countrywide

Commenti

Transcript

countrywide
Jan 1st—Mar 31st 2011 The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office ANSO and our donors accept no liability for
the results of any activity conducted or
A N S O Q U A R T E R LY D ATA R E P O R T Q.1 2011 omitted on the basis of this report.
-Not for copy or sale-
SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT A acks against NGOs by armed opposi on have remained stable and low throughout the Q1 (p.3), although
the overall level of incidents, including criminal acts, has grown by 38%. The criminal sector saw an increase
of 50% (p.4) with a acks by AOG increasing by a lower rate of 29% (or just four actual a acks). A total of seven persons have been killed, comparable to eight at Q1 2010, all by small arms fire either as a result of deliberate intent (mostly criminal), a personal dispute or collaterally in a acks on other targets (p.5). The percentage of total a acks occurring in the North East has jumped from 12% in 2010 to 22% this year with a
spike of incidents (mostly criminal) recently in Badakhshan; notably one of the provinces slated for early
’transi on’. The number of a acks occurring in the East has similarly jumped from 20% to 25%, mostly as a
result of a sharply deteriora ng Nangarhar province. Kine c a acks against NGOs have included improvised
explosive devices (5), rocket strikes (1), small arms fire (8) and armed robberies (6). In addi on there have
been four cases of abduc on, involving seven actual persons, all but one of which have been resolved to
date. Abduc on rates also remain consistent with 2010, which, coincidentally, also saw eight in the Q1.
The data at this stage con nues to support the conclusion that, despite an over all increase in the conflict
rate (p.8), NGOs are not rou nely targeted by the Taliban as a ma er of policy but are being impacted, as a
sta s cal inevitability, by an increase in ambient violence. ANSO currently ranks collateral damage and an
accidental strike with an IED as the highest risk factors facing the NGO community (p.6). Mi ga on strategies for these specific risks would include reduced proximity to likely targets, adop on of a low visibility
movement profile and where possible, direct access nego a ons with opposi on forces to respect neutrality.
There have been no substan al changes in the strategic environment since the last report period. The IMF
remain engaged in establishing the condi ons for their exit, with data sugges ng that their regular force interven ons have not significantly impacted AOG figh ng capacity at a strategic level. AOG a acks in Helmand province have increased by 76% over the Q1 of 2010 (p.9). As an cipated, irregular armed forces connue to develop (under the VSO/ALP rubric) well beyond the planned footprint (p.11) establishing poten al
obstacles to poli cal cohesion and state stability. Preliminary “transi on” areas have been announced, although it remains too early to judge the impact of this in the Q1 data period.
Countrywide, the number of a acks by armed opposi on has already grown by 51% (p.8) on 2010, sugges ng that AOG capacity was not significantly effected by last years IMF opera ons. We an cipate that
2011 will be the most violent year since we have been keeping records.
Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul, April 2011
The views expressed in this report remain the sole
responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ANSO donors or partners.
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 2
Part 1.
NGO TRENDS
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 3
1.1 AOG Attacks Against NGOs
ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to AOG per month, 2006 - 2011
(Includes all types of event such as kinetic, non‐kinetic, threats and abductions)
25
20
20
18
17 17
15
15
13
12
12
12
12
11
10
10
10
10
9
6
8
8
8
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
6
6
6
6
6
5
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
1
2
2
FEB
3
4
MAR
4
3
2
1
2007
2008
2009
2010
FEB
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
FEB
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
FEB
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
FEB
MAR
JAN
0
2011
AOG a acks against NGOs remain within normally low ranges, seeing a moderate rise over the Q1 period
of 2010 (up from 14 to 18, see below right). Just 35% of the total are assessed as being deliberately intended to cause harm or loss, although this count also includes many incidents which look more like
AOGs se ling personal scores than airing a grudge against the NGO. Accidents, most commonly with IED
or RPG strikes, and informa on gathering exercises, most commonly through temporary deten ons, connue to make up a large part of AOG interac on with NGOs. The data con nues to provide no evidence
of systema c or rou ne targe ng of NGOs by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA).
ANSO: Assessed cause/purpose of AOG attacks on NGOs, Q 1 2011
ANSO: AOG attacks against NGOs, Q1 only, 2008-2011
28
30
Influencing Populations
18%
Deliberate & Hostile
35%
Accidental
24%
25
20
18
17
14
15
Info Gathering
23%
10
5
0
Q1-2008
Q1-2009
Q1-2010
Q1-2011
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 4
1 . 2 G e n e r a l N G O Tr e n d s – C r i m i n a l A t t a c k s
ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to criminals per month, 2006-2011
(Includes all types of event kinetic and non‐kinetic)
12
11
10
10
9
9
9
8
9
9
8
7
7
6
6
4
2
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
3
3
3
6
5
4
3
6
5
4
3
7
6
6
6
6
5
4
7
7
7
1
1
2
3
2
1
1
0
2010
FEB
2011
While s ll low in absolute terms, there has been a slight rela ve increase in the number of crimes
against the NGO community, rising from 10 to 15 over the Q1 (below right). The rate does not exceed
longer term norms however (above) and overall NGO exposure to crime appears to be dropping. The
majority of recent a acks have been armed robberies, both at the office and at home, with vehicles ,
cash and valuable electronics being stolen. That the majority of crimes (47%) occur in the North and
North Eastern regions is certainly reflec ve of NGO density there, but it could also suggest a general
growth in criminality invoked by the widespread forma on of irregular mili as. It is in these regions
par cularly that locals have claimed irregular forces to be nothing more than sanc oned criminals.
ANSO: Types of crimes against NGO/NGO staff, Q1 2011 only
ANSO: Criminal attacks against NGOs, Q1 only, 2008-2011
2
Murder
15
16
14
Unarmed Robbery
1
14
Abduction for Ransom (Persons)
1
12
10
Non-Fatal Assault
3
10
Intimidation by IED
3
8
Armed Robbery
5
9
6
4
2
0
Q1-2008
Q1-2009
Q1-2010
Q1-2011
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
FEB
2009
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
AUG
JUN
APR
2008
MAY
FEB
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
AUG
JUN
APR
2007
MAY
FEB
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
FEB
MAR
JAN
0
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 5
1 . 3 N G O I n c i d e n t M a p p i n g — Q 1 2 0 11
ANSO: Province of serious NGO Incidents, Jan-Mar 2011
BADAKSHAN JAWZJAN KUNDUZ
BALKH TAKHAR SAMANGAN
BAGHLAN FARYAB SAR‐E‐PUL BADGHIS PARWAN KAPISA
BAMYAN LAGHMAN KABUL WARDAK
NANGAHAR
HERAT GHOR DAYKUNDI GHAZNI KHOST
URUZGAN FARAH PAKTIKA IED
ZABUL NIMROZ HELMAND Rocket
KANDAHAR
Small Arms Fire
Abduction
Armed Robbery
As usual, serious a acks have occurred in provinces assessed both as calm as well as insecure
with no specific geographic concentra on. That
IED strikes have not, so far, occurred in the
South, reflects the lack of road movement in
those areas. A larger propor on of incidents
occurred in the East as a result of a growing instability in Nangarhar, this will definitely be a
province to watch in 2011. Of the seven NGO
deaths occurring so far this year, five have been
as a result of the small arms fire incidents, a
change from last year when most were from
IEDs. Most of these deaths have been assessed
as being criminally (or personally) mo vated.
The percentage of all incidents occurring in the
North and North East has risen from 40 to 44%.
ANSO: Regional distribution of NGO attacks, Q1 2011
West
South
22%
Central
East
9%
North
North East
6%
16%
22%
25%
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 6
1.3 Security Risk Assessment Matrix (SRAM)
Likelihood
RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX (Likelihood x Impact=Risk)
Very Low
Low
Moderate
High
Very High
Impact
Very Low
1
1
2
3
3
Low
1
2
2
3
3
Moderate
2
3
3
3
4
Risk Rating
High 3
3
4
4
5
Very High
3
3
4
5
5
1
2
3
4
5
Negligible Risk
Mild Risk
Moderate Risk
Serious Risk
Unacceptably High Risk
The Security Risk Assessment Matrix is a common tool to assist NGOs in visualizing and ranking risk. The below presents our current ranking of the primary risks to NGOs, per ANSO opera onal area, along with the recommended
mi ga on tac c. We currently consider collateral damage and accidental IED strikes to be the highest ranked risks
to NGOs countrywide. NGOs might use the charts to further develop regionally specific mi ga on.
COUNTRY WIDE
Type of Incident
Collateral Damage
Accidental IED
Abduction for Interrogation Armed Robbery
Likelihood
Moderate
Moderate
High
Moderate
Impact
High
High
Low
Moderate
ANSO Risk Rating
4
4
3
3
Type of Incident
Collateral Damage
Accidental IED
Deliberate IED Armed Robbery on Road
Deliberate AOG targeting
Likelihood
Low
Low
V. Low
Moderate
V. Low
Impact
High
V. High
V.High
Moderate
V. High
ANSO Risk Rating
3
3
3
3
3
Type of Incident
Abduction at Illegal Checkpoint
Direct Attack on Vehicle/Compound
Accidental IED Collateral Damage
Armed Robbery on Road
Likelihood
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Impact
Moderate
V. High
V. High
High
Moderate
ANSO Risk Rating
3
3
3
3
2
Type of Incident
Targeted Abduction
Armed Robbery on Road
Collateral Damage
Accidental IED Deliberate AOG targeting
Likelihood
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Impact
Moderate
Moderate
High
V. High
V. High
ANSO Risk Rating
3
3
3
3
3
Type of Incident
Likelihood
High
High
Low
Low
Impact
V.High
V.High
V.High
V.High
ANSO Risk Rating
5
5
3
3
Likelihood
Very Low
Low
Moderate
Moderate
High
Impact
V.High
Moderate
V. High
Moderate
Low
ANSO Risk Rating
3
3
4
3
3
Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Avoiding proximity to targets & hardening of facilities (protection)
Use a low profile vehilce (unless your logo is recognized) & travel off peak
Establish community legitimacy & deploy staff from local area only Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
EASTERN REGION
Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Avoiding proximity to targets
Use a low profile vehilce & travel 'off peak'
Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
NORTHERN & NORTH EAST REGIONS
Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Do not carry items linking you to an NGO (sanitized)
Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'
Avoiding proximity to targets
Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
WESTERN REGION
Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Deploy staff from the local area only and establish community support
Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Avoiding proximity to targets
Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'
Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
SOUTHERN REGION
Accidental IED
Collateral Damage
Deliberate AOG targeting
Deliberate IED
Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Reduce road movements, travel low profile & "off peak"
Avoiding proximity to targets
Avoid association to IMF/GIRoA, maintain neutrality in projects
Remain neutral & outreach to AOG to promote acceptance
CENTRAL REGION
Type of Incident
Accidental IED
Accidental IDF strike
Collateral Damage
Armed Robbery on Road
Home/Office Break‐In
Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure
Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'
Avoiding proximity to targets
Avoiding proximity to targets
Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines
Guards, perimeter fence & lighting
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 7
Part 2.
State of the Conflict
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 8
2.1 AOG Initiated Attacks—Countrywide
ANSO: Total AOG initiated attacks per month, 2006‐2011
(Note: This is a clean count of AOG initiated kinetic attaks only, it does not include any criminal activity, kinetic or otherwise) 1800
1600
1541
1400
1200
1102
1093
1000
800
657
634
600
405
400
335
200
FEB
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
2010
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
JAN
MAR
DEC
FEB
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
2009
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
MAR
JAN
FEB
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
2008
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
FEB
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
2007
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
FEB
MAR
JAN
DEC
NOV
SEP
OCT
JUL
2006
AUG
JUN
APR
MAY
FEB
MAR
JAN
0
2011
AOG ini ated a acks have soared this quarter, up by 51% from last year. This ‘gain rate’ is also larger
than the 38% seen between the Q1 of 09-10. March 2011 saw 1,102 a acks, an average of 35 per day,
surpassing even the August 2009 summer peak during Presiden al elec ons. The data suggests that the
deep winter down turn (noted at Q4 2010) was simply an ordinary opera onal pause, and was not reflecve of a permanently degraded capacity as some had suggested at the me. Considering the variety of
IMF tac cs and strengths that have been brought to
ANSO: Total AOG attacks at Q1 stage only, 2007-2011
bear against the opposi on at different periods
3000
throughout the 5.2 years recorded here, it is re2700
markable how consistent the growth rate has been
2500
and suggests that we need to think beyond the linear
logic that a stronger IMF equals a weaker AOG, as
2000
1791
this is clearly not the case. Instead, it is likely that a
1500
more complex ‘co-evolu onary’ rela onship exists
1301
within which the counter-insurgency actually
1000
strengthens and exacerbates the insurgency,
707
through forced adapta on, rather than defea ng it.
434
500
The end result appears to be a perpetually esca‐
la ng stalemate which could sustain itself indefi0
Q1-2007
Q1-2008
Q1-2009
Q1-2010
Q1-2011
nitely, or un l one side, or the other, transi ons out.
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 9
2.2 AOG Initiated Attacks—Per Province
This table provides a comparison of raw AOG a ack rate data, per province, for the Q1 periods of 2010
and 2011. It shows the percentage change and the absolute figure. When using for independent analysis
readers are reminded that a low a ack volume can indicate AOG dominance and that a small absolute
change can be large when stated as a percentage. The ’average’ referred to is the 51% country rate. (p10)
140
21
33
11
58
15
326
31
58
152
93
672
128
97
55
32
43
48
249
338
55
2
23
3
22
19
7
14
46
19
16
5
0
900%
425%
175%
175%
164%
150%
122%
121%
115%
114%
90%
76%
68%
49%
45%
23%
13%
12%
9%
8%
6%
0%
0%
0%
-8%
-10%
-13%
-33%
-42%
-49%
-54%
-74%
-100%
126
17
21
7
36
9
179
17
31
81
44
291
52
32
17
6
5
5
21
26
3
2
0
0
-2
-2
-1
-7
-33
-18
-19
-14
-1
ABOVE AVERAGE GROWTH
14
4
12
4
22
6
147
14
27
71
49
381
76
65
38
26
38
43
228
312
52
0
23
3
24
21
8
21
79
37
35
19
1
BELOW AVERAGE GROWTH
PAKTYA
NURISTAN
JAWZJAN
BADAKHSHAN
FARAH
PARWAN
KHOST
BALKH
HERAT
GHAZNI
URUZGAN
HELMAND
NANGARHAR
BADGHIS
FARYAB
LAGHMAN
WARDAK
PAKTIKA
KANDAHAR
KUNAR
ZABUL
SAMANGAN
LOGAR
GHOR
KABUL
SAR-E PUL
DAYKUNDI
NIMROZ
KUNDUZ
KAPISA
BAGHLAN
TAKHAR
BAMYAN
NEGATIVE GROWTH
PROVINCE
AOG Attacks AOG Attacks Absolute Q1 2010
Q1 2011
% Change Change ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 10
2.3 AOG Initiated Attacks—Insecurity Rating
ANSO: Provincial Insecurity Rating, at Q1 2011
(Rating based on analytical assessment and not just incident rate. Total AOG attacks for 2011 indicated in map. A lack of AOG attacks can indicate uncontested AOG presence)
BADAKSHAN 11
JAWZJAN 33 RC‐
North
SAMANGAN 2
FARYAB 55 SAR‐E‐PUL 19
BADGHIS 97
BAMYAN 0
RC‐
West
HERAT 58 KUNDUZ 46
BALKH 31 TAKHAR 5 BAGHLAN 16
PARWAN KAPISA 19 LAGHMAN 15
32
KABUL 22 WARDAK 43
NANGAHAR 128
RC‐Capital
GHOR 3
DAYKUNDI 7
URUZGAN 93
FARAH 58
RC‐
East
GHAZNI 152
RC‐
South
KHOST 326
Extremely Insecure PAKTIKA 48
ZABUL 55 NIMROZ 14
HELMAND 672
Highly Insecure
KANDAHAR 249
RC‐South West
Moderately Insecure
Deteriorating
Low Insecurity The most vola le area, again, has been Loya Paktya (P2K) plus Ghazni - which corresponds to some of ISAF
RC-EAST and AOG Miramshah Shura - which has seen an averaged growth rate of 287% per province. All
four provinces in this area are ranked as “extremely insecure” and are likely to remain so throughout 2011.
The northern half of ISAF RC-EAST (Nuristan, Kunar) remains ranked as “extremely insecure”, with at least
one district (Waygal) en rely under AOG command. In the south, Uruzgan and Helmand are seeing above
average growth rates, as AOG counter ISAF offensives, while Kandahar and Zabul remain steady and Nimroz
sees decline. We con nue to rank four of the five as “highly insecure” or above, with just Nimroz being
slightly more accessible. The four provinces of the west have seen an averaged growth rate of 82% and we
rank Herat as “deteriora ng” as it is slated for early transi on while seeing a 115% increase in a acks. In
the north west, Faryab is ranked as “moderate” having the regional highest a ack rate in absolute terms.
Jawzjan and Balkh rank as “deteriora ng” due to them having the regions highest percentage growth rates
(175% & 121% respec vely). Sar-i-Pul’s Sayyad district causes it to also be ranked as “deteriora ng”. In the
north east all provinces but Badakhshan have seen lower a ack rates than Q1 last year but con nue to be
ranked as “moderate” and “deteriora ng” due to the very high likelihood of a fresh AOG campaign in Q2.
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 11
2.5 Irregular Armed Forces (IAF)
Irregular armed forces con nue to be developed, as a component of the IMF exit strategy. To deflect cri cism, all such forces are supposed to become enrolled in the MOI Afghan Local Police (ALP) program.
However, as the mapping exercise below shows, irregular armed forces are in fact mobilizing and opera ng well beyond the reach of that program, mostly at the ini a ve of local poli cal and ethnic leaders
and generally with tacit knowledge and approval from IMF (US). The phenomenon presents only minor
immediate threats to NGOs, but may lead to sub-na onal conflicts as “transi on” progresses.
ANSO: Official ALP sites, North East,
2011
Darwaz
Khwahan
Shighnan
Ragh
Chah
Shahri
Ab Shahri Buzur
Fayz Abad
Imam Sahib
Khwaja
Khwaja Ghar
Archi
Qalay‐I‐ Zal
Wakhan
Rustaq
Baharak
Taluqan
Kunduz
Kalafgan
Khan Abad
Chahar Dara
Ishkashim
Kishim
Bangi
Ali Abad
Baghlani Jadid
Baghlani Jad
Chal
Ishkamish
Jurm
Farkhar
Zebak
Burka
Baghlan
Warsaj
Nahrin
Dahana‐I‐ Ghori
Gh
Khost Wa Fir
Kuran Wa Mun
Dushi
Andarab
1. OFFICIALLY APPROVED AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE (ALP) DISTRICTS in NORTHEAST as of JAN 2011
Khinjan
Tala Wa Barf
Tala Wa Barf
ANSO: Irregular force activity, North
East, 2011
Darwaz
Khwahan
Shighnan
Ragh
Chah
Shahri
Ab Shahri Buzur
Fayz Abad
Imam Sahib
Khwaja
Khwaja Ghar
Archi
Qalay‐I‐ Zal
Wakhan
Rustaq
Baharak
Taluqan
Kunduz
Kalafgan
Khan Abad
Chahar Dara
Ishkashim
Kishim
Bangi
Ali Abad
Baghlani Jad
Ishkamish
Chal
Jurm
Farkhar
Zebak
Burka
Baghlan
Warsaj
Nahrin
Dahana‐I‐ Ghori
Gh
Khost Wa Fir
Andarab
Khinjan
Tala Wa Barf
Tala Wa Barf
Kuran Wa Munjan
Kuran Wa Mun
Dushi
2. REPORTED ACTUAL PRESENCE of IRREGULAR ARMED FORCES in NORTHEAST as of JAN 2011
ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT
Page 12
Acronyms:
IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)
AOG- Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
(Taliban); Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH)
IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)
ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)
IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)
IDF—Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)
CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike)
EOF - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop)
SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK47)
REPORT ENDS
For further information
[email protected]
© A N S O , J a n u a r y 2 0 11
This document will be stored in the public domain at
www.afgnso.org
It may be reproduced, stored or transmitted without
permission for non-commercial purposes only and with
written credit to ANSO. Where it is transmitted electronically a link should be provided to ANSO website
www.afgnso.org

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