Between Patriotism and Pacifism. Ernesto Teodoro

History of European Ideas 36 (2010) 324–329
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History of European Ideas
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Between Patriotism and Pacifism. Ernesto Teodoro Moneta and the Italian
conquest of Libya
Alberto Castelli
Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Cagliari, Italy
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Article history:
Available online 3 June 2010
In 1911, the prominent Italian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ernesto T. Moneta and, with him, a number of
Italian ‘‘pacifists’’ actively supported the invasion of Libya (carried out) by the Italian army. On the columns
of ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, journal edited by Moneta since 1898, Italian ‘‘pacifists’’ not only agreed that it
was good and convenient for Italy to conquer a part of North Africa, but showed an enthusiasm they had
never manifested before in support of pacifist initiatives. The question is why an ardent pacifist and wise
intellectual, as Moneta was, renounced so easily his pacifist ideals to support a bloody war and a harsh
repression of the Arab rebels, as the one which followed the defeat of the Turkish army. To answer this
question, the essay analyzes the articles published by Moneta and other contributors on ‘‘La Vita
Internazionale’’ and discusses them with regard to both the international political events occurred during
the first decade of the 20th century and the dominant ideologies of the time (namely irrationalism and antiindividualism). The essay concludes that Moneta’s agreement with the colonialist war has been prepared
and made possible by a number of pre-war ideological and political influences which had transformed his
democratic and peace-oriented ideas of nation, people and state into nationalist and aggressive ones.
ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Ernesto Teodoro Moneta: his Pacifism
«Applauding your energetic action and admirable diplomatic
preparation revealed in today’s press, I wish for a swift end to the
conflict and the triumph of good Italian right».1 With this telegram
sent to the Foreign Affairs Minister Antonino Paternó marquise di
San Giuliano on October 3rd 1911, the Nobel Peace Prize winner
Ernesto Teodoro Moneta, expressed his consent about the war Italy
had just waged against Turkey. It is rather unusual for a pacifist and
refined intellectual as Moneta certainly was, to approve so
enthusiastically of a war leading to the occupation of Libya and
a great amount of death and sorrow. Why did he? Is it possible to
support a war whilst being a pacifist? If it is not, what happened to
Moneta’s high pacifist ideals in 1911?
In order to answer these questions, firstly, we will consider who
Moneta was, and what kind of political ideas he professed.
Secondly, we will briefly outline the main facts that occurred in
1911 and say how they were generally received and debated in
Italy. Then, we will analyze the rhetoric used by Moneta and other
pacifist intellectual in support of the war. Finally, we will propose
E-mail address: [email protected].
1
«Plaudendo vostra energica azione e mirabile preparazione diplomatica rivelata
stampa odierna, auguro prossima fine confitto trionfo buon diritto italico».
Telegram written by E.T. Moneta to Minister di San Giuliano October 3rd 1911;
see ‘‘La Vita internazionale’’, XIV, n. 19, October 5th 1911, 495.
0191-6599/$ – see front matter ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2010.05.002
some explanations for the pro-war choice of Moneta and his
collaborators.
Moneta was born in Milan in 1833 and whilst still young, began
fighting against the Austrian Empire in order to free Italy (the
Italian Risorgimento). He was deeply influenced by Mazzini’s
republican and democratic doctrine. In 1859, he started fighting
alongside Giuseppe Garibaldi and in 1866, took part in the terrible
battle of Custoza against the Austrians. One year later, he left the
army and became editor of ‘‘Il Secolo’’, a popular newspaper
published in Milan. In his contributions to ‘‘Il Secolo’’, Moneta
committed himself to the ideal of a Europe free from wars. In 1878,
he founded the quite unlucky Lega di Libertà, Fratellanza e Pace
(The League for Freedom, Brotherhood and Peace). In 1887, he set
up the pacifist organization Unione Lombarda per la pace (The
Lombard Union for Peace) and in 1898, founded and ran the pacifist
review ‘‘La vita internazionale’’ (International Life). Its most
prominent contributors included: Felice Momigliano, Vilfredo
Pareto, Achille Loria and Gaetano Salvemini. In 1907, Moneta won
the Nobel Peace Prize.2 In 1911, he supported the war against
2
See about Moneta G. Procacci, Premi Nobel per la pace e guerre mondiali (Milano,
1989); U. Buse, Ernesto Teodoro Moneta, 1833–1918: Leben und Werk eines
italienischen Pazifisten (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), 225; C. Ragaini, Giù le armi!
Ernesto Teodoro Moneta e il progetto di pace internazionale, introduction by A.
Colombo (Milano, 1999); A. Colombo, Vita in tre tempi di Teodoro Moneta, ‘‘Nuova
Antologia’’, n. 2243, July–September 2007, 116–32.
A. Castelli / History of European Ideas 36 (2010) 324–329
Turkey to conquer Libya and in 1914, defended the Italian
intervention in the Great War. He died in 1918.
Which kind of Pacifism did Moneta stand for? He was an
exponent of patriotic Pacifism. Whilst patriotic pacifists generally
believed that peace was a very important value, it was not
considered to be the supreme value. They suggested, of course, that
whilst war was horrible and should be abolished, that some aims
justified it. For example, wars for the independence and freedom of
a people (such as the Italian war against the Austrian Empire) were
legitimized. Moreover, they advocated that peace was only
possible if every European people was free and independent. In
other words, respect for the right of every European people to have
its own democratic government was a fundamental condition for
any lasting peace. This is why Pacifism and Patriotism were
inevitably bound together. But this is also the reason why patriotic
Pacifism generally considered the value of national interest to be
superior to that of peace.3
In Moneta’s opinion, however, freedom and independence
alone were not enough to enforce lasting peace. Three other aims
were needed: disarmament, international arbitration and federalism. By the word disarmament, Moneta didn’t mean the complete
destruction of every weapon, but the abolition of permanent
armies (responsible for the constant state of balance of terror) and
the creation of a people’s army endowed only with defensive tasks.
According to Moneta, arbitration consisted of a number of
international institutions, resolving by right any potential conflicts
between States. For him, however, by far the most important aim in
conquering lasting peace was federation. A federal Europe would
open the way to a civilization «without armies, and in which all
fatherlands are confederated in one big common fatherland».4 In
Moneta’s view, Europe should have become like Switzerland: a
federation able to unify people of different cultures and languages
in one political subject.5
Moneta’s Pacifism was based on some premises that need to be
explained. Firstly, he considered human beings to be innately bad
and violent. Men were «tamed beasts» hiding «the tiger, the bear
and the hyena» under their civilized clothes where war was the
natural result of this human nature.6 However, this violent nature
could be limited by using education as well as moral and
intellectual elevation. Moneta trusted unequivocally in the moral
and material progress of humanity to get rid of violent behavior
and war, in other words: peace depended on progress.7
The 1911 war: large consent for the war
Italian economic penetration of Libya began in 1907: the Italian
bank Banco di Roma promoted the industrial development of the
country and its trade with Italy.8 However, in 1911 these activities
no longer appeared enough to the Italian government. In
particular, the Foreign Minister di San Giuliano judged the
conquest of Libya to be sensible: in order to assure Italy political
advantages on the Mediterranean sea, as both a market outlet for
Italian industries and a close destination for Italian emigrants.
Formally, the 1911 war was waged because of both the hostility
of the Turkish government towards Italian economic policy of the
3
E.T. Moneta, Lettera al presidente e ai membri del X Congresso universale della Pace
in Glasgow, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, September 20th 1901, IV, n. 18, 569–71.
4
E.T. Moneta, L’antimilitarismo nell’esercito, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, VIII, n. 20,
October 20th 1905, 457–9.
5
See C. Ragaini, Giù le armi!, 76–93.
6
E.T. Moneta, Filosofando, ‘‘Il Secolo’’, November 28th 1897; quoted in C. Ragaini,
Giù le armi!, 35.
7
E.T. Moneta, Sulla morale, ‘‘La vita internazionale’’, April 4th 1905; see Ragaini,
Giù le armi!, 38.
8
See A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia. Tripoli bel suol d’amore (Roma – Bari, 1986),
38–46.
325
time and of its refusal to take care of the precious resources of the
country.9 The project for conquering the nearest part of Africa
gained consent with a large part of Italian public opinion. The kind
of passions and feelings that arose in 1911 would, three years later,
lead to a large number of Italian party leaders and intellectuals
siding with interventionism during the First World War.10 The
Nationalist movement (born in Florence in 1910) carried out a
campaign in favour of the war. According to the Nationalists, the
war had to be fought and won firstly to demonstrate to other
European nations how powerful Italy was, and secondly for
economic and political reasons. The Nationalist leader Enrico
Corradini thought that the conquest of Libya was the obvious and
instinctive reaction of a great nation (Italy), that had been
oppressed for too long.
Along with the Nationalist movement almost all of the Italian
newspapers, with the exception of ‘‘Corriere della Sera’’, supported
the war.11 In the pro-war articles, Libya was described as a very
rich and fertile country: a perfect destination for Italian farmers
and workers. However, the reasons for conquering it were not only
economic: the war against the Turkish Empire was described as
being a part of a thousand year war of the Italians against the
Moors where the ancient glories of the Roman Empire were largely
recalled.12 From a moral point of view, the aggression was justified
as a war against barbarism (the Turkish Empire) and for civilization
(Italy). As the Prime Minister, Giovanni Giolitti, put it: «colonial
war means civilizing populations that would otherwise go on
living in barbarism».13 Journalists and intellectuals also insisted on
the so called ‘‘proletarian character’’ of Italian colonialism. The
very prominent poet Giovanni Pascoli, for example, described Italy
as a «great proletarian» mother who, by the invasion of Libya, was
just seeking to provide her children with the jobs they needed, not
any political power or undeserved economic benefits.14 It should
be noted that this rhetoric of the ‘‘proletarian character’’ of Italian
colonialism made the invasion theoretically acceptable to any
Italian with patriotic feelings: socialists, democrats and internationalists included.15
Some prominent but isolated intellectuals including: Gaetano
Salvemini, Gaetano Mosca, Edoardo Giretti and Luigi Einaudi
opposed the war for moral, political and economic reasons.16 From
a political and economic point of view, the war would, in their
opinion, be too expensive and result in Italian goods becoming
increasingly difficult to export. In a number of articles published in
‘‘La Voce’’ (edited by Giuseppe Prezzolini), Salvemini was
particularly effective at explaining that, on the one hand, Libya
was not as rich and fertile as the pro-war propaganda was
9
F. Malgeri, La guerra libica (1911–1912) (Roma, 1970); G. Candeloro, Storia
dell’Italia moderna (Milano, 1974, 19952), 312–29; W. Schieder, Fattori dell’imperialismo italiano prima del 1914–15, in L’Italia giolittiana. La storia e la critica (RomaBari, 1977), 236–52; F. Gaeta, La crisi di fine secolo e l’età giolittiana, in Storia d’Italia,
ed. G. Galasso (Torino, 1982), vol. 21, 345–423; L. Saiu, La politica estera italiana
dall’Unità a oggi (Roma – Bari, 1999), 61–7.
10
About the failure of pacifism and the wide-spread nature of interventionism in
1914 see G. Arfé, Storia del socialsimo italiano (1892–1926) (Torino, 1965), 186–200.
11
‘‘Corriere della Sera’’ begins publishing pro-war article on September 10th
1911.
12
See F. Malgeri, La guerra libica (1911–1912) (Roma, 1970), 37–54; see also A. Del
Boca, Gli italiani in Libia, 51–6.
13
G. Giolitti, Discorsi parlamentari (Roma, 1953), 1441.
14
G. Pascoli, discorso del 25 novembre 1911, now in Patria e umanità. Raccolta di
scritti e discorsi (Bologna, 1914), 235.
15
O. Bairé, Imperialismo e colonialismo, in Storia delle idee politiche, economiche e
sociali, ed. L. Firpo (Torino, 1972, 1992), vol. V, 700.
16
G. Mosca, Italia e Libia. Considerazioni politiche, Treves, Milano, 1912. G.
Salvemini, Come siamo andati in Libia e altri scritti dal 1900 al 1915, ed. A. Torre
(Milano, 1963), 90–5, 99–101, 102–14. Salvemini, L’Unità di Gaetano Salvemini, ed.
B. Finocchiaro (Venezia, 1958), 297–300. L. Einaudi e E. Giretti, A proposito della
Tripolitania. Ottimismo o pessimismo coloniale? ‘‘Riforma sociale’’, XXII, dicembre
1911, 740–64. Ghisleri published Tripolitania e Cirenaica. Dal Mediterraneo al Sahara
(Milano – Bergamo, 1912).
326
A. Castelli / History of European Ideas 36 (2010) 324–329
maintaining; and that, on the other hand, Italian military power
would be better used to attempt to stop the Austrian expansion in
the Balkans. From a moral point of view, however, it was Giretti
who insisted that regardless of any economic or political
advantage, war was to be avoided, simply because it would taint
the Italian people with violence.
The Italian Socialist Party, led by Filippo Turati, opposed the war
for similar reasons; because it felt that it both educated
proletarians about violence and wasted economic resources that
should have been used to improve the conditions of the poor in
Southern Italy.17 The Socialist leaders tried to stage a protest
against the war, so on September 27th they organized a general
anti-colonialist strike in order to prove that the proletarians were
effectively able to oppose the war. However, the strike turned out
to be a failure because, despite their official statements, the
Socialist leaders, unable to react properly to the new political
situation, didn’t really support it. Other socialists, however, didn’t
suffer from such inability to react and were ready to put forward
very different and far-reaching ideas. Leonida Bissolati and Ivanoe
Bonomi joined the general enthusiasm for the war and agreed with
Giolitti on the grounds that, besides class solidarity, there was also
race solidarity, which justified any colonial expansionism that
could increase Italian power and richness. Some Trade Union
leaders, for example Arturo Labriola, supported the aggression
because, in their opinion, the war could awaken a revolutionary
mood in the proletarians (if the proletarians learned to wage war,
they also learned to wage revolution).18 Finally, Benito Mussolini
and Alceste De Ambris were hostile to the war, and claimed to be
ready for the use of violence in order to stop it. Such a radical
choice, however, was not due to the conviction that the war was
morally and politically inopportune, but to the idea that the
proletarians should directly and violently oppose any politics of
the bourgeois government.19
Support for the war
As stated above, in 1911, Italian debate about the war
advocated various lines of reasoning. Moneta and other intellectuals took part in it by writing articles in ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’.
The main arguments they put forward to justify the war were not
very original at all; they insisted on the economic-political
advantages; on the opportunity to assure a destination for Italian
emigrants; and on the necessity of spreading (European) civilization. However, the effort made by Moneta and other pacifist
intellectuals to reconcile their support for the war with their
pacifist ideology, was most original indeed. Firstly, they repeated
the most common pro-war reasons circulating in the Italian
newspapers of the time: national interest and the spreading of
civilization. Secondly, they made it clear that war-free politics
would only be possible with an ideal international situation; that it
17
F. Turati, Le vie maestre del socialismo, ed. R. Mondolfo, G. Arfé (Napoli, 1966),
253. See La montatura tripolina, ‘‘l’Avanti!’’, September 13rd 1911.
18
Arturo Labriola, La prima impresa collettiva della nuova Italia, in Pro e contro la
guerra di Tripoli. Discussioni nel campo rivoluzionario (Napoli, 1912), 60–1. About
the ideas of Arturo Labriola see D. Settembrini, Storia dell’idea antiborghese in Italia,
1860–1989. Società del benessere – liberalismo – totalitarismo (Roma – Bari, 1991),
118–20.
19
See A. De Ambris, Contro il brigantaggio coloniale e per l’interesse del proletariato,
‘‘Pagine libere’’, 15 ottobre 1911; now in Pro e contro la guerra di Tripoli. Discussioni
nel campo rivoluzionario, 73–87. About Socialism and the war against Turkey see B.
Vigezzi, Giolitti, il Partito socialista, la Guerra di Libia nelle lettere di Filippo Turati e
Anna kuliscioff (1912) (Roma, 1973); M. Degl’Innocenti, Il socialismo italiano e la
guerra di Libia (Roma, 1976); F. Malgeri, La guerra libica (1911–1912), 216–36; A. Del
Boca, Gli italiani in Libia, 79–85; G. Oliva, Esercito, Paese e movimento operaio.
L’antimilitarismo dal 1861 all’età giolittina (Milano, 1986), 202–10. About the general
debate on Socialism inside of the Italian Socialist Party in this period, see G. Arfé,
Storia del socialsimo italiano (1892–1926), 149–62.
wasn’t consistent with the violent reality of the international
arena. Thirdly, they stated that the Italian occupation of Libya
would create a lasting and peaceful European settlement, in which
every (European) Nation would be satisfied with its own colonial
possessions. In so doing, they linked their arguments for the war to
a plea for a larger pacifist project.
Let us now consider in detail the arguments put forward by the
Italian pacifists in legitimizing the war. In an article published in
‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’ on September 20th,20 the journalist
Berardo Montani (a close contributor to the review) wondered if
the Italian military aggression should have been regarded as an
«act of robbery». He answered: «of course today, every Mediterranean nation has a characteristic expansionist movement, which
nobody can get away from; of course the balance of power in the
Mediterranean sea has been heavily upset with damage to us; and
of course there is nothing left for us on the opposite side of what
was once mare nostrum (. . .) but a strip of land (. . .). Of course, due
to our ever growing population, we need a land for our emigrants,
near to our fatherland».21
In another article, Moneta described the war against Turkey as a
continuation of the war for Italian national unity (Risorgimento).22
In his opinion, Turkish policies against Italy in 1911 had triggered off
Austrian hostility towards Italian unity. Moreover, conquering Libya
would have got rid of the possibility of another European power
taking possession of it, thus avoiding real damage for Italy. But it was
not just a matter of reason of State or of national interest: the Italian
conquest of Libya would have established a real balance of power
among the European States, which was the necessary condition for
any lasting peace on the continent. Therefore, supporting the war
was considered to be consistent with patriotic Pacifism.
Of course the patriotic Pacifism of Moneta and his friends was
not a moral one. As Montani put it: «We are humanitarians and
patriots, humanitarians because as patriots; we are not willing to
see the triumph of our ideals upon the sacrifice of the most vital
interests of our country. We are not Tolstoyan!».23 To be patriotic
and not moral pacifists, in Moneta’s and Montani’s view, didn’t
mean pursuing the dream of a fully peaceful world to be
established ‘‘tomorrow’’. It meant, instead, that the ideal of peace
had to be carried out, as much as allowed, by the concrete historical
situation and as long as it didn’t jeopardize the interests of the
fatherland. The war against the Turkish Empire, therefore, found its
place in the lasting gap between the ideal for peace and the violent
reality of international politics. This point was very clearly
expressed by Dante Diotallevi, another contributor to ‘‘La Vita
Internazionale’’: «If Italy were a member of the ideal State we
aspire to», its aggression should be regarded as «ignoble», but
«because it lives in a violent and thieving age, it is not fair to expect
Italy alone to look on at the huge raptores mundi [plunderers of the
world] of London and Paris». Diotallevi explained that: «as long as
guns are speaking», pacifists had first and foremost to be «good
Italians»; their duty was not to fight against their country, but to
avoid useless violence and to obtain «an honorable solution» to the
war, as soon as possible.24 One should note that Diotallevi didn’t
wish for either a ‘‘lasting’’ and/or a ‘‘just’’ solution to the war, but
for an ‘‘honorable’’ one (for Italy).
20
B. Montani, L’impresa di Tripoli, ‘‘La Vita internazionale’’, XIV, n. 18, September
20th 1911, 465–6.
21
See also B. Montani, La necessità dell’impresa, ‘‘La Vita internazionale’’, XIV, n. 19,
October 5th 1911, 497–9.
22
E.T. Moneta, A guerra incominciata, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XIV, n. 19, October
5th 1911, 491–2.
23
B. Montani, La necessità dell’impresa, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XIV, n. 19, October
5th 1911, 499.
24
D. Diotallevi, Mentre parla il cannone, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XIV, n. 19,
October 5th 1911, 506–8. See also E. Moneta, L’infatuazione imperialista, ‘‘La Vita
internazionale’’, XIV, n. 20, October 20th 1911, 519–21.
A. Castelli / History of European Ideas 36 (2010) 324–329
Another rhetorical strategy put forward by ‘‘La Vita Inernazionale’’ to justify the war played on the ‘‘burden of the white man’’,
that is; on the soundness of spreading civilization where barbarism
then ruled. This idea seemed to be particularly appreciated by the
academic intellectuals who contributed to the review. The
prominent professor of Italian literature Angelo De Gubernatis,
for example, stated that the right of the Italians to invade Libya
derived from the oppressive and barbaric way in which the Turkish
leaders used to run the region.25 Another scholar, Giovanni Vidari,
wrote that Italian aggression was legitimized because it aimed to
substitute «an incapable and uncivil administration with a more
industrious and just one».26 Violence and suffering brought about
by war were, in Vidari’s opinion, just a «painful empirical
expedient», necessary to letting civilization triumph on the
southern Mediterranean shores. Therefore, he concluded that
there was no inconsistency between supporting the war and being
a pacifist: any «modern man» would have liked to see the spreading
of «Justice and of the free spiritual expansion».
Rejecting critiques from abroad
The war, whilst easy at first for the winning Italian army,
revealed its real drawbacks soon afterwards.27 On October 23rd,
Tripoli was attacked by Arab rebels and Turkish soldiers. The
Italians managed to drive the enemy back, but almost four
hundred Italian soldiers died during the battle. A massive and
bloody repression against the rebels and the civilians followed
this episode. Due to this situation, describing the war in terms of
high ideals of civilization became more and more difficult for ‘‘La
Vita Inernazionale’’. However, Moneta and other contributors
tried to defend their point saying that the bloody course taken by
the war, was due to the evil character of the Arab population and of
the Turkish (who were now identified for the first time in the
review by one word: Muslims). ‘‘La Vita internazionale’’ dedicated
a number of pages to both the demonization of the fanatic
‘‘Muslims’’ and to the exaltation of the heroism and good will of
the Italian soldiers.28 The aims of Italy were still described at home
as «noble and willing to civilize» a people «once glorious and now
declined». The rebellion and violence that followed were not due
to the Italians, but to «Turkish intrigue» and Arab «fanatical
religion».29
The point that Moneta (and his friends) made in defending the
war provoked critiques and accusations from abroad and ruined his
reputation among other European pacifist leaders. In Romain
Rainero’s opinion, Moneta’s mere support for the war was
considered overseas as evidence of his corruption and a sign that
he had come to a very questionable agreement with the Italian
government.30 Some foreign publications, however, didn’t even rely
on any inference of corruption regarding Moneta; for instance the
pacifist Alfred H. Fried, who in 1892 founded the Deutsche
Friedengesellschaft, in his review ‘‘Friedens – Warte’’ simply accused
his Italian colleagues of being inconsistent with any pacifist doctrine.
Moreover, the Belgian pacifist and member of Parliament Henri
La Fontaine, wrote that ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’ had betrayed
25
A. De Gubernatis, L’Italia, Tripoli e la Pace, ‘‘La vita internazionale’’, XIV, n. 19,
October 5th 1911, 500–1.
26
G. Vidari, L’azione italiana in Tripolitania e la pace, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XIV,
n. 20, October 20th 1911, 530.
27
About the massive use of violence by the Italian army in Libya see E. Salerno,
Genocidio in Libia. Le atrocità nascoste dell’avventura coloniale italiana (1911–1931)
(Roma, 2005).
28
See for example B. Montani, I nostri morti, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XIV, n. 21,
November 5th 1911, 547–8.
29
Author unknown, Occorre non deviare, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XIV, n. 21,
November 5th 1911, 548.
30
R. Rainero, Paolo Valera e l’opposizione democratica all’impresa di Tripoli,
‘‘Quaderni dell’Istituto italiano di cultura di Tripoli’’, n. 3, 1983, 26.
327
its pacifist ideals.31 Moneta rejected this critique writing that
Pacifism couldn’t be blind and absolute; instead it had to be
conditioned by «contact with reality» and the value of Patriotism.
Reality and Patriotism led Moneta to believe that it was not the
moment to criticize, but to support the soldiers, who defended the
interests and honour of Italy.32 The same opinion was expressed by
Diotallevi much more directly: «When guns are talking and the
world looks at us, and sly enemies make an ambush, while overt
enemies tear apart our young men’s flesh (also assassinating injured
soldiers as Turkish and Arabs are used to doing in Tripoli), then (. . .)
everyone repeats: ‘‘Right or wrong, my country!’’».33
The reasons for change
How could it come to be that pacifist intellectuals like Moneta
and his friends could say ‘‘Right or wrong, my country’’ to justify a
war? Why did they abandon the aim of peace and accept the rhetoric
of warmongering? Is there an «unbridgeable abyss» – as somebody
wrote34 – between Pacifism and Moneta’s support for the war, or can
his change of position be explained on the grounds of ideological
change? Former studies just accepted the arguments Moneta put
forward to explain his choice; Patriotism was the limit of Pacifism;
nothing was more important than the interest of our (free and
democratic) fatherland; there was no peace unless every European
nation had its own independent and strong State.35 This explanation
is certainly enough to understand why Moneta supported the war;
but it is not able to explain why he did it so radically. In other words,
the problem is not understanding why Moneta wanted to invade
Libya, which is clear by this time, but understanding why he did so,
so decidedly and radically. Put in these terms, the question cannot be
answered by simply studying Moneta’s doctrine, instead, we need to
consider the historical, political and cultural reasons that convinced
Moneta to advocate warmongering so drastically in 1911.
The point stated here is that there is not a particular event that
acted as a turning point, convincing Moneta and his friends to
become ardent war supporters; instead this choice came about as
the result of various political influences and cultural presuppositions. More precisely, the Italian pacifists’ change of position was
made possible by three factors: a stark realization of the limits of
pacifism in international politics; the consistency between colonialism and some significant ideas of the Italian democratic and
republican tradition; and the new culture, or mentality, that had
been successfully spreading across Europe during the last part of the
19th century. In the Italian patriotic pacifists’ minds, these factors
justified their radical pro-war choice, reducing the importance of the
value of peace compared to the value of patriotic feelings. As a result,
Moneta’s and his friends’ pacifist doctrine was transformed into a
‘‘right or wrong my country’’ doctrine.
Let us now consider these factors in detail. To begin with, in
1908, something happened that deeply influenced Moneta and the
Italian pacifists. The Austrian government annexed Bosnia, and
went on the verge of a war against Russia. The annexation was
unexpected and even Italy, which was an ally of Austria, was taken
by surprise. Moreover, the expansion of Austria in the Balkans
showed its hedonistic will on Southern Europe, threatening Italian
31
The letters by La Fontaine are published in ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XIV, n. 20,
October 20th 1911, 523–6.
32
E.T. Moneta, E.T. Moneta risponde ad H. La Fontaine, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XIV,
n. 21, November 5th 1911, 559–62.
33
D. Diotallevi, I pacifisti Italiani e la turcofilia, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XIV, n. 21,
November 5th 1911, 564–6. The words Right or wrong, my country are in English in
the original article. About the Italian bebate during the war against Turkish Empire
see S.E. Cooper, Patriotic pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815–1914, Oxford
University Press, New York – Oxford 1991, 173–80.
34
R. Rainero, Paolo Valera., 23.
35
See C. Ragaini, Giù le armi!, 94. See also L. D’Angelo, Pace, liberismo e democrazia,
125–8.
328
A. Castelli / History of European Ideas 36 (2010) 324–329
interests in the region.36 In this situation, the Italian pacifists tried
to convince their Austrian colleagues to oppose the annexation, in
the name of peace and on the principle of the self-determination of
ethnic minorities. The Austrian pacifists gave the cold shoulder to
the Italians and supported their government. The prominent writer
and 1905 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Bertha von Suttner, avoided
discussing the matter and Alfred Fried refused the Italian proposal
because, he said, the annexation didn’t violate any former treatise
and didn’t mean any loss of freedom for the people of Bosnia.37
The reaction of von Suttner and Fried deeply humiliated Moneta
and the Italian pacifists. They experienced how large the gap was
between the ideal of peace and the reality of the ‘‘Reason of state’’.
They learned that ‘‘sacred egoism’’ compelled the citizens of any
state to support their own government when national interests
were at stake. In other words, the refusal of the Austrians to oppose
their government in the name of peace and self-determination of
peoples, demonstrated to Moneta and his friends, that the principle
‘‘right or wrong my country’’, remained the only sound judgment
in international politics. When Italy invaded Libya in 1911, they
put into practice the lesson they had learned only too well in 1908.
A second factor intervened in convincing Moneta and other
Italian pacifists of the soundness of the war. The project for
invading Libya didn’t arise in 1911. It had been circulating among
Italian democratic and republican intellectuals since the 1870s.38
For example, the prominent jurist and democratic statesman
Attilio Brunialti and the socialist and refined scholar Antonio
Labriola stood for this project. But before them, Giuseppe Mazzini,
the father of Italian republicanism and democratic thought, who
greatly influenced Moneta’s pacifism, advocated the same idea, as
has already been mentioned. Mazzini is well known both because
of his political commitment to freedom and justice and because of
his Nationalism deeply bound to the ideal of brotherhood among
nations.39 Nevertheless, in terms of colonialism, he considered the
Italian expansion into North Africa to be sound and even ‘‘natural’’.
In an article published in the journal ‘‘La Roma del popolo’’ in 1871,
he explained that expansionist politics were to be supported
because the occupation of wild and barbarian territories would
help the progress of civilization. He wrote about the «inevitable
movement that called on Europe to civilize African regions»; and
about the «real belonging» of North Africa to the «European
system». Italy, in his opinion, had the right to possess Tunis and
Tripoli because they were close to Sicily and because «the Roman
flag had once waved there, (. . .), and the Mediterranean sea had
been called Mare nostrum (our sea)».40
36
See L. Saiu, La politica estera italiana dall’Unità a oggi, 56–9.
See A. Fried, La voce d’uno dei capi del pacifismo austriaco, ‘‘La Vita
internazionale’’, XI, n. 20, October 20th 1908, 465–6; G. Tomé, Che cosa resta da
fare alla nazione italiana dopo l’annessione dell’Austria della Bosnia-Herzogivina, ‘‘La
Vita Internazionale’’, XI, n. 22, November 20th 1908, 507–9. See the published
letters by Moneta, Giretti, von Suttner and Fried, I pacifisti austriaci e i rapporti con
l’Italia, ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, XI, n. 21, November 5th 1908, 485–7. See S.E.
Cooper, Patriotic pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815–1914 (New York –
Oxford, 1991), 168–72. See also A.H. Fried, Bertha von Suttner (Charlottenburg,
without date), 28; and von Suttner’s autobiobraphy, Memorien von Bertha von
Suttner (Stuttgart und Leipzig, 1909).
38
See A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia, 3–10.
39
See, for example, about this idea of nation G. Mazzini, Scritti politici, ed. T.
Grandi, A. Comba (Torino, 1972), 885.
40
G. Mazzini, Politica internazionale, ‘‘La Roma del Popolo’’, 1871; now in G.
Mazzini, Politica internazionale (Roma, 1885), 22. About Mazzini’s ideas about
exansionism in Africa, see D. Settembrini, Storia dell’idea antiborghese in Italia, 1860–
1989 (Roma – Bari, 1991), 57–69; for a different understanding, see F. Chabod, Storia
delle politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896 (Bari, 1951). About Mazzini’s last
reflections about nation, republic and Europe see G. Angelini, L’ultimo Mazzini. Un
pensiero per l’azione (Milano, 2008). See also for example A. Brunialti, L’Italia e la
questione coloniale (Milano, 1885), 342. A. Labriola, Tripoli, il socialismo e l’espansione
coloniale. Giudizi di un socialista, interview with A. Torre, ‘‘Giornale d’Italia’’, April
13rd 1902; now titled Sulla questione coloniale, in A. Labriola, Scritti filosofici e politici
(Torino, 1973), 957–64.
37
Before 1911, Mazzinian ideals of brotherhood among nations
had surely permeated Moneta’s thoughts but, as the war was
waged, it was again Mazzini’s thought that provided Moneta with
good reasons for justifying the aggression against Libya. As a
matter of fact, there is evident consistency between the argument
put forward by Mazzini decades earlier, and those advanced by
Moneta and his friends in 1911. This, of course, doesn’t mean that
Moneta supported his government’s foreign policies in 1911
because of the ideas of Mazzini (or Brunialti and Labriola). That
consistency means, instead, that the presence of a large consent
regarding the African expansionist project in Italian high progressive thought, made it easier for democratic and pacifist intellectuals, as Moneta and his friends were, to support a war formally
justified by the need for exporting civilization and pursuing the
supreme interests of their country.
The third factor that Moneta’s choice was grounded on was the
permeation by European intellectuals of new ideas, very different
from positivism and from the political culture of Risorgimento that
Moneta’s pacifist doctrine was based on. The new ideas had much
in common with irrationality and anti-individualism; they
strongly opposed democracy, faith in human progress, universal
brotherhood and, above all, Pacifism.41 The nation was perceived
as an organic community with a value considered to be superior to
that of any other political or social ideal. This new mentality
understood human history as being a competition for supremacy
among human races. The white race, which was obviously superior
compared to the others, deserved to dominate the world.42
Conflicts naturally arose among races: there was little possibility
for dialogue or agreement. The domination of the whites over the
others, however, was not just violent, and it was claimed that it
would have turned out to be good for the dominated people too,
because it would have let them move towards civilization.
Of course, it would be exaggerated to affirm that Moneta and his
friends just accepted the new mentality and approved of the war
because they had become anti-democratic, deeply warmongerlike
and racist. It must be stated, however, that the new ideas somehow
permeated the contributors of ‘‘La Vita internazionale’’. In the
review, for example, it was taken for granted that all Europeans
shared the same race; and that people of other races were inferior
compared to them (above all the Blacks and the Jews). A racetheorist, the prominent Italian anthropologist Giuseppe Sergi,
regularly contributed to ‘‘La Vita Internazionale’’, explaining that
studies about race had the same scientific dignity of – say –
anthropology and biology.43 Accepting race theory presupposed an
anti-individualist outlook: the world was composed not of
individuals but of collective subjects (races), whose characteristics
were determined by nature, and who placed themselves in a
hierarchy (with the Whites at the top). Moreover, race theory
presupposed a paternalistic mentality: the White Europeans had
the burden of educating the naturally inferior barbarians, as much
as possible. Of course, it may be that the barbarians would violently
refuse to be educated and civilized. Should this happen, the Whites
would be allowed to react with force by both oppressing and
repressing them.
In the end, it seems that the choice made by Moneta and ‘‘La
Vita Internazionale’’ to radically support the war was due to a
number of reasons. First, as Moneta said, that choice was
consistent with his patriotic Pacifism: a doctrine that subordinated
41
See N. Bobbio, Profilo ideologico del Novecento (Milano, 1990), 47.
See P. Costa, Civitas. Storia della cittadinanza in Europa. La civiltà liberale (RomaBari, 2001), vol. III, 411. See also D. Settembrini, Storia dell’idea antiborghese in Italia,
79–131.
43
See for example G. Sergi, Il Congresso universale delle razze a Londra, e la pace, ‘‘La
Vita Internazionale’’, XIV, n. 17, September 5th 1911, 435–6. On racist mentality in
Italy see R. Rainero, L’anticolonialismo italiano da Assab ad Adua (Milano, 1971), 159–
200; P. Costa, Civitas, 419–30.
42
A. Castelli / History of European Ideas 36 (2010) 324–329
the value of Pacifism to the value of Patriotism. The second reason
was that Moneta and his friends experienced a hard lesson in
political realism on the International arena, when they saw their
Austrian colleagues preferring national interest over pacifist
solidarity with the Italians. Thirdly, supporting the war was made
easier for Moneta because good arguments for an expansion in
Africa were available in Italian democratic and progressive
329
tradition. Lastly, new ideas brought about a new concept of
relations among peoples, contributing to the crisis of democratic
and pacifist ideologies. Although Moneta and his friends carried on
professing to be bound to Pacifism and to the democratic doctrine
coming from the ideals of Risorgimento and Positivism, the new
culture infiltrated their doctrine and indeed, ultimately, supplanted their pacifist ideals.
ID
1159035
Title
BetweenPatriotismandPacifism.ErnestoTeodoroMonetaandtheItalianconquestofLibya
http://fulltext.study/journal/1373
http://FullText.Study
Pages
6