Saleh go out! - Mauro Lovecchio

Transcript

MA International Journalism
2011
Mauro Lovecchio
Saleh go out!
!!"#$ %&‫ار‬
The Yemeni Youths revolution
SALEH GO OUT!
THE YEMENI YOUTHS REVOLUTION
By
MAURO LOVECCHIO
This dissertation is submitted to the Cardiff School of Journalism, Media &
Cultural Studies, Cardiff University, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Journalism.
September 2011
DECLARATION
C1038807
LOVECCHIO
Dr.
MAURO
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted
in candidature for any degree.
Signed ................................................................... (candidate) Date 6 September 2011
STATEMENT 1
This dissertation is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MA
Signed ................................................................... (candidate) Date . 6 September 2011
STATEMENT 2
This dissertation is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated.
Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A Bibliography is appended.
STATEMENT 3 – TO BE COMPLETED WHERE A FURTHER COPY OF THE
DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED IN AN APPROVED ELECTRONIC FORMAT I confirm that the
electronic copy is identical to the bound copy of the dissertation
STATEMENT 4
I hereby give consent for my dissertation, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for interlibrary loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.
STATEMENT 5 - BAR ON ACCESS APPROVED
I hereby give consent for my dissertation, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for interlibrary loans after expiry of a bar on access approved by the Graduate Development Committee.
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To Yemen,
the safe haven where I sought refuge many times
and many times I found myself.
To Yifan,
may our journey be the One of a life time
Alle mie nonne,
per non dimenticare mai da dove vengo
To my grandmothers,
to never forget where I come from
To those who believe things can really change
Acknowledgements
My first thought goes to Verica Rupar who, in the most difficult times of
my research was able to stand by my side as a friend even more than as a
supervisor. Meeting her was for sure one of the best experiences of this
year in Cardiff. Xвала!
I would also like to thank H.E. Ambassador Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi, a
good friend and a noble person, for all the help he has been kindly
giving.
To H.E. Mohamed Qubaty, for the long and interesting talk in London.
To Anas Al-Thawr, Mohammed Alshaibani, Muna Sarari, Abdulghani Ali,
Abdullah Shahari, each of them knows why.
To Sara Hadwin and Howard Barrell, for teaching me to distinguish what
is true from what is not, in their own very particular way.
To my friends and colleagues in Cardiff, for all the nice time spent
together. Good luck guys, to all of us!
To Dr. Sač, once more constantly on my side, pulling the strings of my
work.
To Yifan, for the breakfasts and for the laughters late at night during our
dissertation breaks. 我爱你喵!
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To my parents, my brother and my grandmother, once more supporting
me in my adventures, including those that would sound crazy to most of
the ‘normal’ people, sometime involving the purchase of a bulletproof
jacket.
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Disclaimer
The copyright of all the photos present in this dissertation belongs to the
author with the exception of the cover (PDF and hard cover version),
taken from Belal AL-Shaqaqi’s Facebook page, and those otherwise
acknowledged.
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Abstract
As the ‘Arab Spring’ swept away decades of dictatorship in Egypt
and Tunisia within days, Yemen’s fate remained uncertain for
months, with President Saleh forced to seek medical treatment in
Saudi Arabia after a deadly attack to the Presidential compound,
which beheaded the regime wounding or killing many of its most
prominent figures.
With the stories told by key figures of the opposition and of the
regime, this research draws a clearer picture of the events reshaping
the history of this strategic Middle Eastern country. It also analyses
the foreign interests in Yemen and how they are actively effecting the
current events.
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Contents
Introduction!
1
Introduction!
2
First feature: the Revolution’s background!
4
Second feature: Yemen’s geopolitical role and security issues!
5
Third feature: Interview with Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi!
6
Reflections!
6
Literature review!
8
Introduction!
9
Yemen towards modernity!
9
Origins of instability!
11
Rising of radical islamism and tribal opposition!
13
Destabilising the central government or playing its game?!
18
Rejecting the radical way!
23
Conclusions!
24
Methodology!
26
Introduction!
27
Benefits and risks of a preliminary research trip to Yemen!
28
Format of the features!
28
Research methods!
31
Discarded methods!
38
Pitch!
42
Seeds of instability !
43
Seeds of instability!
44
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Saudi Arabia playground!
Saudi Arabia playground!
To the first kilometre of dignity !
64
65
83
To the first kilometre of dignity. An interview with Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi!84
Conclusions!
Final thoughts!
Reflections !
101
102
105
Reflections!
106
Bibliography !
110
References!
111
Appendices !
121
Appendix A !
i
Appendix B!
i
Appendix C!
i
Appendix D!
i
Appendix D!
i
Appendix E!
i
viii
Introduction
)*+,*
Introduction
This dissertation intends to look at the origins and developments of the
Yemeni uprising, triggered by the outburst of the so called ‘Arab Spring’
across the Middle East and North Africa.
As the regimes started falling in Tunisia and Egypt, the Yemeni Youths
peacefully gathered in the streets and squares of the capital Sana’a and of
the main cities across Yemen.
Hundreds of thousands of educated Yemeni girls and boys crowded the
‘Change Squares’ across the country, facing the often cruel government
repression, hands in the sky, armed with their innocent and disarmingly
naive ideals, which are both their greatest strength and their biggest
weakness.
It didn’t take much time before those who were supposed to be the
strongest supporters of the revolution, the opposition parties, the
powerful General Ali Mohsen and the tribal leader Sheikh Al-Ahmar,
betrayed its ideals, promoting their own agendas, undermining the
2
success of the revolution and stranding the country in a precarious six
months stalemate.
One glaring example is the development of the committees in
Change Square. All the committees began committed to the
ideals of the movement, but unlike less influential groups such
as the cleaning crew, the security committee eventual became
a wing of the JMP. Ultimately, members ended up beating and
dispersing the very activists they were supposed to protect.
(Root, 2011)
A great part of the responsibility of the outburst of violence, at least in
Sana’a, goes to Sheikh Al-Ahmar, the powerful leader of the Hasid tribe,
the same tribe the President belongs to. After troops loyal to Saleh
attacked his residence in late May, he abandoned the non violent strategy
of the Youths, leading the way to a series of clashes with the regime
forces which left Al-Hasbah and other residential areas of the city in
ruins under the strikes of heavy artillery.
General Ali Mohsen, chief of the 1 st Armoured Division, in a press
conference announced his "peaceful support of the youth revolution".
but, according to some analysts, including Root (2011)
3
[it] was not his true motive. He joined the uprising in large
part due to a personal rift between himself and President
Saleh. He knew that his time as the top military leader was
coming to an end regardless. Not surprisingly, he has now
positioned himself and his troops ambivalently between the
revolutionaries and Vice-President Hadi, refusing to support
any particular plan or endorse youth demands.
The three parts, forming the body of this dissertation, will analyse the
events of the recent years that led to the Yemeni Revolution, the
geopolitical role of the country and the impact on the security of the
region and, to conclude, examine possible future scenarios.
First feature: the Revolution’s background
The first feature, titled “Seeds of Instability” intends to explain the
reasons behind the Yemeni revolution, through the voices of key players
from the government, the oppositions and the Youths in the square. It
will analyse the controversial role of the opposition, as seen from the
point of view of the government and the role of the regime, as perceived
by the Youths and the structured opposition.
4
It includes interviews conducted in the UK, Prague and with several
sources in Yemen, some contacted specifically for this research, some
others met in the last 10 years I have been travelling to Yemen.
Second feature: Yemen’s geopolitical role and security issues
The second feature, “Saudi Arabia playground”, deals with the hot issue
of the geopolitical role of Yemen in the Arabian peninsula.
It aims to analyse, from a security and strategic point of view, the foreign
interests in Yemen’s stability (or instability!) and its relationships with
the regional neighbours and the West.
It also looks at the role of Al-Qaeda and how relevant its threat really is.
This feature includes some interviews collected in Yemen (or better, at
Sana’a airport), including one with the local Imam of a village subject to
heavy fights and US drone attacks against ‘islamists’ believed by the
West to be affiliated to Al-Qaeda.
5
Third feature: Interview with Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi
“To the first kilometre of dignity”, reads a sign that leads to Sana’a
‘Change Square’. This feature draws possible future scenarios thanks to
the precious contribution of H.E. Ambassador Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi.
His brother, Ibrahim Al-Hamdi, was the President of Yemen before being
killed allegedly by Saudi agents. Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi pictures, in an
exclusive interview, some particular aspects of his brother’s life from a
family point of view. He reveals shocking details of his brother’s
assassination, directly involving prominent Yemeni and foreign figures
and anticipates what his role might be in the post Saleh Yemen.
Reflections
The final part of this dissertation contains some personal thoughts about
the research works.
The challenges faced during the months preceding the writing of the final
version. The reasons and the consequences of the angle and format
change.
6
From the original idea of a filmed documentary about the impact of AlQaeda on the Yemeni’s daily life, the angle shifted to a documentary on
the Youths in Change Square. Then, after the University’s decision (four
days before my scheduled departure!) to withdraw its support to my
project, I had to change format to a print based dissertation.
7
Literature review
‫د‬/‫) ا‬01‫ا‬2*
‫ب‬
Introduction
I started analysing the history of Yemen and the process leading to the
constitution of a modern state. I then examined the structure of the
Yemeni society, discovering how its tribal nature and its constant inner
conflicts have helped the growth of Al Qaeda in the region and the
formation of separatist groups. I then studied Al Qaeda’s structure and
role in the Yemeni society and its interaction with the tribal structure.
Analysing the economic system of Yemen I was able to determine the
reason why Al Qaeda’s modus operandi involves targeting tourists to
weaken the central government. Basing my hypothesis on some recent
literature and on some recent events in the Middle East, I concluded how
Al Qaeda’s support from the Yemeni population is extremely low and
how its role in the revolution is marginal.
Yemen towards modernity
Yemen, in the last forty years, has had a complex history, struggling to
unify its territory and to build stable political infrastructures.
9
The first attempts to create a modern state came with Ibrahim al-Hamdi
presidency between 1974 and 1977. As Peterson (1982 p. 145) explains
in his research,
Hamdi’s attention and energy in his first year as President was
largely channelled into redirecting the political complexion of
the state. [...] The most important legacy of the Hamdi regime
became its accomplishments in such areas as: promoting the
primacy of the centre over the periphery; providing the
institutional capacity to handle increasing demands and
requirements; improving the development infrastructure in
planning and organisation, including the launching of both the
Three-Year Plan and then the first Five-Year Plan; and
harnessing available resources for development and statebuilding. One major component of these resources was the
increase in the state’s revenues, through more effective
customs work, clever manipulation of Saudi founds intended
for current expenditure into capital improvements, and the
attraction of international development assistance from a
variety of sources”.
Still considered as one of Yemen’s most respected leaders, Hamdi’s
presidency lasted less than three years as he was killed, allegedly, by
foreign agents. Despite Al-Hamdi’s attempts to modernise the country,
major steps still needed to be taken.
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Origins of instability
The reasons for Yemen’s political instability are probably determined by
infrastructural, economic and sociological issues.
The country still lacks critical infrastructures, such as an efficient water
system. This issue is particularly relevant in the capital Sana’a and
crucial in the mountain villages. Also agriculture is badly affected and,
as Brown (2002 p. 36) writes,
in Yemen, a country of 19 million, the water table under most
of the country is falling by roughly two meters a year. Under
the capital, Sana'a, the water table is falling six meters per
year, and the aquifer will be depleted by the end of this
decade. Test wells are being drilled two kilometres deep, but
they have failed to find water.
Water shortage and inability to efficiently recycle rain waters are not the
only problems. In his report, Foppen (2002) underlines how after a major
well inventory in 1995 and in 2000,
The results showed that groundwater in the urban area was
characterised by high concentrations of almost all major
11
cations and anions due to the continuous infiltration of
wastewater into the aquifers via cesspits. [...] The modelling
studies, together with the results from the surveys, tend to
indicate that up to 12% of the current population of the city
could be dependent on contaminated groundwater for their
drinking water supply.
Without basic infrastructures it is hard for economy to develop and be
attractive to foreign investors and this situation provides feeding ground
to extremism. As Barfi (2010p. 11) reports,
only 40 percent of Yemenis have access to safe water and
about 45 percent have access to electricity. In the rural areas,
where al Qaeda has thrived, the situation is even worse. Only
33 percent there have access to piped water and 26 percent use
electricity as their main source of lightning. [...] According to
the World Bank, 70 percent of the population lives in rural
districts as opposed to only 30 percent in urban areas.
Another, and probably the main factor of political instability, is the
social structure of Yemen. The country is based on a highly conflicting
tribal system. In his book, Dresch (1993 p. 7) reports a 1986 interview
with President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
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‘To what extent has Yemen succeeded in moving from the stage
of tribalism to that of the state?’ ‘The state is part of the
tribes’, said the President, ‘and our Yemeni people is a
collection of tribes’.
Dresch (Ibid. pp. 28-29) continues explaining how
the twist to the Yemeni case, as to those in many parts of the
Middle East, is that the tribes themselves are the basis of what
power most governments have ever held. Not only have many
prominent figures in recent national politics been of tribal
background, but the tribes themselves remain important, and
one cannot follow the events of the last few decades, any more
than those of preceding centuries, without some grasp of what
the tribes amount to. [...] For others, [...] the tribes appear as
an undifferentiated bloc, marginal to the ordered affairs of
proper government.
Rising of radical islamism and tribal opposition
The often open conflict between local tribes and the central government
cleared the way to cooperation between those tribes and radical islamists
close to Al-Qaeda.
13
With a weak state and ineffective government bureaucracy
unable to provide for it citizens and protect them, the regime
has been forced to rely on powerful tribes to co-opt a
disgruntled population. To win them over, President Saleh
gives tribal elders jobs, money, and commercial opportunities
to distribute among their clansmen. In turn, these tribes fight
his political and military battles. Though this creates a
modicum functionality, it also reduces the central regime’s
influence in outlying areas. As a result, the government only
has a measure of direct control over the Sanaa-Taiz-Hudayda
triangle (Barfi, 2010p. 12).
Barfi (Ibid. p. 1) also affirms that
al Qaeda’s local affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), has sought to exploit Yemenis’ discontent and the
unstable situation there to establish a regional jihadist hub.
The troubles afflicting the country, a fertile environment for
Islamist extremism, and the regime’s decision to neglect
targeting AQAP have allowed the group to carve out a small
but lethal niche in society. It has succeeded in establishing a
solid, geographically dispersed, and decentralized
organization. Using an effective propaganda machine, it has
attracted a number of foreign jihadists, mostly Saudis. [...] In
February 2009, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair
noted, ‘Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground and
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potential regional base of operations for al-Qa’ida to plan
internal and external attacks’.
In his research, Katz (2003 p. 40) explains how
there are, of course, Yemeni Islamists who support Al Qaeda,
including some ‘Yemeni Afghans’ - Yemeni volunteers who
fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation of that
country in the 1980s and later returned home. But the strong
Al Qaeda presence in Yemen can also be traced to Yemeni
tribes that have been harbouring it in areas largely outside the
control of the Yemen government. [...] Each group that
collaborates with Al Qaeda, however, has its own particular
motivations for doing so.
The author also explains the origin of this ‘cooperation’.
It is the tribal view that the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’
- more so than common religious and ideological affinities or
hostility toward the West - that motivates certain Yemeni
tribes to cooperate with Al Qaeda. For the tribes in the Ma’rib
area, the enemy in question since the mid 1970s has been the
government in Sana’a. Further, al Qaeda is merely the most
recent in a string of ‘friends’ who have supported these tribes
against the government. Two large tribal confederations exist
in the former North Yemen: Hashid and Bakil. Each of these
15
confederations consist of many individual tribes. Tribal
conflict often occurs not just between the two confederations
but also within them. [Bakil’s] chief shaykhs can influence
[...] the individual [...] tribes, but do not control them. The
Hashid confederation is more centrally organized [...].
The only moment of cooperation appears to be during the North Yemen
revolution and the civil war (1962 and 1970). As Katz explains (Ibid. p.
41),
important elements of both the Hashid and the Bakil tribal
confederation fought with the Egyptian-backed republican
government against the Saudi-backed Yemeni royalists.
Both factions protected the first president, Qadi Abd al-Rahman AlIryani (1967-1974). As soon as Ibrahim al-Hamdi gained the presidency
with a military coup d’etat, he “ousted some of the leading Bakil sheikhs
from their positions of power ad influence within the Yemeni army and
government”.
[The president] Ali Abdallah Saleh - also a Hashidi - has ruled
since 1978 in relatively close cooperation with the Hashid
leader, Abdallah al-Ahmar. [...] A general sense has arisen
among the Bakil that government institutions have come under
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the domination of the Hashid, and that the Bekil are
discriminated against.
According to Katz (Ibid.),
Marib has been the scene of much of the Bakil opposition
activity [and Al Qaeda’s attacks against foreign tourists] not
only because it is a Bakil stronghold, but also because of its
mountainous terrain and distance from Sana’a [...] and its
tradition of lawlessness - all of which have made it a difficult
region for Sana’a to control. These factors have also made it
relatively easy for the tribes living in the area to receive
assistance from several external allies.
Al Qaeda is only the last of the supporters backing the Bakil tribe against
the government. Katz (Ibid.) explains how the Marxist South Yemeni,
between 1979 and 1982 and again after 1990, Iraq, in the ‘80s, Saudi
Arabia in response to Yemeni support to Saddam Hussain during the
Persian Gulf War, fought the government alongside with the Bakil tribes.
Katz (Ibid.) uses these examples to demonstrate how
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the tribes around Marib are not ideologically motivated: they
are willing to accept support from literally anyone - Marxist,
Baathist, royalist or Istlamist.
The author also affirms that
the tribes around Marib have learned that obtaining outside
support from Sanaa’s opponents motivates Sanaa - and perhaps
others - to provide resources to them as well. Without such
outside support, the central government has much less
incentive to take the tribes seriously. The power of the tribes,
as their leaders well know, derives from their ability to cause
trouble.
Destabilising the central government or playing its game?
Being Ma’rib one of the most popular tourist destinations in the country,
and being tourism a relevant source of income for Yemen, it results that
targeting tourists and foreigners in general, can be an effective strategy
to destabilise and weaken the government. As Barfi (2010 p. 6) affirms in
his research,
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the second generation of al Qaeda in Yemen has focused on
three targets - oil installations, tourists, and security officials.
The first two are designed to not only strike foreigners, but
also cripple the economy by paralyzing its primary hardcurrency earners.
As revealed by Enders (2002 p. 133),
the tourism sector [in Yemen] is widely seen as a potential
source of growth in the non-oil sector. It is also widely
recognized that a number of structural impediments - such as
security concerns, first and foremost, and lack of
infrastructure - constrain the attainment of this potential and
would need to be fundamentally addressed before the tourism
industry could start making a major contribution to future
economic growth and employment”.
So was writing the author at the beginning of the last decade, after few
years of relative growth in the number of visitors.
Enders (ibid.) also analyses the point of strength of the country in the
tourism sector.
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Yemen has abundant tourism resources and potential for
further growth and development. Yemen’s ancient history,
reflected in its rich and unique culture, has left a wealth of
significant archeological sites and a unique vernacular
architecture. [...] In addition to the traditional tourism
potential based on the existing historic heritage and scenic
attractions, Yemen has significant opportunities for the
development of other forms of tourism [...]. These include
trekking and mountain hiking, [...] beach resort tourism, scuba
diving and eco tourism”.
According to Enders (ibid.), Yemen has experienced a positive trend in
tourism incomes after its unification in 1990, with an increase of about
5% per year. But the civil war in 1994 and the first kidnapping of tourists
with foreign casualties in 1998, caused a major inversion in the trend.
The author also identifies several ‘structural impediments’ to the
development of the tourism sector stating how
at present, the image of Yemen in the Western world is
relatively poor and, prompted by continuos security-related
incidents, the country is often characterized in the Western
media as kidnapping and bombing prone.
20
In recent years a more relevant threat is emerging alongside the
continuous kidnappings of foreign citizens. Several terrorist attacks have
involved tourists, workers and diplomats across the country and in the
capital Sana’a, considered so far to be a safer stronghold under a strict
governmental control.
Since the first episodes occurred, “many countries, including the U.S.,
the U.K. and Japan, have advised their nationals against traveling to
Yemen” (Enders, 2002 p.136). In his research, the author estimates a
decrease of 35% in the tourist arrivals in 1999 compared to the previous
year and a drop in the occupancy rates for the two main hotels in Sana’a
of 50%. According to the same statistics, Yemenia, the state airline,
reported a loss of more than 2 million USD.
This trend seems confirmed and increased in the following years,
according to several newspaper articles lamenting the lack of foreigners
visiting the country. But in his report published on the Yemen Post, AlOmari (2008) opposes those figures stating how “Despite all the
challenges, there had been a steady increase of tourists to Yemen
especially during the mid 1990s”. Al-Omari (Ibid.) agrees that after 9/11
the tourist sector was strongly affected in Yemen.
21
Since 2001, the number of foreign tourists has seen a steep
decrease especially when foreign countries issued warnings to
their citizens advising them not to visit Yemen because it is a
high risk country. In return, Yemeni authorities have tried best
to advertise the country as a favoured tourist destination and
for that end established a separate ministry for tourism after it
was joined with culture in one ministry. Despite all these
efforts, the official campaigns achieved little success, mainly
because of the different terrorist attacks the country witnessed
and still there is no statistics about the number of tourists
visiting the country over the period 2002 to 2007.
This report is conflicting with the official figures released by the Yemeni
M i n i s t r y o f To u r i s m ( w w w. y e m e n t o u r i s m . c o m / s t a t i s t i c s / ) . T h e
government datas, on the other end, show an unlikely constant increase
in the number of foreign arrivals to Yemen, from 154.667 in 2003 to
404.497 in 2008. The statistics for the following years are not available
and I did not receive any reply to my requests from the Ministry of
Tourism.
Confirming the official figures, Ahmed Al Biel, Director of the Yemen
Tourism Promotion Board (YTPB), reports in an article published by
Yemen Today (2009b) an 11% increase in tourist arrivals from 2008. Al
22
Biel himself doubts of his own figures admitting that “this was surprising
and stated that H.E. the Minister of Tourism (MOT) Nabil al-Fakih has
asked the statistics to be reviewed”.
At this stage, the official figures appear to be unreliable and Yemeni
economy, heavily dependent on tourism, is jeopardised by political
instability.
Rejecting the radical way
According to some scholars, Yemeni society has realised the menace
posed to the Yemeni economy by AQAP and consequently its recruitment
strategies have proved largely inefficient.
Barfi (2010 p. 8) affirms that
despite its hard work, AQAP does not have deep roots in
Yemeni society. Though no scientific polling has been
conducted to gauge the group’s support within the country, the
two dozen Yemeni sources consulted for this report said they
believe that very few Yemenis support AQAP’s strategy of
targeting the regime and Westerners. The organization’s
23
underground, secretive nature is at odds with the more open
character of other jihadists whom Yemenis have frown to
admire. The lack of prominent personality in daily contact
with the public has prevented Yemenis from developing bonds
with the organization. Moreover they believe AQAP has no
political program and is simply bent on killing for sport. One
Yemeni told the author ‘They want to turn the water channels
around Old Sanaa into rivers of blood just to see how red they
get’.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it appears that,
Al Qaeda has profited from the convergence of a number of
factors to establish its stronghold in Yemen. A rebellion in the
northern provinces and a secession movement in its southern
ones have monopolized the regime’s sources (Barfi, 2010),
nevertheless, the majority of the Yemeni society does not support violent
forms of radical Islamism.
The recent protests, following the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions,
seem to confirm a general trend in the Middle East and “the point today
24
is not anymore to know if the dictatorships are the best defence against
Islamism. The Islamists have become actors in the democratic game”,
affirms Oliver Roy on Le Monde (2011). “What is the capacity of
regimes to play on traditional allegiances (the Bedouin in Jordan, the
tribes in Yemen)? How these groups can or not to tap into this demand
for democracy and become actors?”, asks the author.
The answers to these questions will probably also be the answer to the
future of a country where foreign interests have always played a pivotal
role, shaping its society and its economy, and finally triggering and
driving the Yemeni version of the Arab spring.
25
Methodology
)34567‫ا‬
Introduction
The methodology for my research has been changing frequently since the
beginning of the course, as the events in Yemen have been extremely
fluid. This absolute uncertainty does inevitably reflect on the structure of
the work, forcing a constant change and adapting to the new situation.
The entire structure of the dissertation changed several times and the
format was shifted from a filmed documentary to a print based
dissertation. Even though certain research methods should remain
constant, the environmental risks might be too high for some other which
would require operating on the field.
The research question has shifted in the past few months as both the
political and security situations in the country have changed
significantly, and new and more news-worthy aspects have emerged.
The first angle of the dissertation focused on the impact of the AlQaeda’s threat on the Yemeni local economy. Still being an interesting
topic, it has become outdated as the events in Yemen have changed, with
the emerging of a student-led revolutionary group aiming at peacefully
27
subverting the president Ali Abdullah Saleh, in power for more than
thirty years.
Benefits and risks of a preliminary research trip to Yemen
I tried to organise a preliminary research on the ground, being aware of
several critical points of travelling to Yemen, mostly related with the
security conditions in the country.
A crucial aspect was the possibility to be arrested and deported at my
arrival at Sana’a airport, as occurred to several international journalists,
including a CNN reporter a few days before. As revealed to me by a
Yemeni diplomatic source, no foreigners were allowed in the country at
the moment.
Format of the features
The analytical features targets an international public with general
interest in the Middle East. It is targeted for the audience of publications
such as Le Monde Diplomatique.
28
The three features cover three different aspects of the current situation in
Yemen.
The first one shows the background that lead to the Yemeni revolution. It
analyses the social structure of the country and the tensions within the
political players.
The second feature intends to analyse the role of Yemen in the regional
security contest. It studies the role and the impact of Al Qaeda and its
real relevance in the social arena. It shows how its role has been often
inflated by the media and by the political actors at their own
convenience.
The third, and probably most problematic feature, intends to explore the
possible scenarios for the country. How the situation can evolve and what
would be the consequences in terms of stability in the macro-region.
Through some of the interview will emerge the strong desire of
emancipation of the young generations, in a country where girls are
usually relegated to a more hidden role.
29
As one of the sources of inspiration, I use the footage of the programme
“Egypt seeds of change”, by Elyzabeth Jones (2011), broadcasted in the
series “People and Power” on Al-Jazeera English. In her documentary,
Jones follows the organisation of the Egyptian youth movement “6 April”
and explains how they started the revolution and how they took
inspiration from, and were trained by, the movement “Otpor!”, which in
October 2000 contributed in overthrowing Slobodan Milošević’s regime.
Another inspiring documentary is “Growing up in a war zone”, by Sonali
Shah (2011), broadcasted by BBC Newsround. The author portrays the
life of children in the “post war” Afghanistan. I found particularly
interesting the use of pictures and the style of the pieces to camera.
A great contribution to my research comes from Yemeni diplomatic
sources, like Mohamed Qubaty, former Yemeni Ambassador to Lebanon
and Cyprus and adviser to the Prime Minister and H.E. Ambassador
Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi. Brother of the former president Ibrahim AlHamdi and 2006 presidential candidate, he is currently leading the
Yemeni diplomatic mission to the Czech Republic.
30
Research methods
Interviews
As my research will relay mainly on a qualitative approach, interviews
will be the main research method applied.
Interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a
participant’s experiences. The interviewer can pursue in-depth
information around the topic. Interviews may be useful as
follow-up to certain respondents to questionnaires, e.g., to
further investigate their responses.
This is how McNamara (1999) summarises this particular research
method.
According to Kvale (1996),
a qualitative research interview seeks to cover both a factual
and a meaning level, though it is usually more difficult to
interview on a meaning level.
31
For my background research I conducted several informal interviews,
some of which by e-mail or using social networks such as Facebook or
Voip technologies. During these interviews no predetermined questions
were asked, in order to remain as open and adaptable as possible to the
interviewee’s nature and priorities and in order to ‘explore’ the subject.
The interviews used for the features were mostly semi-structured and
unstructured. According to the Gubrium & Holstein (2001 p. 324),
the unstructured interview is a research strategy that permits
the persons being interviewed to tell their stories at their own
pace, in their own ways, and within their own time frames”.
The advantage is that the interviewee answers in a more spontaneous
way.
Gubrium & Holstein (Ibid.) explain how
research using structured questionnaires differs from research
using an unstructured approach in the following ways: (a) the
32
questionnaire is prepared before data collection commences
and does not change during data collection, (b) all participants
are asked the same questions in the same order, and (c) data
are not collected and analyzed simultaneously but are analyzed
all at once at the end of the data collection.
I considered the approach of fully structured interviews too rigid for my
needs, therefore I opted for a more flexible way, having several questions
planned, but letting the order and the questions change following the
course of the interview.
Having been able to spend long time in close contact with the subjects, I
could conduct several unstructured interviews, some of them, according
to their quality, might be used in the final features. Through these
interviews I was able to acquire more relevant information and further
familiarise with the interviewees, making sure that they will be at ease
when the semi-structured interviews will take place. This is particularly
relevant in case of broadcasted interviews, as explained by Boyd et al.
(2008 p. 115), “approach is all-important. If the interviewee is
inexperienced and nervous he or she will need to be relaxed and put at
ease”. This applies also to print, as a relaxed interviewee will be more
talkative.
33
Another aspect which, should not be underestimated, is the safety of the
interviewee. By releasing an interview he might be exposed to potential
risks, due to the nature of the topic. For this reason is useful to keep in
mind what said by Iggers (1999).
The right of journalists to protect the confidentiality of their
sources is recognized In most codes, but several, including the
ASNE Statement of Principles, insist that "unless there is a
clear and pressing need to maintain confidences, sources of
information should be identified.
Participant observation
Participant observation, together with interviews, has been the main
research method applied to my dissertation.
As said by Jorgensen (1989 p. 13), “participant observation is especially
appropriate for exploratory studies, descriptive studies [...].”. According
to the author, it is particularly useful when “the phenomenon is hidden
from public view” (ibid.). This is particularly the case of the Yemeni
Youths for Change, as the regime of President Saleh has constantly
targeted foreign journalists.
34
As described by Jorgensen (ibid.), this research method shows is strength
in some particular circumstances.
[When] the research problem is concerned with human
meanings and interactions viewed from the insiders’
perspective; the phenomenon of investigation is observable
within an everyday life situation or setting; the researcher is
able to gain access to an appropriate setting; the phenomenon
is sufficiently limited in size and location to be studied as a
case; [...] and the research problem can be addressed by
qualitative data gathered by direct observation and other
means pertinent to the field setting”.
All these requisites seem to apply to my research case.
A participant observation will be a precious instrument to add news value
to the features and to contextualise the interviews.
However, a participant observation presents several limits and, in the
specific context, some risks.
35
As underlined by Jorgensen (1989 p. 14),
‘the insiders’ conception of reality is not directly accessible to
aliens, outsiders, or non-members, all of whom necessarily
experience it initially as stranger. It is not possible to acquire
more than a very crude notion of the insiders’ world, for
instance, until you comprehend the culture and the language
that is used to communicate its meanings.
There are also health and safety risks, related to a potentially hostile
environment, such as that of a civil unrest or, worse, of a civil war, that
could potentially affect the research.
This would have been an excellent research method, but not being able to
conduct my research work in Yemen, I was not able to benefit of its full
potential.
Discourse analysis
It is important to analyse discourses, because the language in use is a
very base of social interactions. Titscher and Jenner (2000 p. 146)
explain:
36
Society and culture are dialectically related to discourse:
society and culture are shaped by discourse, and at the same
time constitute discourse. Every single instance of language
use reproduces or transforms society and culture, including
power relations. Language use may be ideological. To
determine this it is necessary to analyse texts to investigate
their interpretation, reception and social effects.
This is a precious method to evaluate and critically assess the material
from both parties.
Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory. Critical
analysis implies a systematic methodology and a relationship
between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and
power.relations. (Titscher and Jenner, ibid.).
I will use the tools provided by the discourse analysis research method to
study speeches, political and official documents, etc., to be able to better
understand the true meanings behind the propaganda of both parties and
to differentiate “between ‘fact’ - the content and pragmatic aspect - and
‘manner’ - the mode of linguistic realization” (Titscher and Jenner, 2000
p. 154).
37
This research method has, however, some limits. The first and most
important is the difficulty to validate the results obtained, as it is based
on the interpretation of the information acquired.
Despite my knowledge of Arabic, another, and equally important limit, is
related to the interpretation itself. I will be working on documents
mainly in two languages, Arabic and English, none of which is my native
tongue.
Discarded methods
Having considered several research methods available, also brought me
to discard some as irrelevant or simply not adequate to my research.
Content Analysis
As defined by Neuendorf (2002 p. 10),
content analysis is a summarising, quantitative analysis of
messages that relies on the scientific method (including
attention to objectivity, intersubjectivity, a priori design,
38
reliability, validity, generalisability, replicability, and
hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of
variables that may be measured or the context in which the
messages are created or presented.
While the methods involved in a content analysis are certainly valid in
many circumstances, and some of the scientific principles applied by
Neuendorf will also be applied in my research, this model will not be
used. My research focuses on a more direct approach to the source,
while, as Krippendorff (2004 p. 10) says, “content analysts must predict
or infer phenomena that they cannot observe directly. The inability to
observe phenomena of interest tends to be the primary motivation for
using content analysis”.
Surveys
Sapsford (1999 p. 3) describes a survey as
the collection of quantified data from a population for
purposes of description or to identify covariation between
variables that may point to casual relationships or predictive
patterns of influence. It introduces the notions of
39
representative sampling and of inference from comparison
between groups.
While this method could be valuable in many researches, I decided not to
apply it to my research, focused mainly on the contribution of people
directly involved in the revolution, experts and scholars and on my
personal observation.
Focus groups
According to Morgan (1997 p. 7-8),
at present, the two principal means of collecting qualitative
data in the social sciences are participant observation, which
typically occurs in groups, and open-ended interviews, which
typically occur with individuals.
Morgan (ibid.) also underlines how
the main advantage of focus groups in comparison to
participant observation is the opportunity to observe a large
amount of interaction on a topic in a limited period of time
40
based on the researcher’s ability to assemble and direct the
focus group sessions.” the author also acknowledges some
disadvantages and points out the risk of the focus groups to be
“in some sense unnatural social settings.
Even though I might use some of the methods used in focus groups
during my research, such as group open discussions with members of the
Youth for Change Group, this will only be part of my background
research and will not constitute the core of the project, which will mainly
be based on participant observation and individual interviews.
41
Pitch
Dear Ms. Kristianasen,
For the last ten years I have been travelling to Yemen for work and study, acquiring an
in-depth knowledge of the country and precious contacts.
I have read the interesting article by Gabriele vom Bruck, published on the Online Blog
of Le Monde diplomatique and found it particularly interesting.
I am currently finishing my dissertation for the MA in International Journalism at
Cardiff University, writing on the Yemeni Revolution.
For my research I have interviewed a large number of key players, including several
Youths in the ‘Change Square’, members of the ruling party close to the President, the
former Yemeni Ambassador to Cyprus and Lebanon and former adviser to the Prime
Minister, H.E. Mohamed Qubaty and H.E. Ambassador Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi,
younger brother of one of the most loved presidents of Yemen, Ibrahim Al-Hamdi,
allegedly assassinated by Saudi agents.
The situation in Yemen is due to rapidly develop, after President Saleh recently
expressed his will to return home, having spent two months in Saudi Arabia for
rehabilitation after the attack to the presidential compound.
I would be happy to offer you my collaboration for eventual follow-up articles that your
newspaper would like to publish.
Best regards
Mauro Lovecchio
_______________________________
Ms. Wendy Kristianasen
editorial director
Le Monde diplomatique’s English edition
800 Guillat Avenue,
Kent Science Park,
Sittingbourne ME9 8GU
United Kingdom
Photo © Belal AL-shaqaqi
Seeds of instability
‫ار‬2,89:‫م ا‬+< ‫?>ور‬
Seeds of instability
On the 3 rd of June 2011 an explosion rocked the private mosque in the
presidential compound in the southern periphery of the Yemeni capital
Sana’a.
Windows exploded, furnitures crumbled to the floor and many people
were killed or injured, including the Speaker of the Parliament, the
Governor of Sana’a and several of the President’s personal guards.
The explosion shook the building and the very heart of a regime in power
for more than 30 years.
As the smoke started rising from the stricken presidential palace, a veil
of mystery dropped on the fate of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the eternal
President of one of the most politically unstable countries in the Middle
East.
44
In the few minutes following the attack, Twitter, the fastest and so far
most reliable source of information in the Yemeni version of the Arab
Spring, went crazy.
“Saleh is dead”, tweeted Suhail TV, the opposition channel. No, “Yemeni
president was slightly injured in palace attack”, Reuters relaunched an
Al-Arabya flash news, echoing one of the ‘revolutionaries’ tweets.
With most of the phone lines not working, it was hard to get hold of
reliable information from the field.
Dead, alive, injured, healthy; for days the news about the President kept
changing every hour.
While the Yemeni authorities were issuing reassuring communicates,
saying that the President suffered only minor scratches, I called a Yemeni
diplomatic source, and his answer was quite different. “The President is
either dead or injured”, he said. “We’ll see in the next few hours. If he
appears on TV today, then good. If not? For sure, several high level
officials accompanying him are confirmed dead.”
45
Few hours passed and the first unconfirmed reports started to find their
way, first across the social media, then on the mainstream news channels.
President Saleh had left Yemen and had landed in Saudi Arabia for urgent
medical treatment.
For the first time in more than thirty years, Yemen was without its leader.
Raja Althaibani, a Yemeni journalist and blogger, was one of the first to
report the news, at first denied by the government. “Someone at the
military just reported that President Saleh is in ICU, implying his
injuries are critical... this has not been confirmed.”
The early attempts of the regime to reassure the public about the health
conditions of the President were crushing against the reality. President
Saleh was seriously injured in an unprecedented attack to his person
which beheaded the government, leaving Yemen without its leader and in
a vacuum of power that could easily trigger the worst civil war in the
Arab world.
46
Far from being democratic, the regime had the merit of controlling the
power aspirations of the different tribes that form the social structure of
Yemen. With a mixture of diplomacy, iron fist and corruption, Saleh had
managed to keep the country united and to gradually increase the power
of the central government. But at what price?
The first time I travelled to Yemen, in 2001, driving out of Sana’a meant
detailed paperwork, stating the name of the driver, details of the vehicle
and itinerary. But, most relevant, it meant dealing with countless
different armed escorts, from the single AK-47 equipped solider to a
pick-up with a heavy machine gun, each belonging to a different tribe.
For each journey it was essential to count all the checkpoints, usually
distant a few tens of kilometres from each other, and calculate the extra
cost of food and ‘qat’, the tropical evergreen plant whose leaves are used
as a stimulant and chewed by most of the Yemenis on a daily basis. An
extra that the young soldiers escorting the convoy would hardly give up.
It was a price foreigners were ready to pay, to increase their sense of
security, as Yemen is one of the countries with the highest concentration
of firearms and a persistent reputation of kidnapping. Virtually
47
everybody in the country has several weapons at home, from the standard
Makarov pistols and Kalashnikov rifles to, sometime, something more
serious.
Walking with a Chinese AK-47 hanging from their taylor-made jacket
shoulder, was more a status symbol than a real sign of aggression, and
the real use of it was to celebrate weddings shooting in the air, a practice
they seemed to particularly enjoy sharing proudly with the present
foreigners.
Back in Yemen in 2008, the difference was immediately visible. A new
law banning firearms was launched and seriously enforced by the
government, and its effects were stunning. During the few days I spent
there, I didn’t see a single weapon and I travelled freely from Sana’a to
other provinces.
That time I looked at Yemen with optimism, as those reforms seemed to
be finally driving the country closer to the concept of a modern State. It
didn’t really matter if they were also part of Saleh’s strategy to disarm
the opposition while he was receiving weapons and training from the
West as reward for his ‘key role’ in fighting Al-Qaeda.
48
The country appeared to be on the right track to modernisation, but it
was only a false impression and a very superficial analysis.
The economy was stagnating and the spending power of the Yemenis was
rapidly decreasing, suffocated by rising inflation and rising costs of fuel
and other basic goods.
Prices started rocketing sky-high in one of the 40 poorest countries in the
world, and the first protests started mounting, in a country where the
President’s main concern seemed to be the power transfer to his son
Ahmed.
But it wasn't until Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself on the streets of
Sidi Busaid in Tunisia, triggering the so called Arab Spring, that Yemen
took a dramatic turn.
Like in other countries swiped by the waves of the Arab Spring, a group
of highly educated students from Sana’a University, organised in a
49
galaxy of spontaneous groups, met in the University Square, asking for
reforms and for President Saleh and his regime to step down.
It was the beginning of the 2011 Yemeni Revolution.
Like in Tunisia and Egypt, a web of informal contacts based on social
networks like Facebook and Twitter, and mainly on sms and mobile
contacts, was behind the organisation of the protests.
“Revolution is not just on the street”, said Abdullatif Saleh Aljaradi, one
of the students in charge of communicating through Facebook the
message of the revolution. “The Yemeni one is a unique revolution.
Because you know, almost all yemeni people are armed and we are 24
millions. Still we can do it with less blood than anywhere in the world.
One of the reason is that everybody in Yemen has relatives in other cities
and is related to other tribes so no one dares to kill his cousin.”
Even though Yemen is not new to civil conflicts, Abdullatif could see a
substantial difference with the country’s troubled history. “In the past it
was between armed tribe and military or military and military such as in
50
1994, but now is between the regime and the Yemeni people. I believe in
our army and I bet on them because most of them are honest. They are
suffering more than us.”
As the day passed, Abdullatif ’s analysis proved to be a little too
optimistic.
On the 18 th of March, 53 protesters were killed by snipers in
the capital Sana’a; allegedly mercenaries at the service of
President Saleh. It was the bloodiest day in the otherwise most
peaceful revolution of the ‘Arab Spring’. Among those killed,
Jamal Al-Sharaabi, a photojournalist for the independent
weekly Al-Masdar.
It was a pivotal day in the course of the revolution. Few hours
later, President Saleh mourned the victims of the massacre but
used the event as an excuse to impose a state of emergency.
The reactions didn’t wait. As more demonstrations were
mounting through the streets of Sana’a, following the funerals
of the victims, the powerful (and controversial) Major General
Ali Mohsen, commander of the 1 st Armoured Division,
officially defected, taking the side and protecting the antigovernment protesters. Twitter reports were indicating that
Mohsen’s troops were deployed on the road to the airport and
51
that occasional firefights with the Republican Guard, the elite
presidential unit, had resulted in casualties.
As the news started circulating I received an e-mail from a
friend, a diplomat in one of the Yemeni embassies who speaks
on condition of anonymity.
“I would like to inform you that I have already sent you the
passport with the visa. On a second thought, I would request
you not to go to Yemen, at least for now, until the situation
gets better. Now, there are bad news suggesting that the
country is close to military confrontation. So I hope you'll take
my warning seriously. The consequences will be dire. The
ambassador and I were discussing this today... and he strongly
recommends that you don't go as the security situation might
deteriorate in any moment during the next few hours or days.
It's nothing like Egypt and emergency rule has been approved
today morning by the parliament... We are praying for safety
of our people.”
I was probably the only lucky journalist who managed to
obtain a visa to enter the country, but with the state of
emergency enforced and the Republican Guard controlling the
airport, entering Yemen would have been almost impossible.1
1 LOVECCHIO, M. 2011. Reporting from the Imam’s mafraj. The media in the Yemeni Youths insurgency
[Online]. Mauro Lovecchio. Available: http://www.maurolovecchio.eu/Web/Blog/Voci/
2011/5/9_Reporting_from_the_Imams_mafrajThe_media_in_the_Yemeni_Youths_insurgency.html [Accessed
22/05/2011 2011].
52
Few weeks later I was meeting a Czech-Yemeni journalist and business
man in the back room of a smokey pub under one of the business towers
of Prague’s shopping mall Palac Flora, gathering information a couple of
days before my departure to Sana’a.
Patrik Marschal had just come back from Yemen a few weeks earlier and
had agreed to meet for a debriefing.
“It’s crazy there now man”, he started saying as soon as the first beer
touched the table. “I am from Yemen, my family lives there, I used to
bring Czech tourists and I know everybody at the airport, that’s why I
managed to get in. The ambassador told me not to go, but I couldn’t
believe it was so bad. We have also been shot at when we were driving
back to Sana’a along the mountain road”.
The meeting lasted for some two hours, in a strange mix of Yemeni stile
negotiation and Czech pub chat.
53
Finally Patrick showed his cards and offered himself as fixer. “I will
have my tribesman protecting us, 6 or 10 bodyguards”, he said
swallowing a shot of Magister while scribbling numbers and details for
what seemed like the preparation for an expedition in a war zone.
The offer was declined.
The news from Yemen started drawing a clearer picture, with the capital
frozen in a surreal atmosphere of expectations, with only sporadic
clashes between the troops of the Republican Guard and the National
Security, loyal to the President, on one side, and the forces of the
defected General Ali Mohsen and the powerful Al-Ahmar family on the
other. While the rest of the country was rocked by serious fightings.
The lid of Pandora's box was cracking, revealing some far older
problems, as Mohamed Qubaty, former Yemeni Ambassador to Lebanon
and Cyprus, former advisor to the Prime Minister, former Head of
Political and Foreign Relations Department of the ruling Party and now
active member of the opposition started explaining in a noisy café near
Marble Arch in london weeks later.
54
2“Yemen
was not stable for the past 17 years, since 1994. Since the civil
war which happened in 1994”, he started, stirring his long milk-coffee.
“Just before the war there was a very long dialogue process between the
different political parties and, that time, the two ruling parties, the
official ruling party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, and the northern party of
Ali Abdullah Saleh. The dialogue started in October and culminated by
an agreement signed in February in Jordan. The so called accord of
reconciliation, where most parties and most opposition sections were
involved together with some former presidents of Yemen, from the South
and from the North. It was a quite widely accepted document which,
unfortunately, was ended by the war that the North, which Ali Abdullah
Saleh, waged against the South.”
“I remember asking the President in 1995, if that was a good chance to
leave the first part of the agreement and go to the second part, the one
regarding the local governments and devolution, getting more powers
from the centre to the peripheries, getting people involved. He said that
it was an agreement of ‘treason’ and conspiracy. Since that time things
started getting worse. With the elections of 1997 the other party, the
Islah, that was ruling before, got eliminated.”
2 Qubaty 2011, interview, APPENDIX B: i-iv
55
Islah is currently one of the main opposition party in Yemen, with its
22.6 % of the popular vote and 46 out of 301 seats from the 2003
elections.
Being the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islah is not always
well seen in the West. Nor is its growing involvement in the Youths
protests, and its strong presence in the so called ‘Change Squares’ around
the country.
“We, people in the ruling party, at that time were trying to help”,
continued Ambassador Qubaty, “getting some approach towards
reconciliation and towards the issue of local government. How to get
more power, especially in the South. Because we, southerners, felt that
suddenly everything was working against us.”
The government, according to several voices from the opposition, was
gradually shifting to a more centralised vision of power.
56
“After 2003 elections we reached a confrontation between me and the
party. After the 1997 elections the ruling party got what they called at
that time a ‘comfortable majority’.”
The 1993 elections saw three big parliamentary groups. The largest one
was the President’s party GPC (General People’s Congress), the second
and third group, close to each other with nearly 60 seats, were the Yemen
Socialist Party (YSP), former ruling party of Southern Yemen, and Islah.
“In 1997, suddenly this was turned around and they spoke about the
‘comfortable majority’, where the ruling party or Ali Abdullah Saleh,
managed to get about 180 or 190 seats. In 2003 they started speaking
about the ‘overwhelming majority’, and at that time I was against and I
said that it was not a way to go forward for democracy. If you have
230/240 seats this is no more democracy. And that’s why I left. I was
sent as Ambassador to Lebanon as a promotion, but in fact it was a
demotion.”
The consequences of this unbalanced power were severe.
57
“Centralisation increased corruption in the country. Everything was dealt
from the capital Sana’a and no power was shared with the periphery.
Saleh was trying to concentrate power in the Presidential Office. We
ended up with the Prime Minister not having any real power.”
“I knew Saleh since I was in the party. I think in the year 2001 he got so
focused and so taken away with his idea of moving power to his son. He
wanted a big majority so he could move things towards his son. And not
just his son, also his nephews. His whole family got much more in key
positions. That was not happening in 2001 but now you can see it very
clearly. All key position have been taken by them. From the year 2003 he
became a real dictator. When I left to Beirut, things were obvious. There
are these four ‘children’, that some people call ‘the four thugs’. Ahmad,
in control of the Republican Guard, Yahya in charge of the security
forces, Tariq brother of Yahya, controlling the special forces, and Ahmar
who is in charge of the National Security Commission. There is also
another son, who just came back after graduating in England, who is in
charge of another military unit, and so on.”
“They have managed to carry out a coup d’etat when the father left the
country. It is nearly five weeks he is not in charge and according to the
constitution the powers should have been moved to the Vice President,
58
but during this time it was them effectively controlling the State. Now,
during his visit, John Brennan, the special advisor for President Obama
for counterterrorism and national security visited Ali Abdullah Saleh in
Riyadh and reiterated the US position for an immediate transfer of
power.”
A position, that of the US, shared by several Western countries, including
the UK and Germany. According to a statement issued by the German
deputy Ambassador in Sana’a after a meeting with General Ali Mohsen,
Germany had refused to receive President Saleh for medical treatment
after his refusal to sign the peaceful transition of power plan drafted by
the GCC, the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Still not enough for the oppositions, as Ambassador Qubaty lamented.
“The Americans and the Europeans are not using the real leverages. We
have seen freezings of the assets of Gaddafi, of Assad and so on, but we
haven’t seen such moves being imposed or at least threatened against
them.”
59
“The reason might be the involvement of the Saudis, who want to take
the situation into their hands and use their own way to try to convince
those people to move out of power. The Saudis didn’t like perhaps the
way Mubarak was driven out of power in Egypt and wanted another way,
as they consider Yemen their back garden. But unfortunately our brothers
in the GCC have failed and the way Saleh has threaten them is very
irrational. A way we Yemeni feel very sad and uneasy about.”
Mohamed Qubaty referred to the incident that involved the British
Ambassador, alongside with diplomatic observers, including envoys from
the EU, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, besieged in the embassy of
the United Arab Emirates by a mob of Saleh’s supporters.
“They have been humiliated and we thought there would be a reaction,
that the initiative would be pulled back, but all the time they treated him
so softly and that’s why these people can sometime act arrogantly.”
Despite the growing internal opposition and the increasing foreign
isolation, the regime in Sana’a managed to achieve something its
counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia failed to obtain. A counterbalancing
support in the streets.
60
Saleh and his establishment managed to move masses of supporters, whit
the forces of the Republican Guard and of the National Security
challenging the military power of the defected 1 st Armoured Division of
Ali Mohsen.
Arhab Al Sarhi, member of the presidential party and personal interpreter
of the President talked with the usual tones of the governmental rhetoric,
nevertheless making some crucial points.
3“The
opposition only wants to gain the power, but then I don’t know
what they will be able to do. Meanwhile our people is suffering. They
thought that making all this mess, with the lacks of electricity, water and
fuel they could gain more supporters, but still, people are marching in
the streets with pictures of Saleh. It is really incredible. Yemenis are
strange people, people to admire. Hard to bend and to manipulate. Now
they don’t want this anymore, they say they were happier before. Yes,
there was corruption, but not everywhere, and people could work.”
3 Al Sarhi 2011, Interview, APPENDIX C: xxxiii-xxxiv
61
“We can’t deny what this man has done for Yemen. Yemen till 20-30
years ago was nothing. Now, thank God, there are Universities, hospitals,
streets. There are bad things all over the world, but I don’t think that the
solutions to those problems comes by killing people.”
But when it comes to describing the opposition and the youths in
‘Change Square’, Al Sarhi tone changes radically.
“After months of this they didn’t manage to do anything, because
unfortunately they have no ideas, they are not organised and they spread
many wrong and false information.”
“As for the youths, they never managed to organise themselves and have
a council to represent them. In the square there are now 18 groups and
their bad organisation lead us having months of this situation. In Egypt it
took them 18 days to overturn Mubarak, in Tunisia 15.”
With his words Al Sarhi hit an uncovered nerve of the Youths’
Revolution. The news of a Transitional Council nominated by the Youths,
whose ‘members’ were unaware of being part of it, was rather
embarrassing. And the non democratic way used by Tawakul Karman,
62
activist and member of the religious Islah party, to chose those members
opened a wound in the already splitting opposition.
“People link [the revolution to] what happened in Tunisia or Egypt. In
Yemen things were building up from long time ago. Already in 2007 we
had fightings, riots and demonstrations. Between two and three hundred
people from the South were killed between 2007 and 2011. The
revolution that started in February this year is just the culmination of a
lot of instability which was growing across Yemen.” Said Ambassador
Qubaty.
“The question now is how to prevent Yemen from disintegrating.
Different parts of the country are controlled by different people. Yemen
is now a failing State and we don’t see any move from the Friends of
Yemen, the group of countries formed here in England in January last
year. This is something quite frustrating for these youths in the streets.
Don’t blame them if they become allied with the devil.”
Meanwhile, Yemen is threatened by a growing humanitarian crisis. With
no water, no electricity and no fuel, people are struggling to survive.
63
Saudi Arabia
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Saudi Arabia playground
As a red sun slowly descended on the sea of Alexandria, making the Nile
shine of incredible light, my plane prepared to land for a stop-over in a
newly ‘liberated’ Cairo, before reaching its final destination, Sana’a.
I had been on that route many times before but, as the first residential
suburbs of the Yemeni capital started showing through the porthole, my
guts begun to shrink.
My tourist visa, the only options to enter the country those days, would
have expired in a couple of days and Yemen Embassies around the world
had received a dispatch from Sana’a prohibiting to issue new visas to
foreigners.
It was the one and only chance to enter the country and join the small
group of foreign journalists, mostly freelance, reporting from Yemen, as
the regime had tried as much as possible to silence the media. Especially
after the massacre of the 18 th of March. 53 people were killed in the
streets of Sana’a by snipers, allegedly mercenaries paid by President
65
Saleh. Among them, Jamal Al-Sharaabi, a photojournalist for the
independent weekly Al-Masdar.
It was one of the bloodiest days of the Yemeni ‘Arab Spring’ and many
were to follow, especially in cities like Ta’izz and Aden, where the
regime’s control was weakened by a feeling, maturated in years, of
under-representation of the South Yemen in the North-dominated power
palaces.
Arrived at the airport, I was welcomed by two friends, working for the
Immigration and the Ministry of Interior. We had been in touch for weeks
organising in details a way to let me in. Everything was carefully studied
to make my arrival coincide with specific shifts in the Immigration
Office. Then everything had to be changed few days before my arrival as
the University that was supposed to support me, withdrew its approval
for a research on the field, due to freshly rediscovered health and safety
issues.
The Secret Service easily spotted me, as I was the only westerner in the
airport and, without a credible reason to be there, detained me, waiting
66
for deportation, together with some two hundred Ethiopian refugees in a
dirty and overcrowded room of the transit hall.
I spent the second night of my ‘detention’ chatting and playing iPad
games with the head of the Secret Service at the airport, Ashraf, an
elegant man in his early forty, with shaved head and a sharp profile, in an
smart dark blue suit with a shocking pink tie.
He was no doubt the one commanding there.
In the tiny room, separated from the rest of the hall by a reflective glass,
we were sitting on a dusty sofa, talking about technology and Yemeni
politics. “Do you know the NSB?”, he asked. “The National Security
Bureau. Is like the FBI. We are all from there”, he said pointing at the
other three men in traditional Yemeni clothes chewing qat in the room.
The NSB, like the Republican Guard and the anti terrorism units, is
under the control of the closest relatives of the President.
Those elite units had been trained, armed and financed by the West,
mainly by the US. A ‘contribute’ to fight Al-Qaeda’s threat in the region.
67
A consistent amount of money and military equipment, transferred under
the direct control of the President.
“He is coming back and everything will be alright”, said Ashraf, talking
about the President in Saudi Arabia for medical treatment, after the
attack against his compound. Probably trying to convince himself more
than me, while bringing a pillow from the dusty sofa to let me sleep more
comfortably. Few minutes earlier I saw him through the reflective
glasses, badly beating and kicking an Ethiopian boy. A reminder that,
despite the clean look, these people were no joke.
I felt grateful for my treatment in ‘white gloves’. Being a westerner still
has its advantages in Yemen. My Italian passport was probably a good
reminder of all the money my government is sending to Yemen, being
one of the regime’s most generous contributors.
Between 2010 and 2011, the Italian government has sent over 100
million euros to Sana’a. 60 millions through the Development
Cooperation, a programme of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to finance
the first two steps of a coast radars network, the ‘Vessel traffic maritime
system’ (Vtms), and the training of the Yemeni Coast Guard.
68
The Vtms is part of the measures to contrast piracy in the Red Sea, a
priority for many countries that led the Italian Foreign Minister, Franco
Frattini, to declare Yemen a “national priority”, and join the association
Friends of Yemen.
The firm in charge of the Vtms is SELEX. The company, as they say on
their website4
“stems from the Anglo-Italian joint-venture Alenia
Marconi Systems (AMS) and its predecessor Selenia. The company, now
a fully owned Finmeccanica company, has a customer base in 150
countries and a fifty-year know-how.”
The CEO of SELEX is Marina Grossi, wife of Pier Francesco
Guarguaglini, president of Finmeccanica, the Italian industrial giant
operating in the fields of defence, aerospace, security, automation,
transport and energy. Finmeccanica was established in 1948 as a
subholding for mechanical industry of state owned IRI and 30% of its
shares are still controlled by the Italian Government. The same
Finmeccanica that, through its Alenia Aeronautica subsidiary, is a 21%
shareholder of Eurofighter GmbH, producer of the Eurofighter Typhoon
4
http://www.selex-si.com
69
multirole combat aircraft, and that through the Anglo-Italian
AgustaWestland was supposed to produce the US Presidential helicopter
before the White House cancelled the order.
Pier Francesco Guarguaglini is one of the most powerful and influential
Italian managers whose role in the business has often proved to be at
least unclear. He has been involved in several investigations for
corruption and bribery including the scandal ‘Oil for Food’, the UN
programme regulating the trade with Saddam’s regime in Iraq5 .
More recently, at the end of July, Guarguaglini has been once more put
under investigation by the Italian authorities with the accusation of fraud
and false billing. According to the investigator Giancarlo Capaldo,
Guarguaglini had organised a parallel and illegal countability for
SELEX, in order to create black founds to pay consulting, commissions
and allegedly also bribes that could not figure in the regular company
balance. The same SELEX, led by his wife Marina Grossi, responsible
for a multi-million euros project with the Yemeni government.
5 According to a report of the Guardia di Finanza, the police corp of the Italian Ministry of Economics, “Links
have been found between the company Rinopyln (Pacini-Guaraglini) and the Despro Srl, represented by Roberto
Colonnello, subject to the investigation”. The same Colonnello who was operating in Baghdad on behalf of
Alenia, a Finmeccanica controlled holding.
70
The fixer and link between Guarguaglini and the Yemeni president Saleh
is Arhab Al Sarhi. He has been awarded in 2006, by the Italian President
Giorgio Napolitano, of the Order of Knighthood of the Republic, for his
contribution to the liberation of five kidnapped Italian tourists in Yemen.
“I solved many problems for several Italian companies. I have a great
relationship with the Italian Government,6 ” he said in a recent phone
interview. “Beside what I do for the government,” - he is the personal
interpreter for the President - “I have my own private company. I work
with Italian companies and I represent many of them. I represent
Finmeccanica and I have a great relationship with the president
Guarguaglini. I always tried to facilitate the job of the Italians, and not
only in Yemen. I created activities also in Bahrain and in Jeddah7”.
With so much money invested and such tight relations between private
businessmen and governments, both Yemeni and Westerns, two things
have to be ensured. A credible ‘enemy’, strong enough to justify such an
expense - Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula - and a stable friendly
government that would respect those contracts. For sure a revolution,
6 Al
Sarhi 2011, Interview, APPENDIX C: xv
7 Al
Sarhi 2011, Interview, APPENDIX C: xxii
71
even more if the Muslim Brotherhood party gets involved, is not what
many people in or outside the country, would hope for.
But is Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula really as strong as many would
like us to believe?
Many think that the government has used Al-Qaeda as an excuse to
obtain more contributes from the West.
“This is what the opposition says.8 ” screamed Arhab Al Sarhi through
miles of phone line connection. “If you believe what they say, then you
should also criticise the U.S. that they annoyed us with the story of Bin
Laden for 10 years. And then at the end was it just bullshit? Let's be real.
If we say that Yemen uses Al-Qaeda, then America has done the same,
they used Al-Qaeda to enter in Afghanistan? They used Al-Qaeda to go
into Iraq to steal Iraq's oil?”
“I assure you that there are people here who have fled from Afghanistan
to Yemen, because we were always the ones to support Osama when he
8 Al
Sarhi 2011, Interview, APPENDIX C: viii - ix
72
was in Afghanistan, so when these people came back they started
creating these groups.”
“You can’t define up to what point it is serious. I do not always call it
Al-Qaida, because it is easy to throw all on this organisation. There are
many groups that make all this trouble and then, at the end, only AlQaeda is recognised. However, believe me, something is there, maybe
not as much as they want us to believe, I admit it, but we can’t deny it
fully, it is a nonsense.”
“Come see what's happening in Abyan, who are they shooting at? There
is a war there.”
And ‘they’ are shooting indeed; with the active participation of the
Americans, as confirmed by Mohammad, the Imam of Lawdar, a small
town in the Abyan governorate.
We met at Sana’a airport, shortly before he boarded a flight to Jeddah.
73
“There is a war in Abyan”, he said. “few days ago I was trying to go
home but I was sent back by the army. They say it is Al-Qaeda, but is
just an excuse. It is all a political issue. Al-Qaeda is eventually damaging
Islam. In the Islam it is said that we must respect life, that we must not
kill.”
“According to the Quran, the Jihad is not violent”, he explained, pointing
out its deeper meaning of moral and spiritual struggle, opposed to the
interpretation of Al-Qaeda’s extremists, of martyrdom and ‘holy war’
against the infidels. But as the ‘noisy minority’, those extremists end up
being associated with all the believers. “If some muslims, like Bin
Laden, behave badly, they are the problem, not Islam as a whole.”
Still, this doesn’t appear to be the case in Abyan, where the ‘noisy
minority’ is a perfect excuse for a military intervention in a region
strongly influenced by a separatist movement.
The Republic of Yemen as we know it today is the result of the
unification of the Yemen Arab Republic (North) and the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South) in 1990. Only four years later an
74
armed revolt sparkled in the South, organised by militants against what
they considered the corrupt state of the dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The revolt failed as Saleh enlisted in his ranks Salafi and Jihadist armed
groups, to fight against the Socialist Party. The same Islamists that, 15
years later, had broken the alliance with the regime, joining the South
Yemen Movement. Tariq Al-Fadhli, a prominent leader of the Southern
Islamist movement, had fought for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan
against the Soviets and, once close ally of the President, the 28 th of April
2009 started a revolt in the South, moving masses of people into the
streets of the major southern towns.
The Southern movement is a reality that the government often tries to
minimise.
“I assure you that in Aden city there is nothing.” Sais Al-Sarhi. “Even in
the square in Aden, the people are gone. This movement in the South is
not even able to organise and make a party. If you're strong and you think
you can really make a party, so be it. Get the power. Make sure to get
your representatives in parliament, but they do not even have a party. So
what are we talking about? Only 5 / 600 people making noise? But we
75
are Yemen. You can not talk to separate a country. How do you separate a
country?9 ”
Surrounded in the South by the separatists and in the North by the
Houthis, Zaidi Shia insurgents, the government has seen its control of the
country progressively weakened. The regime has been accusing the two
movements of being Al-Qaeda’s supporters, in the South, and to
represent the long hand of the Iranians in the North. In turn, the Houthis
have replied alleging that the Yemeni government plays the game of
anti-Shia factions including Al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia.
Partially sustained by evidences, those reciprocal allegations show an
intricate network of foreign interests colliding in Yemen and contributing
to its instability.
Some analysts see in this fragmentation the potential for what they call
the “Somalisation of Yemen”. An uncontrolled explosion of the country
into separate regions, under the influence of different tribes and diverse
interests, in conflict with each other.
9 Al
Sarhi 2011, Interview, APPENDIX C: xiv - xv
76
This is a scenario used many times by Saleh to push Western and
regional governments to support his regime, although the differences
between Somalia and Yemen, from a geo-strategic point of view, are
significant, as Al Sarhi recognises.
“The situation is different from Somalia. Somalia has been left by all
because, at the end, there is nothing to gain from that country. See, all
participated in the case of Iraq because of the oil. See what is happening
in Libya, the French have started on their own, then joined NATO, now
the Italians. It is a war for economic purpose, but what do you take from
Somalia?”
“Yemen is a country that borders with Saudi Arabia and you know that
Saudi Arabia has close relationships with the United States. Then there is
the Gulf of Aden with the passage of all ships en route to East Asia. For
this Yemen will never be left alone. And what confirms this is the
importance the the United States and Saudi Arabia are giving to this
country, because they fear that if Yemen becomes an unstable country,
they will then pay the consequences.”
77
His ideas are partially shared by H.E. Mohamed Qubaty, once walking in
the palaces of power, as Head of Political and Foreign Relations
Department of the ruling Party, advisor to the Prime Minister and Yemeni
Ambassador to Lebanon and Cyprus; today active member of the
opposition abroad.
“ 10This is a very dangerous game. If the country is going to disintegrate,
I know that we, as Yemeni are going to pay a very high cost for it. But I
think that our global and regional partners need to understand that they
are also going to pay a price for that.”
“We in Yemen are receiving millions of refugees from Somalia, then
what will the Saudis and the Omanis receive if the country disintegrates?
Will the Saudis like that?”
Ambassador’s Qubaty idea about ‘the game’ is quite clear.
“Abyan is under the control of the so called Al-Qaeda. But is not AlQ a e d a . T h e s e p e o p l e w e r e a c t u a l l y a ff i l i a t e s o f t h e s e c u r i t y
organisations. These are people paid by Ali Abdullah Saleh. If you go
10
Qubaty 2011, interview, APPENDIX B: xi - xii
78
back to August 2010 there were three reports on the Guardian by Ghaith
Abdul-Ahad. He was there in Abyan and he met these people and one of
them declared that the week before he was in the presidential palace.”
“This is a game! Ali Abdullah Saleh has managed to draw a scenario
where if at any time he feels he is going to be threatened, he will just
pass some powers, as he already managed, to those extremists. They
already took over Abyan and before they took over Jaar, without a single
shot. They gave them the control of an ammunition factory. This is a very
serious incident. How these people managed to get control of an
ammunition factory and got all the weapons and ammunitions that were
in that factory.”
“They arranged a sort of understanding between Saleh and Al-Qaeda. The
West was playing Saleh to get him more and more against Al-Qaeda, but
Saleh never wanted to kill it because Al Qaeda was his number one found
raiser. Saleh would hit Al-Qaeda, but didn’t want to eventually kill it. AlQaeda wanted money from Ali Abdullah Saleh, he was helping them to
get it. Some of the bank robberies that happened in Aden were from
people affiliated to Al-Qaeda. How Al-Qaeda managed to raid big
security offices in Aden?”
79
Those were not the only ‘incidents’ involving alleged Al-Qaeda
members. In the end of June, 62 suspected Al-Qaeda affiliates managed
to escape from a prison in the port city of Al Mukalla, 300 miles East
from Aden.
Map from Limes http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/yemen-chi-conta-nella-crisi-alondra-una-conferenza-flash/10629?printpage=undefined (edit.)
80
“Ali Abdullah Saleh is playing a very clear game. Everybody knows it.
The West seems to keep its ears closed, they just don’t want to see what’s
happening. You got three provinces under the control of the Houthis,
Sa’da, Hajja, ‘Amran and part of Al-Jawf. You’ve got Hadramawt which
is now under control of local committees. The whole situation is very
much threatening to put the country into disintegration and we have the
Americans who thought that now, without a sovereign government, they
can have a chance to hit more on Al-Qaeda and be able to use more of
their drones, and that’s what they are doing. But that is unfortunately a
non-calculated sort of risk they are taking, because on the long run, the
country is disintegrating.
But why Saleh and his sons would be playing such a dangerous game?
“It is greediness of power. They are threatening with a zero sum game.
They know that they can not be defeated and they can not win, but they
also know that the other side is in the same position.”
“Unfortunately the way the American are approaching it looks quite laid.
Maybe because they are worried and they don’t want to aggravate the
81
Saudis even more after the aggravation they had in Egypt, but is obvious
that things have got complicated by this attitude of hesitancy and delay.”
“It’s time for the West and for the Americans to start using more
leverages on these criminals.”
With Saleh quickly recovering in Saudi Arabia and expressing his will to
return “soon” to Yemen, the future and the stability of the country poses
many interrogatives as many are concerned about his possible revenge
against the opposition he claims responsible for the attack against him.
82
Photo © Reuters
To the first kilometre
‫ أول‬of@*‫ا‬2A"‫ا‬
dignity
GKL 28*GB3M
To the first kilometre of dignity. An interview with
Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi
The first thing that strikes you when you meet Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi
are his eyes. Gentle, kind and peaceful eyes. The same attitude that
reflects in his naturally elegant and calm manners.
Class ’61, since 2009 he is the Yemeni Ambassador to the Czech
Republic, and before that he represented Yemen in the Arab League
Council and served as MP after the unification of the country.
Coming from one of the most respected Yemeni families, Mr. Al-Hamdi
is not new to politics.
His elder brother, Ibrahim Al-Hamdi was, according to many, the most
loved president of Yemen. Under his presidency, from 1974 to 1977, the
country prospered economically and socially. Schools and hospitals were
built and many new roads were paved, connecting cities through a rough
mountainous landscape.
84
But the golden years of Yemen were abruptly interrupted the 11 th of
October 1977 by the bullets of gunmen, allegedly sent by Saudi Arabia,
which killed the President and one of his brothers.
“What he tried,” said Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi11 talking about his brother,
“was to build Yemen as a modern state, governed by institutions and
government agencies. Before that Yemen was ruled by tribal leaders and
chiefs of the army and the country was divided in two or three parts. He
tried to establish a State, a civilised country where everybody is subject
to the law and nobody is above the law. Equal citizenship, equal rights,
equal access to education and health, equal distribution of the welfare of
the country. He was not a socialist, he simply believed in equal social
justice.”
While very popular among the people, his reforms often clashed with the
strong powers ruling the country.
“Before he became President, there were certain families in Yemen
dominating the political arena. One of them was controlling most of the
forces in the army. The Al-Ahmar, whose son now is playing a major role
11 Al-Hamdi
2011, interview, APPENDIX D: i
85
in the revolution, was leading the second largest tribe. Then there was
the Bakil tribe, which is the largest in Yemen, and those families
basically were controlling the country”.
The two main tribes were either supported by Saudi Arabia or backed by
the Ba'ath party, from Iraq.
“My family belongs to one of those tribes, the Bakil; but my brother did
not believe in the role of the tribes to rule the country. So, even in his
short period as President, he did not rely on them to support him or used
them to stabilise the presidency. He pursued justice and equality for all
Yemeni.”
Ibrahim Al-Hamdi rose to power with a military coup d’etat that ousted
the previous president Abdulrahman Yahya Al-Iryani in 1974.
“The President, before my brother, was Abdulrahman Al-Iryani. He was a
very good person, a fierce man, but he didn’t have power and authority in
his hands. He was just like an honorary president.”
86
“Before becoming President, my brother was leading one of the strongest
factions of the army, the Airforce.”
As condition to leave the presidency, Al-Iryani demanded that the most
influential figures in the political arena would leave with him, forcing
Sheikh Abdallah, the speaker of the parliament, and the Governor of AlHudayda, the grey eminence of Yemen, to resign.
“All those three people resigned in the same day. After the resignations
the presidency had to go to the Army. At that time the Commander in
Chief of the Army was outside Yemen. My brother was the Deputy Chief
of Staff so he was the most senior officer in the Army. He was called to
form and chair a Leading Council.”
What begun as a military coup d’etat, soon started gaining strong popular
support.
“He was not working only in the army. He also established the so called
Cooperation Movement, which was mainly concentrating in providing
social and development help to all Yemeni. The movement spread in
Yemen in few years amazingly. There were volunteers building roads,
87
hospitals, schools, drilling water wells for people in the villages. He
started gaining a lot of reputation and popularity throughout the years.
When he became President many people knew him.”
“Above that, before my brother become President, my family was very
well known in Yemen, even though we are not a Sheikh family. We were
always religious scholars and had a lot of influence. My father was a
very distinguished figure in Yemen even before the revolution.”
“He was also a very educated person. He was educated in literature, in
grammar, in Arabic, in religion. In his speeches he was always
emphasising that we are not rulers, we are servants to the Yemeni people.
That is something people still remember.”
Ibrahim Al-Hamdi was a President in touch with his people who liked to
live in among regular Yemenis.
“He had a 3 cars convoy and he ordered them not to break traffic lights. I
was living with him at that time. We had only between 30 and 50 guards.
He had a Volkswagen, we still have it, and during the weekends he used
to slip away from his guards and drive his car on his own. On the way he
88
would meet an old man or an old lady hitchhiking - something still very
common in Yemen - he would pick them up and give them a ride. That
was my brother.”
“He used to get gifts from kings, princes and sheiks. Some of those are
from the Shah of Iran, some are gold, swords decorated with jewellery,
diamonds. He donated all of them to the National Museum of Yemen. He
also got some checks as gifts. Ten million dollars, thirty million dollars,
five million dollars, for a total of almost one hundred million dollars.
But if you’re talking about 1977, that 100 million US dollars is a lot of
money. Today it could be like billions.
He never took them. He forwarded them to the Yemeni government. He
used to say ‘they are giving it to me because I’m the president of Yemen,
so it should go back to Yemeni people’. He never kept a single dollar or a
single riyal in his personal account. So when he passed away, he had
some 300.000 Yemeni riyals debts, because he was building our home in
our village. Because the house me and him had inherited from our father,
was donated by him to the village as hospital.
He passed away when we were still building that house.”
89
“Anyone could reach him. I remember in Eid, the festivity after
Ramadan, we would open our house to all the people. They were coming
to shake hands with him. No guards, no search. He was a very easy going
person. You could go to a marked and find him next to you. He was not a
very isolated leader; he was the people’s leader. He was very close to the
people. It was easy for them to assassinate him.”
The assassination took place the 11 th of October 1977 and no proper
investigation ever took place. But Al-Hamdi’s family truth is very clear.
“My brother was with a friend. There were few people, I know them, who
participated in the shooting. The assassination took place in Al-Hashmid
house and President Saleh was one of them. One of those traitors who
pulled the trigger. They were trained and financed by the Saudi Arabia.
And that is still really tracking up to now.”
“Saudi Arabia doesn’t want the whole story to unfold.”
The fear, from the Saudi side, is that once questions about Al-Hamdi
assassination would start rising, Yemeni would want to trial the killers
90
and dig into the network of complicities that might touch the Al-Saud
family, threatening the country’s stability and reputation.
But some questions are already rising, and the memory of Ibrahim AlHamdi is far from being forgotten.
“Saleh had the presidency for the past 33 years, he did everything trying
to erase the memory of my brother. In the past 33 years he was never
mentioned.
In Yemen when they establish a new project, when they build new roads,
new schools, they always put a stone with the name of the president
engraved on it. Those made during my brother’s presidency have been
erased or broken, but it did not work out. The only picture that they rise
in all squares in Yemen and in all the demonstrations today are the
pictures of my brother. I was surprised, after 33 years, how much the
love of Yemeni people for my brother has grown and his memory is
living with them up to today. These young people in the streets are in
their twenties, and they are supposed to be the generation of Ali Abdallah
Saleh, not the generation of Ibrahim Al-Hamdi, but they are raising the
pictures of my brother and they are trying to investigate and explore
everything about Ibrahim Al-Hamdi and write about it, and chant about
91
it. That’s why many say that if I decide to run for presidency we would
win”
Already in 2006 Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi expressed his wish to run for
the presidential elections, but later decided to withdraw.
“I did withdraw at the end and I did support the candidate from the
opposition. I did it because the opposition came to my house, all the
leaders, and asked me, almost begged me that I should not continue in
my quest for the presidency. They said that if we had two candidates the
votes would be divided and President Saleh would win. And they told me
something which was very strange. They said ‘if you are really serious to
compete for the presidency you would be our candidate, but we know the
time now is not right and we are not willing to give all we can for this
elections, we want to test’. I knew that at that time the elections would
not be transparent.”
“I’m sure I would have won if it was a fair election. I told this to
President Saleh himself when he called me. I told him I wish it could be
a fair elections, a transparent elections, and he said if it was fair he was
sure I would win. He is a very tricky person. He said he would not
92
transfer the power at the time and he said he would vote for me. He is the
biggest liar in the world.”
But times seem to be finally changing. Although Saleh managed to drag
thousands of supporters into the streets, his international friends have
started to take the distance from his increasingly unpopular regime. And
maybe time has come for another Al-Hamdi to take the lead of Yemen.
“Maybe is the right time, the right circumstances. I would go for it. Even
though I have been asked many times since the revolution started to go
back to Yemen and take my role in there. I have been asked by the
Youths, I have been asked by the opposition of the Joint Meeting, but I
told them I’m taking it step by step.”
“Our main concern now is to make it a peaceful transfer of power in
Yemen, because if it gets violent it can not be controlled and we can not
stop it. Yemeni people have shown a very modern and civilised way of
expressing their point of view. For Yemeni the easiest way to express
their point of view was always by means of violence and using guns. But
this is the first time in history when Yemeni have left their guns at home
and gone down to the streets, demonstrating peacefully and demanding a
93
change of power by peaceful means. Some of them come from outside of
Sana’a, they are from tribal origins, and those people have showed a lot
of tolerance towards abuses from the Security Forces. They are trying to
draw those people for military confrontation. But the other side has
shown a lot of restrain, a lot of tolerance, a lot of patience. They said we
started our movement and uprising peacefully, we will end it peacefully.”
The only exception to the peaceful trend of the revolution came from the
powerful Al-Ahmar family. After forces loyal to President Saleh shelled
their homes in Sana’a, they responded fighting.
“They defended themselves because, they said, it was militaries attacking
the house of Sheikh Abdallah; that they wanted to storm it and to occupy
it. And, in Yemeni tradition, you have to defend your house and family
by all means.”
“But they are both part of the problem and part of the solution I think”,
said Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi, stressing the tights the Al-Ahmar clan has
and always had with the regime, being part of the same tribe. But he also
recognises the important role they can play now supporting the
revolution.
94
The other key player is the defected General Ali Mohsen, leading the 1 st
Armoured Division. For many the second most powerful man in Yemen,
Mohsen appears in some Wikileaks cable suspected of smuggling
weapons and diesel between Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
“I hope that Ali Mohsen is sincere in what he said. That he only wants to
support the revolution peacefully and he would step down once the
revolution succeeds. But what you can read from everything, from what
is happening, that is not the truth. That’s why I said that the Al-Ahmar
family - to which Ali Mohsen belongs - could be part of the solution and
part of the problem. I think Ali Mohsen should leave and consequently
should keep with him some of the key military figures that have
defected. Also Sheikh Abdallah Al-Ahmar and his son, they should leave
as well and stay at least two years out of Yemen. Then maybe they could
come back and do some kind of political career.”
Even though desirable, a total eradication of the current political elite,
after 33 years of regime, is hard to imagine. Al-Hamdi’s idea on who
should lead the country during this transition is clear.
95
“What I think is the best for the country now, to prevent any bloodshed,
to prevent any military confrontation, is that the Vice President should be
in power. I think that the President should transfer or resign his authority
to his Vice President and the Vice President should ask the ruling party
and the opposition to form a government that would make constitutional
reforms and prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections.”
“This is the basis of the GCC initiative supported by the International
Community and by the Arab League. The Saudis and the Americans are
the major key players in Yemen right now. If they really put their effort
and resources into that, I think this solution can prevail. But
unfortunately this is not what is happening currently.”
The main obstacle to tis peaceful transition, at the moment, seems to be
posed by Saleh’s son, Ahmad, and by his nephews, controlling pivotal
positions in the military establishment.
“Since the President has left Yemen, [the Vice President] was not able to
perform his duties. Ahmad was really ruling the country with Saudi’s
money.”
96
But would Ahmad ever leave the power?
“If his father will tell him to do so, I think he will do it. Especially if he
announces publicly that he has resigned and transferred his power, so
that would cut any way for his son. He would have no position to run the
country, but also that is not enough. The Saudis should stop sending the
money to Yemen that have been keeping the President and his sons alive
for the past three or four months. You know, if it was not for the Saudi’s
money the regime would have collapsed four months ago.”
So far the President’s son and nephews don’t seem to be willing to leave
the power so easily. A high profile Yemeni source, who talks under
condition of anonymity, describes the attack on the presidential
compound.
“President Saleh has created a lot of enemies during the past 33 years of
his ruling of Yemen. But the question is who is able to penetrate that
very close circle of President Saleh? I think is one of the closest circle to
him. Somebody who benefited the most from the attack on him. Who
could reach him. President Saleh doesn’t trust anyone, even, I think, his
very close family. I was reading few weeks ago an announcement about
97
the President by a Ministry, who said that President Saleh was going to
sign the GCC agreement that day. Ok, if you think like that, who was the
person that would be the biggest looser if the president signs that treaty?
The son. That’s it. And none of his close relatives, Tariq, Ammar, Yahya,
Ahmad Ali, was injured. Some could argue that in Yemen, if you have
money, you could do anything. That would be true during normal
circumstances, but at that stage Yemen was almost in a war state. So, the
security were in an extremely high alert.”
Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi partially disagrees with that version of the story,
believing that President Saleh would have never signed the GCC
agreement.
“I knew that President Saleh would never sign that treaty. The ‘throne’,
the presidency, the position, is his life. He would not give it up. He is a
very tricky person and he is just playing to gain time. He wants to
reshuffle his cards, he wants to obtain as much as he can from his
resources, financially and military. I know they are buying some more
weapons from outside and now they are trying to sign new deals.”
98
“Some are coming from Russia, from Bulgaria, from Ukraine, from other
former Soviet Union countries. Bulgaria I think are breaching the EU
protocol.”
If Al-Hamdi’s allegations would prove to be true, Bulgaria would be
breaching a EU embargo against weapons trade with Saleh’s regime.
With more weapons flowing into the country and the elite units of the
army firmly under the regime’s control, it could be risky for
Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi to return to Yemen and begin a full scale
presidential campaign. Those people who targeted his family decades ago
might fear a new Al-Hamdi could gain enough popular support to win the
presidency.
There has been already two or three attempts to my life, one when I was
in Yemen and I run for elections in the Parliament, after reunification in
1993. But I would not be afraid that my life is in danger if this regime is
removed. Who is threatening us is the regime, is Ali Abdullah Saleh. If
he is not in power anymore there is nothing to fear, because I know that
most of Yemeni love my family. So I would not be afraid. The only fear
for me is to run for presidency in the circumstances like what is going on
99
right now. If President Saleh is still in power, if his relatives, the son the
nephews are still in control of the agencies and those important military
units, like the Republican Guard. If they still have the control of power
and money. In that case I would really think a lot before I take that
decision. But in a circumstance where those people are not in the
political arena, they have no control or sources or military or money, I
would not be scared of danger toward me or any member of my family.”
“I’m not a person who works for revenge”, said Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi
thinking once more about what his family sacrificed for Yemen
“I think the best revenge for my brother is not to kill his killer, but to
revive his legacy. To achieve his goals. To continue the mission he
started. He had a dream of a peaceful Yemen, that is governed by
institutions, that is governed by law, by constitution. A country where all
people are equal and have equal opportunity.”
A dream marked by a sign, leading to Sana’a Change Square. A sign that
leads ‘To the first kilometre of dignity’.
100
Conclusions
‫ت‬#1#8689‫ا‬
Final thoughts
As the pages of this dissertation are about to find their place tightened by
a hard bindings and travel their way towards the University offices,
ready to be examined, it will be over six months that, across Yemen,
youth have used their rediscovered dignity to create change that their
fathers could only have dreamed about.
With President Saleh still in Saudi Arabia it is difficult to speculate on
the future of the country. If on one side instability seems to be growing
after months of clashes between the loyalist to the President and some
groups of the opposition, it is surprising to see how this did not escalate
to a full scale military confrontation. Especially knowing the violent
history of the country.
As emerged during the research, there are many and conflicting interests
in Yemen, both local and foreign. The most relevant being probably the
long lasting support of the US and Saudi Arabia to Saleh’s regime. A
support paid in terms of popularity, as the American administration has
started to realise. The United States, and most of the European countries,
have started condemning the regime’s repression, pushing for a fast
102
transition of power. After the initial caution, also the American
administration seems to have understood that Saleh’s regime does not
detain the exclusive antidote against Al-Qaeda in the country - America’s
biggest fear - and that the risk of supporting such an unpopular regime is
simply too high.
Still determined to return to Yemen, President Saleh is founding himself
under growing international pressure to remain in Riyadh and support a
peaceful transition of power to his Vice President. But so far the power
has been effectively in the hands of his eldest son Ahmad and of his
nephews, leaving Vice President Hadi impotent of absolving his
constitutional role.
The opposition, for long time divided and unable to find credible
alternatives, has finally managed to form a Transitional Council, hoping
to reunite all the country’s political souls and put to an end the six
months impasse.
Trapped between the repression of a thirty years authoritarian regime and
the false promises of an eager opposition, the Yemeni Youths have been
103
able to stand their ground and continue in their peaceful revolution for
rights and freedom.
Only time will tell if Yemen will emerge from these months of revolution
as a new and more modern country or if, as many fear, the pressure will
be too much to bear and the country will dissolve into what some
analysts called “Somalisation of Yemen”. A scenario where different
tribes and factions would fight each other, financed and supported by
foreign countries and their conflicting interests.
104
Reflections
‫ت‬O*PQ
Reflections
When I started thinking about my research project, at the beginning of
the course, I could not imagine how radically events would reshape my
work and the whole history of the country it was based in.
The original idea was to film a 15 minutes documentary on the impact of
Al-Qaeda’s threat on local daily life.
As the events of the ‘Arab Spring’ spread to Yemen, I decided to change
the angle, filming the Youths in the square, reporting their ideals and
aspirations.
I was aware of the risks involved with travelling to Yemen, but at the
time I was supposed to travel, the situation started calming down, at least
in Sana’a.
Unfortunately, the University that until that moment had supported my
research, even after the clashes that killed 53 people in Sana’a, decided
to suddenly withdraw its approval.
106
Course director Sara Hadwin, who had so far pushed me and encouraged
me to pursue my research on the field, also by suggesting me and helping
me to try to obtain external fundings, changed her mind four days before
my departure.
In few e-mails 12 she denied she ever supported me and clearly said that
she would not accept a documentary filmed in Yemen due to the risks
involved. “The university cannot sanction such risk taking nor would a
mainstream broadcaster such as the BBC.”
The BBC of course did, reporting from Sana’a, as many other main
stream broadcasters and newspapers did.
The reports I was receiving from my contacts in Sana’a, including
several freelance journalists, were of a reasonably calm situation. Based
on that information, on the support I had on the ground and on my
knowledge of the place (having spent there over one year in the past ten
years) I decided to travel anyway as I believed that the duty of a
journalist is to report and inform, a duty that, sometime, can involve a
higher degree of risk which is part of the job.
12 APPENDIX
E
107
In any moment, before, during or after my trip to Sana’a, even when I
was detained by the Secret Service, I felt threatened in any way.
Although uncomfortable, my condition never exposed me to any sort of
danger, confirming my idea that, more than my own safety, the
University was trying to protect itself.
“After you submit your dissertation you’re free to go wherever you want
because the University is not responsible for you anymore” I had been
told once.
This behaviour, extremely frustrating from my side, was perceived by me
as a betrayal of the very ideas about the role of journalism that the
University was trying to teach us.
To my arguments about the risk assessment and my measures to reduce it,
Sara Hadwin and Howard Barrell, my potential new supervisor, were
only able to answer with a generic “you can’t go there because is
dangerous”.
As one of the lecturers invited by Sara Hadwin once told us, “also
crossing a street is dangerous”, explaining the difference between ‘risk’
and ‘threat’.
108
I was fully aware of the risks but I considered the effective threat being
relatively low, and I and the other foreign journalists in Yemen proved it
to be true so far.
Cardiff, August 23 rd 2011
109
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#3R‫ا‬2SG3BT?
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120
‫س‬25V"‫ا‬
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Department of Peacekeeping Operations
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National capital
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YEMEN
Appendix A
Map of Yemen (United Nations 2004)
i
Appendix B
Interview Mohamed Qubaty
Former Yemeni Ambassador to Lebanon and Cyprus
Former advisor to the Prime Minister
Former Head of Political and Foreign Relations Department of the ruling Party
London 12-07-2011 14:00
Duration: 01:13:41
*** TRANSCRIPT ***
What is your opinion about the current situation?
Yemen was not stable for the past 17 years, since 1994. Since the civil
war which happened in 1994. Just before the war there was a very long
dialogue process between the different political parties and that time the
two ruling parties, the official ruling party, the Yemeni Socialist Party,
and the northern party of Ali Abdullah Saleh. The dialogue started since
October and it culminated by an agreement signed in February in Jordan.
The so called accord of reconciliation where most parties and most
opposition sections were involved and also some members and
independent people were involved, previous presidents of Yemen, from
the South and from the North. It was quite widely accepted document,
which unfortunately was ended by the war that the North, with Ali
Abdullah Saleh waged against the South. After it a lot of people thought
well, perhaps because it was unified after the conflict, there would be no
further reason for conflicts between the military and the institutions, it
i
would continue towards some progress in building a new civilian
government and getting some more democratisation. Unfortunately it
went to the other side. I remember asking the President in 1995, well, it
is a good chance now, leave the first part of the agreement and go to the
second part of the agreement, especially regarding the local governments
and devolution, getting more powers from the centre to the peripheries,
getting people involved. He said that it was an agreement of ‘treason’
and conspiracy. Since that time things started getting worse. With the
elections of 1997 the other party, which was the Islah party, that was
ruling before, got eliminated. So I think president tried to build. We,
people in the ruling party, at that time were trying to help, getting some
approach towards reconciliation and towards gaining and building on the
issue which is quite sensible, the issue of local government. How to get
more power, especially in the South. Because we, southerners, felt that
suddenly everything is working against us.
You could find a lot of grievances in the South and the North or the
Saleh’s group achieved victories and continued on a route that proved
day by day that they were getting their way in the south the way they
like. Suddenly they grabbed all the properties in the South, and they built
on a a stage, in 2003 election when we reached a confrontation between
me and the party because at that time, the 1997 elections the ruling Party
got what they called that time “comfortable majority”. Before 1997, the
1993 elections, the result included 3 big groups. The bigger group was
ii
the GPC (General People's Congress), and then the second and the third
one were very close to each other and got nearly 60 seats, which was the
YSP (Yemen Socialist Party) and the Islah. In 1997, suddenly this was
turned around and they spoke about the so called “comfortable majority”,
where the ruling party or Ali Abdullah Saleh, managed to get about 180
or 190 seats. In 2003 they started speaking about the “overwhelming
majority”. And at that time I was against and I said no, this is not a way
to go forward for democracy, if you have 230 - 240 seats this is no more
democracy. And that’s why I left. I was sent as Ambassador to Lebanon
as a promotion, but in fact it was a demotion because. I think is not only
the parliament elections, but also the local elections of 2001, because the
low for local councils passed in 2000, but then in 2001 the ruling party
managed to draw back again those powers to the centre. Eventually when
we had the so called local council conferences in 2009, people spoke
directly and said that the local councils ended up with less power than
they had in 2001. Because in 2001 we knew that we had some 37 lows to
get powers from the centre to the periphery. In 2008/9 in the local
councils conference, there were 139 lows taking power back to the
centre. Instead of getting decentralisation we were getting more
centralisation. And these things started getting things out of hand and
especially in the South people started thinking that everything was in
Sana’a. Centralisation increased corruption in the country and everything
iii
was dealt from the capital Sana’a and no power was shared with the
periphery.
What happened in this last revolution. People link it what what happened
in Tunisia or Egypt, in Yemen things were building up from long time
ago. In Yemen already in 2007 we had fightings and getting a lot of riots
and demonstrations. People were killed. Between 2 and 3 hundred people
from the South were killed between 2007 and 2011. The revolution that
started in February this year is just the culmination of a lot of instability
which was growing across Yemen.
So you are saying that Saleh was trying to concentrate power in
Sana’a?
Saleh was trying to concentrate power in the Presidential office. We
ended up with the Prime Minister not having any real power.
I could see some differences in Yemen between 2001 and 2008. People
in 2001 used to carry guns and we needed military escorts to travel.
In 2008 this was very different. Wasn’t it a good effect of
centralisation?
Let’s see the actual things happening on the ground. In 2001 you needed
escorts to travel, but in 2008/2009 foreigners were not allowed to move
because the situation was very dangerous; Al Qaeda had many hits and
the situation got very much worse. The government was worried and
iv
that’s why it stopped people from carrying weapons in Sana’a, but we
have been asking that since 1992, with the law controlling and regulating
the carrying of guns passed in 1992 but the government didn’t want to
implement it. But in 2008, because the government was very worried
about itself, and the incidents were getting out of control, so it prevented
guns from circulating, and this was only a measure against the so called
terrorist activities, but on the ground it is not a measure. On the ground
people got worse. The whole situation, if you travelled from Sana’a to
Aden, the roads in 2008 were closed. If you wanted to go to Aden in
2009 you had to go through Ta’izz. Because the southern movement was
controlling the roads.
You know Saleh and you met him? What was his justification for
this?
I knew him since I was in the party. I think in the year 2001 he got so
focused and so taken away with his idea of moving power to his son. I
think the matter of succession became aligned to passing power to
Ahmed so since 2001-2003 he wanted a big majority so he could move
things towards his son. And not just his son, also his nephew. His all
family got much more in key positions. That was not happening in 2001
but you can now see it very clearly. All key position have been taken by
them. In 2001 there was not this National Security Commission, now is
run by his nephew. Everything got into his hands and from the year 2003
v
he became a real dictator. That when I left to Beirut, things were
obvious. These four children, that some people calls the four thugs,
Ahmad, in control of the Republican Guard, Yahya in charge of the
security forces, Tareq brother of Yahya, controlling the special forces,
and Ammar who is in charge of the National Security Commission. There
is also another son, who just came back after graduating in England, who
is in charge of another military unit, and so on.
With all those key roles taken by Saleh’s family and with some high
ranking officers taking part in the revolution, what can be the
solution?
What they have done now, they have managed to carry out a coup d’etat
when the father actually left the country. Is nearly five weeks he is not in
charge and according to the constitution the powers should have been
moved to the Vice President, but during this time it was them effectively
controlling the State. Now, with the arrival of John Brennan the special
advisor for President Obama for counterterrorism and national security
he visited Ali Abdullah Saleh in Riyadh and then he reiterated the US
position for an immediate transfer of power. Then he went to Sana’a and
met with the vice president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Chief of Staff, and
today he was meeting the leaders of the opposition trying to formulate a
way for the transfer of power. But the ‘four thugs’ are threatening to
push the country into civil war. They have a lot of power and they are
vi
concentrating forces in the Hadda district of the capital, with new BM-21
rocket launchers, they are very powerful and they are threatening to
bring a zero sum situation.
Where are those weapons coming from?
The Americans. It was quite obvious during the last visit of the Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to Sana’a, Jeffrey D. Feltman,
he actually spoke to Ahmad and told him that he can’t use that way the
weapons we have given for counterterrorism against the people. Ahmad,
joking, replied that those weapons are ours now, and you can bring new
weapons for counterterrorism... We will use those the way we like.
The Americans and the Europeans are not using the real leverages. We
have seen freezings of the assets of Gaddafi, of Assad and so on, but we
haven’t seen such moves being imposed or at least threatened against
them.
What do you think is the reason for such a soft approach of the
West?
The reason might be the involvement of the Saudis, who want to take the
situation into their hands and use their own way to try to convince those
people to move out of power. The Saudis didn’t like perhaps the way
Mubarak was driven out of power in Egypt and wanted another way, as
they consider Yemen their back garden. But unfortunately our brothers in
vii
the GCC have failed and the way Saleh has threaten them is very
irrational. A way we Yemeni feel very sad and uneasy about. The last
visit they were besieged in the UAE Embassy and threatened to be killed.
They have been humiliated and we thought there would be a reaction,
that the initiative would be pulled back, but all the time they treated him
so softly and that’s why these people can sometime act arrogantly.
Who do you think is behind the assassination attempt against Saleh?
That is the one billion dollar question. I don’t know. I don’t believe that
he was really hit in the mosque. I can not explain how six of his body
guards were killed, but he is still alive. They first said that when the
bomb blew the president was kneeling, then the imam of the mosque said
that when the bomb blew everybody was standing. We have reports that
his media secretary was hit by bullets. I still think that the president was
somewhere else, not in the mosque.
So what really happened there is still a mystery?
They kept all these people away from the press. The only person who
spoke until now was the imam of the mosque. If everybody was standing,
how could you get all the people close to him killed and not him? Shows
that incident has happened somewhere else.
viii
So who do you think is behind it?
It was from the inside, obviously. We don’t know until now. Was it
actually rockets or was it a bomb inside? Was he hit in the mosque or
was hit as he was trying to leave the scene outside? Was he hit
somewhere else in the palace? But this is an inside job obviously.
But in that case there must have been two explosions.
The reports coming originally talked about two explosions.
There different theories. Somebody thinks that behind the attack there is
his half brother Ali Saleh al Ahmar, but the question now is how to
prevent Yemen from disintegrating. Yemen is now obviously, you got
different parts of the country controlled by different people. Yemen is
now a failing State and we don’t see any move from the Friends of
Yemen, the group of countries formed here in England on January last
year. This is something quite frustrating for these young people, the
youths in the streets. Don’t blame them if they become allied with the
devil. They see that the West is treating this completely with double
standard.
What is the picture now in Yemen? Who is controlling what?
ix
The thing is we can’t speak about South different from North. One of the
very obvious flows in the so called GCC initiative was to treat the
opposition as official opposition, which is the JMP, and never took an
inclusive sort of approach, considering other sectors of the opposition,
like the southerners, the opposition outside the country, the Houtis. I
come from Aden and we heard a very stupid position by the Minister of
defence some 10 days ago, who advised the young men of Aden to form
militias to defend their city against Al Qaeda who can take over any
time, and we can’t understand, we got very strong regiments with
thousands of troops in Aden, what are they doing if they’re not going to
prevent Al-Qaeda from controlling Aden? And then you’ve got Abyan
under the control of the so called Al-Qaeda. Is not Al-Qaeda. These
people were actually affiliates of the security organisations who were
called islamists, but not Al-Qaeda. These are people paid by Ali Abdullah
Saleh. If you go back to August 2010 there were 3 reports from the
Guardian by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad. He was there in Abyan and he met
these people and one of them declared that the week before he was in the
presidential palace. This is a game. Ali Abdullah Saleh has managed to
draw a scenario where if at any time he feels he is going to be
threatened, he will just pass some powers, as he already managed, to
those extremists. They already took over Abyan and before they took
over Jaar, without a single shot. They gave them the control of an
ammunition factory. This is a very serious incident how these people
x
managed to get control of an ammunition factory and get all the weapons
and ammunitions that were in that factory. Ali Abdullah Saleh is playing
a game which is very clear. Every body knows it. The West seems to keep
its ears closed, they just don’t want to hear what’s happening. You got 3
of the provinces under the control of the Hutis, Sa’da, Hajja, Amran and
part of Al-Jawf. You’ve got Hadramawt which is now under control of
local committees. The whole situation is very much threatening to put the
country into disintegration and we have the Americans who thought that
now, without a sovereign government, can have a chance to hit more on
Al-Qaeda and be able to use more of their drones, and that’s what they
are doing. But that is unfortunately an not calculated sort of risk they are
taking, because on the long run, the country is disintegrating.
So if not Al Qaeda, who are they targeting?
They have got some targets they knew for long time. We don’t deny that
there are some members of Al Qaeda in Yemen, but they are not that
strong. I think the americans perhaps managed to score some successes
by hitting Osama Bin Laden, but of course Bin Laden approach was
different. At one time they wanted to hit Anwar Al Awlaky. He at one
time was in the hands of the government, but they allowed him to escape
and now he is in the mountain just like Osama Bin Laden was in
Afghanistan. This is a very dangerous game. If the country is going to
xi
disintegrate, I know that we, as Yemeni are going to pay a very high cost
for it, but I think that our global and regional partners need to understand
that they are also going to pay a price for that.
We in Yemen are receiving millions of refugees from Somalia, then what
will the Saudis and the Omanis receive if the country disintegrates. Will
the Saudis like that?
Why they keep playing this dangerous game then?
Is greediness of power. They are threatening with a zero sum game. They
know that they can not be defeated and they can not win, but they also
know that the other side is in the same position. They are youngsters.
That’s why we’re trying to find a compromise. We are for an inclusive
approach. There should be at the end the approach that at one time was of
the group of the ‘friends of Yemen’, there should be a national universal
dialogue and everybody should take part of it. And to frame a new
democratic constitution that includes at least devolution, if not
federalism. So move power from the centre to different parts of Yemen.
And we don’t want a presidential system anymore, but a parliamentary
one.
Who in Yemen could work to solve this situation?
xii
Some people say that the situation should be in the hands of Yemenis and
they should resolve it, but how can they if the Americans gave weapons
in the hands of those kids? They have forces not only equipped, but also
trained by the Americans, and then you’ve got money given to them by
the Saudis. So this people have got money, they have arms, and training
from people from the outside. The outside world has been intervening in
Yemen for the past 100 years and now Yemenis can not simply sort out
the situation on the ground.
Why the western countries are not using their leverages? Why not to
freeze the assets of those four kids? Why not preventing them from
moving not giving visas for them? Why not to move to the International
Criminal Court the files of those people or the crimes they committed in
the last years? We haven’t seen those leverages. There is a double
standard they are treated in comparison with Libya or Syria.
What is the British Government saying?
The last official meeting I had with UK officials was with the Minister of
International Development, my friend Mr. Alan Duncan and there were
people from the FCO, from some of the think tanks, and they said that
the friend of yemen’s process will start again. I was not surprised when
said in this situation now we’re going to act. The saudis are quite
influential due to their oil and they’ve got everything in their hands.
xiii
They also have a lot of problems ad the decision making process in Saudi
Arabia during these days is not so clear. They’ve got the man who was in
charge of the Yemeni file is having an operation. But now there is John
Brennan on the ground and let’s see.
Now in Sana’a there is some sort of ceasefire.
They’re just like Saddam’s sons.
Some people consider Saleh’s son Ahmad as a modern leader.
Ahmad. Tareq, the brother of Yahya, he is the strong one, is all the time
there, he is controlling Ahmad completely. He is in charge of the Special
Units, which are the people who form the guard of the President. He is
all the time beside Ahmad, 24 hours. So actually he is the one who is
calling the shots.
Do you believe there will be some change soon?
We expect something on the 17th of July, the anniversary of his rising to
the power.
If things continue like this for the next few weeks, the country will go
into complete chaos.
xiv
Do you think Saleh will go back to Yemen?
Unless he is going to come back is just going to be an excuse to hand out
power. He always wants to play differently. He wants to show that he
hands power not because he was kicked out from the country he wants to
say that he is handing out power.
Have you seen the video broadcasted few days ago?
He was again on TV 2 days ago with Brennan, he looked much better, in
a suit and so on, moving his hands and his legs. This is just a game.
There is something they want to cover up. It shows that there was
something like a breach in the Republican Guard and they want to cover
that up. And is in the family itself. Because the thing you’ve got to
review as journalist, and I have seen a lot of people follow this. The
general of the GCC was there Abdullatif al-Zayani, the president was hit
on friday and it was agreed on thursday than 2 ministers from Saudi
Arabia and UAE were going to arrive in Sana’a for the President to sign
the initiative. And they hit him 3 days earlier. The people who hit him
didn’t want him to sign the agreement. This is for sure now. This was
mentioned by the Secretary General of the ruling party in a meeting with
the opposition and the Vice President. And as far as I’m concerned, I
have checked that even from the Saudi and Emirati side and they
xv
confirmed. Because the president had agreed to sign. There was
something there that had broken or driven away.
Who might want him not to sign?
The 4 thugs.
They would kill their own father?
Why not. It has happened and all the way across history. Few hundreds
years ago in Europe and more recently in Yemen. King Ahmad killed 3 of
his brothers. And in the Emirates, Zayed pushed his other brother out.
The same in Qatar and Bahrain.
Ahmad doesn’t like his father because he thinks that he killed his mother.
The mother of Ahmad, there are a lot of stories that she was killed by the
President. Long time ago.
They managed for the past 2 years to keep power among themselves and
to convince the Americans that they are the only people who could fight
Al Qaeda and they should continue to rule. And they have this sort of
believe that the Americans are with them and that the father is going to
give up the power.
xvi
That’s why I said that what happened there is the one billion dollars
question.
Might not have been directly the son, but somebody tho thinks that this
way he is helping Ahmad or Yahya. Or the other way round, the half
brother of the President, Ali Saleh Al-Ahmar, and the president is
accused to have killed his son. They are brothers from the mother. Ali
Saleh Al-Ahmar and Mohamad Saleh al Ahmar, are his half brothers.
What is the role of the defected General Ali Mohsen?
Ali Mohsen felt that he had to do something when he started feeling from
1999 that he was working to pass the power to his son. 2 big officers
were killed in an helicopter that was brought down in Mukhalla in
1999/2000, 2 big military people from Sana’a, relatives of Ali Mohsen,
were brought down in a helicopter. They showed it was an accident.
One of Saleh’s sons in law joined the revolution. The president killed his
father and then brought him up and let him marry his daughter. But
eventually the son moved to Ali Mohsen.
Mohsen wants to maintain the interests of Sana’a. His role is, he
manages to get things into a situation where the kids can not gain
victory. But he also can not win.
xvii
He claims that he doesn’t want power.
He wants to keep power not for himself, but for the Sana’anis. For the
family, for the clan.
According to some Wikileaks cables Ali Mohsen was involved in
weapons trafficking.
He was involved, he was part of the system and of the corruption, but
eventually the biggest crack in the regime was him leaving the system.
As he says, he doesn’t want to rule, and that is a credit for the
revolution. He says and I don’t feel he would be able to come back as a
king or a king-maker anymore he is going to be involved but...
He is also thought to be close to Islah and to extremists.
This is the game of Ali Abdullah Saleh. He keeps everybody and he gave
this portrait that Ali Mohsen is a man who is linked with Al-Qaeda and
Islah. Ali Mohsen now hits back and says on the contrary, I was just
following the orders of the president. He said in an interview that people
from Al-Qaeda are in Ali Abdullah Saleh’s personal guard. And that two
sons are actually involved with Al Qaeda now. Ali Abdullah Saleh has
been playing this game. All the time he pointing at Ali Mohsen as the
guy linking with Al-Qaeda, and I could see that he was using everybody.
xviii
He got this job of fighting Al-Qaeda, before he was fighting Al-Houthi,
now he is reconciling with Al-Houthi and he said I was following orders.
Complete intrigue, it looks like a Middle Ages sort of story.
What is the role of the Youths? Are they being used?
The Youths being used. Well, this has happened everywhere, in Tunisia
and Egypt too, they’ve got their own platform, but I don’t think they can
achieve that platform in one move. I think they have managed, at least at
this stage, to go half way and at least crack down the idea that Ali
Abdullah Saleh be quitting his power to his son. They have managed at
least to achieve that. To this stage is their merit. Just like Egypt, he has
learned the game and even Ali Abdullah Saleh said the 2nd of March, I’m
with federalism. And agreed to a parliamentary system of government,
and then to a proportional representation and regionalism. He agreed all
those. If people like us have managed Ali Abdullah Saleh to agree on all
those, which even Al-Ahmar can not agree on, most of the tribes will not
agree.
Would not be the first time he says he agrees on something and
changes his mind right after.
xix
Not this time. Is the first time he agrees on those things. We could say
from 1994 since he signed the accord of reconciliation, these 4 goals
were not even well framed and phrased in the agreement, but now they
have been clearly phrased. And for the youths to become at least the
vanguard movement for those 4 goals, I think that’s a great thing for
Yemen, and those are 4 things that have been there at least for one
hundred years, that people have been asking for that. If you go back to
1924, the southerners that time king Yahya was trying to grab the south
and to join, apart from Aden, ruled by the British. They wanted a
constitutional monarchy, he should be a king, who reigns but not rules,
they would agree for a prime minister and a cabinet and a federal
unification of Yemen. He refused it, that was 1924, is in a book, the
Yemeni voyage, by a Tunisian Al Tha'alibi, the founder of the
constitutional party in Tunisia. Those 4 objectives had been there for at
least 100 years, ad for the youths to bring them forward and make them
clear and for people like Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The critics against the Youths are that they lack prospectives.
The youth’s prospective is clear, they are after a civilian government. At
least Ali Mohsen in his last interview has said yes, I don’t want the
military to rule. For him to come and say is the end of any military rule
in Yemen. That’s quite a big achievement, to agree at least on this idea.
xx
The perspective is clear, but the way. They have got a vision, I mean,
how to act towards achieving that vision is the difficult thing. Their
vision is very much clear with that of the opposition, but I think the way
forward is not that clear. How to act to achieve that.
The Youths’ goal is to get rid of Saleh. Then what?
The youths are not organised in one group. If you go for the different
organisers, speaking in the name of the youths, you’ll find that their
documents are clear about that, but not all of them can speak of them.
And the other thing is that what is in the Change Square in Sana’a can
not be imposed in other Change Squares in Ta’izz or Aden, there is much
more clear. If you go to Ta’izz or Aden they are quite clear. They want a
federal parliamentary system and a civilian government. In Sana’a Islah
and the tribes are not that clear on those.
But we have a country where the same party has been in power for
over 30 years...
Not the Party. I was a member of the party and I didn’t have any power
to change anything. I couldn’t appoint even a porter in my department.
While Shaikh Al-Ahmar, who was in the opposition, could name
ministers and he is the leader of the opposition party. Could appoint
xxi
officers, governors, and I, was from the ruling party... This is a game. Ali
Abdullah Saleh has been... And we showed him this was a fraud and
that’s why he got angry and said you go out.
We have showed him this. Was not a ruling party, was a ruling click and
Al-Ahmar was part of it.
Who do you think is behind the Youths?
There are all different political parties. Specially Islah, are trying to
control and manipulate them. If you go to the square, you will find those
splits. The other thing is that unlike Tunisia and Egypt, where there was
a prevalence of using the internet. So they could tweet, go to Facebook
and organise themselves. So at least there is a way to organise them in
semi organised groups. In Sana’a internet covers less than 2% and is very
controlled. It takes long time for the groups to get organised and move
together.
We have an inclusive approach, based on dialogue.
Why are there only northerners in the Republican Guard trained by the
Americans? They are playing the game.
The way the americans are dealing with those... Looks like... Somehow...
Unfortunately the way the American are approaching it looks quite laid.
Or because they are worried and they don’t want to aggravate the Saudis
xxii
even more after the aggravation they had in Egypt, but is obvious that
things have got complicated by this attitude of hesitancy and delay in
moving.
It’s time for the West and for the Americans to start using more leverages
on these click of criminals.
Do you think the West is being naive?
The West is not naive, the Saudis have been threatening that they would
aggravated.
And they don’t understand that Saleh is using the fight against AlQaeda to raise money?
They were using it. They thought they could get to a position of some
sort of clash between Saleh... They thought that at a certain stage the
ability to harmonise this sort of game between Saleh and the rest of these
people would come to a clash. It has and they clashed against each other
and then they arranged a sort of understanding between Saleh and AlQaeda. The West was playing Saleh to get him more and more against Al
Qaeda, to sort of moving away from moving it. But Saleh never wanted
to kill it because Al Qaeda was his number one found raiser. Saleh would
hit Al-Qaeda, but didn’t want to eventually kill it.
xxiii
Al-Qaeda wanted money from Ali Abdullah Saleh, he was helping it
getting money. Some of the banks robbery that happened in Aden it was
from people affiliated to Al-Qaeda. How Al-Qaeda managed to raid big
security offices in Aden?
He got some sort of understanding with them. He would give the position
to the americans after they had left.
/// END ///
xxiv
Appendix C
Interview Arhab Al-Sarhi
Italian interpreter for President Saleh and member of the presidential Party
Telephone 18-07-2011 20:00 GMT
Duration: 01:26:01
*** ORIGINAL ITALIAN TRANSCRIPT ***
Da quello che so sei vicino al Presidente, è così?
Diciamo che sono vicino al presidente perché l’opposizione non mi ha
confermato in tutti questi mesi di essere capace di poter fare qualcosa di
diverso o di migliorare la situazione del Paese. Non è che sono uno che
ci tiene e anche se una cosa è sbagliata gli va dietro. Speravamo che
questi erano capaci di poter fare qualcosa di meglio, speravamo che
erano tanto organizzati da convincere il popolo, non solo i loro seguaci,
ma anche tutti. Ma purtroppo dopo quattro mesi non sono riusciti a fare
nulla perché purtroppo non hanno idee, non sono organizzati, hanno
raccontato tante falsità. Hanno dato informazioni sbagliate e fasulle. E
quindi strada facendo hanno perso qualsiasi ruolo che potesse essere
anche a loro favore.
Perchè dici che non sono organizzati? Hanno un programma politico
basato su quattro punti fondamentali.
Di chi parli tu? Parli dei giovani o parli dell’opposizione con i partiti?
i
Di entrambi, perché a quanto ne so, concordano sui 4 punti.
Assolutamente no, perché vorrei farti capire che da quello che sta
succedendo adesso, se hai seguito a che punto siamo arrivati, i giovani
delle piazze addirittura non sono mai riusciti ad unificare loro stessi per
poter avere un consiglio che rappresenti. Anche quando c’è stata
l’iniziativa dei Paesi del Golfo, guarda caso hanno chiamato
un’opposizione sola, non hanno mai, scusami la parola, cagato i giovani.
Non li hanno mai presi in considerazione. Non hanno mai pensato di
parlare con loro. La delegazione che è andata a Ryad era una delegazione
formata da persone che rappresentano i partiti dell’opposizione. Poi, un
secondo giro di trattative è stato fatto con il partito del presidente
insieme ad altri partiti che lo appoggiano. Questi giovani non sono
riusciti in quattro mesi ad avere un consiglio di cinque o dieci persone
che possano essere in grado di parlare con loro. Oggi nella piazza di
Sana’a ci sono 18 gruppi. Immagina, 18. Ma ti rendi conto? Per questo,
assolutamente non sono d'accordo con te quando dici che sono
organizzati. La loro mal organizzazione ci ha fatto arrivare a questo. La
loro mal organizzazione ci ha fatto arrivare a 5 mesi di rivoluzione. In
Egitto in 18 giorni sono riusciti a mandare via Mubarak. In Tunisia in 15
giorni. Qui stiamo entrando al sesto mese e tutto il paese soffre. Tutto il
paese è ormai da qualsiasi parte parli con qualcuno che 5 mesi fa
appoggiava la rivoluzione, ormai non la vuole nemmeno sentir parlare.
ii
Probabilmente più che dare la colpa ai giovani, bisogna riconoscere
che il regime è stato abbastanza forte da rimanere comunque in piedi
in questi 6 mesi?
Mancanza di esperienza, fare cose solo per farsi notare o per dire anche
noi possiamo fare come hanno fatto gli egiziani e i tunisini. Ripetere
certe cose non è facile. La colpa che do io ai giovani è la mancanza di
esperienza e di andare dietro a certe persone che gli hanno fatto capire
certe cose che non sono vere. In certi momenti hanno creduto ai partiti e
li hanno seguiti, poi hanno visto che i capi dei partiti dell’opposizione,
c’è un certo Khatan Zayed che è il capo del partito degli sciiti ha detto
certe parole chiare, registrate, che puoi guardare su internet e le trovi.
‘Cari giovani, non pensate di poter decidere qualcosa, non pensate di
poter entrare a far parte di qualche consiglio per decidere in questo
paese, non farete i ministri, non farete gli ambasciatori. Voi dovete solo
fare la rivolta e noi faremo il resto’. Ti rendi conto a che livello sono
arrivati i partiti d’opposizione? Adesso tu sottovaluti le persone che
hanno dato la possibilità di dialogare, perché fino al 2011 i partiti di
opposizione non potevano fare niente, perché avevano perso le elezioni e
dovevano aspettare come succede anche in occidente. Qui l’opposizione
è uguale, ha perso le elezioni, è diventata debole, perchè alla fine non si
può sempre dire c’è falsificazione, c’è falsificazione. Il cavolo! Tu non
so se ti ricordi, se seguivi lo Yemen nel 2006, abbiamo avuto delegazioni
dell’ONU, dell’UE, della lega araba che hanno controllato tutto quello
iii
che riguardava le elezioni del 2006. Però i partiti d’opposizione hanno
approfittato di questi giovani che sono usciti, li hanno messi li, hanno
messo anche i loro seguaci e di conseguenza le piazze sono diventate un
misto di gente che non c’entrava niente con i partiti e di gente che fa
parte dei partiti. Adesso non ci sono più giovani indipendenti. Tutti
quelli che ci sono sono figli dell’Islah, figli del partito dei Fratelli
Musulmani, figli del Partito Socialista e così via, degli sciiti, per questo
ti dico che non sono stati così capaci di far arrivare questa rivoluzione su
una strada giusta. Non per la forza del presidente o altro, non è vero.
Saleh è al potere da 33 anni, ha messo al potere tutta la sua famiglia
e pensava di passare il potere al figlio, forse non è proprio un sistema
di governo particolarmente sano?
Se tu parli di questa cosa e tu dici che c’è stato Saleh per 33 anni,
ricordati che il capo del Parlamento, il papà di questi figli di Al-Ahmar,
che stanno facendo adesso l’opposizione e stanno facendo questa
rivoluzione per arrivare il potere, il loro papà ha guidato il Parlamento
per 18 anni. E allora? Cosa significa? Non è Saleh la persona che ha
guidato questo Paese. Se sei il capo del parlamento per 18 anni hai
partecipato a tutto, hai partecipato a tutti, hai partecipato alla corruzione
se c’è stata corruzione, hai partecipato al maltrattamento della
popolazione.
iv
Per quanto riguarda il figlio di Saleh, lui non dice che come in una
monarchia, io muoio e mio figlio viene automaticamente nominato come
è successo in tanti altri paesi arabi. Saleh dice, se mio figlio ha voglia di
fare politica e ha voglia di fare il presidente, ben venga la cosa però con
elezioni controllate, con elezioni legali. Ricordati che l’America, che noi
chiamiamo il ventre della democrazia, ha avuto Bush padre e figlio. Per
questo se al padre succede il figlio non è detto automaticamente che c’è
una monarchia o che c’è corruzione. Come opposizione avete la forza di
dire no, di sfidare il figlio di Saleh e di candidarsi e vediamo chi vince,
però se il popolo, che loro pensavano non avrebbe più appoggiato Saleh,
credimi, quello che ha fatto allungare questa rivoluzione è il
bilanciamento di potere che c’è in questo Paese. Loro pensavano che
Saleh non era più appoggiato da nessuno, e invece nonostante tutto
quello che si dice, la gente vuole bene a quest’uomo. C’è gente che esce
tutti i venerdì in supporto. Se tu calcoli che nel 2006 lui ha vinto con
4.500.000 voti, il candidato dell’opposizione ha perso con 1.600.000
voti. Per questo se tu calcoli tutti quelli che sono nelle piazze, saranno
questo milione e sei. Per questo, da quando la democrazia ci consente di
andare per le strade se non si vincono le elezioni. La democrazia
significa anche che tu devi accettare il risultato, al di la del fatto se ci
sono brogli, perché ricorda che anche le elezioni negli stati uniti, il figlio
di Bush ha vinto per un pugno di voti e addirittura siamo rimasti una
settimana ad aspettare il risultato finale. Per questo falsificare le elezioni
v
c’è ovunque. Quello che però bisogna capire è quello che la gente
realmente vuole. Qui la gente non vuole i Fratelli Musulmani, non vuole
più queste persone che hanno sempre creato problemi in questo paese.
Al di la di chi ha vinto le elezioni, la situazione è quella di ragazzi
disarmati in una piazza più volte attaccati e anche uccisi da forze
governative.
Come fai a sapere e come fai a confermare che sono le forze
governative? Loro dicono che il giorno 18 marzo l’organizzazione dei
giovani sostiene di aver catturato 11 persone e fino a oggi non sappiamo
niente di queste 11 persone. Queste persone fanno parte dell’opposizione.
Sono loro che hanno sparato. Io non dico che il governo non ha sparato,
qualcuno ha sparato e qualcuno ha aiutato che i morti diventino di più.
Credimi qui purtroppo la politica non è come in Europa, qui non è pulita.
Qui c’è una politica sporca, usano il sangue, usano le persone innocenti
per arrivare dove vogliono. Per questo non devi mai credere. Se hanno
catturato davvero queste 11 persone che sparavano, dove sono oggi?
Perché queste persone non dicono chi le ha mandate? Perché credimi loro
stessi hanno organizzato questa cosa perché sapevano che la rivoluzione
si allungava e non avevano scampo. Dovevano fare qualcosa per attirare
l’attenzione internazionale e hanno fatto quello per attirarla. E credimi,
non sono stupidi gli ambasciatori che sono qui nello Yemen. Hanno
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capito che è un gioco e hanno capito che qualcuno sta lavorando sporco
per arrivare al potere. Io sono d’accordo e a l’inizio li appoggiavo e
speravo in un cambiamento nel Paese, però quando vedo che le persone
usano le cose sporche, ammazzano le persone, falsificano tutto quello
che si vede, abbiamo visto tanti video dove loro mettono le persone e
insegnano loro come fare quando ci sarà un attacco delle forze
governative, dovete fare così, girare così, far vedere di avere male alla
pancia, e che hanno usato il gas. Il gas usato e i lacrimogeni usati sono
gli stessi usati anche in Italia durante il G8 di Genova. C’è stato anche il
morto a Genova se ti ricordi. Dobbiamo essere reali quando raccontiamo
le cose per aiutare a capire la situazione, perché questo Paese è diverso.
Abbiamo vissuto tanti problemi e tante guerre. I Paesi del Golfo usano lo
Yemen per poter arrivare ai loro scopi. Qatar e Arabia Saudita litigano e
risolvono i loro problemi nello Yemen. Il Qatar appoggia gli Sciiti per
creare problemi nel sud dell’Arabia Saudita e l’Arabia Saudita fa la
guerra... Un casino guarda. Per questo credimi, quello che è arrivato a te
non è tutta la verità. Per questo sarò sempre disponibile a sfidare te o
chiunque su qual’è la realtà di questo Paese.
Non sono filo governativo al 100% e non sarò mai contro l’opposizione
al 100%, ma parlo soltanto di fatti che sono davanti a me.
vii
Spesso Al-Qaeda è stata utilizzata forse anche come scusa per tenere
in piedi Saleh?
Questo è quello che dice l’opposizione. Se credi a quello che dice
l’opposizione, allora devi anche criticare gli USA che ci hanno rotto le
palle con la storia di Bin Laden per 10 anni. E allora alla fine era una
cazzata? Cerchiamo di essere reali. Se diciamo che lo Yemen utilizza AlQaeda, allora l’America che ha fatto, ha usato Al-Qaeda per entrare in
Afghanistan? Ha utilizzato Al-Qaeda per entrare in Iraq per rubare il
petrolio dell’Iraq? E allora diciamo che se tu critichi Saleh, bisogna
criticare allora la forza più forte del mondo che sta controllando il
mondo. Qui nessuno sta facendo... Non hai sentito un articolo che dice
che l'America racconta balle, che vuole utilizzare certi fini. Io ti assicuro
che c’è qualcuno di quelli che sono scappati dall’Afghanistan qui in
Yemen perché siamo stati sempre noi Yemeniti ad appoggiare Osama
quando era in Afghanistan, per questo quando questa gente è rientrata ha
cominciato a fare questi gruppi. I sauditi che stanno in Arabia Saudita
perché il confine tra noi e l’Arabia Saudita è così grande da non poter
controllarlo, per questo vengono qua nello Yemen e rimangono qua. Per
questo anche l’Arabia saudita è bugiarda?
C’è, ma non sarà come qualcuno dice, va bene, io posso accettare questo,
però negare completamente l’esistenza di questa cosa secondo me è
abbastanza stupido, perché gli USA stessi sono qui ad appoggiarci. Sono
viii
loro che ci danno tutti i mezzi per combattere questa gente. Sono loro
che girano con i loro aerei e attaccano. Hanno ammazzato uno a Ma’rib
più di due mesi fa usando questi aerei senza pilota e adesso stiamo
pagando perché questi di questa famiglia di Ma’rib, ogni tanto fanno
esplodere un oleodotto, e siamo qui a soffrire tutti i giorni. Per questo è
una cosa che loro possono utilizzare strumentalmente contro Saleh, però
è difficile accettare come verità assoluta tutto quello che dicono. C’è
falsità anche da parte loro.
Fino a che punto questa minaccia di Al-Qaeda è però reale?
Non è che si può definire fino a che punto è grave. La situazione che c’è
ad esempio in Somalia, ci sono i pirati, ecc... Tutte queste cose
confermano che c’è terrorismo. Io non lo chiamo sempre Al-Qaeda,
perché facile appoggiare tutto su questa organizzazione, ma non è una
sola, ormai sono più di una. Ci sono tantissimi gruppi che fanno tutti
questi casini e poi alla fine viene riconosciuta solo Al-Qaeda. Comunque
credimi, qualcosa c’è, ma non sarà come cercano di far capire, va bene,
lo ammetto, però che noi neghiamo l’esigenza è una stupidaggine. Vieni
a vedere cosa sta succedendo ad Abyan, a chi sparano? C’è una guerra li.
ix
Ho parlato con un Imam di un paese vicino ad Abyan e lui dice che
non c’è Al-Qaeda. Quindi a chi sparano?
La famiglia di Saleh, il ministro degli interni, non usa mai la parola AlQaeda. Sono loro che dicono questo. Lui dice, se noi non riusciamo a
mantenere la stabilità di questo paese difficile da controllare perché
abbiamo un confine di 2000 km di deserto con l’Arabia Saudita dove è
difficile controllarlo. Abbiamo 2.500 km di spiagge nel mar rosso
dall’Arabia Saudita fino al confine con l’Oman. Per questo è difficile
controllare questo paese. Per questo lui dice che se non riusciamo a
stabilizzarlo, tantissimi gruppi terroristici, e non ha mai detto solo AlQaeda. Lo Yemen può essere un campo facile dove insediarsi e creare
sedi per poter fare casino anche in altri paesi, non solo in Yemen. Per
questo la parola Al-Qaeda è secondo me una cosa che dicono tutti per
arrivare a un risultato. Qui però ci sono altri gruppi che vogliono anche
cose diverse da Al-Qaeda. Per questo bisogna vedere quanti sono e cosa
vogliono, però alla fine credimi esistono, ci sono gli attacchi ad Abyan, e
non solo. Con tanti problemi che ci sono in Yemen sarebbe da stupidi
andare ad aprire un confronto così duro in quella zona.
Qualcuno chiama questa situazione “Somalizzazione dello Yemen”,
non giova al governo nel loro rapporto con l’Occidente, disposto a
supportare Saleh o il figlio Ahmad pur di non rischiare?
x
La situazione è diversa dalla Somalia perché la Somalia è stata lasciata
da tutti perché alla fine da quel Paese non c’è da guadagnare molto.
Guarda caso l’Iraq tutti hanno partecipato per via del petrolio. Guarda
caso quello che sta succedendo in Libia, i francesi hanno cominciato da
soli poi la NATO è entrata, adesso gli italiani... È una guerra a scopo
economico, però dalla Somalia che cosa ti prendi? Per questo è stato un
Paese lasciato da parte. Invece lo Yemen è difficile. Lo Yemen è un paese
che confina con l’Arabia Saudita e sai che in Arabia Saudita è vicina agli
Stati Uniti, poi c’è il golfo di Aden con il passaggio di tutte le navi che
fanno rotta verso l’est Asia. Per questo lo Yemen non sarà mai lasciato da
solo. E quello che conferma questo è l’importanza che stanno dando gli
Stati Uniti e l’Arabia Saudita a questo paese, perché loro hanno paura
che lo Yemen diventi un paese instabile e saranno loro a pagare le
conseguenze.
Vista quindi l’importanza strategica dello Yemen, non può essere
questa una strategia del governo? Minacciarne l’instabilità per
convincere l’Arabia Saudita e gli USA a supportarlo?
Ma guarda che non c’è bisogno. Perché tu fai queste azioni quando devi
confermare a qualcuno che abbiamo una posizione strategica forte, ma
invece è una cosa che sanno tutti al di la di fare certe cose per far capire
che io riesco ad essere stabile o il problema ci sarà. Il problema qui dello
xi
Yemen, anche nella guerra del ’94 tra nord e sud, c’è stato l’appoggio
dell’Arabia Saudita al sud, guarda caso, e l’appoggio degli USA al nord,
nel senso che c’è stata la guerra e Saleh è riuscito a stabilire
l’unificazione dello Yemen che sembrava sul punto di essere diviso di
nuovo. Per questo scrivimi lo Stato con tutto quello che sta succedendo
non è così stupido da segnare certe azioni solo per poter dire agli altri
guarda che qui c’è un casino, e dobbiamo fare cose altrimenti se succede
un casino siete messi male. Anche perché non è stato Saleh a spingere i
giovani ad andare in piazza. Io mi ricordo un discorso che ha fatto Saleh
dopo che i ragazzi si sono messi vicino all’Università e ha detto
chiaramente, cari ragazzi, fate un partito e cercate di non farvi
condizionare dai partiti dell’opposizione, fate un partito, sediamoci
insieme, vediamo le cose che state chiedendo e vedrete che ci sarà
sicuramente un qualcosa di costruttivo. In questi sei mesi ci sono stati
solamente perso 60.000 posti di lavoro. Per questo la piazza è stata usata
dai partiti dell’opposizione perché pensavano che era l’unico modo per
poter arrivare al governo e a guidare questo paese. Io ho avuto una lunga
conversazione con i capi dell’opposizione e gli ho detto in chiaro, perché
state facendo questo, perché non andiamo alle elezioni? E non mi hanno
risposto perché le elezioni saranno truccate, mi hanno risposto perché
sappiamo che non abbiamo una base, per questo vedi, le cose sono
chiare. Questi pensavano di poter fare la stessa cosa che hanno fatto in
Egitto e mandare via Saleh, andare al potere e quindi controllare il paese
xii
e non dare più possibilità di fare elezioni, rimandare rimandare come sta
succedendo anche in Egitto. La loro strategia è fallita, questa è la realtà.
Perché ci sono stati anche dall’altra parte i giovani che sono usciti per
dire noi vogliamo Saleh. Strada facendo hanno perso supporti perché
falsificavano certe cose, facevano modo di fare certe cose che invece non
sono vere e hanno perso tantissimo. Guarda che la piazza non è più come
prima. Ci sono le tende ma non c’è nessuno nelle tende. Il venerdì per
poter fare quelle foto in cui sono tanti chiudono tutte le moschee di
quella zona per poter spingere la gente ad andare per forza. E poi la
gente finisce e se ne va e in piazza non resta nessuno.
Persone come Muhamad Qubaty lamentano una scarsa
rappresentanza dello Yemen del Sud.
Non è vero. Tu devi chiedere a questo Mohamed Qubaty che parla e non
ha veramente informazioni su niente. Ti giuro fa ridere. Tu puoi
chiedergli chi è il primo ministro dello Yemen.
Quello che lui diceva è che il potere effettivo è solo nelle mani di
Saleh.
Non è vero che il potere reale non è nelle mani del primo ministro. Il
primo ministro fa il suo lavoro alla grande. Prima di lui c’era un primo
xiii
ministro dell’Hadramawt. Praticamente da quando abbiamo avuto
l’unificazione dello Yemen non abbiamo mai avuto un primo ministro del
nord. Questa gente davvero falsifica l’informazione. E ti assicuro che
Aden è diventata un’altra cosa. Vai a vedere le foto di Aden prima del
’90 e vai a vedere le foto di Aden adesso. Siamo riusciti a convincere i
Paesi del Golfo a ospitare la Coppa del Golfo di calcio, che nessuno ci
credeva. Abbiamo costruito degli alberghi bellissimi e un nuovo stadio
alla grande. Aden non era niente prima dell’unificazione. Mukalla non
era niente, non aveva neanche l’acqua. Per questo è inutile paragonare lo
Yemen del sud prima del ’90 con lo Yemen del sud di adesso. Guarda che
veramente fa ridere questa cosa.
Come mai il movimento indipendentista ad Aden è così forte?
Assolutamente, io ti assicuro che ad Aden come città non c’è niente.
Addirittura la piazza che c’è ad Aden la gente se n’è andata. Ha capito
che è una cazzata. Questa gente è inutile che racconta balle perché non
sarà mai contenta.
Questo movimento che c’è nel sud non è neanche riuscito ad organizzarsi
per fare un partito. Se tu sei forte e pensi di poter veramente fare un
partito, ben venga la cosa. Prendi il potere. Fai in modo di far arrivare i
tuoi rappresentanti in parlamento, invece loro non hanno neanche un
partito. Allora di che parliamo? Solo di 5/600 persone che fanno casino?
xiv
Parlami di uno che si è organizzato, che è riuscito a farsi riconoscere e a
prendere la responsabilità di questa parte dello Yemen del sud per poter
dire di voler tornare ad essere un paese separato. Cazzate, lo Yemen è
sempre stato lo Yemen. Gli inglesi hanno fatto in modo di separarci
perché non sono stati capaci di occupare tutto lo Yemen. Sono entrati
nella parte del sud, lo Yemen del nord era pieno di montagne, non
riusciamo ad andar su, e sono rimasti a sud, mentre nello Yemen c’era la
monarchia, e poi lo Yemen è diventato repubblica e gli inglesi sono
rimasti fino al ’68. Così sono divenuti due paesi. Invece noi siamo lo
Yemen. Non puoi parlare di separare un paese. Come fai a separare un
Paese.
Per quanto riguarda il tuo ruolo, come preferisci essere citato?
Puoi dire quello che vuoi e ti risponderò. Lascia stare questa storia, poi
magari più avanti te la spiegherò, però sappi che ho un buon rapporto,
sono ben messo e anche con l’Italia. Sono stato nominato Cavaliere della
Repubblica Italiana, ho aiutato alla liberazione dei 5 ostaggi italiani a
Ma’rib, ho risolto tantissimi problemi per tante società italiane che
lavorano. Diciamo che il rapporto ce l’ho con l’Italia e con tutti gli
ambasciatori che erano qua. E ho un ottimo rapporto con il governo
italiano. Chiedimi quello che vuoi al di la del lavoro che faccio perché le
xv
informazioni che ti do sono informazioni vere, non ho nessun motivo di
raccontarti cose a favore di uno contro altri.
Mi da fastidio quando si pensa che quello che dice l’opposizione o quello
che dicono i giovani sia il vero. Bisogna saper distinguere.
Quando la rivoluzione è incominciata io gli ho chiesto di organizzarsi
meglio, di fare in modo di sbrigarsi, invece sono stati, scusami la parola,
inculati e adesso nessuno li caga. Non hanno una possibilità di decidere
niente. Chi sta trattando sono i partiti dell’opposizione, con l’ufficio del
Presidente, con gli ambasciatori dell’UE, con l’ambasciatore inglese. I
giovani addirittura hanno costituito un Consiglio di transizione che
veramente diventata la barzelletta del giorno. Le persone che sono state
nominate hanno detto di non essere state informate! E l’ambasciatore
inglese che rilascia un’intervista allo Yemen Times dicendo io non
riconoscerò mai un consiglio di transizione dello Yemen, perché lo
Yemen non è la Libia. Lo Yemen non ha bisogno di questo. A me dispiace
che questi giovani che erano partiti con la voglia di cambiare il paese
siano solo stati usati per dare potere all’opposizione. Tu vuoi il potere,
ben venga, vieni e fammi vedere se sei capace. I capi dell’opposizione
dicono che tramite le elezioni non arriveranno mai al potere. Se tu
calcoli che dal ’90 non hanno mai avuto la possibilità di controllare il
parlamento in Yemen.
xvi
Ben venga la democrazia, ma con i suoi pregi e i suoi difetti. Tu devi
accettare cosa viene fuori.
O hai una conferma che qualcosa è successo e le elezioni sono truccate e
lo conferma la comunità internazionale, ma non possiamo fare in modo di
farci ridere dietro raccontano balle.
Secondo te chi c’è dietro l’attentato a Saleh?
Di cose che possono essere spontanee da dire. Può essere... Mhh...
L’opposizione, ma non dico l’opposizione dei partiti che conosciamo, ma
qualche membro dell’opposizione come possono essere i figli di Al
Ahmar, insieme al generale Ali Mohsen, diventato anche uno che ha
appoggiato questa rivoluzione. Se uno vuole pensare può pensare solo a
quelli in questo momento.
Non sembra però essere il risultato delle indagini degli americani,
secondo cui l’esplosione c’è stata dall’interno. Come potevano
membri dell’opposizione arrivare così vicino da mettere una bomba
all’interno?
Io non penso che tu non pensi che comprare le persone è la cosa più
facile al mondo. Non è una cosa difficile. Io posso con un milione di
dollari comprare una persona e me ne frego di quello che fa. Basta
xvii
pensare che il responsabile della moschea, in quella preghiera, non è
venuto a pregare guarda caso. L’imam, quello che ha la chiave della
moschea quel giorno non è venuto a pregare e da quel momento è sparito.
Allora mi spieghi com’è? È facile, io vado da questo e dico ti do non so
quanto e con i soldi si può arrivare a qualsiasi cosa.
Come si chiama questa persona?
Non mi ricordo, però è una cosa che è uscita sul giornale. Questa persona
è sparita da quel giorno. Non si sa dove sta. Non è così difficile
comprare le persone. Sai quante storie simili sono successe. Non è una
cosa così difficile da accettare o impossibile da realizzare. Infatti loro
secondo me hanno studiato tutte le possibilità e hanno trovato che questa
era la più facile. C’è da riconoscere che c’è stato un fatto negativo che le
guardie del presidente non sono riuscite a controllare questa cosa e come
è scattata questa cosa bisognerebbe pensare anche quello. Non sappiamo
e non sapremo finché qualcuno deciderà di renderlo pubblico perché
secondo me loro lo sanno. Sia gli americani, sia il presidente che quelli
che sono vicinissimi al presidente. Perché guarda che è un’informazione
che utilizzerà per poter trattare perché secondo me se l’opposizione ha
organizzato questa cosa o sa che qualcuno ha scoperto che è stata lei,
adesso è debole, molto debole e tratterà.
xviii
Conosci personalmente il Presidente?
Si, lo conosco personalmente.
Sai in che condizioni è?
Il secondo filmato. Guarda caso, per farti capire quale opposizione
abbiamo nello Yemen. 3 giorni prima di quell’immagine il presidente ha
fatto un discorso che però era stato registrato 10 giorni prima. Quando
l’hanno trasmesso il presidente si muoveva meno. Secondo me è stata
anche studiata. La gente i giovani sono usciti con parolacce, ormai è
cieco, non vede più, ha le mani tagliate, non riesce più a muovere i
piedi... Hanno messo tantissime storie . Quando è uscito l’altro video con
l’assistente di Obama, lui ha fatto in modo di muovere mani e piedi, di
fare tutto quello che poteva per confermare anche a quelli che sono
stupidi, che usano solo queste cose per poter pensare che con queste
parole possono avere l’appoggio di qualcuno, invece no. Quando si è
fatto vedere in questo modo, credimi, anche con tutto quello che stiamo
soffrendo in questo Paese, ancora c’è gente che gli vuole bene.
Le mani apparivano però rigide e coperte da guanti.
I guanti è normale perché è uno che ha bruciato le mani è normale, però
le muoveva le mani. Mentre l’opposizione era uscita con un comunicato
xix
in cui diceva che aveva le mani tagliate. Ti rendi conto? La differenza tra
uno che dice che ha la mano tagliata mentre invece la muove con i
guanti. Spero che tu prendi le cose che ti dico per poter valutare le
persone di questa opposizione e per giudicare queste persone che
approfittano di certe immagini per poter fare quello che vogliono e alla
fine è una falsità. Ti dico anche altro. L’opposizione ha un canale
televisivo che si chiama Suhail che lo stesso giorno in cui la TV di stato
annunciava la trasmissione del discorso del presidente, il canale
televisivo dell’opposizione ha mandato per un’ora la breaking news che
il discorso che il canale di stato avrebbe fatto vedere era un discorso
falsificato, con una foto e la voce non sarebbe stato di Saleh ma di una
controfigura. Allora, ti rendi conto come questi cercano di far capire di
sapere tanto e invece non sanno un cazzo. Quando è uscita poi
l’immagine di Saleh che ha parlato con la faccia bruciata, a dimostrare
quanto è forte quest’uomo, perché è uno che in 33 anni si è sempre fatto
vedere elegantissimo, una persona che ci tiene all’immagine, accetta di
farsi vedere in questo modo solo per sbugiardare l’opposizione dicendo
che quello che hanno raccontato a tutti è falso, che sta bene.
Come facciamo a credere a questa opposizione? Come facciamo a
credere che questi sono capaci di guidare questo paese? Il giorno 3
giugno, quando c’è stato l’attentato, subito sul canale televisivo
dell’opposizione, in grande, Ali Saleh è stato ucciso. Dopo mezz’ora uno
dei capi dell’opposizione ha detto non ci credete, è una messa in scena di
xx
Saleh. Se il tuo canale televisivo ha scritto che è stato ucciso, dopo
mezz’ora dici che è una cazzata di Saleh.
Anche la TV di Stato però non è sempre imparziale o precisa.
Ti assicuro che il canale televisivo del governo non ha mai raccontato
falsità. Mi basta questo. Non ha mai scritto qualsiasi cosa sbagliata o
fasulla sull’opposizione. Al di la che sono figli di Saleh e dicono quello
che vuole Saleh. Quello è normale.
È inutile che tu parli del canale televisivo di Sana’a e dimentichi la tua
televisione. È normale. Però, la cosa che voglio se tu hai la possibilità di
parlare con quelli con cui parli e gli dici datemi un’informazione fasulla
che ha trasmesso il canale governativo, poi io ti parlo. Invece se tu senti
quello che dicono loro e non prendi le cose importanti che ti ho detto.
Raccontare falsità alla gente, l’informazione è creata per raccontare le
cose come stanno, non per raccontare le cose fasulle. Il canale televisivo
dello Yemen non ha mai detto cose fasulle sui partiti dell’opposizione.
Assolutamente. E io sfido chiunque. E queste cose che loro ripetono in
continuazione sono cazzate. Perché non hanno niente. E tu quando ti dico
le cose non è che voglio insegnarti nulla, però chiedi conferme e io
qualsiasi cosa ti ho raccontato stasera, te la posso confermare. Guarda
che io lo so a memoria e ti posso dire tutto quello che hanno detto,
perché non hanno altro. Qualsiasi cosa ti ho raccontato stasera ti posso
portare cose per dimostrarti che non ti ho raccontato balle, però se tu
xxi
chiedi la stessa cosa all’opposizione, a questo Mohamed Qubaty che ti
parla di cazzate e che non sa niente, io sono disponibile ad un confronto
faccia a faccia con lui, e vedrai. Perché io so cosa so e so la realtà del
Paese. Non sono uno che sta cercando di arrivare al potere o che sta
cercando di fare tante cose fasulle per arrivare a qualcosa. Io sto bene
con il mio. Io oltre a quello che faccio nel governo ho la mia società
privata, sto benissimo, lavoro con le società italiane e ne rappresento
tantissime, rappresento la Finmeccanica, ho un gran rapporto con
Guarguaglini, presidente di Finmeccanica, praticamente ho sempre
cercato di facilitare il lavoro degli italiani non solo nello Yemen. Ho
creato attività anche nel Bahrain, a Jeddah, grazie a Dio sono uno che si
è fatto da solo e non è perché sono del governo, invece Mohamad Al
Qubaty non so cos’ha fatto e pensa di poter arrivare a far parte del
governo o a essere un ambasciatore, e per questo racconta balle. È stato
ambasciatore grazie alla corruzione che ha fatto nella Total, e per questo,
io non voglio andare nel particolare, però è uno che ha sempre usato la
sua posizione per fare cose che non sono da fare. Per questo io se vuoi e
se lui ha il coraggio, faccia a faccia e vediamo chi vince. Perché prima
della rivoluzione dei giovani, se lui aveva le palle, doveva lasciare il
partito del presidente prima. Perché se tu sei una persona reale, se tu sei
una persona che rispetta te stesso, non aspetti che qualcuno fa la
rivoluzione e tu perché hai paura di essere messo in prigione ti ritiri e li
appoggi.
xxii
Ha detto di aver lasciato il partito nel 2003.
Non è vero, è bugiardo. È stato cacciato dal partito. C’è differenza tra
lasciare ed essere cacciati.
Comunque nel 2003.
Non nel 2003. Quando era ambasciatore a Beirut?
Fino al 2006 se non erro.
Come si fa ad essere fuori del partito ed essere ambasciatore del governo
yemenita? Quando ha lasciato Beirut è entrato in Yemen, ha cercato di
farsi assegnare un’altra sede, nessuno l’ha cagato e poi è stato cacciato.
Se lui aveva il coraggio doveva parlare male del governo e del
presidente, tirare fuori la corruzione, cercare di far capire tutto questo
prima del febbraio 2011, perché tutti quelli che hanno girato pagina e si
sono dimostrati vicini alla rivoluzione sono quelli avevano paura della
vendetta dei giovani nel caso in cui avessero vinto la rivoluzione. E
invece non è vero. Per questo anche questi hanno perso la faccia per
niente. E lui è uno sfigato che vive li in UK e non è arrivato a niente.
xxiii
Ma se è stato cacciato nel 2003, evidentemente ha dissentito prima
del 2006.
È stato cacciato dal partito del presidente ma non mi ricordo quando.
Fino al 2006 era a Beirut.
Non è l’unico, ci sono altri ambasciatori che fanno parte
dell’opposizione, come Al-Hamdi.
Al-hamdi è stato premiato perché è il figlio del nostro ex presidente
Ibrahim Al-Hamdi. Ti assicuro e io ho seguito anche questa cosa qui,
questo uomo non fa niente nello Yemen, bisogna dargli una posizione. Se
tu parli con Al-Hamdi oggi, non è uno che ha voltato la faccia. Lui
ancora sta con il partito del presidente e sta ancora con il presidente e
non ha mai fatto una comunicazione con cui dice di appoggiare i giovani.
Esistono dei video in cui Al-Hamdi critica duramente il governo.
Ma cosa significa criticare? Io voglio che lui mi dica di stare con i
giovani e che questa rivoluzione. Criticare è normale, ben venga la
democrazia nello Yemen per criticare. Siamo così. Guarda che qui c’è
una libertà dei giornali che non c’è in nessun altro paese arabo.
Cerchiamo di essere reali e di essere riconoscenti di quello che ha fatto
Saleh. Ci sono giornali nello Yemen che parlano malissimo di Saleh.
xxiv
Ben venga criticare. Lo faccio anche io. Te l’ho detto anche io quando ho
iniziato il mio discorso che ci sono cose che non mi piacevano di quello
che faceva il governo.
Però non mi dire che se uno critica significa che è contro Saleh. No, io
critico perché questo è un paese democratico, civile e quando ci sono le
cose sbagliate, quando ci sono le cose che non sono giuste da fare, però
dammi una comunicazione di Al-Hamdi in cui lui dice di appoggiare i
giovani contro Saleh. Non lo farà mai. Lui lo sa chi l’ha mandato li. Lo
sa che Saleh gli ha voluto bene. Lui non ha mai fatto parte del MFA.
Per questo diciamo che è stata una premiazione a lui e alla sua famiglia.
Certe cose bisogna raccontarle in certi modi diversi. Criticare il governo
è una cosa bellissima qui. Io lo vedo come un atto positivo nei confronti
di Saleh, perché in è l’unico Paese arabo dove ci sono i giornali che
parlano malissimo di lui, del figlio, ci sono tutti i documenti di
corruzione. C’è una libertà di stampa bellissima, veramente da stare
contenti.
Secondo te ora cosa succede?
Secondo me succede quello che ha sempre richiesto Saleh. Questa è una
dimostrazione di forza di questo uomo. Lui ha sempre chiesto di stare
intorno a un tavolo, parlare con l’opposizione, di anticipare le elezioni,
xxv
lui non si ricandida più e vediamo se l’opposizione è capace di guidare
questo Paese. È l’unica soluzione. Usare la forza non è a loro favore.
Fare ancora questi casini, cercare sempre di fare sempre le stesse cose,
non arriveremo mai a niente. Cercare di ammazzare, non arriveremo
neanche a niente. Se ti rendi conto basta vedere, il presidente non c’è, il
primo ministro non c’è, il presidente del parlamento non c’è, e comunque
l’opposizione non è riuscita a controllare il paese. Non sono riusciti a
fare un colpo di stato. Che cosa significa?
Chi controlla il Paese adesso?
Hem... Mmm... Secondo me... Le cose sono chiare... Il vice presidente
insieme ai capi dell’esercito e il governo con il ministro
dell’informazione che ha preso il posto del primo ministro che sta male.
Se l’ambasciatore inglese è uscito oggi con un’intervista per dire
“l’opposizione non hanno altro che stare in un posto a masticare il qat
aspettando che la comunità internazionale risolva il loro problema”.
Questo non è uno che ha sparato questa cosa così. Questo è un
ambasciatore dell’UK. Questo significa che ha capito queste persone. E
per favore vai a dire a Muhammad Qubaty di chiamare l'ambasciatore
inglese nello Yemen che gli spieghi questa cosa.
Credo che certe cose sono chiare, siamo adesso a più di cinquanta giorni
che il presidente non c’è e non sono riusciti veramente a fare niente.
xxvi
Perché alla fine, come ha detto l’ambasciatore inglese, è gente che sa
masticare qat e pensa di potersi appoggiare alla comunità internazionale
per risolvere i loro problemi. Credo che questa sia una cosa chiarissima
da poter capire con chi abbiamo a che fare. C’è anche un’altra cosa. Che
l’opposizione quando ha mandato la sua delegazione in Arabia Saudita,
sono stati più di 3 ore e mezzo a parlare e quando sono usciti, il ministro
degli esteri saudita ha detto, ah, e questa la gente che deve guidare lo
Yemen dopo Saleh? No no no...
Spiegami tu perché un ambasciatore inglese dice questo e il ministro
degli affari esteri saudita dice questo. Credo che la cosa si spiega da
sola. Non abbiamo un’opposizione forte, non abbiamo un’opposizione
valida e organizzata, che riesce a convincere di essere la scelta ideale per
guidare il paese. E poi, ti racconto anche un’altra cosa che penso capirai.
Durante la guerra del ’94, quando c’è stato il sud contro il nord e il sud
con il partito socialista che cercava di avere alle spalle lo Yemen del sud
come un Paese. Il partito dell’Islah, il partito musulmano, ha emesso un
comunicato dice che ammazzare uno del partito socialista porta in
paradiso. È stata una fatwa da parte di Al Zindani. Ti rendi conto che
quelli che nel 94 hanno dato una fatwa per ammazzare i socialisti, oggi
sono insieme?
Non c’è nessuno nell’opposizione, Saleh non si ricandida. Allora chi?
xxvii
Allora chi? Vediamo. Qualsiasi uomo ha le palle di candidarsi, sia da
parte del partito del presidente, sia da parte dell’opposizione o di Islah,
ben venga. Venite, portate tutto quello che volete, le Nazioni Unite, e
vediamo chi vince e ti assicuro che non vinceranno, non perché c’è
possibilità di brogli, ma perché noi sappiamo chi sono.
Allora chi, Ahmad?
Il partito popolare del presidente ha tantissimi persone che possono
essere in grado di essere gente capace di guidare questo paese. Non c’è
solo Ahmad. Perché dobbiamo sempre dire Ahmad. Chi se ne frega, se
Ahmad vuole candidarsi, è libero di fare quello che vuole. Non è che
siamo una monarchia che lui va automaticamente. Si vedrà. Lui è libero
di fare quello che vuole. Se lui non vuole, il partito del presidente ha
tante altre persone che sono capaci di guidare questo paese, poi vediamo.
Saranno le elezioni a dimostrare chi è questo e chi è quello.
Spero di riuscire a venire per le elezioni allora.
Io ti assicuro che lo Yemen non è mai stato chiuso a nessuno, e nel
2006...
Io veramente sono stato rimandato in dietro.
xxviii
C’è stato un giornalista del Corriere della Sera qui. Ho organizzato tutto
io. È andato nelle piazze, come mai allora? Cerchiamo di essere reali. Lo
Yemen non ha chiuso. A noi non piace essere presi per i fondelli. Uno
che entra come turista e fa il giornalista viene mandato via. Bisogna
rispettare le leggi di questo paese. Non è che uno viene come turista e
poi vengono fuori le immagini e le foto. E che cazzo oh!
Lo Yemen è un paese ben messo e ben controllato, al di la di tutti i
problemi che ci sono.
Ci sono i giornalisti della televisione russa, Al Arabiya è venuta qui e ha
fatto l’intervista al presidente. Ci sono i cinesi di CCTV, c’è di tutto. Il
Corriere della Sera era qui. Non è vero che lo Yemen chiude. Basta solo
fare le cose in regola. Guarda caso, io sono sicuro che se tu chiedi
all’ambasciatore tuo che ha anche chiuso la sua ambasciata da due mesi,
sarà lui a dire di non andare. Sarà l’Italia a negarti di venire nello
Yemen, non noi. E ti diranno vai a responsabilità tua, perché se tu vai sul
sito dell’Unità di Crisi, ti dicono che lo Yemen è sulla lista nera. Per
questo prendi prima il permesso del tuo Paese, poi parlami del mio
Paese.
Questo è un Paese dove se vieni legalmente come giornalista e chiedi
come giornalista, non avrai nessun problema. Abbiamo sempre persone
che vengono... Abbiamo mandato un neozelandese che è entrato come
turista. Ma cazzo, mi prendi per i fondelli? Tu vieni, devi avere il
xxix
permesso, perché io sono responsabile per te. Tu sei giornalista, ti
accompagno, ti porto qua, ti porto la, non perché devo controllare come
scrivi, perché, caro amico, adesso non è più facile controllare se uno
vuole scrivere cose negative. C’è internet... Non è più come una volta,
non si può più controllare l’informazione.
La politica non è per il primo arrivato. La politica è sporca e bisogna
avere esperienza. Non possiamo essere tutti politici. C’è gente capace di
fare il poeta, gente capace di fare il cantante, gente capace di essere
fotografo e magari non giornalista. È la vita che ci fa capire strada
facendo. È necessario che i giovani capiscano quello che vogliono e
come arrivarci. Per me l’opposizione li ha usati. E ti posso confermare
che sono stati usati e le due volte che sono usciti dalla piazza hanno
avuto il comportamento negativo della polizia e delle forze dell’ordine,
sono stati organizzati e usati. Il primo quando c’è stata la seduta dei
ministri degli esteri del GCC con l’opposizione e hanno fatto in modo di
mandarli fuori per creare casino, e la seconda quando c’è stato il secondo
meeting con il GCC. Per questo vedi che era tutto organizzato e
manipolato? Li usano solo per fare i cazzi loro e questo mi da fastidio.
Sicuramente comunque dispiace per l’attentato. Non dovrebbero
essere quelli i metodi della politica.
xxx
Dispiace perché noi non vogliamo il male di nessuno. Vogliamo avere un
paese democratico e a volte penso che abbiamo sbagliato a scegliere la
democrazia in questo paese perché secondo me ancora siamo abbastanza
innocenti e non maturi per la democrazia. Credo che stiamo pagando
questa cosa perché la democrazia in questo paese, anche se fasulla, come
qualcuno vuole dire, sta dando fastidio ai paesi vicini, perché i paesi
vicini sicuramente, l’Arabia Saudita, il Bahrain, gli UAE, il Qatar,
l’Oman, sono tutti paesi dove c’è la monarchia. Per questo secondo me
anche questo ha creato abbastanza fastidio e lo Yemen sta pagando.
Purtroppo la cosa continua e adesso non sappiamo dove arriviamo.
Nessuno vuole più fare il bene del Paese. Ognuno vuole solo arrivare al
potere e poi non so cosa sarà capace di fare, però il popolo sta soffrendo
tantissimo. Loro pensavano che con questi casini che ci sono, mancanza
di elettricità, di benzina, pensavano di poter avere più persone a loro
favore, invece niente, guarda caso con tutto quello che stiamo soffrendo,
ancora la gente in strada alza le foto di Saleh. È una cosa veramente
incredibile, che ha fatto cambiare anche le decisioni di certi Paesi amici
che appoggiavano i giovani fino a due o tre mesi fa, ma quando hanno
visto che c’è ancora gente che dice no, con tutto quello che voi dite su
Saleh, io voglio Saleh.
L’elettricità manca tanto, non c’è carburante, manca l’acqua. Per questo
credimi, io parlo di Sana’a e la gente soffre tantissimo e qualcuno pensa
xxxi
che facendo in questo modo che avrà più appoggio, però guarda caso la
gente resiste. Questo popolo, guarda caso, è un popolo strano ma da
ammirare, perché non è facile piegarlo. Non è facile manipolarlo. La
gente, con tutto quello che c’è, va in giro e dice manca l’acqua, questa è
la rivoluzione, dovete sacrificare un po’... Ma chi... Questo ti conferma
di quanto la gente era più contenta prima, stava bene, è vero che c’era
corruzione, ma non dappertutto, ci sono certe persone che hanno sempre
fatto in modo di lavorare. È inutile negare che quest’uomo ha fatto tanto
per lo Yemen. Lo Yemen fino a 20-30 anni fa non era niente, adesso
grazie a dio ci sono Università, ospedali, strade. Vieni a Sana’a e ci sono
ponti dappertutto. Vai a Tripoli dove ci sono i soldi come l’acqua e non
trovi neanche un ponte. Grazie a dio Sana’a è piena di queste
infrastrutture. E questo è inutile negarlo. Se ci sono state cose negative,
va bene, in tutto il mondo ci sono cose negative, però non credo che la
soluzione di questi problemi viene con la forza e ammazzando le
persone.
Come entrare in Yemen?
Il giornalista del Corriere della Sera mi ha chiamato, mi ha parlato, mi
ha detto che cosa voleva, è stato ricevuto dal ministero dell’informazione
all’aeroporto, è andato anche dai giovani, e nessuno gli ha chiesto fammi
vedere cosa scriverai o cosa hai mandato. Io ho letto tutto quello che ha
xxxii
scritto sul Corriere della Sera, sono d'accordo con certe cose, con altre
no, però è bello che riesce a riportare le cose in modo chiaro e questo è il
bello del giornalismo, una voce che non altera e non fa in modo che la
tua opinione personale si rifletta sull’articolo, perché purtroppo ci sono
giornalisti che arrivano e si fanno condizionare e poi vedi che il loro
pezzo parte già con la loro idea personale e questo è sbagliato. Perché
alla fine tu sei un giornalista e devi riportare le cose nelle due facce che
ci sono. E invece certe cose non sono fatte bene. Quando pensi che
l’opposizione è debole, messa male, allora devo appoggiarla e fare un
pezzo a loro favore, questo è sbagliato.
Tutto il mondo è paese, ma a volte alcune cose vengono accettate in un
Paese e non vengono accettate in un altro. E questo non va bene. Per
questo vediamo... Il buon giornalismo è quello che ti ho detto, che non si
fa condizionare per riportare un pezzo a favore di qualcun contro qualcun
altro, perché alla fine, non voglio parlarti di giornalisti che sono stati
pagati dall’opposizione e alla fine, quando hanno lasciato lo Yemen,
hanno detto di essere stati pagati per scrivere certe cose contro il
governo, questo è sbagliato. Questo è quello che da fastidio. A me non
piace comprare le persone, i soldi lo so che sono importanti nella vita,
però, quando cominci con i soldi, veramente è brutto. Compri le persone,
compri le idee...
xxxiii
Non è più un problema tra l’opposizione e Saleh. Adesso è diventato un
problema tra due governi, perché non credo che sei al buio i quello che
sta facendo il Qatar nello Yemen. Stiamo veramente usando i soldi di
altri nello Yemen. Speriamo che le cose possano andare nel verso giusto
e riusciamo ad arrivare a una conclusione che vada bene per tutti. Una
transizione che dia modo di guidare il paese secondo la volontà del
popolo.
E l’Iran? Qual’è il suo ruolo?
Bah, diciamo che per il momento chi sta lavorando è il Qatar e significa
che il Qatar è dietro l’Iran. Il Qatar o l’Iran sono la stessa cosa, è inutile
che ci nascondiamo questo, lo sappiamo tutti.
/// END ///
xxxiv
Appendix D
Interview Arhab Al Sarhi
Italian interpreter for President Saleh and member of the presidential Party
Duration: 01:26:01
*** TRANSCRIPT TRANSLATION***
From what I know you are close to the President, right?
Let's say I’m close to the president because the opposition has not
confirmed to me in all these months that it could be able to do something
different or to improve the situation of the country. Not that I'm one who
cares and even if something is wrong to goes after it. We hoped that they
were able to do something better, we hoped that they were so organised
to convince the people, not just their followers, but everyone. But
unfortunately, after four months were unable to do anything because they
have no ideas, unfortunately, they are not organised, they have told many
lies. They gave the wrong and false information. And then on the way
they have lost any role that could also be in their favour.
Why say you are not organised? They have a political agenda based
on four key points.
i
Who are you talking about? The youth or the opposition parties?
Both, because as far as I know, agree on the 4 points.
Absolutely not, because I want you to understand what is happening now,
if you followed where we arrived, even the young people of the streets
have never been able to unite themselves in order to have a council that
represents them. Even when there was the initiative of the Gulf
countries, they have called the opposition alone, they never, excuse the
word, gave a damn about the youths. They have never taken them into
consideration. They never thought to talk to them. The delegation that
went to Riyadh was a delegation made up of people representing the
opposition parties. Then, a second round of negotiations has been done
with the party of the President together with other parties that support
him. These young people have failed in four months to have a council of
five or ten people who may be able to talk to them. Today in the square
in Sana'a, there are 18 groups. Imagine, 18. But do you realize? For this,
I absolutely do not agree with you when you say they are organised.
Their bad organisation has brought us here. Because of heir illorganisation we got 5 months of revolution. In Egypt in 18 days they
ii
managed to overturn Mubarak. In Tunisia in 15 days. Here we are
entering the sixth month and the whole country suffers. If you talk to
whoever supported the revolution 5 months ago, now doesn’t even want
to hear about it.
Probably more than blaming young people, we must recognize that
the regime was strong enough to stay still standing in these 6
months?
Lack of experience, doing things just to get noticed or to say we too can
do as the Egyptians and Tunisians. Repeat certain things is not easy. I
blame the young people of lacking the experience and go after certain
people that wanted them to believe certain things which are not true. At
times they believed the parties and followed them, then they saw that the
leaders of opposition parties, there is a certain Khatan Zayed who is the
head of the Shiite party said certain words clearly, registered, you can
watch on the internet and find them. 'My dear young friends, do not
expect to decide on something, do not expect to become part of some
council to decide in this country, you will not be ministers, you will not
be ambassadors. You just have to make a revolution and we will do the
rest '. Do you realise the stage the opposition parties reached? Now you
underestimate the people who have the opportunity to talk, because until
iii
2011 the opposition parties could not do anything, because they had lost
the election and had to wait as happens in the West. Here the opposition
is the same, they lost the elections, has become weak, because in the end
you can’t always say there is falsification and forgery. What the hell! If
you remember, if you went to Yemen in 2006, we had delegations of the
UN, EU, Arab League that controlled everything about the 2006
elections. But opposition parties have taken advantage of these young
people who have come out, they put them there, they also put their
followers and therefore the squares have become a mixture of people
who had nothing to do with political parties and people part of the
parties. Now there are no more independent young. All those who are
there are children of Islah, children of the party of the Muslim
Brotherhood, sons of the Socialist Party and so on, of the Shiites, so I
tell you that they were not capable of bringing this revolution on the
right track. Not for the power of the President.
Saleh has been in power for 33 years, has power to all his family and
thought to pass power to his son, maybe not exactly a very healthy
system of government?
If you talk about it and you say that there was Saleh for 33 years,
remember that the head of Parliament, the father of these sons of Al-
iv
Ahmar, who are in the opposition now and are doing this revolution to
get power, their father has led the House for 18 years. So what? What
does this mean? Saleh is not the person who led this country. If you are
the head of parliament for 18 years you have participated in all, you have
participated in corruption if there was corruption, you have participated
in the mistreatment of the population.
With regard to Saleh's son, he does not say that as in a monarchy, I die
and my son is automatically appointed as happened in many other Arab
countries. Saleh said, if my son wants to do politics and wants to be
president, well, but with controlled elections, with legal elections.
Remember that America, which we call the cradle of democracy, there
was Bush father and son. So if the father is succeeded by his son does
not mean automatically that there is a monarchy, or there is corruption. If
the opposition has the strength to say no, to challenge the son of Saleh
and stand and see who wins, but if the people who they thought would no
longer supported Saleh, believe me, what lengthen this revolution is the
balance of power in this country. They thought that Saleh was no longer
supported by anyone, and yet despite everything that is said, the people
still love this man. There are people coming out every Friday in support.
If you calculate that in 2006 he won with 4,500,000 votes, the opposition
candidate has lost with 1,600,000 votes. So if you calculate all those who
are in the squares, this will be one million and six. Therefore, since when
democracy allows us to go on the streets if you do not win elections.
v
Democracy also means that you must accept the result, beyond the fact if
there is fraud, because remember that even elections in the United States,
Bush's son has won a handful of votes, and even we were to wait a week
the final result. To falsify elections is everywhere. But what you have to
understand is what people actually want. Here people do not want the
Muslim Brotherhood, no longer wants these people who have always
created problems in this country.
Beyond those who have won the elections, the situation is that of
unarmed youths in the square have been attacked and even killed
several times by government forces.
How do you know and how do you confirm that those were government
forces? On March the 18th the youth organisation claims to have
captured 11 people and up to now we do not know anything about those
11 people. These people are part of the opposition. They are the ones
who fired. I'm not saying that the government did not fire, someone shot
and someone helped that the deaths may be more. Believe me,
unfortunately, politics here is not as in Europe, here it is not clean.
Here's a dirty politics, they use the blood, using innocent people to get
where they want. That’s why
you should never believe. If they have
really captured these 11 people who were shooting, where are they
vi
today? Why these people do not say who sent them? Believe me because
they have organised this thing themselves, because they knew that the
revolution had not stretched out. They had to do something to attract
international attention and have done that to draw it. And believe me, the
ambassadors who are here in Yemen are not stupid. They understood that
it is a game and realised that someone is working hard to get to power. I
agreed and at the beginning I supported them, and I was hoping for a
change in the country, but when I see people use dirty things, kill people,
falsify everything you see, we've seen many videos where they put
people and teach them how to do when there is an attack by government
forces, you must do so, turn this way, to show that you have hurt your
belly, and they used gas. The gas used, the tear gas, are the same ones
used in Italy during the G8 summit in Genoa. There was also a fatality in
Genoa if you remember. We have to be real when we tell things to help
understand the situation, because this country is different. We have
experienced many problems and many wars. The Gulf countries, used
Yemen to be able to reach their goals. Qatar and Saudi Arabia fight and
solve their problems in Yemen. Qatar supports the Shiites to create
problems in the south of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia wages the war ...
Look, is a mess. For this, believe me, what came to you not the whole
truth. For this I am always willing to challenge you or anyone on what is
the reality of this country.
vii
I'm not 100% pro-government and will never be 100% against the
opposition, but I speak only of facts that are before me.
Al-Qaeda has often been used as an excuse to possibly keep Saleh in
power?
This is what the opposition says. If you believe what they say, then you
should also criticise the U.S. that they annoyed us with the story of Bin
Laden for 10 years. And then at the end was just bullshit? Let's be real. If
we say that Yemen uses Al-Qaeda, then America has done the same, they
used Al-Qaeda to enter in Afghanistan? They used Al-Qaeda to go into
Iraq to steal Iraq's oil? And then we say that if you criticise Saleh, then
you must criticise the world's strongest power that is controlling the
world. No one here is doing ... Haven’t you heard of an article that says
that America says bullshits, that wants to use for certain purposes. I
assure you that there is someone here who have fled from Afghanistan to
Yemen because we were always the ones to support Osama when he was
in Afghanistan, so when these people started to come back they started
creating these groups. The Saudis are in Saudi Arabia because the Saudi
Arabia border between us is so long that it can not be controlled, that’s
why they come here and stay here in Yemen. This is why Saudi Arabia is
also a liar?
viii
There is, but maybe is not as some say, okay, I can accept this, but
completely deny the existence of this thing I think is pretty stupid,
because the U.S. are here to support us. They are the ones that give us all
the means to fight these people. They are the ones that ride their planes
and attack. They killed one person in Ma’rib more than two months ago
using these drones, and now we are paying because of this family of
Ma’rib, sometimes they blow up a pipeline, and we are here to suffer
every day. For this is something they can use against Saleh
instrumentally, but it is difficult to accept as absolute truth everything
they say. There is also false on their part.
To what extent the threat of Al Qaeda is real?
You can’t define up to what point is serious. The situation is such as in
Somalia, there are pirates, etc. ... All these things confirm that there is
terrorism. I do not always call Al-Qaida, because it is easy to throw all
on this organisation, but it is not just one, now we have more than one.
There are many groups that make all this trouble and then the end is only
recognised Al-Qaeda. However, believe me, something is there, maybe
not as much as they want us to believe, I admit it, but we can’t deny it
fully, it is a nonsense.
Come see what's happening in Abyan, who are they shooting? There is a
war there.
ix
I talked with the Imam of a village near Abyan and he says there is
no Al-Qaeda there. So who are they shooting at?
Saleh's family, the Interior Minister, he never uses the word Al-Qaeda.
They are the ones who say this. He says, if we fail to maintain the
stability of this country, difficult to control because we have a border of
2000 km of desert with Saudi Arabia, where it is difficult to control. We
have 2,500 km of beaches on the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia to the
border with Oman. Therefore, it is difficult to control this country. That’s
why he says that if we fail to stabilise, many terrorist groups, and has
never said only Al-Qaeda. Yemen can be an easy place to settle and
create camps to make some mess in other countries, not only in Yemen.
For this reason, the word Al-Qaeda is one thing I think they all use to get
a result. Here, however, there are also other groups who want different
things from Al-Qaeda. For this we need to see how many they are and
what they want, but believe me there are, there are attacks on Abyan, and
more. With so many problems that exist in Yemen would be stupid to go
to open a clash so hard in that area.
x
Someone called this situation "Somalisation of Yemen", doesn’t it
benefit the government in its relationship with the West, willing to
support Saleh or his son Ahmad rather than risk?
The situation is different from Somalia because Somalia has been left by
all because at the end there is nothing to gain from that country. See all
participated in the case of Iraq because of the oil. See if what is
happening in Libya, the French have started on their own, then joined
NATO, now Italians ... It is a war for economic purpose, but what you
take from Somalia? Is a country that has been left aside. Yemen is rather
difficult. Yemen is a country that borders with Saudi Arabia and you
know that Saudi Arabia is close to the United States, then there is the
Gulf of Aden with the passage of all ships en route to East Asia. Yemen,
for this will never be left alone. And what confirms this is the importance
the United States and Saudi Arabia are giving to this country because
they fear that Yemen will become an unstable country and they will pay
the consequences.
So, considering the strategic importance of Yemen, can not this be a
government strategy? Threaten instability to convince Saudi Arabia
and the U.S. to support it?
xi
Look, there’s no need for that. Because you do these things when you
need to confirm to someone that we have a strong strategic position, but
that is something that everyone knows beyond to do certain things to
make it clear that I have to be stable or the problem will be. The problem
here in Yemen, also in the '94 war between north and south, there was the
support of Saudi Arabia to the south, not surprisingly, and support the
U.S. in the north, in the sense that there was War and Saleh has managed
to establish the unification of Yemen, which seemed about to be divided
again.
So write me, if the State with all what is happening is not so stupid to do
certain things just to be able to say looks, there is a mess, and we must
do something otherwise there will be a mess here and you’ll get it too.
Also because it was not Saleh to push young people to go to the streets. I
remember a speech that Saleh gave after the youths went near the
University and he made it clear, dear youths, create a party and try not to
get influenced by opposition parties, have a party, sit down together,
we’ll see what you are asking and you will see that there will definitely
be something constructive. In these six months there have been lost
60,000 jobs. For this reason, the square has been used by opposition
parties because they thought it was the only way to get to the government
and lead this country. I had a long talk with opposition leaders and told
xii
clearly, why are you doing this, why do not we go to elections? And they
told me that the elections will be rigged, they said because we know that
we have no basis to win, things are clear. They thought they could do the
same thing they did in Egypt and knock Saleh, come to power and then
control the country and give no more chances to make new elections, to
postpone postpone as is happening in Egypt. Their strategy has failed,
this is reality. Because there were on the other side the young people who
came out to say they want Saleh. They have lost support along the way
because they falsified certain things, they did certain things which are
not true and have lost so much. Look at the square is not the same as
before. There are tents, but there is no one in the tents. On Friday in
order to make those pictures in which there are many, they close all the
mosques in that area in order to push people. And then people go away
and the square remains empty.
People like Muhammad Qubaty complain of poor representation of
South Yemen.
It is not true. You have to ask this Mohamed Qubaty who talks and has
no information about anything. I swear it makes me laugh. You can ask
him who is the prime minister of Yemen.
xiii
What he said is that the real power is only in the hands of Saleh.
It is not true that the real power is not in the hands of the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister does his job great. Before him was a prime minister
from Hadramawt. Practically since we had the unification of Yemen
we've never had a prime minister of the north. These people actually
falsify the information. And I assure you that Aden has become
something else. If you see pictures of Aden before the 90's then see
pictures of Aden now. We managed to convince the Gulf countries to host
the Gulf Football Cup, which nobody believed we could manage. We
have built beautiful hotels and a new stadium. Aden was nothing before
the unification. Mukalla was nothing, did not even have water. For this it
is useless to compare South Yemen before the 90's with South Yemen
now. Look, this thing really makes me laugh.
Why the independence movement in Aden is so strong then?
Absolutely, I assure you that in Aden city as there is nothing. Even in the
square in Aden people is gone. They understood that it is bullshit. Is
xiv
useless that these people keep their lies because they will never be
happy.
This movement in the south that there is not even able to organise
themselves to make a party. If you're strong and you think you can really
make a party, so be it. Get the power. Make sure to get your
representatives in parliament, but they do not even have a party. So what
are we talking about? Only 5 / 600 people making noise? Tell me about
someone who is organised, which is able to be recognised and take
responsibility for this part of South Yemen in order to say you want to go
back to being a separate country. Bullshit, Yemen has always been
Yemen. The British have managed to separate us because they were not
able to occupy all of Yemen. They came in the southern part, the North
Yemen was full of mountains, they could not go up and remained in the
south, while the monarchy was in Yemen, then Yemen has become a
republic and the English were there until '68. So they have become two
countries. But we are Yemen. You can not talk to separate a country. How
do you separate a country.
As for your role, how you prefer to be quoted?
xv
You can ask what you want and I'll answer. Forget this story, then
perhaps will explain it later, but know that I have a good relationship,
I’m well placed also with Italy. I was made a Knight of the Italian
Republic, I helped in the liberation of the 5 Italian hostages in Ma’rib, I
have solved many problems for many Italian companies that work here.
Let's say I’ve got a relationship with Italy and with all the ambassadors
who were here. And I have a great relationship with the Italian
government. Ask me anything you want beyond the work I do because
the information you give is true information, I have no reason to tell you
things in favour of one against another.
It bothers me when you think that what the opposition says or what
young people say is true. We must be able to distinguish.
When the revolution has begun I asked them to organise themselves
better, make sure to hurry, but they were, excuse the word, fucked and
now no one gives a damn about them. They do not have a chance to
decide anything. Who is dealing with the office of the President, with the
ambassadors of the EU, with the English ambassador are the opposition
parties. Young people haven even set up a Transitional Council that truly
became the joke of the day. People who have been named said they were
not being informed! And the British ambassador to Yemen gave an
interview to the Times saying I will never recognise a transitional
council of Yemen because Yemen is not Libya. In Yemen there is no need
xvi
for this. I'm sorry that these young people who had left with the desire to
change the country have only been used to empower the opposition. You
want power, so be it, come and let me see if you can. Opposition leaders
say they will never get to power through the election. If you calculate
that from the 90's have never been able to control the parliament in
Yemen.
I welcome the democracy, but with its strengths and weaknesses. You
must accept what comes out.
Either you have a confirmation that something has happened and the
elections are rigged, and is confirmed by the international community,
but we can not make us laughable for their bullshit.
Who do you think is behind the attack to Saleh?
Of things that can be spontaneous to say. It can be ... Mhh ... The
opposition, but I don’t the say the opposition parties that we know, but
maybe a member of the opposition may be the sons of Al Ahmar, along
with General Ali Mohsen, who also became one that supported the
revolution. If one wants to think can only think of those right now.
xvii
Does not seem to be the result of investigations of Americans.
According to them there was an explosion inside. How members of
the opposition could get close enough to put a bomb inside?
I do not think you do not think that buy people is the easiest thing in the
world. It is not a difficult thing. I can buy a person with a million dollars
and I do not care what he does. Just think that the head of the mosque, in
that prayer, did not come to pray, strangely. The imam of the mosque
who has the key that day has not come to pray and then disappeared.
Then explain to me how? It's easy, I go to him and I say I’ll give you I
don’t know how much, and with the money you can get to anything.
What is this person’s name?
I don’t remember, but it is one thing that came out in the papers. This
person is gone from that day. We do not know where he is. It's not that
hard to buy people. You know how many similar stories have happened.
It is not such a difficult thing to accept or impossible to implement. In
fact I think they have studied all the possibilities and have found that this
was the easiest. It must be recognised that it was a bad thing that the
guards of the president have failed to control this thing, we should think
xviii
about that too. We don’t know and we will not know until someone
decides to make it public because I think they know it. Both the
Americans, the president and those who are close to the president.
Because, look, that is a piece of information that he will use to negotiate,
because I think if the opposition has organised this thing or knows
someone has discovered that it was them, now is weak, very weak and
will negotiate.
Do you personally know the President?
Yes, I know him personally.
Do you know in what condition he is now?
The second film. Not surprisingly, to let you know what kind of
opposition we have in Yemen. 3 days before those images the president
made a speech but it had been registered 10 days before. When they
broadcasted it, the president was moving less. I think it was also studied.
The young people have come up with words, now is blind, he no longer
sees, his hands are cut, he is no longer able to move his feet ... They
xix
made up so many stories. When the other video came out, with Obama's
assistant, he made sure to move hands and feet, to do whatever he could
to confirm that those are stupid, that they only use these things to think
that with these words may have the support of someone, but no. When he
showed himself that way, believe me, even with all that we are suffering
in this country, yet there are people who love him.
His hands however appeared stiff and covered with gloves.
The glove is normal because he has burned hands, is normal, however, he
moved his hands. While the opposition was out with a statement saying
that his hands were cut off. Do you realise? The difference between one
who says he cut his hand while he moves the hand with the gloves. I
hope you take the things I say in order to assess the people of this
opposition and to judge these people who take advantage of certain
images to be able to do what they want and at the end is a falsehood. I
tell you something else. The opposition has a television channel called
Suhail that the same day that the national television announced that it
will broadcast the president's speech, the opposition television channel
has broadcast for an hour the breaking news that the speech that the State
channel would show was a fake address, with a picture and the voice of
Saleh would not have been his but that of a stunt. Then, you realise how
xx
they are trying to show they know so much when in fact they don’t know
shit. When the picture of Saleh came out, with him speaking with his
face burned, to show how strong this man is, because in 33 years he has
always showed himself very elegant, a person who cares about his image,
accepts to be seen in this way just to show that the opposition is lying,
saying that what I have told all is fake, that he is fine.
How do we believe this opposition? How are we to believe that they are
able to lead this country? On the 3rd of June, when there was the attack,
immediately on the opposition television channel, big, Ali Saleh was
killed. After a half hour of opposition leaders said do not believe it, is a
staging of Saleh. If your television has written that Saleh was killed,
after half an hour he says it's bullshit.
But also the state TV is not always fair or accurate.
I assure you that the television channel of the government has never told
lies. This is enough for me. He never wrote anything wrong or fake about
the opposition. Beyond that are children of Saleh and they say what
Saleh wants. That is normal.
It is useless for you to talk about the television channel Sana'a, don’t
forget your television. It is normal. But the thing I want, if you have the
xxi
opportunity to speak with those with whom you speak and say give me
the false information that was broadcast by the government channel, then
I will speak. Instead, if you hear what they say and do not get the
important things that I told you. Telling falsehoods to people,
information is created to tell it like it is, not to tell falsity. The television
channel of Yemen has never said anything fraudulent about the
opposition parties. Absolutely. And I challenge anyone. And these things
they are constantly repeating is bullshit. Because they have nothing. And
when I tell you things is not that I want to teach you anything, but ask
for confirmation about everything I told you tonight, I can confirm to
you. Look, I know by heart and I can tell you everything they have said,
because they don’t have anything else. Whatever I told you tonight I can
bring things to show you that I have not told lies, but if you ask the same
thing in opposition to this Qubaty Mohamed, he talks about crap and
doesn’t know anything, I am available for an face to face with him and
see. Because I know what I know and I know the reality of the country.
I'm not one who is trying to come to power, or trying to do many false
things to get to something. I'm fine with what I have. I do what I do in
the government and I have my own private company as well, I'm fine,
working with Italian companies and I represent many, I have a great
relationship with Guarguaglini, president of Finmeccanica, I pretty much
always tried to facilitate the work of the Italians not only in Yemen. I
also created activities in Bahrain, Jeddah, thank God I’m a self made
xxii
man, and not because I’m in the government, instead Mohamad Qubaty, I
don’t know what he did and he thinks he can get to be part of the
government or be an ambassador, and for this he tells bullshit. He was
ambassador thanks to the corruption that has made with Total, and for
that, I do not want to go into detail, but it is one that has always used his
position to do things that are not to do. Therefore if you want and if he
has the courage, we can make a face to face and see who wins. Because
before the revolution of youth, if he had balls, he had to leave the party
of the president before. Because if you're a real person, if you are a
person who respects yourself, do not wait for someone to make a
revolution and you because you're afraid of being put in jail will
withdraw and support them.
He said he left the party in 2003.
It is not true, he is a liar. He was expelled from the party. There is a
difference between leaving and being kicked out.
However, in 2003.
Not in 2003. When he was ambassador in Beirut?
xxiii
Until 2006 I believe.
How can I be out of the party and be an ambassador of the Yemeni
government? When he left Beirut came to Yemen, tried to be assigned
another seat, no one gave a damn about him and then was kicked out. If
he had had the courage to speak ill of the government and the President,
uncover corruption, try to make all this public before February 2011,
because all those who have turned the page and have proven to be close
to the revolution are those who were afraid of the revenge of the young
when they would win the revolution. But it is not true. For this they have
also lost face for nothing. And he's a loser who lives in the UK and they
did not achieve anything.
But if he was expelled from the party in 2003, evidently he disagreed
before 2006.
He was expelled from the party of the president but I do not remember
when. Until 2006 he was in Beirut.
xxiv
He is not alone, there are other ambassadors who are part of the
opposition, such as Al-Hamdi.
Al-Hamdi was honoured because he is the son of our former President
Ibrahim Al-Hamdi. I assure you and I have also followed this thing here,
people said this man does nothing in Yemen, you have to give him a
position. If you speak with Al-Hamdi today is not one that has turned the
face. He is still with the party of the president and is still with the
President and has never made a statement in which he gives his support
to the youths.
There are videos in which Al-Hamdi harshly criticises the
government.
But what it means to criticise? I want him to tell me that he is with the
youths and that this revolution. Criticism is normal, welcome to
democracy in Yemen to criticise. We are so. Look, here's a freedom of
the press that there is no other Arab country. Let's be real and be grateful
for what Saleh did. There are newspapers in Yemen who speak badly of
Saleh.
xxv
I welcome criticism. I do too. I also told you when I started my speech
that there are things that I did not like about what he was doing the
government.
But do not tell me that if somebody is critical means that he is against
Saleh. No, I'm critical because this is a democratic and civil country, and
when there are things wrong, when there are things that are not right to
do, but give me a statement of Al-Hamdi in which he claims to support
the youth against Saleh . He never will. He knows who sent him. Knows
that Saleh loved him. He has never been part of the MFA.
To say that this was a prize to him and his family. Some things must be
told in certain ways. Criticising the government is a beautiful thing here.
I see it as a positive act towards Saleh, because it is the only Arab
country where there are newspapers that speak badly of him, his son,
there are all the documents of corruption. There is a wonderful freedom
of the press, to be truly happy.
What do you think will happen now?
In my opinion will happen what Saleh has always asked for. This is a
demonstration of the strength of this man. He has always asked to sit
around a table talking with the opposition, to bring forward the elections,
xxvi
he would not re-nominated again and let’s see if the opposition is able to
lead this country. It is the only solution. Using force is not in their
favour. Still making trouble, always try to do the same things we'll never
get anything. Trying to kill, do not even come to anything. If you realise,
just look, there's no president, prime minister, speaker of parliament,
however, the opposition has failed to control the country. They could not
make a coup. What does it mean?
Who controls the country now?
Hem ... Hmm ... In my opinion ... Things are clear ... The vice president
with the leaders of the army and the government with the minister of
information that has taken the place of the prime minister who is ill. If
the English ambassador came out today with an interview to say "the
opposition can do nothing but stay in one place chewing qat waiting for
the international community to solve their problem.". This is a UK
ambassador saying it. This means that he understood these people. And
please go and tell Mohamed Qubaty to call the British ambassador in
Yemen to explain this.
I think that certain things are clear, we are now more than fifty days the
president is not there and have not been able to really do anything.
xxvii
Because in the end, as the British ambassador said, these are people who
know chewing qat and think it can get support
from the international
community to solve their problems. I think this is one very clear thing,
that you can understand who we are dealing with. There is something
else. When the opposition sent a delegation to Saudi Arabia, after more
than 3 ½ hours talk, and when they came out, the Saudi foreign minister
said, ah, and this people must guide Yemen after Saleh ? No no no ...
Explain why there is an English ambassador says this and the Saudi
foreign minister says this. I think the thing is self-explanatory. We don’t
have a strong opposition, we don’t have valid and organised opposition,
which is able to convince to be the ideal choice to lead the country. And
then, I'll tell you another thing I think you'll understand. During the war
of '94, when there was the south against the north and south with the
socialist party that tried to get behind South Yemen as a country. The
Islah party, the Muslim party, had issued a statement saying that killing
one of the Socialist party leads to paradise. It was a fatwa by Al Zindani.
Do you realise that those who in 94 gave a fatwa to kill the Socialists,
are together with them now?
So, if there is nobody in the opposition and Saleh will not run again,
then who?
xxviii
Then who? Let's see. Any man who has the balls both, from the
President's party, or from the opposition Islah, so be it. Come, bring
whatever you want, the United Nations, and see who wins and I assure
you they will not win, because there is no possibility of fraud, but
because we know who they are.
So who, Ahmad?
The President’s People Party has a lot of people who may be able of
leading this country. There is not only Ahmad. Why do we always say
Ahmad. Who cares if Ahmad wants to run, he is free to do whatever he
wants. It's not that we are a monarchy that he goes automatically. We'll
see. He is free to do whatever he wants. If he does not want the
President's party has so many other people who are capable of leading
this country, then we'll see. Elections will figure out.
I hope to come for the elections then.
I assure you that Yemen was never closed to anyone, and in 2006 ...
xxix
Well, actually I have been sent back last time.
There has been a journalist for the Corriere della Sera here. I organised
everything myself. He went into the streets, how come? Let's be real.
Yemen is not closed. We do not like being fooled. One who enters as a
tourist and is a journalist is sent away. We must respect the laws of this
country. It is not that one is as a tourist and then come out the images
and photos. And oh, what the fuck!
Yemen is a country well-cared and well-controlled, beyond all the
problems we have.
There are journalists of Russian TV, Al Arabiya came here and did the
interview with the president. There are CCTV, the Chinese television,
there is everything. The Corriere della Sera was here. It isn’t true that
Yemen closes. Just do things in order. I'm sure if you ask your
ambassador, who has also closed its embassy for two months, he'll say do
not go. Italy will deny you to come to Yemen, not us. And says go under
your responsibility, because if you go to the website of the Crisis Unit,
they say that Yemen is on the blacklist. For this first get the permission
from your country, then tell me about my country.
This is a country where if you come legally as a journalist and ask as a
journalist, you'll have no problem. We always have people who are ... We
xxx
sent back a New Zealander who came in as tourists. But what the hell,
are you fooling me? You come, you must get permission, because I am
responsible for you. You are a journalist, I'll take you, I bring you here,
I'll take you there, not because I have to check what you write, because,
dear friend, now it isn’t easy to control if one wants to write negative
things. There is internet ... It's not like it used to be, we can no longer
control the information.
Politics is not for the first runner. Politics is dirty and you must have
experience. We can not all be politicians. There are people capable of
being a poet, people able to be a singer, people who can possibly be a
photographer but not a journalist. It is life that makes us understand the
way. It is necessary that young people understand what they want and
how to get there. For me, the opposition used them. And I can confirm
they were used and the two times they've gone out from the square and
got the negative behaviour of the police and security forces, they were
organised and used. The first is when there has been the meeting of the
foreign ministers of the GCC with the opposition and they made sure to
send them out to create trouble, and the second when there was the
second meeting with the GCC. Do you see that this was all organised and
manipulated? They use them just to make their dirty business and this
bothers me.
xxxi
Surely, however, many feel sorry for the attack. They should not be
those methods of politics.
Yes because we do not wish the bad to anyone. We want a democratic
country and sometimes I think we were wrong to choose democracy in
this country because I think we are still innocent and not mature enough
for democracy. I think we are paying for this thing because democracy in
this country, even if false, as some would say, is bothering the
neighbours, because neighbours surely, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE,
Qatar, the Oman, are all countries where there is the monarchy. For this
reason I think this has also created enough discomfort and Yemen is
paying for it.
Unfortunately, it continues and now we do not know where we’ll arrive.
Nobody wants to do good for the country. Everyone just wants to come to
power and then not be able to know what to do, but the people are
suffering so much. They thought that with this mess that we are lacking
electricity, gas, to have more people in their favour, but nothing happens,
with all that we are suffering, people still go to the street with photos of
Saleh. It's truly amazing, it also changed the decisions of certain friendly
countries who supported the youths up to two or three months ago, but
xxxii
when they saw that there are still people who say no, with everything you
say about Saleh, I want Saleh.
The electricity is lacking so much, there is no fuel, no water. For this,
believe me, I speak of Sana'a and the people suffer so much, and
someone thinks that doing so he will have more support, however, people
resist. These people are strange people, but to be admired, because it is
not easy to bend. It isn’t easy to manipulate. People with all this, goes
around and says there is no water, this is the revolution, you have to
sacrifice some '... no thanks! ... This will confirm what most people were
happy before, it was fine, it is true that there was corruption, but not
everywhere, there are certain people who have always made sure to
work. It is useless to deny that this man hasn’t done so much for Yemen.
Yemen, up to 20-30 years ago was nothing, now, thank God there are
universities, hospitals, roads. Come to Sana'a and there are bridges
everywhere. Go to Tripoli where there is money like water and can not
find even a bridge. Thank god Sana'a is full of such infrastructure. And
this is useless to deny. If there were bad things, all right, all over the
world there are bad things, but I do not think that the solution of these
problems is by force and killing people.
How to get to Yemen?
xxxiii
The journalist of the Corriere della Sera called me, told me, told me what
he wanted, he was received by the information ministry at the airport,
went even among the youths, and nobody asked him to see what he wrote
or what he had sent. I read everything he wrote in the Corriere della
Sera, I agree with certain things, not with others, but it's nice that
manages to put things clearly and that's the beauty of journalism, a voice
that does not alter and makes sure that your opinion is not reflected in
the article, because unfortunately there are journalists who arrive get
affected, and then you see that part of their piece already with their own
idea and this is wrong. Because in the end you are a journalist and you
have to report both faces of the medal. But certain things are done well.
When you think that the opposition is weak, in a bad state, then you
support it and do a piece for them, this is wrong.
The whole world is the same, but sometimes some things are accepted in
a country and are not accepted in another. And that's not good. See
this ... Good journalism is what I said, not influenced and does not report
a piece for someone against someone else, because in the end, I do not
want to talk about journalists who were paid by the opposition and in the
end, when they left Yemen, said they were paid to write such things
against the government, this is wrong. This is what bothers me. I do not
like to buy people, the money, I know is important in life, however, when
you start with the money, is really ugly. To buy people, buy ideas...
xxxiv
It is no longer an issue between the opposition and Saleh. Now it has
become an issue between two governments, I do not think you ignore
what Qatar is doing in Yemen. We are really using the money of others in
Yemen. We hope that things can go in the right direction and we can
arrive at a conclusion that fits all. A transition that will enable us to lead
the country according to the will of the people.
And Iran? What is its role?
Well, let's say for the moment who is working is Qatar, and it means that
Iran is behind Qatar. Qatar or Iran are the same thing, there's no point in
hiding it, we all know this.
/// END ///
xxxv
Appendix D
Interview Abdulrahman Al-Hamdi
Yemeni Ambassador to the Czech Republic and former MP
Brother of the former Yemeni President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi
Duration: 01:07:23
*** TRANSCRIPT ***
President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi was your brother, is it correct?
Yes, he was.
Could you tell me something about his person from a family point of
view, as he was probably the most loved president in Yemen?
I think that there are a lot of information about him on the Internet, but
unfortunately most of it are in Arabic.
What he tried, he tried to put steps for a Yemen a modern state, governed
by institutions and government agencies. Before that Yemen was ruled by
tribal leaders and chiefs of the army and the country was divided
between two or three parts. Each part was led by a chief of the tribe or of
the army. He tried to establish a State, a civilised country where
i
everybody is subject to the law, nobody is above the law. Equal
citizenship, equal rights, equal education, health, equal distribution of
the welfare of the country. He was not a socialist, he believed in equal
justice, equal social justice. Which is not communism but is in between.
He is also he tried to make a stop, before he came there were certain
families in Yemen dominating the political arena. One of them was
controlling most of the forces of the army, the other one, the Al-Ahmar,
whose son now is playing a major role in the revolution, who was leading
the second largest tribe in Yemen, then there was the Bakil which is the
largest tribe in Yemen, and those two families basically were controlling
Yemen. The first one was supported by Saudi Arabia, while Al-Ahmar
family and their supporters were backed by the Ba'ath party, supported
from Iraq. And of course the President was Abdulrahman Al-Iryani who
was a very good person, a fierce man, but he didn’t have power and
authority in his hands. He was just like an honorary president.
So, Yemen was divided between those tribes?
It is still up to now.
So, to which tribe does your family belong?
ii
My family belongs to one of those tribes, we come from the Bakil tribe.
But my brother did not believe in the role of the tribes to rule the
country. So, even in his short period as President, he did not rely on the
tribes to support him or to use them to stabilise the presidency. Even
though we are from Bakil, but because my brother pursued justice and
equality for all Yemeni, most of the population was, even of North
Yemen or south Yemen. His main strength came from the army. Before he
became president he was leading one of the strongest factions of the
army. He was leading the airforce of the yemeni army. Which was that
time one of the strongest. When he became president he also made some
allies. He called the two factions who disagreed and the president
decided to resign, Al-Irani, and then he made a condition and said that if
he resigned also Sheikh Abdallah would have to resign, he was the
speaker of the parliament, and the Governor of Al-Hudayda as well, he
was the strongest man in Yemen, from behind the scene, he and his
brothers were leading some important brigades in the army with tanks,
and missiles and airforces and so on. So all those three people resigned
in the same day. After the resignations the presidency had to go to the
army. At that time the Commander in Chief of the army was outside
Yemen, the Chief of Staff was outside Yemen. My brother was the
Deputy Chief of Staff at that time so he was the most senior officer in the
army, that’s why he formed a leading Council and he was the president of
iii
that leading council. Before that my brother had so many supporters and
allies in the army who supported him. Also most of that a quantity of
Yemeni people who knew my brother. He was not working only in the
army but also he established in the cities a movement in Yemen which
was called a Cooperation Movement, which this cooperation was mainly
concentrating in providing and giving social and development help to all
Yemeni. And that movement spread in Yemen in few years amazingly.
There were volunteers building roads, hospitals, schools, drilling water
wells for those people in the villages, so he really started gaining a lot of
reputation and popularity throughout the years. When he became
president so many people knew him. Above that, even before my brother
become president, my family was very well known in Yemen, even
though we are not a Sheikh family, but my family always were scholars,
religious scholars, in Yemen. We had a lot of influence. My father was a
very distinguished figure in Yemen even before the revolution and after
the revolution in 62.
These days we are living are very hectic, not only because we are
fasting, but because the situation in Yemen is very tense. I’m afraid that
we are very close to stepping into a civil war and I hope we are not
reaching that point.
Do you really believe it is going to be so bad?
iv
It is bad, but I always believe that Yemen will prevail at the end. I hope.
Do you think that the President will really go back to Yemen as he
said, despite the US and the EU are trying to persuade him to stay in
Saudi Arabia?
I think he was supposed to go back to Yemen last week, but I think he
did.. He will go to Yemen but because last week the situation
deteriorated very much in Yemen, there were preparations from both
sides, from the president and the nephews and the heads of the army,
they were all threatening for the worse. You almost reach a violent
confrontation. But I think now there were some indications from
yesterday that things have started to ease a bit. I hope that it will
continue on that direction.
What kind of indications?
Some came from the media. I mean, if you are a politician and you read
some of those statement, you can read between the lines and you would
v
know, just from the tones, the language, the tone of the voice, the
wording of the statement, you can read... You know that.
Above that, I’ve got my own sources, my own information. Ok?
What is your plan? In 2006 you planned to run for presidency. Are
you planning to go back to Yemen if the situation eases?
Yes, I did announce in 2006 that I was planning to run for presidency at
that time. But I did withdraw at the end and I did support the candidate
for the opposition. I did it because the opposition came to my house, and
all of the leaders, and asked me, almost begged me that I should not
continue in my quest for presidency. They said that if we had two
candidates the votes would be divided and President Saleh would win.
And actually they told me something which was very strange. They said
if you are really serious to compete for the presidency you would be our
candidate, but we know the time now is not right and we are not willing
to give all we can for this elections, we want to test. I found that at that
time the elections would not be transparent, I knew that the opposition,
especially the Joint Meeting, all the most powerful and influential parties
are gathered in what they call the Joint Meeting and I think it converges,
if I’m not mistaken, 5 parties, Islah, which is the Muslim Brotherhood,
vi
the Socialist Party, that was ruling South Yemen before the unification,
and others.
To which party do you belong?
I’m an independent. I was running as independent when I was running
for the parliament and I won that election. I’m an independent and I
think I run for the reputation of my brother, my family and for what my
brother did for the country. As Wikipedia describes my family as the
Kennedy family of Yemen. I’m sure I would have won if it was a fair
election. I told this to President Saleh himself when he called me. I told
him I wish it could be a fair elections, a transparent elections, and I said
if it was fair I’m sure I would win. And you know, he is a very tricky
person. He said he would not transfer at the time and he said he would
vote for me. But you know he is the biggest liar in the world.
Are you planning to run again for the presidency or be active again
in Yemeni politics?
I am always active in Yemeni politics, even though I’m in Prague, but
you know, with our people, our supporters, with people who are there in
vii
Yemen, we are in contact with them. But if you mean if I’m willing to
give it another shot, maybe is the right time, the right circumstances, I
would go for it. Even though I have been asked many times since the
revolution started to go back to Yemen and take my role in there. I have
been asked by the Youths, I have been asked by the opposition of the
Joint Meeting, but I told them I’m taking it step by step, I’m completely
you know, in contact with them, with the most senior factions in Yemen.
We just wait and see. Our main concern now in Yemen is to make it a
peaceful transfer of power in Yemen, because if it gets violent in Yemen
you’ll see an ugly and it can not be controlled and we can not stop it.
Yemeni people have given a very modern and civilised state of
expressing their point of view. For Yemeni always, their easiest way to
express their point of view was by means of violence and using guns. But
this is the first time in history when Yemeni have left their guns at home
and gone down to the streets, demonstrating and expressing their point of
view peacefully and demanding a change of power by peaceful means.
What is really frightening me is that so many of those young people in
the streets in Yemen, even in Sana’a, in Ta'izz, Al-Hudayda and al those
squares that they call Change Square, Freedom Square and so on, some
of them come from outside of Sana’a, they are from tribal origins, and
those people have showed a lot of tolerance towards abuses from the
Security Forces, agencies or by thugs that are being paid and supervised
by the regime and security agencies. The tolerance those people have
viii
shown in the streets is amazing, because the easiest thing for a Yemeni
person from tribal origins is to reach a gun and start a fight, but they
have shown a lot of tolerance and patience. And that is really something
they should be respected for.
Is funny, in the past 6 months the government and the regime have been
trying to draw those young man and those people who have supported
their side into a violent confrontation. They are trying to draw those
people for military confrontation. But the other side has shown a lot of
restrain, a lot of tolerance, a lot of patience. They said we started our
movement and uprising peacefully, we will end it peacefully. The only
way to divert this peaceful unrest or movement, to have a chance for a
violent confrontation is if they will have to defend themselves. They fear
a military assault and they will have any other choice except to defend
themselves and to defend those young revolutionaries in the streets.
But so far the only ones attacking back are the members of the clan
Al-Ahmar.
That was an isolated incident. It happened in Sana’a and things have
stopped, but you are right. They defended themselves because they said,
according to their story, that it was militaries attacking the house of
ix
Sheikh Abdallah, they wanted to storm it and to occupy it. And you
know, in Yemeni tradition you have to defend your house and family by
all means.
But they are both part of the problem and part of the solution I think. AlAhmar family both tribes, with the president and his family and Abdallah
and so on. They are part of the problem and they should be part of the
solution.
If you look on the people on the streets on Fridays, the majority is with
the revolution, that is for sure. Of course, the regime is gathering
hundreds of thousands on Fridays, but they are being paid, they are being
fed, they hare being transported. If the camera is there and you see that
after the speeches no one is there. While on the other side, they have
been camping there on all conditions, rain conditions, fire conditions,
everything for the past six months, that is something different. At the end
they will prevail, that is for sure. Hopefully they will and the revolution
will not be taken by those generals who have defected to the other side.
What do you think is the role of Ali Mohsen?
Ahh... Well, is not really easy to cover it in a short interview, but I hope,
let’s put it this way, I hope that Ali Mohsen he is sincere in what he said.
x
That he said that he only wants to support the revolution peacefully and
he would step down once the revolution succeeds. But what you can read
from everything, from what is happening, that is not the truth, you know.
That’s why I told you that the Al-Ahmar family could be part of the
solution and part of the problem. They are part of the problem and they
could be part of the solution. What I meant is that the President is gonna
leave so why not the other part leave with him? You know, Ali Mohsen
and Sheikh Abdallah are demanding that the President should step down
and should leave Yemen, also he should take with him his very close
relatives, his son and nephews who control major positions in the army
and security forces. On the other hand I think from the other part, Ali
Mohsen should leave and consequently should keep with him some of the
key military figures that have defected with him. Also Sheikh Abdallah
Al-Ahmar and his son, I think they should leave and stay at least two
years out of Yemen and then maybe they could come back and do some
kind of political career and so on.
Who do you think should lead the transition? The Vice President?
The Transition Council?
Well, if that’s to me that should be something else. What I think is the
best for the country now, to prevent any bloodshed, to prevent any
xi
military confrontation, I think that the Vice President should be in power.
I think that the president should transfer or resign his authority to his
Vice President and the Vice President should ask the ruling party and the
opposition to form a government that would make constitutional reforms
and prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections. I think this is
the easiest and the safest way to transfer power in Yemen.
This is the basis for the GCC initiative supported by the International
Community and by the Arab League and the arab countries. The Saudis
and the Americans are the major key players in Yemen right now. If they
really put their effort and resources into that, I think this solution can
prevail. But unfortunately this is not what is happening currently.
But the Vice President is not really in control now, is Ahmad ruling
the country.
Yes, that’s true. I mean it could be the right solution. The power
transferred to him provided that Ahmed and the nephew leave Yemen.
Otherwise he will, you know, he will be like an honorary president.
Actually, since the president has left Yemen, he was not able to perform
his duties for a couple of weeks, maybe one and half months, and during
that time Ahmad was really ruling the country. Since the president has
xii
gained consciousness he has been trying to rule the country by the phone
from Riyadh, but the actual thing in Sana’a was that the country was
ruled by Ahmad Ali and the Saudi’s money.
Maybe Saleh will accept to step down, but what about the son? Will
he renounce his power?
... .... Well, I think... ... If his father will tell him to do so, I think he will
do it. Especially if he announces publicly that his has resigned and
transferred his power, so that would cut any way for his son, he would
have no position to run the country, but also that is not enough. The
Saudis should stop sending the money to Yemen that have been keeping
the President and his sons alive for the past three or four months. You
know, if it was not for the Saudi’s money the regime would have
collapsed four months ago.
Also, the Americans and the EU should make a lot of pressure on the
President and his son, they should threaten him of freezing their assets,
apply sanctions on them and should trial them for war crimes. I think that
all those pressures and threats would have their effect.
Why they’re not doing it?
xiii
That is a good question. You should ask them. I talked to them quite, you
know, I talked to so many parties, the EU and the Americans and so on
and they said they are doing, but I don’t think they are doing enough.I
don’t think they are doing anything. According to myself the Americans
they were willing to release some statement concerning freezing of
assets, sanctions and so on, before the attack on the mosque. That was
my understanding. When I talked to some American diplomats, ok? But I
think after the mosque they somehow withdrew their statement. Their
main concern, the Americans are afraid of Al-Qaeda. They think that the
only one who is keeping Al-Qaeda from Yemen is president Ali Abdallah
Saleh, that’s not true.
Some say Saleh was actually playing with Al-Qaeda.
Yea, he has been using Al-Qaeda for sure and he is still using it. Well, I
think the Americans are not making the right decision in Yemen. I think
they are making the same mistake in they did in Iran. In Iran they
supported Shah of Iran. And they left Iran until today. They left Irani
people, they left everything. If they continue to support president Saleh,
their absolute support to the president, they will have to make a decision
xiv
sooner or later on which side they are taking. If they’re taking president
saleh’s side is a matter of time before he either throw Yemen into a civil
war or just turn away from Yemen and if that is the case, I think the
American will just loose their influence in Yemen. Also the Saudis are
playing the same game. The Saudis have a different agenda, they are
afraid on any revolution, democracy and so on. They have different
agenda. The american have Al-Qaeda and the saudis are afraid of
something else. But at the end I believe that the Yemeni people and the
Yemeni Youths will prevail and I think Yemen after Saleh will be a free
country, a peaceful country and more stable element in the region for the
security of the region and of the international world I think. Even if there
are some members of Al-Qaeda in Yemen I think they can be controlled.
Here in Yemen, is like if you are a young man and you have one grey
hair, you can spot it easily if you have black hair, like we, we are
mediterranean, we have black hair. If you have black hair you can see it.
If you have one white hair or one grey hair, you can spot it and you can
remove it. That’s exactly Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Those people who are from
Al-Qaeda, either Yemeni or outside, where are they gonna hide? They’re
gonna hide in tribes, and in tribes we can spot them easily. Like you spot
one grey hair in a black hair. Because they are intruders, they are illegal,
they are aliens, we can control them easily.
xv
Especially considering the Yemen tribal social structure.
That’s correct.
You know what is scaring me, is that the United States, and the Saudis
and those supporting the president and the president stays and the
suffering continues and the killing continues, and the economic situation
keeps deteriorating and the shortages of food, electricity and so on, and
people who will be blaming? They will blame the United States and the
Saudis. Because they think that if it was not for those two countries the
regime would have fallen down.
In that case they would decide to get back at those countries. How would
they do it? By protecting and making it a safe heaven for some members
of Al-Qaeda. You know it could backfire on them. This is one thing. The
other think which is quite scary, if you do not intervene at the right time
and exert a lot of pressure on both parties to sit down and dialogue, on
president to step down, if they leave it to Yemeni right now to solve it by
themselves, and it gets bad, the biggest fear of the United States will
come true. In other words, I know the Americans and other Europeans are
afraid of Islamic extremists to take over and control Yemen. The only
way to avoid that is as I told you, the transfer must be transferred to the
Vice President, all those transfers and changes will be supervised by the
Americans, by the EU and so on, so everything will be put on the right
xvi
place, but if the Saudis, the EU and so on leave Yemeni to solve their
problems on their own and the crisis develops into a violent
confrontation, then you should be fool. The ones coming and taking
control of the country is the extremists. They will. Any violent
confrontation, at the end, would be on their favour. President Saleh and
his sons can not draw the country into a civil war. But still they can
create major chaos, major destruction, but only for a limited time,
because even the ones who are on their side are fighting for money and
for prestige, and those people can not keep pumping money for long
time. Where on the other side, people fighting them are people who have
beliefs. They are fighting for freedom, or for a better future, or for a
political belief, or for religious belief. So if you try weight both sides,
people who fight for beliefs will always prevail, because they are not
doing it for mercenary, only for money, then the money stops and they
will not continue. But also don’t forget one thing. On Fridays there are
millions in Yemen protesting against the President. On those
demonstration and chants, there are brothers and cousins and relatives of
all factions are in there. What I’m trying to say is the public can start to
hesitate to launch a full military attack against those people because they
would know that they have their relatives there, they would have a friend
or a brother or a cousin in those squares. What I’m trying to say, Yemen
has been divided. You start having families with the Youths while the
father or the brother is with the President. So it would not be that easy.
xvii
Do you know what is really ironic? President Saleh had the presidency
for the past 33 years, he did everything trying to erase the memory of my
brother from everything. From the memory of the people, from the
photos, from TV, from media, he is not mentioned whatsoever, not even
once for the past 33 years. Also, you know in Yemen and in the Arab
countries, when they establish a new project, when they build new roads,
new schools, they always put a stone and on those stones there are
engraved this project was made during the presidency of and so on, even
those stones that were made during my brother, they were destroyed and
erased. But this did not work out. The only picture that they rise in all
squares in Yemen and in all the demonstrations, you can see them in AlJazeera, Al-Arabiya, are the pictures of my brother. I was surprised, after
33 years, how much the love of Yemeni people for my brother has grown
and his memory is living with them up to today. Because these young
people in the streets are in their twenties, from 18 to 20, and they are
supposed to be the generation of Ali Abdallah Saleh, not the generation
of Ibrahim Al-Hamdi, but they turn out they are now putting down the
pictures of Ali Abdallah Saleh and they are raising the pictures of
Ibrahim Al-Hamdi and they are trying to investigate and explore
everything about Ibrahim Al-Hamdi and write about it, and chant about it
and that is the true leading liberty.
My brother was a very educated person. He was educated in literature, in
grammar, in Arabic, in religion, and so on. His speeches, you can listen
xviii
to them, he always spoke in perfect Arabic, he was very fluent, and also
he never read from written speeches except two or three speeches that are
very official. And in his speeches he was always emphasising that we are
not rulers, we are servants to the Yemeni people. That is something
people still remember, that we are not rulers, we are servant of the
people. Did you know that my brother, he was the first president, he
stopped at the traffic light, he ordered his convoy should not break a
traffic light, he should stop. His convoy was 3 cars. He had a guard at
home and I was living with him at that time, between 30 and 50, and that
was all he had. On weekends or Fridays he had a Volkswagen at home,
we still have it. He would drive it by himself, going away, flow away
from his guards, he would go driving his car on his own. And driving he
would meet an old lady or an old man hitchhiking, he would pick them
up and give them a ride. That was my brother. Did you know, and some
of those I posted on his website, some of those pictures. He used to get
gifts from kings and princes and sheiks. Some of those are from the Shah
of Iran, some are gold, swords decorated by jewellery, diamonds and so
on. All those, all the gifts that he received he put them in the National
Museum of Yemen. But that’s not only what he got. He got some checks
as gifts. 10 million dollars, thirty million dollars, five million dollars and
so on, for a total of almost one hundred million dollars. But if you’re
talking about 1977, that 100 million US dollars is a huge portion. Today
it could be like billions. All those checks, he never took them. He
xix
forwarded them to the Yemeni government. And we have receipts for all
of them, official receipts. I remember when somebody asked my brother,
why Ibrahim you’re giving all those money to the government? Those are
not been given to the government, they were given to you as gift. He said
to him, if any of those kings and presidents are giving you any gift? He
said no. Ok, they are not giving it to me because I’m Ibrahim Al-Hamdi,
they are giving it to me because I’m the president of Yemen. So, it
should go back to Yemeni people, and he never kept a single dollar or a
single riyal from Yemen in his personal account. So when he died, he
passed away, he had debts. He had like 300.000 Yemeni riyals debts,
because he was building our home in our village. Because our home,
which was owned by him and me, we had inherited from our father, he
donated it as hospital, because it was a huge house, to the village. He
said is such a big house and we don’t need it. So he gave it to the people.
And he builded a smaller house. He passed away when we were still
constructing that house, and he had some debts, some 300.000 Yemeni
riyals at that time, at that time 300.000 or 400.000 riyals is like 100.000
dollars. Because at that time 4 Yemeni riyals was equal to 1 US dollar.
The economy was very good. Of course, those debts were paid by the
government after he died, but I just wanted to give you some points of
view of his personal touch.
xx
That’s probably what people could see and understand.
That’s why they still love him.
Anyone could reach him. I remember in Eid, the festivity after Ramadan,
we would open our house to all the people. They were coming and shake
hands with him. No guards, no search. He was very easy going person.
You could go to a marked and find him next to you. You know, he was
not a very isolated leader. He was the people’s leader. He was very close
to the people. It was easy for them to assassinate him. Because he never
took high security procedures. That’s why we think, many say, that if I
decide to run for presidency we would win, you know. At least this is not
one of our priorities or concern. Now our priority or concern is to see
Yemen safe, Yemen passes through this transition process in peace and
harmony and reconciliation. And that’s a major thing.
Who do you this was behind his assassination? As there are many
voices.
Which ones did you hear? Is my turn now to ask a question.
xxi
Some say that President Saleh was involved.
Yes, he was. If you want the whole story, my brother was with a friend,
the assassination took place in his house. And President Saleh was one of
the members who really... There were few people, I know them, who
participated in the shooting. They took part in it. It was an announced
coup. Because they knew all Yemeni people would reject them and not
accept them. The assassination took place in Al-Hashmid house, and
Saleh was one of them. One of those traitors who pulled the trigger. They
were trained and financed by the Saudi Arabia. And that is still really
tracking up to now. Saudi Arabia they don’t want the whole story to
unfold. They don’t want the whole story to be said. Especially people in
Yemen who raise the picture of my brother, the question rises, they want
to trial the killer, they want to trial the people who were behind the
killer, and this is scary signals that they are sending outside to Saudis
and so on. I’m not a person who works for revenge, I think the best
revenge for my brother is not to kill his killer, but to revive his legacy.
To achieve the goals that he started. To continue the mission that he
started. The dream he had. He had a dream of a peaceful Yemen, that is
governed by institutions, that is governed by law, by constitution, by
institutions. A country where all people are equal, people have equal
opportunity to resources, a fear chance to be in the army, and so on.
xxii
There are so many things. So this thing for me to revenge for my brother
is to achieve his goals. If it is for the best of my country and is part of
the solution for Yemen that us, as Al-Hamdi family to forget about our
case we would do that if it is in the benefit of the country. We will not
seek revenge.
Aren’t you afraid for yourself, if you decide to run for the
presidency? Aren’t you scared of those people who already targeted
your family would do it again?
Well, there has been already 2 or 3 attempts to my life, one when I was
in Yemen and I run for elections in the Parliament, after reunification in
1993, but I would not be afraid that my life is in danger if this regime is
removed. You see, who is threatening us is the regime, is Ali Abdullah
Saleh. If he is not in power anymore there is nothing to fear, because I
know that most of Yemeni, the people from North and South of Yemen,
they love my family, they love us. So I would not be afraid. The only
fear for me is to run for presidency in the circumstances like what is
going on right now. If President Saleh is still in power, if his relatives,
the sun the nephews are still in control of the agencies and those
important military units, like the Republican Guard and so on. And they
still have the control of power and money. And in that case I would
xxiii
really think a lot before I take that decision. But in a circumstance where
those people are not in the political arena, they have no control or
sources or military or money, I would not be scared of danger toward me
or any member of my family.
To tell you the truth, I knew that President Saleh would never sign that
treaty. The ‘throne’, the presidency, the position, is his life. He would
not give it up. He is a very tricky person and he is just playing to gain
time. He is playing to gain time. He thinks that he wants to reshuffle his
cards, he wants to obtain as much as he can
from the resources,
financially and military. I know they are buying some more weapons
from outside and now they are trying to sign new deals to buy some
weapons from, you know there are embargoes from the EU, and
embargoes to export weapons to Yemen right now, and apart from that
EU, I think it stays that if there is any violent confrontation in any other
country, the EU should send any weapon to that part of the world.
Few days ago I read of a convoy of tanks for Saleh intercepted by the
Revolution.
Yes, that was coming from Russia. Some are coming from Russia, from
Bulgaria. Bulgaria I think are breaching the EU protocol. From Ukraine,
xxiv
from other former Soviet Union countries. I think they are trying now to
gain and score as much as they can.
xxv
Appendix E
Sara Hadwin’s e-mail
Da:
Oggetto:
Data:
A:
Cc:
"Sara Hadwin" <[email protected]>
Your dissertation
18 maggio 2011 15:00:15 GMT+01:00
"Mauro Lovecchio" <[email protected]>
"Ros Bew" <[email protected]>, "Colin Larcombe" <[email protected]>, "Howard Barrell"
<[email protected]>
Dear Mauro
I am surprised by your response to the agreement we reached last week about the acceptable way to pursue your dissertation
topic on the Yemen. You are imagining complications which don't exist.
I have made it clear to you since last October that the chances of the university approving a trip to the Yemen for your
dissertation were remote. We let you keep that option open in the hope that some radical change might make it possible. You
have known all along that permission was not likely to be granted and this was confirmed when the prospect of a trip was
imminent around Easter. I made the situation very clear to you that we could not endorse a trip because the level of risk was
unacceptable.
After Easter you sought a review of the situation and I agreed that we needed a formal cut off otherwise you would not have
chance to do justice to an alternative approach. I urged you to pursue a treatment which did not involve a trip to the Yemen in
our first discussion last October and have repeated that advice at intervals since.
Since Easter I have spent a great deal of time and effort on your situation including a meeting with you, me and Howard
Barrell, and with you me and your lead supervisor.
In investigating the way ahead we considered all options - a change of supervisor, a change of format, a change of topic - and
your preferred option, of those available, was to pursue the same topic and format but without going to the Yemen.
Our discussions were based on the judgment that filming in the Yemen for your dissertation remains too dangerous for us to
sanction. Applying our ethical approval and risk assessment procedures, based on industry practice, we determined that it is
not safe for you to film in the Yemen.
You sought a resolution and I judged that the time had come when we had to abandon any prospect of the situation in the
Yemen changing sufficiently to allow for you to film there for your dissertation. Obviously this is not the outcome you would
want but I thought you understood, as I have explained repeatedly, that the university cannot sanction such risk taking nor
would a mainstream broadcaster such as the BBC.
I thought we agreed last week that the Plan B was now, however reluctantly, to be adopted. I consider that you accepted this
in the meetings on Thursday and went away to come up with proposals of how to develop your story and shoot it without going
to the Yemen.
After our meeting on Thursday, Ros Bew and I discussed your supervision and she felt it would be helpful to bring in Colin
Larcombe as back-up as it was likely that you would need logistical help to develop the Plan B approach which Howard, Colin,
Ros and I all feel is feasible. She needed to approach Colin to request his help which he confirmed and I was due to update you
on the arrangement on the Monday so that you could put your new ideas to them this week.
But rather than pursue Plan B, you renewed your efforts to enter the Yemen and then sought another meeting with me on the
Monday to update me on your plans. I was not immediately available on the Monday and anyway it is not appropriate or
necessary for the course director to be involved in every twist and turn of a student's dissertation. I advised you to discuss any
changes with your supervisor as at very least I would need a supervisor's support to review the judgment, consistent
throughout, that it is not safe for you to go to the Yemen to film for your dissertation. There is no realistic prospect of that
situation changing which is the basis on which I thought we had agreed to change approach last week.
If you really feel you have some information to which we are not privy that suggests the risks are significantly less than they
appear and have suddenly reduced in the past few days, please discuss them with your supervisor in the first instance.
But my advice is, as it was last week, that the time has come to abandon the prospect of filming in the Yemen for your
dissertation and to focus on alternative treatments of your topic. This advice is offered in good faith and in what I perceive to
be your best interests. I would hope you would accept it as such.
You must proceed on the basis that you do not have university approval for any trip to the Yemen and that we
cannot support you in pursuing that goal through supervision or acceptance of a dissertation undertaken in
violation of our decision.
Sara Hadwin
Course director
MA International Journalism
School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies
Cardiff University
Bute Building
i

Saleh go out! - Mauro Lovecchio

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