Atti convegno - Archivio Disarmo

Transcript

Atti convegno - Archivio Disarmo
Schelling’s Nobel Prize Lecture
The game theorist Thomas Schelling(*)
opened his Nobel Prize lecture in 2005 with
the words, “The most spectacular event of the
past half century is one that did not occur. We
have enjoyed 60 years without nuclear
weapons exploded in anger.” By now, the
streak has stretched to 70 years.
(*) Thomas Schelling lectured at the Fourth Isodarco Course: Padova
1972. His contribution is in the Isodarco publication:
The Dynamics of the Arms Race
and will be reprinted in the Isodarco 50th Anniversary Book.
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No nuclear weapons used in Vietnam
The most powerful state in the world chose to
accept a huge strategic defeat without first
unleashing its most powerful weapons against
an opponent that could not respond in kind.
Nixon may have been itching to break the
nuclear taboo, but he also knew there was a
taboo that would have to be broken.
Therefore, in the end he let Henry Kissinger
talk him down from the idea.
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Nuclear Weapons in the World
60 000
http://thebulletin.org/
nuclear-notebookmultimedia
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Nuclear Weapons (minor arsenals)
500
Fr
UK
Ch
Pk
Is
In
http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia
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Nuclear Suicide Club
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - XVII – April 1961
Paesi con armamenti nucleari
1961: USA 24111, URSS 2471, UK 50
2015: USA (1945) 7100, Russia (1949) 7700, UK (1952) 225,
Francia (1960) 300, Cina (1964) 260,
India (1974) 120, Pakistan (1998) 120, Israele (1967-73) 80,
Corea del Nord (2006) 8
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Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari
Argomento a Favore: la Deterrenza
1. La presenza della deterrenza nucleare (Russia dal 1949)
ha impedito una Terza Guerra Mondiale tra Nato e Patto di
Varsavia.
Guerra
che
si
sarebbe
combattuta
prevalentemente in Europa.
2. La deterrenza nucleare (Pakistan dal 1998) ha impedito
un ulteriore conflitto armato tra India e Pakistan: 1947 First
Kashmir War, 1965 Second Kashmir War, 1971 Bangladesh
Liberation War, 1999 Kargil War (limited).
3.
Il deterrente nucleare israeliano (dal 1967-74) ha
impedito ulteriori guerre tra Israele ed i paesi arabi
confinanti (in particolare Egitto e Siria): 1948 First Arab
Israeli War, 1956 Suez Crisis, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom
Kippur War.
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Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Argomenti Contrari
1. Il non uso delle armi nucleari nei conflitti che si sono avuti
dal 1945 ad oggi non implica che non possano essere usate nel
futuro.
2. E’ facile immaginare scenari in cui un conflitto tradizionale
possa superare la soglia nucleare:
a.
Un conflitto India-Pakistan in cui l’esercito indiano,
numericamente superiore, penetri in profondità in territorio
pakistano minacciando importanti città come Lahore
(situata a 26 km dal confine);
b.
Una rivolta nella Corea del Nord con un intervento
militare della Corea del Sud il cui l’esercito superando la
zona demilitarizzata penetri in profondità nel Nord;
c.
Un conflitto arabo-israeliano in cui l’esercito egiziano,
numericamente superiore, sconfigga l’esercito israeliano e
avanzi velocemente dal Sinai minacciando Tel Aviv.
(Tel Aviv dista dal confine egiziano ~110 km di pianura)
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Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Segue Contrari
3. Un gruppo terroristico acquisisce una bomba nucleare e
la fa esplodere in una grande città di un paese dotato di
armi nucleari. Prima che il paese colpito si renda conto che
l’attentato è dovuto ad un gruppo terroristico, potrebbe
partire una rappresaglia nucleare verso il “nemico” del
momento.
4. Una rappresaglia nucleare potrebbe partire per un falso
allarme o un errore umano o meccanico, o per la follia
improvvisa dei responsabili del lancio di missili istallati a
terra (ICBM) o su sommergibili (SLBM).
Svolgerò alcune riflessioni sulle opzioni 3 e 4 che
sono a mio avviso le meno improbabili e normalmente
sottovalutate dagli esperti ufficiali.
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Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Segue Contrari
3. Bomba nucleare in mano a gruppi terroristici.
Oggi il principio di funzionamento di una bomba nucleare non è un
segreto e la realizzazione di una rudimentale bomba all’Uranio del
tipo di quella di Hiroshima richiederebbe un modesto numero di
esperti facilmente recuperabili in una società tecnologicamente
avanzata.
In sostanza servono esperti nell’uso di esplosivi
convenzionali e la costruzione di bombe
convenzionali ed esperti nella metallurgia degli
elementi pesanti capaci di realizzare i due
elementi subcritici di materiale fissile che uniti
velocemente da un’esplosione formano una
massa critica.
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Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Segue Contrari
3. Bomba nucleare in mano a gruppi terroristici.
Il principale ostacolo sarebbe procurarsi il materiale fissile cioè un
centinaio di chili di Uranio 235 arricchito sopra il 90-95%.
Preoccupazioni per la fuga di questo materiale da alcuni laboratori russi ci
sono state nel periodo immediatamente successivo al crollo dell’URSS e
indipendentemente in Pakistan nelle operazioni del gruppo di Munir
Ahmad Khan il Presidente della Commissione per l‘Energia Atomica
Pakistana (1972-1991) che ha venduto segretamente conoscenze e
tecnologie nucleari.
Al momento attuale non ci sono informazioni pubbliche sicure sulla fuga
di materiali fissili e quindi il pericolo maggiore è che alcuni paesi dotati di
materiali fissili lo forniscano riservatamente a gruppi terroristici ad essi
vicini.
Uno degli argomenti usati dagli oppositori del programma nucleare
iraniano era la preoccupazione che una volta che l’Iran avesse
accumulato una sufficiente quantità di Uranio adatto a fare le bombe una
parte potesse finire nelle mani di organizzazioni straniere vicine al regime
degli Ayatollah.
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Ruolo delle Bombe Nucleari: Segue Contrari
4.
Guerra Nucleare per accidente o
incidente
E’ questa l’eventualità a mio avviso più
temibile ed esiste oggi una ricca narrativa di
situazioni in cui per errore umano o
strumentale l’umanità è arrivata molto
vicino ad una guerra nucleare fermandosi a
volte il processo solo al livello precedente a
quello della esecuzione di un attacco
nucleare.
La raccolta più ricca di raccapriccianti
episodi è nel libro di Eric Schlosser:
Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons,
the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of
Safety. Illustrerò in seguito alcuni episodi di
cui sono conoscenza.
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Cuban Missile Crisis Confrontation
On the morning of October 14th, 1962, an American U-2 plane from the 4080th
Strategic Reconnaissance Wing flew over the Communist island of Cuba, and
discovered launching sites for a number of SS-4 medium range missiles, sparking
the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States wasn’t best pleased by the building of
missile launchers right under their noses and considered a number of options for
dealing with the threat, from doing nothing, to launching airstrikes to destroy the
missiles, to a full scale military invasion. Eventually, it was decided to blockade the
island to prevent any more missiles being delivered to Cuba. Tensions mounted, as
the Soviets viewed this as an act of aggression. For the first and only time in
history, the American Strategic Air Command was raised to DEFCON 2 – the second
highest readiness level. During the blockade, on October 27th, an American
destroyer detected the Soviet submarine B-59. Practice depth charges were
dropped near the submarine in order to force it to surface. The captain of the
submarine ordered the submarine’s nuclear tipped torpedoes to be readied for
firing in retaliation.
However, to be allowed to fire, the ship’s captain,
political officer and second in command all had to
agree on this. Only the second in command, Vasili
Arkhipov, was against the launch, but that was
enough. He vetoed the launch and managed to
persuade the captain to surface the submarine and
await orders from Moscow, therefore averting nuclear
war.
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The Man who Saved the World
Just after midnight, on September 26th, 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov
was on duty at the Serpukhov 15 bunker, at Gantsevichi, Belarus. Suddenly, the
bunker’s computers alerted him that one of the Oko warning satellites in orbit
around the Earth had detected the launch of 5 Minuteman II ICBMs from their
hardened silos in mid-West America. A nuclear exchange which would threaten the
entire world, it seemed, was imminent. However, Petrov disobeyed Soviet
procedure and refused to pass the warning higher up the chain of command. The
reliability of the computer system had been called into question in the past, and
Petrov reasoned that if America did launch an attack, it would involve thousands of
missiles, not five. Afterwards, he said “When people start a war, they don’t start it
with only five missiles. You can do little damage with five missiles.” It later turned
out that the satellite’s infra-red sensors had mistaken the light and heat of the sun
for the hot exhaust gases from a missile launch. In 2006, he travelled to America
where he was honored by a United Nations meeting in New York City, and he was
presented an award by the Association of World Citizens.
http://listverse.com/2010/11/28/8potentially-world-ending-nuclear-scares/
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Norwegian Rocket Incident
On January 25th, 1995, a team of scientists
launched a Black Brandt XII research rocket from
Norway. Russian radar stations quickly picked up
the launch, and it was believed that this was the
launch of a Trident missile from a submarine
positioned off the North Cape. It was believed that
the EMP (electromagnetic pulse) from the explosion
of the missile’s eight warheads in the atmosphere
were designed to knock out Moscow’s command
and control system, as a prelude to a full-scale
nuclear attack. An alert was immediately sent to the
Russian high command, and the Russian President,
Defense Minister and Chief of the Armed Forces
held a tense video-conference. One can only
imagine the tone and content of this conversation.
After eight minutes, the Russian computers
calculated that the missile would actually splash
down in the Norwegian Sea. It was not aimed at
Russia. Russian nuclear doctrine stated that there
should only be 10 minutes before detecting a
launch to deciding on a course of action. Therefore,
President Yeltsin had perhaps only 2 minutes before
he would have had to choose: launch his own
missiles and start a global war, or risk complete
destruction.
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Training Tape Incident
At 8:50am, on the morning on November 9th, 1979, a warning appeared on the
computers of four American command centers (including at the Pentagon and at
the Strategic Air Command’s bunker deep beneath Cheyenne Mountain) that a
massive Soviet ICBM strike was en route to the United States. Minuteman nuclear
missiles were readied to launch a retaliatory attack, and the National Emergency
Airborne Command Post (a 747 modified to resist the effects of EMPs and
radiation) took off, although the president was not on board. Senior officers quickly
convened a threat assessment conference. However, after six tense minutes, early
warning satellites and radar showed that no Russian missiles had been launched. It
was later discovered that a training tape depicting a massive Soviet attack had
accidentally been loaded into the early warning computers, and had generated the
false alarm. After an investigation of the incident, a new off-site facility was
created on which to run training tapes.
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Thule Air Base Crash
A B-52 carrying 4 hydrogen bombs was flying over Baffin Bay near Greenland on
the 21st January, 1968, as part of a “Hard Head” mission. This is where bombers
armed with nuclear weapons loitered outside Soviet airspace, so that they could
deliver either a rapid first strike, or an immediate retaliatory attack should war
break out. However, on this flight, a fire broke out onboard the aircraft. Six of the
crew managed to eject, but the last was killed as he tried to bail out. The plane
crashed onto sea ice, causing the high explosive component of the nuclear bombs
to explode, sending radioactive material over a wide area. There was no atomic
explosion as the bombs had not been armed. A huge cleanup operation was
launched, with the base camp situated at the crash site. Eventually, 6700 m3 of
contaminated ice and snow were removed and transported to the United States.
After obtaining a number of documents under the Freedom of Information Act, the BBC claimed that one of the four nuclear weapons had not been accounted for during the cleanup operation. However, the Danish Institute for International Studies launched their own study in 2009, which refuted the BBC’s claims.
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Air Force Nuke Officers Caught Up Cheating
The U.S. Air Force's nuclear command has been rocked by a cheating scandal
involving nearly three dozen officers.
Cheating on a proficiency exam involving intercontinental missile launch officers at
the Global Strike Command at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana apparently
was carried out around last August and September by text and appears to be the
largest incident of its kind, the Pentagon said.
The case involving 34 officers with the 341st Missile Wing stemmed from a drug
possession investigation at multiple air bases in the United States and overseas.
Two of those caught up in the cheating episode have been linked to the other
probe, officials said.
Sixteen officers were ultimately found to have actually cheated on the monthly
proficiency exam while the rest knew the answers had been shared with others
and did not report the violation, the Pentagon said.
This is the latest incident to rock the Air Force nuclear operations.
Last year, a missile unit at Malmstrom failed a safety and security inspection.
They operate about a third of the 450 Minuteman III nuclear-tipped
intercontinental ballistic missiles in the U.S. force, according to the Air Force
statement.
Also last year, another outfit based at Minot, North Dakota, did poorly in an
inspection, resulting in the removal of 17 military personnel from their jobs.
Tim McCaughan, CNN, Updated 0323 GMT (1123 HKT) January 16, 2014
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Air Force Nuke Officers Caught Up Cheating
These stories, and many more, can be found in Eric
Schlosser’s “Command and Control” (Penguin), an
excellent journalistic investigation of the efforts made
since the first atomic bomb was exploded, outside
Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, to put
some kind of harness on nuclear weaponry. By a
miracle of information management, Schlosser has
synthesized a huge archive of material, including
government reports, scientific papers, and a substantial
historical and polemical literature on nukes, and
transformed it into a crisp narrative covering more than
fifty years of scientific and political change. And he has
interwoven that narrative with a hair-raising, minuteby-minute account of an accident at a Titan II missile
silo in Arkansas, in 1980, which he renders in the
manner of a techno-thriller:
Plumb watched the nine-pound socket slip through the
narrow gap between the platform and the missile, fall
about seventy feet, hit the thrust mount, and then
ricochet off the Titan II. It seemed to happen in slow
motion. A moment later, fuel sprayed from a hole in the
missile like water from a garden hose.
“Oh man,” Plumb thought. “This is not good.”
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Che fare? 1/3
Con approssimazione la probabilità di un incidente nucleare, Pnuc, è
legato al numero di paesi che posseggono armi nucleari e per ogni paese
nucleare al numero di bombe nucleari da lui possedute. Da fisico direi
che questa probabilità è la somma di 9 probabilità parziali, ciascuna
calcolata per ognuno dei 9 paesi che possiedono armi nucleari. Le
probabilità parziali sono poi proporzionali al numero di bombe possedute
da ciascun paese:
Pnuc = PUS + PRu + PUK + PFr + PCh + PIs + PIn + PPk + PNK
con:
PUS = aUS nUS ; PRu = aRu nRu ; PUK = aUK nUK ; PFr = aFr nFr ;
PCh = aCh nCh ; PIs = aIs nIs ; PIn = aIn nIn ; PPk = aPk nPk ; PNK = aNK nNK
dove:
nUS è il numero di testate nucleari possedute dagli Stati Uniti e
aUS è il coefficiente di rischio presentato da ogni testata atomica
presente negli arsenali militari degli Stati Uniti.
Analogamente per gli altri otto paesi nucleari.
Pnuc = aUS nUS + aRu nRu + aUK nUK + aFr nFr + aCh nCh + aIs nIs +
+ aIn nIn + aPk nPk + aNK nNK
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Che fare? 2/3
Naturalmente i coefficienti a sono molto diversi da un paese all’altro in
quanto dipendono dal livello tecnologico dei sistemi di sicurezza di
ciascun paese, dalle risorse che ogni paese impegna per la sicurezza,
dall’addestramento del personale addetto alla sicurezza dei sistemi di
arma nucleari, dalla stabilità del suo sistema politico, ……e dalla tensione
della situazione politica internazionale in cui si trova immerso in ogni
momento.
Pnuc = aUS nUS + aRu nRu + aUK nUK + aFr nFr + aCh nCh + aIs nIs +
+ aIn nIn + aPk nPk + aNK nNK
Tuttavia da questa semplice formula emergono chiaramente le cose più
importanti da fare per ridurre il pericolo di un olocausto nucleare:
1. Tenere il più ridotto possibile il numero di stati che posseggono armi
nucleari: Non Proliferazione;
2. Ridurre il numero di ordigni nucleari posseduti da ciascun paese
nucleare: Riduzione del numero di testate.
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The Weapons
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - XVII – April 1961
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Sicurezza Informatica
Oggi la sicurezza delle bombe nucleari è resa più
critica dai problemi della sicurezza informatica. Se nei
film di James Bond i cattivi si impadroniscono di un
ordigno nucleare rubandolo fisicamente, oggi è
pensabile che un hacker riesca ad entrare nel sistema
di comando e controllo elettronico di una batteria di
missili con testata nucleare disponendo il lancio di un
missile e programmandone anche la destinazione.
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Collateral Damage
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Isodarco
since 1966
Italian Pugwash Group
International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts
29th Winter Course on:
“Nuclear Governance in a Changing World”
ANDALO (TRENTO) - ITALY
-
7 - 14 January 2016
Directors of the Course: Paolo Foradori (School of
International Studies, University of Trento, Italy)
Tariq Rauf (Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), Sweden)
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