5. The politics of famine and food aid a. Famine: what, when, why? b
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5. The politics of famine and food aid a. Famine: what, when, why? b
5. The politics of famine and food aid 5. The politics of famine and food aid a. Famine: what, when, why? b. How to deal with famine? End, response & prevention c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid a. Famine: what, when? – Famine differs from chronic under nutrition • Large nr. people die quickly (not enough to eat) – Several events in history • China 1333-7 (6 million); Ireland 1845-9 (1 million); India 1876-8 (10 million); URSS 1921-2 & 1932-3 (15 million); China 1958-61 (30 million); North Korea 1994-8 (3 million); Africa ‘70s-80s (Sahel, Ethiopia, Sudan) http://listverse.com/2013/04/10/10-terrible-famines-inhistory/ Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid a. Famine: why? – Causes • Natural events, e.g. droughts & floods (Africa, India), crop diseases (Ireland), wars (Leningrad 1941), ideology (Stalin taking away land&food from private farmers in Ukraine 1932-3; Mao organizing ag.production through people communes–no incentives for productivity, farmers working in furnaces, grains shipped to cities) • Amartya Sen, economist, Nobel 1998: – Natural events disrupt ag labour and cut incomes of landless farmworkers – Expectation of food shortages&panic high prices – Food available but people can’t afford – Absence of free markets & free elections and ideology make things worst Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid b. How to deal with famine? End, response & prevention – End • Deaths & migrations reduce the importance of the problem • International food aids (e.g. Britain helping Ireland 1849) • End of wrong political interventions (e.g. Ukraine 1933, Stalin ends mandatory state procurements from the region; China 1961, idem; Bengal 1943, Britain ships 1 million ton grains) • End of civil conflicts (e.g. Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique 1980s) Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid b. How to deal with famine? End, response & prevention (continue) – Response • Food aid delivery – Not too soon (not to encourage relocation of farmers to feeding stations risk permanent dependence on food aid – Reduce nr. meals/day, switch to less desirable ‘famine foods’ (e.g. Cassava) – Selling off animals, nonessential HH assets – Selling off essential HH assets relocation (camps) – After crisis: replace food aid with farm implements, animals, cash (one-time distribution). Allow displaced people to return to their farming communities Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid b. How to deal with famine? End, response & prevention (continue) – Prevention • FAO early warning system: http://www.fao.org/GIEWS/english/index.htm • USAID early warning system http://www.fews.net/Pages/default.aspx • WFP emergency preparedness http://www.wfp.org/our-work/being-ready http://www.wfp.org/ Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? – Food aid is the international shipment of food through ‘concessional’ channels (gifts): • Donor gvt recipient gvt (30%) • Donor gvt NGO inside recipient country (15%) • Donor gvt multilateral organizations (WFP) (55%) Increasing role of UN (WFP) and NGOs: – diminishing role of foreign policy calculations on who gets aid – risk of becoming dependent on food aid (no political conditioning, reduced urgency to escape dependence (e.g. India vs. African countries) – Delivery mode options: • Donor gvt-owned surplus supplies (direct transfer) • Home market of donor country (direct transfer) • Local market of recipient country (local purchase) • Third-country market close to recipient country (triangular transaction) Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid CHANNELS OF FOOD AID FLOWS 2000 vs. 2004 2000 2004 NGOs Bilateral 28% 34% Multilateral 38% NGOs Bilateral 21% 27% Multilateral 52% Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia Bilateral Donors:1990-2000 5. The politics of famine and food aid c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? (continue) – Food aid purposes: • Address famine emergency & feed refugees • Cushion food price inflations (e.g. 2008 price crisis) • Support local work or education activities (e.g. WFP ‘food for work’ pay workers with food in projects with public benefits – Weight of food aid on international trade: • Low on a global scale (3% of all cross-border food flows) • Significant share of total food imports for some individual recipient countries – Main country recipients: • 1950s: Europe (Marshall plan) • 1960s: India & South Asia • 1970-80s: Vietnam & Middle East (foreign policy objectives) • 1990s: SSA Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? (continue) – Rich countries disposing their food surplus: • Yes, US 1950s: farm subsidy policy generating wheat surplus (stocks) food aids to developing countries – To avoid complaints (unfair trade) ‘payment’ in local currency spent on local economies (US embassy). But...long-term low-interest credit: almost free….. • No, US from 1960-70s to date: – no more surplus but cash useful for foreign policy…. – No more govt-owned surplus: food purchases on US market (farm lobby), shipments US vessels [‘cargo preference’] (very expensive,70-80% more costly than foreign vessels) – Difficult to change (Congress voted against), shipping firms & dept of Defense lobbies » On the contrary: EU, Japan & Canada: purchase close to the site of emergency – Sales on local markets, decrease prices, disadvantage local farmers » US NGOs use cash from ‘monetization’ of food to fund their development projects…. Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia I. Average shipping rates (US$/ton) 140 Small number of food vendors 120 100 (11% procurement premium) II. Very small number of shippers (78% cargo preference premium) III. NGOs (resources, esp. monetized) 80 US-flag 60 Foreign-flag 40 20 0 1991-93 1999-2000 80 70 60 Approved Title II Monetization Rate FY2001 416(b) and Food for Progress Shipments: Freight Forwarders 50 2% 14% 40 Wilson Logistics 30 BKA Logistics 8% 43% 20 Fettig & Donalty Panalpina Other 8 10 Target Title II Monetization Rate Forw arder not reported 13% 0 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 % Title II non-emergency food aid shipments 5. The politics of famine and food aid So Who Benefits? The Iron Triangle 20% Iron Triangle of Food Aid Producers and Domestic Food Processors • Profits are bottom line (Price supported Procurement & Sales of Food Commodities) Maritime Interests (Shippers) • Receive significant Mark-ups on FACargo • Monetization-Mix of Interna. Dev’t&Humanitar. Assistance Mission (Poverty Reduction Concern) and it heavily depends on FA as a resource for their operations. The NGOs (Washington Based Lobby Groups-Represent 14 NGOs) Consequence = poor financial efficiency of FA as a means of Providing overseas dev’t & humanitarian assistance 5. The politics of famine and food aid c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? (continue) – Impact on farmers in recipient countries: • Local consumers hooked on cheap food from abroad • Local farmers out of business (depressed price) • Food aid ends and consumers become ‘customers’ of the donor country (commercial markets) Is this so? o No, it did not work like this for US o It destroys more commercial sales in the short run than creates in the long run o Commercial sales in the long run increase with income growth development works better o Food aid delivered is not large enough inside local market to encourage change in consumer behavior • Aid delivered at the wrong time (e.g. local harvest) can depress price better to deliver during off season • Now better control: UN multilateral & early warning Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia Food Aid Management: Efficiency & Efficacy Issues • Inefficiency • Inefficacy • • • • Insufficient amount of aid Timeliness Low quality of food Distortion in use of resources (monetisation) implies limitations in targeting the most vulnerable populations • Targeting errors & other forms of mismanagement: HUMANITARIAN & ECONOMIC IMPACTS 5. The politics of famine and food aid c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? (continue) – Food power of donor govts: • Conditioning food aid on policy reforms (e.g. president Johnson and India 1965-6 Failure: India refused end criticism of Vietnam war • Embargo on US exports (president Carter)to URSS Failure: URSS imported from other countries (and US exported to other countries) e • No gains from manipulation of commercial policies (but risky in ‘political’ terms accusation to use starvation as a tool of foreign policy • Unlike international markets as petroleum, food markets provide little coercive leverage to big exporters – Food: NOT scarce non-renewable resource available in few places; & fixed supply; & often gains value if not consumed; & free storage (as petroleum) – Food: abundant renewable resource that most countries (can) produce; & looses value if not consumed; & costly to store Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia 5. The politics of famine and food aid Resources: Paarlberg R., Food Politics, chapters 5 & 7 Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia