Atti convegno - Archivio Disarmo
Transcript
Atti convegno - Archivio Disarmo
Schelling’s Nobel Prize Lecture The game theorist Thomas Schelling(*) opened his Nobel Prize lecture in 2005 with the words, “The most spectacular event of the past half century is one that did not occur. We have enjoyed 60 years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger.” By now, the streak has stretched to 70 years. (*) Thomas Schelling lectured at the Fourth Isodarco Course: Padova 1972. His contribution is in the Isodarco publication: The Dynamics of the Arms Race and will be reprinted in the Isodarco 50th Anniversary Book. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 1 No nuclear weapons used in Vietnam The most powerful state in the world chose to accept a huge strategic defeat without first unleashing its most powerful weapons against an opponent that could not respond in kind. Nixon may have been itching to break the nuclear taboo, but he also knew there was a taboo that would have to be broken. Therefore, in the end he let Henry Kissinger talk him down from the idea. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 2 Nuclear Weapons in the World 60 000 http://thebulletin.org/ nuclear-notebookmultimedia 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 3 Nuclear Weapons (minor arsenals) 500 Fr UK Ch Pk Is In http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 4 Nuclear Suicide Club Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - XVII – April 1961 Paesi con armamenti nucleari 1961: USA 24111, URSS 2471, UK 50 2015: USA (1945) 7100, Russia (1949) 7700, UK (1952) 225, Francia (1960) 300, Cina (1964) 260, India (1974) 120, Pakistan (1998) 120, Israele (1967-73) 80, Corea del Nord (2006) 8 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 5 Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari Argomento a Favore: la Deterrenza 1. La presenza della deterrenza nucleare (Russia dal 1949) ha impedito una Terza Guerra Mondiale tra Nato e Patto di Varsavia. Guerra che si sarebbe combattuta prevalentemente in Europa. 2. La deterrenza nucleare (Pakistan dal 1998) ha impedito un ulteriore conflitto armato tra India e Pakistan: 1947 First Kashmir War, 1965 Second Kashmir War, 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, 1999 Kargil War (limited). 3. Il deterrente nucleare israeliano (dal 1967-74) ha impedito ulteriori guerre tra Israele ed i paesi arabi confinanti (in particolare Egitto e Siria): 1948 First Arab Israeli War, 1956 Suez Crisis, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 6 Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Argomenti Contrari 1. Il non uso delle armi nucleari nei conflitti che si sono avuti dal 1945 ad oggi non implica che non possano essere usate nel futuro. 2. E’ facile immaginare scenari in cui un conflitto tradizionale possa superare la soglia nucleare: a. Un conflitto India-Pakistan in cui l’esercito indiano, numericamente superiore, penetri in profondità in territorio pakistano minacciando importanti città come Lahore (situata a 26 km dal confine); b. Una rivolta nella Corea del Nord con un intervento militare della Corea del Sud il cui l’esercito superando la zona demilitarizzata penetri in profondità nel Nord; c. Un conflitto arabo-israeliano in cui l’esercito egiziano, numericamente superiore, sconfigga l’esercito israeliano e avanzi velocemente dal Sinai minacciando Tel Aviv. (Tel Aviv dista dal confine egiziano ~110 km di pianura) 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 7 Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Segue Contrari 3. Un gruppo terroristico acquisisce una bomba nucleare e la fa esplodere in una grande città di un paese dotato di armi nucleari. Prima che il paese colpito si renda conto che l’attentato è dovuto ad un gruppo terroristico, potrebbe partire una rappresaglia nucleare verso il “nemico” del momento. 4. Una rappresaglia nucleare potrebbe partire per un falso allarme o un errore umano o meccanico, o per la follia improvvisa dei responsabili del lancio di missili istallati a terra (ICBM) o su sommergibili (SLBM). Svolgerò alcune riflessioni sulle opzioni 3 e 4 che sono a mio avviso le meno improbabili e normalmente sottovalutate dagli esperti ufficiali. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 8 Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Segue Contrari 3. Bomba nucleare in mano a gruppi terroristici. Oggi il principio di funzionamento di una bomba nucleare non è un segreto e la realizzazione di una rudimentale bomba all’Uranio del tipo di quella di Hiroshima richiederebbe un modesto numero di esperti facilmente recuperabili in una società tecnologicamente avanzata. In sostanza servono esperti nell’uso di esplosivi convenzionali e la costruzione di bombe convenzionali ed esperti nella metallurgia degli elementi pesanti capaci di realizzare i due elementi subcritici di materiale fissile che uniti velocemente da un’esplosione formano una massa critica. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 9 Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Segue Contrari 3. Bomba nucleare in mano a gruppi terroristici. Il principale ostacolo sarebbe procurarsi il materiale fissile cioè un centinaio di chili di Uranio 235 arricchito sopra il 90-95%. Preoccupazioni per la fuga di questo materiale da alcuni laboratori russi ci sono state nel periodo immediatamente successivo al crollo dell’URSS e indipendentemente in Pakistan nelle operazioni del gruppo di Munir Ahmad Khan il Presidente della Commissione per l‘Energia Atomica Pakistana (1972-1991) che ha venduto segretamente conoscenze e tecnologie nucleari. Al momento attuale non ci sono informazioni pubbliche sicure sulla fuga di materiali fissili e quindi il pericolo maggiore è che alcuni paesi dotati di materiali fissili lo forniscano riservatamente a gruppi terroristici ad essi vicini. Uno degli argomenti usati dagli oppositori del programma nucleare iraniano era la preoccupazione che una volta che l’Iran avesse accumulato una sufficiente quantità di Uranio adatto a fare le bombe una parte potesse finire nelle mani di organizzazioni straniere vicine al regime degli Ayatollah. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 10 Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Segue Contrari 4. Guerra Nucleare per accidente o incidente E’ questa l’eventualità a mio avviso più temibile ed esiste oggi una ricca narrativa di situazioni in cui per errore umano o strumentale l’umanità è arrivata molto vicino ad una guerra nucleare fermandosi a volte il processo solo al livello precedente a quello della esecuzione di un attacco nucleare. La raccolta più ricca di raccapriccianti episodi è nel libro di Eric Schlosser: Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety. Illustrerò in seguito alcuni episodi di cui sono conoscenza. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 11 Cuban Missile Crisis Confrontation On the morning of October 14th, 1962, an American U-2 plane from the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing flew over the Communist island of Cuba, and discovered launching sites for a number of SS-4 medium range missiles, sparking the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States wasn’t best pleased by the building of missile launchers right under their noses and considered a number of options for dealing with the threat, from doing nothing, to launching airstrikes to destroy the missiles, to a full scale military invasion. Eventually, it was decided to blockade the island to prevent any more missiles being delivered to Cuba. Tensions mounted, as the Soviets viewed this as an act of aggression. For the first and only time in history, the American Strategic Air Command was raised to DEFCON 2 – the second highest readiness level. During the blockade, on October 27th, an American destroyer detected the Soviet submarine B-59. Practice depth charges were dropped near the submarine in order to force it to surface. The captain of the submarine ordered the submarine’s nuclear tipped torpedoes to be readied for firing in retaliation. However, to be allowed to fire, the ship’s captain, political officer and second in command all had to agree on this. Only the second in command, Vasili Arkhipov, was against the launch, but that was enough. He vetoed the launch and managed to persuade the captain to surface the submarine and await orders from Moscow, therefore averting nuclear war. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 12 The Man who Saved the World Just after midnight, on September 26th, 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov was on duty at the Serpukhov 15 bunker, at Gantsevichi, Belarus. Suddenly, the bunker’s computers alerted him that one of the Oko warning satellites in orbit around the Earth had detected the launch of 5 Minuteman II ICBMs from their hardened silos in mid-West America. A nuclear exchange which would threaten the entire world, it seemed, was imminent. However, Petrov disobeyed Soviet procedure and refused to pass the warning higher up the chain of command. The reliability of the computer system had been called into question in the past, and Petrov reasoned that if America did launch an attack, it would involve thousands of missiles, not five. Afterwards, he said “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only five missiles. You can do little damage with five missiles.” It later turned out that the satellite’s infra-red sensors had mistaken the light and heat of the sun for the hot exhaust gases from a missile launch. In 2006, he travelled to America where he was honored by a United Nations meeting in New York City, and he was presented an award by the Association of World Citizens. http://listverse.com/2010/11/28/8potentially-world-ending-nuclear-scares/ 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 13 Norwegian Rocket Incident On January 25th, 1995, a team of scientists launched a Black Brandt XII research rocket from Norway. Russian radar stations quickly picked up the launch, and it was believed that this was the launch of a Trident missile from a submarine positioned off the North Cape. It was believed that the EMP (electromagnetic pulse) from the explosion of the missile’s eight warheads in the atmosphere were designed to knock out Moscow’s command and control system, as a prelude to a full-scale nuclear attack. An alert was immediately sent to the Russian high command, and the Russian President, Defense Minister and Chief of the Armed Forces held a tense video-conference. One can only imagine the tone and content of this conversation. After eight minutes, the Russian computers calculated that the missile would actually splash down in the Norwegian Sea. It was not aimed at Russia. Russian nuclear doctrine stated that there should only be 10 minutes before detecting a launch to deciding on a course of action. Therefore, President Yeltsin had perhaps only 2 minutes before he would have had to choose: launch his own missiles and start a global war, or risk complete destruction. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 14 Training Tape Incident At 8:50am, on the morning on November 9th, 1979, a warning appeared on the computers of four American command centers (including at the Pentagon and at the Strategic Air Command’s bunker deep beneath Cheyenne Mountain) that a massive Soviet ICBM strike was en route to the United States. Minuteman nuclear missiles were readied to launch a retaliatory attack, and the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (a 747 modified to resist the effects of EMPs and radiation) took off, although the president was not on board. Senior officers quickly convened a threat assessment conference. However, after six tense minutes, early warning satellites and radar showed that no Russian missiles had been launched. It was later discovered that a training tape depicting a massive Soviet attack had accidentally been loaded into the early warning computers, and had generated the false alarm. After an investigation of the incident, a new off-site facility was created on which to run training tapes. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 15 Thule Air Base Crash A B-52 carrying 4 hydrogen bombs was flying over Baffin Bay near Greenland on the 21st January, 1968, as part of a “Hard Head” mission. This is where bombers armed with nuclear weapons loitered outside Soviet airspace, so that they could deliver either a rapid first strike, or an immediate retaliatory attack should war break out. However, on this flight, a fire broke out onboard the aircraft. Six of the crew managed to eject, but the last was killed as he tried to bail out. The plane crashed onto sea ice, causing the high explosive component of the nuclear bombs to explode, sending radioactive material over a wide area. There was no atomic explosion as the bombs had not been armed. A huge cleanup operation was launched, with the base camp situated at the crash site. Eventually, 6700 m3 of contaminated ice and snow were removed and transported to the United States. After obtaining a number of documents under the Freedom of Information Act, the BBC claimed that one of the four nuclear weapons had not been accounted for during the cleanup operation. However, the Danish Institute for International Studies launched their own study in 2009, which refuted the BBC’s claims. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 16 Air Force Nuke Officers Caught Up Cheating The U.S. Air Force's nuclear command has been rocked by a cheating scandal involving nearly three dozen officers. Cheating on a proficiency exam involving intercontinental missile launch officers at the Global Strike Command at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana apparently was carried out around last August and September by text and appears to be the largest incident of its kind, the Pentagon said. The case involving 34 officers with the 341st Missile Wing stemmed from a drug possession investigation at multiple air bases in the United States and overseas. Two of those caught up in the cheating episode have been linked to the other probe, officials said. Sixteen officers were ultimately found to have actually cheated on the monthly proficiency exam while the rest knew the answers had been shared with others and did not report the violation, the Pentagon said. This is the latest incident to rock the Air Force nuclear operations. Last year, a missile unit at Malmstrom failed a safety and security inspection. They operate about a third of the 450 Minuteman III nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles in the U.S. force, according to the Air Force statement. Also last year, another outfit based at Minot, North Dakota, did poorly in an inspection, resulting in the removal of 17 military personnel from their jobs. Tim McCaughan, CNN, Updated 0323 GMT (1123 HKT) January 16, 2014 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 17 Air Force Nuke Officers Caught Up Cheating These stories, and many more, can be found in Eric Schlosser’s “Command and Control” (Penguin), an excellent journalistic investigation of the efforts made since the first atomic bomb was exploded, outside Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, to put some kind of harness on nuclear weaponry. By a miracle of information management, Schlosser has synthesized a huge archive of material, including government reports, scientific papers, and a substantial historical and polemical literature on nukes, and transformed it into a crisp narrative covering more than fifty years of scientific and political change. And he has interwoven that narrative with a hair-raising, minuteby-minute account of an accident at a Titan II missile silo in Arkansas, in 1980, which he renders in the manner of a techno-thriller: Plumb watched the nine-pound socket slip through the narrow gap between the platform and the missile, fall about seventy feet, hit the thrust mount, and then ricochet off the Titan II. It seemed to happen in slow motion. A moment later, fuel sprayed from a hole in the missile like water from a garden hose. “Oh man,” Plumb thought. “This is not good.” 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 18 Che fare? 1/3 Con approssimazione la probabilità di un incidente nucleare, Pnuc, è legato al numero di paesi che posseggono armi nucleari e per ogni paese nucleare al numero di bombe nucleari da lui possedute. Da fisico direi che questa probabilità è la somma di 9 probabilità parziali, ciascuna calcolata per ognuno dei 9 paesi che possiedono armi nucleari. Le probabilità parziali sono poi proporzionali al numero di bombe possedute da ciascun paese: Pnuc = PUS + PRu + PUK + PFr + PCh + PIs + PIn + PPk + PNK con: PUS = aUS nUS ; PRu = aRu nRu ; PUK = aUK nUK ; PFr = aFr nFr ; PCh = aCh nCh ; PIs = aIs nIs ; PIn = aIn nIn ; PPk = aPk nPk ; PNK = aNK nNK dove: nUS è il numero di testate nucleari possedute dagli Stati Uniti e aUS è il coefficiente di rischio presentato da ogni testata atomica presente negli arsenali militari degli Stati Uniti. Analogamente per gli altri otto paesi nucleari. Pnuc = aUS nUS + aRu nRu + aUK nUK + aFr nFr + aCh nCh + aIs nIs + + aIn nIn + aPk nPk + aNK nNK 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 19 Che fare? 2/3 Naturalmente i coefficienti a sono molto diversi da un paese all’altro in quanto dipendono dal livello tecnologico dei sistemi di sicurezza di ciascun paese, dalle risorse che ogni paese impegna per la sicurezza, dall’addestramento del personale addetto alla sicurezza dei sistemi di arma nucleari, dalla stabilità del suo sistema politico, ……e dalla tensione della situazione politica internazionale in cui si trova immerso in ogni momento. Pnuc = aUS nUS + aRu nRu + aUK nUK + aFr nFr + aCh nCh + aIs nIs + + aIn nIn + aPk nPk + aNK nNK Tuttavia da questa semplice formula emergono chiaramente le cose più importanti da fare per ridurre il pericolo di un olocausto nucleare: 1. Tenere il più ridotto possibile il numero di stati che posseggono armi nucleari: Non Proliferazione; 2. Ridurre il numero di ordigni nucleari posseduti da ciascun paese nucleare: Riduzione del numero di testate. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 20 The Weapons Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - XVII – April 1961 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 21 Sicurezza Informatica Oggi la sicurezza delle bombe nucleari è resa più critica dai problemi della sicurezza informatica. Se nei film di James Bond i cattivi si impadroniscono di un ordigno nucleare rubandolo fisicamente, oggi è pensabile che un hacker riesca ad entrare nel sistema di comando e controllo elettronico di una batteria di missili con testata nucleare disponendo il lancio di un missile e programmandone anche la destinazione. 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 22 Collateral Damage 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 23 Isodarco since 1966 Italian Pugwash Group International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts 29th Winter Course on: “Nuclear Governance in a Changing World” ANDALO (TRENTO) - ITALY - 7 - 14 January 2016 Directors of the Course: Paolo Foradori (School of International Studies, University of Trento, Italy) Tariq Rauf (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden) 28/10/15 Archivio Disarmo 151028 - Carlo Schaerf 24