, formed
by natural elements (neurons and neuronal networks), into a cultural and moral
world where objectives, intentions and values are present? What have been the
mechanisms of development of intentions and values in the descents of the
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human beings and what are the mechanisms of the development of morality in
the present members of the Homo sapiens sapiens species (Ball SW 1995)?
It cannot be disputed that children acquire their cultural and moral knowledge during interaction with adults and thus from the environment. There are,
however, two questions. The first question is that, even if children receive moral
rules from adults, assimilations of the moral rules provided by adults is not
sufficient to become a moral person. In fact, the question remains open as to the
transition from the condition of an etheronomous (or conventional) morality to
that of an autonomous morality, a transition which implies the elaboration and
unique manifestation of free will. The second question is that of the process of
transition from a society of heteronomous to autonomous morality: who has
been responsible for, or has contributed to, the development of autonomous
morality in the first descents of Homo sapiens sapiens? The non-religious explanation is that the descents of the human species have been able to elaborate
by themselves, during their natural history, the contents of their cultural and
moral worlds and that each human being is able, by using his own experience
and capacity of elaboration, to perform the transition from etheronomous to
autonomous morality. A proper answer to these questions requires, however,
knowledge of the evolutionary processes of the human mind-brain system underlying the development of cultural and moral worlds. The central question
is that of elaborating a convincing explanation for the mechanism of transition from mental systems dealing with natural facts to mental systems capable
of generating intentions and values where both are made only of neuronal
cells and networks. Neither experimental details nor general considerations or
theoretical proposals on the nature of these processes have been yet elaborated.
5 Darwin’s comments on the generation of morality
Darwin himself was always very cautious in discussing the generation of values
during biological evolution. Boniolo (2006; see also other papers in Boniolo
and deAnna, 2006) made an interesting analysis of Darwin’s contribution to
the idea of morality as a product of human evolution (see also, Dennett D
1997). First, according to Darwin, in the descents of Homo sapiens sapiens,
it is more probable that the most comfortable feelings, developed by staying
together, appeared before the rational decision of staying together was taken
(1871, p. 108). Second, an instinct of social behaviour was not sufficient for the
generation of morality: an adequate cerebral-mental development must have
occurred. Darwin’s description of the biological roots of moral capacity was
as follows: “The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable,
namely, that any animal, whatever endowed with well-marked social instincts,
the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire
a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as
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well, or nearly as well developed, as in man” (1871, p. 101). Boniolo (2006)
pointed out that Darwin did not discuss the genesis of the content of moral
principles and judgments, but only the genesis of the enabling conditions for
the capacity of formulating moral judgments and of behaving accordingly. This
means that only a posteriori we are allowed to define a certain behaviour as
"moral." This aspect is important, from the point of view of the foundations of
ethics, because it leads to an antifundamentalist and antiessentialist position
(Gould SJ 1984). In brief, Darwin did not try to naturalize the moral world, as
sometimes he has been accused, but only to understand the biological foundation for the motivation of moral behaviour, a biological foundation which may
become essential in order to remove the religious belief in the supernatural
origin of the moral world.
The final comment of Boniolo was that “in Darwin’s view – and this is
really a very strong and impressive claim – human moral capacity does not
belong to man because he is a privileged being, in whatever sense this claim
might be understood, but only because of casual and non-teleological events
that have occurred along his phylogenetic evolution [...]. It was the natural
history of our species that made us “privileged,” and not some unknown or
unknowable metaphysical property donated by some God”. Darwin’s point
of view on the nature of a moral human being is a follows: “A moral human
being is one who is capable of reflecting on his past actions and the motives of
approving of some and disapproving of others; and the fact that man is the one
being who certainly deserves this designation, is the greatest of all distinctions
between him and the lower animals (1871, p. 633)”. For Boniolo, then: “That
is, morality is not an intrinsic property of the behaviour of a living organism,
but depends on the fact that a certain act is performed by a living organism,
who has acquired the capacity of becoming a moral agent, that is, an agent
capable of moral judgments on behaviour. First, this means that, on one hand,
there are behaviours and, on the other hand, moral judgments on behaviours.
Secondly, it means that, in order to both formulate and apply moral judgments
on behaviours and to behave accordingly, one must have a suitable cerebralmental structure”. Boniolo reports that Darwin himself admits that: “I am
aware that the conclusions arrived at in this work will be denounced by some
as highly irreligious”.
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6 Cultural and moral products reflect mind operations belonging to
specific areas of the mind
My analysis of the nature of moral behaviour starts from the consideration that
human beings face two types of problems of very different nature (cf also Ruse
M 1986). The first are problems that can be defined as of qualitative character
(or intrinsically ambiguous) in that they are problems which appear to reflect
less a logical reasoning or a calculation than the search for a solution: these
are the problems of choice, culture, feeling, desire and hope. The second are
problems of quantitative character, i.e. of calculations of natural events, logical
reasoning, technology and procedure. Can these problems, of such a different
nature, be dealt with by a unique type of neurophysiological process? And if
the mechanisms are different, what is the nature of the physiological processes
capable of leading the mind to perform operations indicated as of qualitative
character (and sometimes including intentions and values) (cf also Searle R
1985, 1994, 2003)?
The two types of problems (qualitative and quantitative character, respectively) involve very different evaluation processes and responses. In the first
type of problem, indicated above as qualitative or intrinsically ambiguous, the
elaboration of several responses or choices is very common, often largely similar or equivalent among themselves. The presence of a multiplicity of responses
depends on the interactions of a particular group of neuronal networks with a
great variety of other neuronal networks possessing two types of properties:
the first property is that of being networks linked to emotions and sentiments
whereas the second property is that of being networks reflecting the result, or
memory, of preceding experiences made by the acting person. The multiplicity and possible equivalence of the responses is then the consequence of the
large number of factors which influence the thoughts of the person and their
subsequent decision. It follows that, to a large extent, the response turns out to
be adequate or non-adequate depending both on the emotional participation
and the past history of the person who makes the choice. The situation is very
different in the case of the second type of problems where elaboration has been
indicated as quantitative (but which may also be indicated as of deterministic
nature). In this case, the production of only a single or unique response is a
very common event. Clearly, in this latter case the response cannot be indicated
as adequate or not adequate but only as right or wrong (correct or incorrect).
The conclusion is that human beings deal with intrinsically different problems which require, or lead to, responses of very different nature. In order to
deal with problems of intrinsic heterogeneity, human beings must be aware of
the fact that this heterogeneity influences the mechanisms of the responses.
The point is that – with the exception of problems of strictly deterministic
nature belonging to the natural world or to the technical area – a large part
of the problems that human beings are dealing with are ambiguous in nature
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and require responses which are often evaluated with respect to their capacity
to improve adaptation to the environment. This means that the difficulties in
providing a proper response and in selecting the proper solution arise from
the qualitative nature and ambiguous character of the problem. It is the ambiguity of the problems that makes the responses open to a variety of solutions
depending on the character and emotional character of the person, on the operational conditions and on personal experiences. Often it is possible to evaluate
only a posteriori whether the response was adapt or non adapt or adequate
or non-adequate with respect either to the problem or to the character of the
person involved in the decision.
Strictly connected with the question of the intrinsic diversity of the nature
of problems is that of the mental structures which provide the response of qualitative or quantitative nature. The mental structures which provide responses
requiring a physical, chemical, biological or technological competence are
those which are involved in problems requiring a deterministic type of knowledge and reasoning: these structures operate under the guidance of rationality
and mostly within the area involved in the problems of the natural world. On
the other hand, in the case of problems of ambiguous or qualitative nature,
the mental structures providing the response are those which are more or less
influenced by the effects of emotions, motivations and of intentions and usually need the largest possible amount of information from areas internal as
well as external to the mind. It is only from the habit to deal with problems
intrinsically complex and ambiguous, the solution of which requires a multiplicity of diversified types of information, that some areas of the mind acquire
the knowledge and experience to find the solutions for problems. These areas
seem to be largely located within the cortex of the frontal lobes.
In summary, the main emphasis of this analysis is concentrated on questions of relationship: firstly, between the nature of problems and of answers,
and secondly, between the nature of problems and of areas of mental operations. The first question is that of the extent to which the different nature of
the answers reflect the different nature of the problems. In my opinion, one
thing is to provide an answer to questions concerning rational problems of
deterministic nature (problems of the natural world requiring simple answers
of the type yes-no or right-wrong) and another thing is to provide answers to
questions arising from ambiguous problems (problems which involve complex
analysis and evaluations requiring answers of the type adapt or non adapt, appropriate or not-appropriate). It is the nature of the problems which determine
the area of the mind involved in the answer: the areas of the mind-brain system
are developed to deal with problems which are, respectively, ambiguous and
qualitative or non-ambiguous and quantitative.
The second question is that of the specificity of the functions of the areas
of the mind-brain systems involved in the production of cultural and moral
thoughts and behaviours. The present proposal is that, although neuronal net-
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works are always made only of neurons, synapses, axons and dendrites, they
evolve in a different way, or direction, according to whether they reflect and
deal only with objective facts or whether they reflect and deal also with cultural
and moral thoughts and behaviours. In the latter case, and only in this case,
the neuronal networks will be associated with, and will reflect, also subjective emotions, feelings and intentions: in every human being there are, then,
neurophysiological processes which have become, for evolutionary and individual reasons, naturally associated with emotions, feelings, motivations and
objectives as well as, possibly, also to intentions and values. According to this
proposal, in the human mind-brain system, during individual brain evolution,
diversified areas of neurophysiological processes are going to develop: in some
areas the processes producing efficient causes adapt for rational reasoning and
for mental operations of deterministic nature with prevail, whereas in other areas processes motivating thoughts and behaviours and then promoting products
of cultural and moral nature will prevail.
To explain the generation of products of the cultural and moral world, no
transition from facts to values is necessary (Ball SW 1988; Collier J and Stingl
M, 1993). It is much more rational to suppose that the neurophysiological processes of the various areas, acquire during individual mind-brain evolution,
different functional properties: some neuronal networks develop the capacity
to deal with problems concerning the natural world (which are deterministic
in nature) whereas other neuronal networks will be associated with emotions,
feelings and intentions, and become then capable of elaborating cultural products and of taking moral decisions (cf Greene J 2003, for demonstration, by
imaging technique, of the involvement of emotions in moral decisions). The
enabling conditions for handling moral problems and behaviours (Boniolo G
2006) is nothing more than the generation, during evolution of the human
species and of the brain of each individual, of specialized areas of the mind
where the activities of neuronal networks are organized in such a way as to
become capable of handling emotions, feelings, motivations and intentions.
7 The pathology of frontal lobes and diseases of moral behaviour
In the field of medicine, a classical approach, which has led to some of the
greater successes in the area of hormons and vitamins, consists of modifying physiological processes by removing the organic components which are
supposed to be responsible for specific functions. Several investigators (cf
Damasio A 1994; Goldberg E 2004) have utilized a similar approach in order
to obtain more extensive information on human misbehaviours in the areas of
intentions and values.
The loss of feelings, emotions, intentions, values, and morality has been
observed in the case of damage to particular areas of the mind-brain system,
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i.e. those of the frontal lobes. These areas have been considered for a long time
as silent and inaccessible. However, the utilization of new technologies has
provided new information not only on the functions of these areas of the mindbrain system, but also on the nature of mental diseases. Crucial has been the
discovery that the frontal lobes are mainly, and perhaps the uniquely, responsible for the qualitative decisions and choices performed by human beings: the
most important function of the frontal lobe cortex is that of being responsable
for the answers provided by human beings to the problems here defined as qualitative or ambiguous. For example, one of the most common signs of dementia
is the lack of capacity to make decisions: it has been shown that the development of dementia is usually accompanied by diminished neuronal activity
coupled to diminished blood circulation in the frontal lobes. The mechanism
of dementia supports the conclusion that the main function of the frontal lobes
is that of receiving, evaluating and coordinating information received from
various areas of the mind-brain system. For these functions, the frontal lobes
have also been indicated as the managers (or the orchestra directors) of the
mind.
In the evolution of the human species, the expansion of the areas of the
frontal lobes took place later than for other areas of the brain. The frontal lobes
began to accelerate their development only in anthropomorphic apes and acquired only in recent times the role of being the area of control of intentionality
and of the capacity to predict and plan the future. Up to very recently, the texts
of neurology dedicated only a few lines to the frontal lobes. Slowly, however,
neuropathologists and psychiatrists began to understand that the coordination
of processes of the human mind in elaborating projects, aspirations and ambitions is essentially concentrated in the cortex of the frontal lobes. The whole
evolution of the human being might be, or should be considered as, the age of
the frontal lobes. According to Goldberg (2004), although the structures of the
frontal lobes possess multiple functions, the prefrontal cortex is essential in the
planning of objectives, projects and intentions of human beings. The frontal
lobes are, furthermore, responsible for the evaluation of human performances,
because they consider these performances as successes or failures on the basis
of their intentions.
Damage to the frontal lobes causes different types of diseases. One of these
diseases appears as a pseudo-depression: the patient shows a flat affective state
(as if the sense of humour had been lost) and appears to be indifferent to everything. Goldberg suggested that patients who have lesions of the frontal lobes
behave as objects of Newtonian physics in that they have lost their capacity
to initiate or terminate their performances: they always need some external
stimulus in order to do something. Schizofrenia is today considered a frontal
lobe disease. Another disease of the frontal lobes is accompanied by a lack
of morality, in that patients become devoid of moral control. The pattern is
202
G.F. Azzone
that of human beings who have lost control of their impulses and who refuse
to take into consideration the legal or moral consequences of their verbal or
material actions. Under these conditions, the patients are, in general, sexually
aggressive and perform antisocial actions.
8 From mind properties to moral behaviour
The distinction between aspects of morality, which may be considered of objective and subjective nature, respectively, has relevant implications not only in
the moral but also in the legal area. For example: are psychopaths legally and
morally responsible for their actions? According to the Psychology American
Association, the irresponsible and antisocial behaviour of psychopaths begins
in childhood and early adolescence, and continues in adulthood. Psychopaths
do not have a sense of guilt and remorse, and are unable to feel sympathy
for their victims. According to recent reports (Blair, 1995) psychopaths do
not develop anxiety when they perform immoral actions or when their transgression is punished. It has been suggested that these individuals possess a
mechanism of inhibition of violence (VIM= violence inhibition mechanism),
which is activated by a non-verbal communication of distress (for example a
sad facial expression, the appearance of tears and so on). This happens usually
between four and seven years, independently of the fact that activation of the
mechanism occurs in individuals that are actors or spectators of discomfort.
For Blair, the VIM reaction causes a rapid change of behaviour because of the
development of the moral emotion.
In cognitive sciences it is largely accepted that there is a distinction between
violation of conventions and violation of moral imperatives, where transgression of the conventions concerns violations of the uniformity of behaviour
acquired by means of social interaction. The difference in evaluation is due to
the fact that the two types of transgression depend on two different conceptual
systems. Evaluation of moral imperatives requires a reflection on previous experiences and a counter-factual reasoning. The boy considers the action which
makes another boy a victim not only an uncomfortable event but also an event
to be condemned morally, and this because he has found himself before under
the same conditions. This type of evaluation does not take place during the
transgression of conventions. According to Blair, the distinction between the
two types of transgressions is the effect of the activation of the VIM system,
a sort of conditioned reflex which is the consequence of the discomfort felt
during the observation of pain suffered by others. The development of the VIM
system may be due partly to the maturation of an innate physiological structure and partly to preceding personal experiences. Whereas a boy endowed
of the VIM system stops his aggressive actions, the boy without VIM has no
feelings of guilt and does not stop his aggressive actions. During phylogenetic
The Biological Foundations of Culture and Morality
203
and ontogenetic development, there is spontaneous maturation of the violence
inhibition mechanism and activation of the systems regulating empathic moral
emotions. The inhibitor of violence would then represent the innate, or objective, part of morality and would indicate biological predisposition which
influences what concerns human feelings of cruelty and sympathy (Azzone
GF 2003, 2005)
Recognition of the existence of conditions under which emotional and
moral behaviour have predominantly an objective nature is not in contrast with
the fact that in the majority of cases moral behaviour has a predominantly subjective nature and that moral decisions usually require subjective and complex
evaluations and judgements. This is probably the case for sexual attraction, a
phenomenon where the behaviour of human beings is always determined by
factors which are at the same time subjective and objective. But the recognition
that there are moral behaviours which may be due to different reasons and evaluations – both situations in which the moral decision is the result of perception
of moral objective values and situations in which prevail the purely subjective moral evaluation – suggests that the moral behaviour of human beings is
usually modified as a consequence of experience accumulated in life.
The problem of the extent to which the human conscience is influenced
by objective deterministic principles or by subjective moral evaluations has
relevant effects on the problems of the moral responsibility of human beings
and on the interpretation of free will limits. In fact, the interpretation of human
behaviour as partially regulated by a deterministic naturalism – and then of
forces of which human beings are not completely responsible – implies that,
in some cases or conditions, human beings may not be responsible for their
behaviour and cannot be legally condemned or punished.
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