Ivory Trafficking as a Tool for Fueling Conflict in sub

Ivory Trafficking as a Tool for Fueling Conflict in sub

Ivory Trafficking as a Tool for Fueling
Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa
Gregory Yigitkurt, MA
Innovative Research in Conflict Analysis
NYU IR MA Program
Summer 2015
Introduction
The ivory trade was established over a thousand years ago and remains a lucrative industry.
Elephant tusks and rhino horn are the most commonly desired forms of ivory, and demand is
driven by several industries. In addition to its ornamental use, ivory is believed to have healing
properties in some cultures (pbs.org, 2010). Countries such as China and India utilize ivory to
cure a variety of ailments, such as snakebites, typhoid and food poisoning. However, the most
prominent reason ivory is obtained in the present day is its social significance. Similar to the
lasting demand for diamonds, ivory is prized as a cultural symbol amongst several populations,
most notably those in sub-Saharan African countries and China, for aesthetic elegance and level
of scarcity. According to The New York Times reporter Jeffrey Gettleman, 70 percent of illegal
ivory is shipped to China, valued at around $1,000 per pound (theatlantic.com, 2012).
Unfortunately, ivory is commonly obtained through illegal poaching. The increasing
demand from international markets has spurred on poachers, who frequently cooperate with
domestic militant groups. Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, two primary examples, were reported to
be obtaining a significant share of their funding through the selling and purchasing of the
commodity. This finance has aided these militant groups in carrying out several terrorist
activities, and fueling conflict in the process. In January 2014, the United Nations (UN) Security
Council adopted two resolutions that stated trade in illegal wildlife fueled conflicts in the Central
African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (businessinsider.com,
2014). By examining the history of ivory trafficking and analyzing the activities and terrorism
typology of sub-Saharan militant groups, effective intervention and prevention strategies can be
achieved to mitigate the growth of such a trade, disband militant groups, and ultimately
contribute to reducing conflict in the region.
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History of Ivory Trafficking
In 1975, the first attempt was made at curtailing the ivory trade, with the advent of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
Although the hunt for ivory through poaching existed long before the 1970s, the frequency of the
activity had increased due to greater access to automatic weapons (Raffalovich, p. 2). The ivory
market was estimated to be $50-$60 million annually. CITES placed elephants under Appendix
II species, which signified that species not under the threat of extinction were at risk of being
endangered (UKessays.com). However, the efforts by CITES to increase regulation on the ivory
trade failed with the increase in poaching activity, and in 1989, CITES revised the placement of
elephants in its regulation, and placed the animal under Appendix I species. This Appendix is
reserved for species threatened by extinction, thus making it illegal to kill elephants and engage
in the ivory trade. Ivory trade declined soon after; for instance, the amount of poached elephants
in Kenya dropped from 3,500 in the 1980s to 500 in 1993. In 2000, CITES attempted to frame a
system of controlled trading in order to understand the connection between the sale of stockpiled
ivory and the demand for ivory (savetheelephants.org). A one-time time sale was allowed for 54
tons of stockpiled South African ivory to Japan. Unfortunately, the results were inconclusive in
determining if legal ivory increased demand. In 2008, CITES granted another one-time sale of
120 tons of ivory from four African countries to China and Japan with an attempt to overwhelm
the market and undercut the commodity’s price. This tactic didn't work as it resulted in 84
percent of the Chinese population desiring to purchase ivory. In 2011, authorities in Africa
seized over 23 tons of illegal ivory, which is the equivalent of 2,500 individual elephants
(e360.yale.edu). This is believed to be the largest seizure of ivory since the initial ban that was
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placed in 1989, and factored into the UN adopting two resolutions in 2014 that declared the trade
as fueling conflict.
Militant Group Financing
Illegal trading process
The increased demand and access to ivory in recent years, and a greater presence of Asians on
the ground in Africa has led to the involvement of transnational criminal syndicates. In June
2002, two tons of illegal ivory was found on a cargo ship in Singapore (Gossmann 2005, p. 5).
This totaled 532 elephant tusks. The seizure, which was obtained in transit, was believed to be
one of 19 shipments, and similar seizures in Hong Kong and Taipei in 2006 suggest an organized
approach rather than isolated incidents. Such strategic maneuvering can only be accomplished
through large criminal organizations.
In the early 1990s, countries like China experienced a surge in economic development,
which resulted in a growing affluent population. This development carried over to African
countries where business investments were carried out through the region, including projects
encompassing timber, road-building, mining, and oil exploitation (Gossmann 2005, p. 4). Several
of these projects had a close proximity to sources of ivory granting opportunities for illegal
activities to be established, and the development of plans to transport the commodity into Asian
markets.
The success in transporting large quantities of ivory have been aided by the prevalence of
corruption amongst law enforcement, and the backing of internationally connected criminal
syndicates. The illegal trafficking of this criminal enterprise contracts poachers to obtain the
ivory, which is then transported by land to a selected port. The journey typically involves
crossing several borders in order to disguise the origin of shipment in case of a seizure. Once the
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ivory is loaded into shipping containers, it’s disguised within cargo containing materials such as
the timber or grains from local projects. Countries with poor infrastructure and inadequate
wildlife ministries, such as the DRC, are prime sources for illegally obtaining ivory. In 2009, 35
kilograms of ivory was obtained near Kampala that had originated from the DRC (Gossmann
2005, p. 10).
There is a strong relationship between regional conflict and rebel groups. The protection
offered by sanctuaries is likely to be compromised in the instance of a domestic conflict zone,
providing ample opportunity for poachers and local militias to hunt wildlife. Militant groups
often obtain the ivory from these reserves, and join the process of selling it for operational
income – a means to acquire weapons. This ultimately fuels the conflicts that initially allowed
for such opportunities to occur, causing a steady cycle of violence.
Al–Shabaab
Al-Shabaab, also known as “The Youth”, is an al-Qaeda affiliated militant group based in
Somalia. Their mission is to create a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia, and have declared
jihad in Africa as a means to achieving their goal (cfr.org). In June 2010, the group carried out its
first terrorist attack outside of Somalia by coordinating a series of suicide bombings in the
Ugandan capital of Kampala. The attack claimed 24 lives. In 2013, the group killed 67
individuals during a four-day siege in the Westgate shopping center in Nairobi, Kenya
(independent.co.uk, 2013). The militant group has shown no signs of slowing, as was
demonstrated during their most recent attack in November 2014 where they hijacked a bus in
Northern Kenya and killed 28 non-Muslims on board (aljazeera.com, 2014).
According to Andrea Costa, Director of the Elephant Action League (EAL), the illicit
ivory trade funds approximately 40 percent of the group’s 5,000-person army
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(independent.co.uk, 2013). It is estimated that slaying a single elephant provides enough funding
to carry out an attack on two U.S. embassies in East Africa. An average ivory tusk weighs 13.6
kg (30 pounds) with wholesale ivory prices amounting to $2,357 per kilogram. Al-Shabaab is
believed to be making $200,000 - $600,000 per month from the sale of ivory to Asia,
demonstrating the value of the trade towards their financing (slate.com, 2013). Although Kenyan
authorities were able to drive away the militants from smuggling ivory from their stronghold of
Kismayo, the Kenyan port of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania remain vulnerable points
for the illegal activity. This is largely due to rampant corruption amongst Kenyan and Tanzania
officers.
Lord’s Resistance Army
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was formed in Northern Uganda in 1986, to fight against the
Ugandan government (state.gov). According to a 2006 study conducted by UNICEF, it was
estimated that 66,000 children and youth had been abducted between 1986 and 2005. Joseph
Kony, leader of the LRA, headed operation out of South Sudan and is wanted by the
International Criminal Court for committing crimes against humanity. Although the militant
group stopped operations in Uganda in 2006, they are now operating in the DRC and CAR where
they continue to carry out abductions. Military units across the region continue to pursue and
attempt to disband the LRA, and in 2011 the African Union designated it a terrorist group.
In 2013, the Enough Project in cooperation with the Satellite Sentinel Project released a
report that highlighted elephant poaching as a means to sustain the LRA’s objectives. The
group’s activities in the DRC’s Garamba National Park have been linked to global ivory trade
(enoughproject.org). Former captives and defectors of the LRA have attested to the validity of
these findings, stating that arms, ammunition and food are traded for ivory. There were
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approximately 20,000 elephants in Garamba National Park during the 1970’s, however only
1,800 remain today (theguardian.com, 2013).
Janjaweed
The Janjaweed militia is an Arab militant group operating out of Darfur. The word Janjaweed
translates to “horseback raider” in Arabic. During Darfur’s ethnic conflict in the early 2000s, this
militia was blamed for killing thousands of civilians in response to two non-Arab groups, the
Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, acting against the Sudanese
government (nytimes.com, 2012). In April 2014, the Janjaweed group razed 127 villages in
Darfur, and has recently been given a new title by Sudan – Rapid Support Forces (aljazeera.com,
2014). The group is also known to have links to poaching and the ivory trade. They were
reported to have killed thousands of elephants in the 1980s, and slaughtered at least 300 in
Bouba Ndjida National Park in Cameroon in January 2012. As stated in the New York Times,
“Businessmen are clearly bankrolling these enormous ivory expeditions, both feeding off and
fueling conflict.”
Boko Haram
Boko Haram, an Islamic sect that translates to "Western education is sin”, was formed in 2002 in
Borno by Islamist cleric Mohammed Yusuf (cfr.org). The group’s mission is to establish an
Islamic sect in Nigeria. The group quickly radicalized with the influence of al-Qaeda, and led to
such incidents as the April 2014 bus station bombing that killed one hundred people. Overall,
more than 5,000 people have been killed by the group, and nearly 300,000 displaced. Boko
Haram has been targeting elephants in Cameroon in order to acquire ivory for operational
financing, and have contributed to the deaths of 23,000 elephants in 2013 (newscientist.com,
2014). As mentioned by Consultancy Africa Intelligence, “There is an intimate connection: like
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many terrorist organizations in Africa, Boko Haram is funded by sales of illegal ivory
(consultancyafrica.com, 2014).”
Terrorism Typology
It is important to understand the fundamental typology behind these militant groups in order to
better discern how they function as an entity, what drives them as an organization, and how to
best coordinate an effort to prevent future conflict from occurring. The U.S. government defines
terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, and is usually intended to influence an
audience (Ramsbotham, 2011, p. 82). Many may think that typologies of terrorism do not relate
to typologies of conflict; however, this is not the case according to existing literature. Peter
Wallensteen of Uppsala University noted that terrorism covers “distinct different actions, such as
criminal activities and gangsterism, and is often directed against civilians and symbolic societal
targets, as opposed to government targets (Ramsbotham, 2011, p. 80).” Four types of terrorism
are distinguished in relation to the armed conflict. The first type of terrorism is a kind that is an
unavoidable aspect in armed conflicts. The second type is “a supplementary measure in
asymmetric conflicts.” This is done to enhance influence. The third type is a form of terrorism
where the act itself is more important than traditional armed conflict. This form of terrorism can
be most associated with economic opportunity and greed. Finally, the fourth typology is one that
contains radical Islamists, most notably al-Qaeda. While the first two typologies can be open to
negotiation and political agreement, the latter two are not as easily open to such a resolution,
because the international scope and core ideologies do not allow for political negotiations. It is
important to view Wallensteen’s typology in conjunction with Schmid and Jongman’s in order to
make an accurate assessment of where the aforementioned sub-Saharan militant groups are
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categorized (Figure 1). There is a distinction between (a) national/separatist terrorism (b) social
revolutionary terrorism (c) right-wing terrorism, and (d) religious fundamentalist terrorism
(Schmid and Jongman, 2008).
Figure 1: Conflict resolution terrorism typology
Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram would both be classified as radical Islamist/international
terrorism. As referenced earlier, this typology makes it increasingly difficult to conduct any
political talks or agreements. According to CFR fellow Bronwyn Bruton, there are several
cleavages that divide leadership amongst Al-Shabaab, and includes a difference in opinion
among the group’s nationalist intent (cfr.org). This rift adds to the level of difficulty in forming a
potential resolution with the group, as it would be hard-pressed to reach a peace accord with a
full consensus. In addition, the group’s international roots means that another faction would
likely branch out and replace Al-Shabaab over time even with a temporary resolution. Similar to
Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram originated with the intent to spread Islamic doctrine after great
inequality in Nigerian society, however the group has become so diffuse since it’s establishment
that fighters don’t entirely follow the Salafi doctrine (cfr.org). This form of existing chaos within
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the group is indicative of the level of difficulty present in reaching a peace accord. The Nigerian
government’s assessment of Boko Haram as an internationally affiliated terrorist group has led
them to use no other method but force in order to control the group. Although this is a logical
approach, it is important to incorporate the group’s origins when determining the best course of
action.
The LRA, associated with the economic/factional typology, would require “police”
responses. From 2006 to 2008, Southern Sudan officials mediated a peace negotiation between
the Government of Uganda and the LRA. Although a peace agreement was finalized, Joseph
Kony refused to finalize it (state.gov). This demonstrates the degree of difficulty in the political
negotiation process. As the Janjaweed (or Rapid Support Force) are categorized as a
supplementary measure by Sudan, they are theoretically more open to political agreements in
comparison to the other three militant groups.
Conflict Resolution Theory
When examining illicit ivory trade and militant group financing in the context of conflict
resolution theory, three models help to place the issue in an appropriate context. When
examining the “hourglass model” (Figure 2) of conflict resolution theory, it is appropriate to
place the activities of all four militant groups involved in the ivory conflict within the narrow
space of violence and war (Ramsbotham, 2011, p.13). This is demonstrated by the response of
those opposing these militants, being conflict containment and war limitation. As an example,
President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria believed that Boko Haram was not capable of being
defeated as they have continued to acquire more weapons and better fighters through the years,
and believed the solution was to quell the group through the use of force (cfr.org). This action is
synonymous with conflict containment.
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Figure 2: Hourglass model
The second model that is applicable to the ivory trade issue is the multitrack conflict
resolution model (Figure 3) (Ramsbotham, 2011, p. 29). Rather than having outsiders address
potential conflict resolution in mediation efforts, it is more effective to place emphasis on
indigenous resources and local actors. Track III diplomacy will allow for peace constituencies
within the conflict, and eventually build social cohesion and common ground. Groups such as
Boko Haram are sensitive to further being radicalized if response and containment efforts are not
strategically placed. Although Boko Haram has grown to be more complex from its inception,
utilizing local knowledge to correctly discern original intent can effectively aid in the process of
containment efforts by placing ideology and militant psychology in the appropriate context.
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Figure 3: Multitrack conflict resolution model
The third model necessary to examine is that of the spheres of cosmopolitan conflict
resolution (Figure 4) (Ramsbotham, 2011, p. 30). This model addresses armed conflicts of hybrid
struggles that encompass international, state, and societal levels. The trans-boarder conflict of the
illicit ivory trade, which spans sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, in addition to the cross-cutting
influence of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab network, can only be solved by conflict
transformation that simultaneously impacts all three levels. This would include meeting the
objective of Track III initiatives and containing the trans-border conflict, which incorporates the
previous two models. This can ideally result in a peaceful resolution that halts illicit ivory trade
and reduced local conflict.
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Figure 4: Spheres of cosmopolitan conflict resolution
Intervention and Prevention Strategy
Several measures can be taken to intervene in the illicit trade of ivory, and decrease the
likelihood of future activity. In regards to physical measures, greater support can be provided on
the ground by equipping park rangers with sophisticated equipment that will allow for the
tracking of armed poachers in areas like national parks (enougproject.org). This includes
capabilities of real-time intelligence sharing. In 2013, The Economic Community of Central
African States (ECOSAC) endorsed a $2.3 million initiative that will add a 1,000 person civilian
police and military force to combat poaching in the DRC. During the same year, former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also introduced an $80 million plan by conservation groups
and African governments to combat poaching (independent.co.uk). In addition, satellite
surveillance, similar to the Satellite Sentinel Project, coupled with geospatial information can be
utilized as an early-warning indicator tool to predict militant group movements (Figure 5)
(wired.co.uk). Supplying land vehicles and satellite phones with such technology to the African
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Union Regional Task Force and U.S. military advisors can establish a formidable intervention
strategy against poaching.
Figure 5: Port of Sudan, October 8, 2011, DigitalGlobe, satellite GeoEye-1
Mapping tools that use satellite imagery are currently being put into effect to help stem
the flow of ivory poaching. The firm Tomnod crowd sources volunteers to study satellite
photographs in order to address problems around the world (Figure 6) (tomnod.com). Tomnod
has helped locate victims and damage from the Nepal earthquake in April 2015, as well as
scanning over 340,000 square km’s of ocean in search of the Malaysian Flight 370 that went
missing in March 2014 (http://blog.tomnod.com/SAR-request-form/). A recent campaign was
launched to stop elephant poaching in Garamba National Park in the DRC. This will provide a
useful test of the capabilities of satellite and geospatial information in addressing real time
poaching and its link to conflict.
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Figure 6: Tomnod crowd-collected data and assessed poacher routes
Even though prevention may prove to be more difficult, two strategies should be
considered in tackling the issue. The first strategy involves legalizing the ivory trade. According
to Dan Stiles, an anthropologist from Kenya, providing low-price raw ivory in sufficient quantity
and at predictable times will lower the incentive to buy high-risk illegal ivory
(voices.nationalgeographic.com). His theory is grounded on the basis of speculative stockpiling
being the core driver of poaching, which occurs due to calls for more controls and quotas that are
listed in the trade ban. By establishing high-end market models in consumer countries, such as
China, illegal operators will be attracted into the legal market because of low pricing of raw
ivory and high consumer pricing, which would yield high profits. Attempting to drive the illegal
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market towards a legal establishment can also have major consequences that include corruption,
however the benefits of such a strategy may outweigh the risks.
Another preventative strategy is to learn and mirror conflict resolution efforts of the
blood diamond trade of Sierra Leone (nytimes.com, 2012). Diamonds are similar to ivory for
being a natural substance with little value but prized social significance (theatlantic.com, 2012).
Both commodities are found in similar locations, such as West Africa, the DRC, and CAR. The
Kimberley Process was introduced in 2003 as a method to regulate the flow of illicit rough
diamonds. However, the process has led to a “veil of legitimacy” for illegally mined diamonds
by allowing them to be laundered through a certification system (Gossmann 2005, p. 64). This
ultimately legitimizes the flows due to the poor governance and infrastructural capacity of
conflict-inflicted countries. Understanding what not to do is also an important strategy to prevent
the illegal ivory trade from growing, which is why a Kimberley System for ivory should not be
considered for implementation.
Conclusion
Careful measures need to be taken when assessing how to best resolve the issue of illicit ivory
trade and its connection to funding militant groups in sub-Saharan Africa. The increase of Asian
presence in the region has largely contributed to the operational effectiveness of criminal
syndicates, poachers, and militant groups regarding the transportation and shipment of ivory to
consumer countries such as China, where 84 percent of the population would like to own some
form of ivory (savetheelephants.org). It was found that Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab are less
inclined to a peaceful resolution due to their complex history as an Islamic group and
international presence, while the LRA is centered on economic gains and the Janjaweed are
utilized as a supplementary measure by Sudan. Although it has been determined that there is
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currently no viable opportunity to reach a resolution with these groups, appropriate measures can
be taken to contain, intervene, and prevent the escalation of conflict. This includes greater
support on the ground through the use of real-time intelligence sharing equipment, geospatial
support akin to the Satellite Sentinel Project and Tomnod, and lessons learned in the illicit
diamond trade that could prevent the smuggling of illegal ivory to escalate. Being conscious of
these measures in the realm of a mutitrack and cosmopolitan conflict resolution model can
provide the knowledge base needed to effectively take action against “Jihad’s white gold”
(consultancyafrica.com, 2014).
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Appendix
Figure 1
Figure 2
17
Figure 3
Figure 4
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Figure 5
Figure 6
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