Grillo and Berlusconi: web vs tv?

Maria Elisabetta Lanzone
PhD Candidate, University of Pavia
[email protected]
Grillo and Berlusconi: web vs tv?
Forza italia and MoVimento 5 Stelle. Two examples of “mediatic populism” in comparison
1. Introduction
The first part of this work was presented during the Annual Sisp Conference, which was held last
September in Rome. This was the first attempt to place the movement started by Beppe Grillo, the
so called Movimento 5 Stelle (abbreviated as M5S), within conceptual schemes which highlight the
common characteristics of the most important populist phenomena of the post-war era, especially in
Italy.
The thesis begins by analysing the structure of this new political movement and in particular the
means of communication and participation it uses, relying almost entirely on the internet and
especially the Web 2.0 technology. Therefore M5S was included among those populist phenomena
that employ new forms of political participation (web populism). Three tools are used for the
following analysis: first of all a theoretical background that follows Yves Mény and Yves Surel’s
analysis (Mény-Surel 2000: 35-38) it does not consider populism as “a democracy’s enemy” but a
symptom of the democratic unease that emerges under specific circumstances, such as the
progressive weakening of the traditional media systems (the political parties), the growth of power’s
personalisation and the development of media’s influence. As a result, populism is considered as
“an appeal to the people referring to ‘the simple man’s pathos” (Canovan 1981: 7). Secondly, M5S’s
programmes and development phases between the end of 2008 and the end of 2012 that contributed
to its success are analysed. In this context M5S’s structure and the relationships between leadership
and membership are taken into consideration. Finally, the movement’s internet activity was
monitored for six months from two different points of view: on a qualitative level, posts and
comments on its Facebook group page and its blog (www.beppegrillo.it) which shows populist
characteristics both from leaders and followers, and on a quantitative level, the popularity of Beppe
Grillo’s posts are analysed counting the number of “likes”, comments, shared posts and data from
1
other
national
political
leader’s
pages
that
use
social
networks.
From the analysis it emerged that most populist messages come from the leaders, whereas members
show a more fragmented and undefined use of populist messages (this is why a survey to find out
who the “Grillini” are will start); Beppe Grillo is very popular and remains at the top of the chart of
leaders that use the internet as their favourite means of communication; M5S’s future remains
uncertain
as
far
as
national
elections
are
concerned.
That being stated, the following analysis aims to provide a further contribution to a new political
subject that can be compared to other political phenomena which characterised Italy between its
First and Second Republic. More specifically, this thesis aims to compare Beppe Grillo’s M5S to
Forza Italia, the party founded by Berlusconi in 1994. Nevertheless, it will not be a simple
comparison between Grillo and Berlusconi: assuming that Beppe Grillo is only “a continuation of
Berlusconi’s work using different media” (Santoro, 2012: 107) would be a simplification that might
lead to schematism. As a matter of fact, the following analysis aims to go beyond this comparison
and to place the two political subjects in the picture of populism and in particular in its mediatic
form, where means of communication are the main mobilization tool, often turned into a political
show. Subsequently, the structure of what is defined as “TV party” (Forza Italia) will be compared
to the first “web party” (M5S). In this context, the two leading figures who brought the two parties
to
life
will
be
analyzed
in
their
relationship
leadership/membership.
Finally, the two subjects will be placed in their context of political and social development, showing
more analogies and differences in their rise: here it emerges how Berlusconi’s gradual decline could
correspond to Grillo’s rise. The final part of this thesis will provide a web survey started in
November 2012 about different components of M5S in order to clarify specific aspects regarding
leaders and members. In the analysis, qualitative and quantitative data about M5S will be compared
with Forza Italia’s data from 1994 and the current decline of Pdl (People of Freedom, a centre-right
political party). The first element to be analysed is the survey that Epokè 1 ran six months before
the elections in Parma, which saw the first M5S mayor as a winner in a provincial city. Data about
trust in the parties and their leaders, the voting location and the use of new media will be presented.
In particular, these are the questions this analysis will try to answer:
 Which features should a political party/movement have in order to be considered an
example of mediatic populism?
 Does the leader build the followers?
1 About Epokè-Ricerche Sociali Applicate see www.epokericerche.it
2
 Is it necessary to analyse the political subjects’ structures in order to understand the
relationship between leader and followers?
 What are the consequences of the foundation of a TV party and a web party?
 Can M5S be included in the web populism and post-modern politics context to which
Berlusconi’s decline belongs? Can the latter be considered as a symbol of the Second
Republic (after Tangentopoli) and Grillo as an icon for the birth of the Third Republic?
2. About “mediatic populism”
Referring to the term “populism” means approaching a controversial field of political science that
for a long time was neither defined nor classified. This analysis attempts to create a common
nucleus that defines the most important characteristics of populism following Yves Mény and Yves
Surel’s work, who integrate it fully in the democratic system. Considering populism not as an
ideology but more as an “ideological scheme” or a “conversational register”, one finds that at its
core there is the conviction that “the people are, politically, a sovereign entity that deserves the
monopoly of legitimacy that the leading classes betrayed, therefore it is the people’s duty to directly
restore their own supremacy” (Mény-Surel 2000: 18). For the purpose of this analysis the
innovative element introduced by Margaret Canovan is worth mentioning: she acknowledges in
populism a “common man pathos, an appreciation for public virtues of simple citizens in contrast
with their governors’ vice” (Canovan 1981: 9). This view is supported by Hans Georg Bets, who
defines populism as “an appeal to the ordinary man and his common sense, which is considered
superior” (Mény-Surel 2000: 19). These definitions will occur very often in the following analysis.
Furthermore, Mény and Surel add three conditions to these definitions that historically might have
promoted
populism’s
development.
As previously mentioned these conditions are:
•
the progressive weakening of traditional mediation apparatuses, in particular of political
parties , around which the representative democracy was structured
•
the continuous growth of power’s personalisation (predominance of personal parties)
•
the development of media’s influence (see Sartori 1999: “videopolitics”)
This is the starting point for the following analysis: both political subjects that will be taken into
consideration (Forza Italia and M5S) appear to have the three conditions that Mény and Surel
3
identified. As it will be explained later, they both fit in the periods of major crisis for political
parties, playing on the growing personalisation of power (on speaks about two political parties
starting with two very personal leader, Silvio Berlusconi e Beppe Grillo). Finally, on both parties –
and
on
both
leaders
–
it's
important
the
media
influence
(but
different
media).
The crisis of the traditional mediation systems (the parties) is the context to which the development
of the two political subjects and their growing election success belong, whereas the personalisation
of power represents the construction of the two political subjects and their structure, which will be
analysed in terms of the relationship between leadership and membership. Finally, the influence
from the media represents a double tool for political communication and participation that generates
the
so
called
“mediatic
populism”.
First of all it will be necessary to concentrate on the political life’s media world: again according to
Mény and Surel it redifines the relationship between power and people (leader – followers and
leadership – membership). With the rise of mass media a progressive redefinition of traditional
means of mediation between citizens and political world takes place: parties and square gatherings
are replaced by television, newspapers and finally Web 2.0, blogs and social networks. Media take
the parties’ place in terms of selection mechanisms of the political class and as mobilization of the
public opinion or definition of the political programme. At first television becomes a public ground
for comparison often based on turning politics into a show with strong messages that can affect the
viewer/voter easily, quickly and effectively. This is exactly what Sartori defined as “videopolitics”
(Sartori
1999)
and
Pier
André
Taguieff
as
“tele-populism”
(Taguieff
2001).
The growth of media’s influence went at the same pace of parties’ decline, such as militant
organisations (élite or mass ones) which were able to gather people’s opinions and interests
(Pasquino 2010: 169)2. Furthermore, the increasing use of new communication techniques made it
possible to address messages to citizens that could be adapted by the media on the left and right
wing like a commercial product. In addition, according to Sartori “videopolitics” caused voters to
identify themselves more and more with a leader, a face, a persona and as a result they would vote
for a person and not always for a party. They would vote for a man that uses clever slogans that
mobilize masses rather than political programmes. This is what happened to all the new political
subjects that became popular at the beginning of the Second Republic: their development, their
success and often their declined was bound to one only political figure, whether leader or founder,
around which the party or movement was built. The most relevant examples are Umberto Bossi’s
2 Parties’ decline was underlined between 80s and 90s in almost all Europe, in particular in Italy. About this, also see
survey and new record (2011-2012).
4
Lega Nord, Antonio di Pietro’s Italia dei Valori, Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and more recently
Nichi
Vendola’s
Sinistra
Ecologia
e
Libertà
and
Beppe
Grillo’s
M5S.
These are some of the examples that Marco Tarchi lebeled as populist (Tarchi 2003: 7-11). This
analysis will, however, focus on Forza Italia and M5S. The former, upon the “Tangentopoli” scandal
and the “Mani Pulite” investigation, represents the “television party” par excellance founded by
businessman from Milan Silvio Berlusconi, whose intent was to “interpret the dreams of the Italian
people” in 1994; the latter was founded as a “non party” 3 by the comedian from Genoa Beppe
Grillo, who made internet his main political communication and mobilization tool once he
disappeared
from
the
TV
screens.
More specifically, the question this analysis will attempt to answer is the following: what kind of
structure should a political party have in order to align with the populist strategy (or ideology?) in a
context of politics turned into a mediatic show? In order to answer this question it is important first
of all to distinguish the populist leadership (Berlusconi and Grillo) from the leadership of populist
movements (Forza Italia and M5S) meant as membership (voters and political class). By doing this
there will also be an attempt to find differences between the two media used by the parties: TV for
Forza Italia and web for M5S. As a matter of fact, in both cases one can define it as the construction
of politics through media, using different tools that can have partially different structures but, more
importantly,
different
consequences
in
terms
of
constituency.
This thesis will proceed with a brief analysis on the two leading founders and their origins, pointing
out the context in which their political subjects developed. Subsequently a distinction of the
structure of the two subjects will be looked into on three levels: leadership (charisma,
spokesperson), membership (political class) and simple followers (supporters, voters and militants).
From this it will be possible to see how the different use of media can cause differences in the
relation
of
these
three
levels
despite
analogies
in
the
structure.
Finally this analysis will focus on M5S, which will be looked into in the decline phase of the
Berlusconi era. Data about the success of the new political subject will be presented in relation to
the decline of the current Pdl (amongst others), considering also M5S’s future in the context of the
next national elections.
3 “non party” is a definition of the same M5S. See “non association” at
http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Regolamento-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdf
5
3. The man of TV and the man from TV
Forza Italia was organized during the summer of 1993, when Silvio Berlusconi left his role of
successful entrepreneur to give voice to the “need for a new class.” On June 29, with the signatures
of Berlusconi, Marcello Dell’Utri, Cesare Previti, Antonio Martino and Mario Valducci, Forza Italia
was born, in Milan, as an organization for “good governance”. On December 10, in Brigherio, the
first club was funded, and its first grass-roots Weapon, the anthem, was made public. But the Forza
Italia Political Movement will only appear the following year, on 18 January 1994. On January 26,
through a 9 minute message broadcast by his own tv-channels and even by Rai television news,
Berlusconi announced his “descent in the political arena” nefore the national elections.
His
message contains a new “recipe” for the Italian people: dissatisfaction with the old political elite,
the “self-made man” myth, an appeal to the Catholic world, the anti-communist rhetoric, trust in
free
enterprise
and,
most
of
all,
the
promise
of
a
“new
Italian
miracle”:
“I enter the ield with a new movement and I ask of you to do the same, now. The political
movement I introduce to you is called Forza Italia. It’s a free organization of voters of a completely
new kind: it’s not just another party, another faction whose aim is only to divide, but on the contrary
a force whose goal is to unite, to give Italy, at last, a government who can understand the most
deeply felt needs of the common people. A political force made of brand new men. A program with
only sensible and understandable projects. What we want is to renew Italian society and make space
for those who are willing to build their own future, both in the North and in the South. We want to
promote environmental politics and say no to crime and corruption. It’s a turning point: I’m an
entrepreneur, a citizen who took to the field for the sake of Italy. It’s possible to defeat the politics
of endless chatter and no-good politicians. Together we can make a fairer Italy (Silvio Berlusconi) 4.
On 28 March 1994 Forza Italia wins the election, and the era of Berlusconismo begins: a series of
changes in power that lasted until 2011: almost twenty years mared by the ascent, the success and
the decline of th “tv party” led by its own funder Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi can be considered
the man of the tv, one who used television as a medium for political propaganda, and as a means of
social influence: the messages conveyed during the berlusconismo golden age belong to two
different kinds, both of a populist character, having the ability “make dream” that Guy Hermet has
pointed out. According to Hermet “populism consists of different strategies for mass-manipulation.
An appeal to the people, which can be defined as charismatic patronage, operating instantly and
aiming at ‘making dream’ (which is often the same as ‘making believe’). Furthermore, the speech of
the modern demagogue (populist or neo-populist) prefers representation with a highly imaginative4 Berlusconi’s speech is taken from the videohttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8-uIYqnk5A .
6
emotional content” (Hermet 2003: 103). In Berlusconi’s case, the first kind of messages are, strictly
speaking, of a “political” kind and are tied to the propaganda for Forza Italia and, later, for the
Popolo della Libertà. The second type is non-political messages, which are none the less able to
influence and gain votes, still through tv. 5 As Giovanni Cominetti reminds us: “Berlusconi’s
television has been decisive not only for the mighty propaganda coverage during electoral
campaigns, but even more for the cultural hegemony it has express in all these years […] The
Fininvest network, a sort of modern grass-roots organic intellectual, has built common sense and
been
hegemonic
for
more
than
10
years”
(Fiori
2004:
28).
As an example of “media populism”, berlusconismo can be compared to a recent phenomenon in
Italian politics: that which started when the Genoese comedian Beppe Grillo “took to the field” with
his MoVimento 5 Stelle. Apparently, Grillo’s interest for politics developed on the web, when in
2005the ex-comedian (banned from tv) created a blog which in few months became one of the
most read in the world. Then together with the first activists, he developed the project of the
meetups, a digital platform aimed at creating a net on citizens, to help dialogue and experiencesharing. Two years later, in 2007, came the first V-Day, to support the “Clean Parliament” initiative,
and in 2008 the second V-Day for freedom o the press. A movement born on the web but that soon
took to the streets, with groups of people joining to create the civil list “Beppe Grillo’s Friends”,
supported by the comedian, which run for local elections and conquered some seats, for example in
Rome.
In 2009, then, the Movimento 5 Stelle was born (the 5 stars stand for the five themes at the core of
the movement’s ideology: public water supply, transport, development, connectivity, environment).
In 2010 the Woodstock event was organized in Cesena, showing how strong the new-born
movement was. The birth of the movement was announced by Grillo himself on his blog (Political
press release n. 25): “4 October 2009 will see the creation of the new “Movimento Nazionale a
Cinque Stelle” (National Five Stars Movement). It will come into life on the Internet. Every Italian
citizen with a clean record and not signed up to a political party will be able to join. Two years have
gone by since September 2007, since the first V-day in Bologna and a little over a year since the
second V-day in Turin. In those days, millions of people informed via the Internet asked for two
things: a Parliament that is an expression of the citizens without convicts and with the possibility of
choosing a candidate and the freedom of information. These informed people were derided by the
parties, by the TV stations and by the newspapers”6. Since that moment until today the M5S has
kept growing – as shown by polls and by the results in the regional and local elections –
5 See Novelli (Comunicazione Politica a. V, n. 1 pp.143-154).
7
conquering, last May, four municipalities: Parma (Federico Pizzarotti), Comacchio (Marco Fabbri),
Mira (Alvise Maniero) e Sarego (Roberto Castiglion).
The map of Italy below shows how five-star mayors are located in Northern Italy and especially in
Veneto and Emilia Romagna.
Then, in October 2012, there was the extraordinary result in Sicily regional elections: “The
Spokesman candidate for President Giancarlo Cancelleri has gained the confidence of 368.006
people, which make up for 18,2% of voters. Together with all other Spokespersons Candidates in
the region, M5S has become the first political force with 15% of consent among Sicilian voters.
Thanks to your engagement 15 citizens without previous convictions have made their way into the
Sicilian Regional Assembly. Thaks to all citizens who have supported us.” 7 (from Facebook 22
October 2012). As a matter of fact, in Sicily, the 5 star list has elected 15 coucillors in the regional
Assembly and the Movement was confirmed as the first political force in the region. A success
confirmed by polls in the following weeks, with the M5S as the second party on a national scale,
behind
the
PD,
with
a
18%
of
consent. 8
But where does the movement funder, Beppe Grillo, come from? In middle-class Genoa, in the 50s,
Grillo – after leaving school and the family business – made his way in the show business, making
6 Beppe Grillo’s Political Press Realese n. 25. Blog Archives www.beppegrillo.it .
7 Post on Facebook 26 October 2012, “Candidato Portavoce” MoVimento 5 Stelle Sicilia.
8 For the survey results, see www.epokericerche.it .
8
his debut on tv in 1976, after meeting the Sicilian tv host Pippo Baudo. In 1979 he participated in
the first season of Fantastico, the new Saturday night tv-show. The true turning point in Grillo’s
carrer came when he met Antonio Ricci, the man behind Canale 5 satirical news programme Striscia
la
notizia.
In 1983 Grillo, back in Rai, “discoverd” political satire, in the same time as Democrazia Cristiana
reached a low of 35%. In the same years Grillo shot some commercials for Yomo yoghurt. In 1990
he made his debut in theatres with a show that – according to an Abacus survey – got him chosen as
Italy’s “most popular” comedian – although he had not been on tv for a couple. of years. In 1990 he
then brought his Beppe Grillo Show on tv, a programme followed by 15 million Italians: “A crossparty audience confused after Tangentopoli, and post-ideological. Those who decreed its success
were the same that a few months later elected Silvio Berlusconi as Prime Minister.” (Santoro 2012:
22).
Understanding where Beppe Grillo comes from is then necessary to understand, on the one hand,
his ties to italian popo culture and, on the other hand, the laguage of televisione devolpped during
Berlusconi’s ascent, the success of his tv-channels and of the people who stood for it, as Antonio
Ricci.
The tie betwee Grillo and tv has been decisive for his step form satire to politics. His path led him
away from television (whose language and functioning he nonetheless learnt from) and brought him
to
the
web
as
a
new
instrument
for
communication
and
political
agitation.
So, as Berlusconi was preparing Forza Italia and his descent into the politicl arena, Beppe Grillo
was shouting in theatres (and n TV) about the political crisi, scandals and corruption.
There’s a common thread between berlusconismo and Grillo, 9 which is manifest in their political
language, as Massimiliano Panarari10 notices when he describes Ricci’s influence on Grillo, using
Gur Debord’s theories about the “soociety of the spectacle” (which are also used in the language of
advertisement). Panarari shows how Ricci’s goal was “appropriating words for propaganda,
emtying them of their meaning in order to conquer the audience”. This aspect demonstrates the
importance of language and of the relationship between populism – considered as the ability to
engage the masses telling them exactly what they expect to be told – and pop culture, as reassuring
and
disengaged
mass
language
(Santoro
2012:
26).
9 To this day, the analogies do not refer the Silvio berlusconi and Beppe grillo on a personal level. They refer to the
“Tv culture” born with berlusconismo and the schemes used by Grillo during his shows, which recur in his speeches
and political battles.
10 Massimiliano Panarari teaches Analysis of Political Lnguage and political Communication at Università di Modena
e Reggio Emilia and Political Marketing in the School of Government of Università luiss "Guido Carli" in Rome.
See L'egemonia sottoculturale.
9
The same context can be found in the messages Grillo sent as a leader, once he asserted himself as
the M5S political leader. 11 We have here to consider two phenomena – berlusconismo and grillismo
– which apparently are very distant but which share common roots: we can first of all see
Berlusconi as the man of the tv, that is the man who build his image throgh television and who, in so
doing, brought about the language of the “society of the spectacle” Pananari mentions. Beppe Grillo
is, on the contrary, the man from TV that learnt its communicative schemes and transfered those
messages to another media, more innovative and effective, the web 2.0. That’s for the conceptual
schemes
considered.
Considering the leaders themselves, Berlusconi and Grillo can seem even more different: the first
one is entrepreneur, the second one a comedian. Two personalities, two images that are quite
different but that both carry populist messages which partly overlap: 12 first of all, both leaders make
a direct appeal to the people, both speak for the renewal of the political class, both evoke the
neccessity of changement and need an enemy to fight (“communism”, “the left” for Berlusconi, the
entire political class and the “parties” for Grillo) (Grillo-Casaleggio 2011). These are elements that
brought about a highly individual leadership, where personal popularity can be used to gain political
consent. Anyhow, these are characteristics that Marco tarchi has found in every populist leader who
has created a personal party in post-world war Italy (see Tarchi 2003). What Berlusconi and grillo
really have in common is a political language derived from the media and based on
spectacularization. Furthermore, one has to look at the level of membership built around the
leadership: can one compare the two structures, which have made the success of Forza Italia and
M5S possible? Which elements do they share? And above all what consequences will the Internet
have as communicative and participatory strategy to build a new political-communicational subject?
It will be seen that the web – by definition interactive and participatory – is used in different ways
and can have different consequences than tv. M5S communications and Grillo’s personal campaigns
will be analyzed, in the effects brought about on the Internet on in the real world, combining new
and old communicative elements (the square and traditional media) 13. Lastly, it will be shown how
the interactive character of the web 2.0 could even cause internal problems to the new political
11 It is schemes used by “communication leader” Beppe Grillo to appeal to his “people”, different from the schemes
and contents which can be inda t the membership level trying to break free of the leader. This aspect will be taken up
in the final part of this paper and will be the subject of following research, aiming at reconstructing the history of
M5S.
12 On the leader “image” and the way it is constructed, see Belpoliti 2009.
13 As during Grillo’s campaign in Sicily before the regional elections last October.
10
subject and in the relationship between membership and leadership (problems of 2internal
democracy”). The horizontal character of web-mediated communication might not be ideal for the
highly polarized structure built aorund Grillo’s leadership, and might even been more suitable for
Berlusconi’s tv-party, that through television has made possible a “non-mobilitation” which or more
than 15 years has enabled the entrepreneur from Milan to mantain his populartity and be the only
charismatic leader in Forza Italia and in the PDL.14
4. Forza Italia and M5S: structure in comparison
To answer the initial question, that is “which structures a political subject is supposed to have in
order to be considered a populist phenomenon” one has to analyze the development of Forza Italia
and M5S in order to find out similarities and differences in the two forces that have brought
Berlusconi and Grillo to success. One has to ask whether the structures – and the media used – are
ideal for the highly personal leadership which characterizes both cases, and what consequences
ensued. First of all, one needs to consider the context in which the two movements evolved; Forza
Italia, as has been said, was born in 1994, taking advantage of the crisis of the political parties, of
the Tangentopoli scandal and Mani Pulite inquiry. A political vacuum and a need for renewal to
which Berlusconi responded taking to the field with Forza Italia. The trust in political parties
seemed to have reached a low, but today a new record is about to be set, as pollsters point out
comparing the years of Tangentopoli with the current situation. “The data show – explains Renato
Mannheimer, President of Ispo – “that there are many convergences between the current crisis and
the one that followed Tangentopoli in 1992-94. Then, Berlusconi succeeded in finding a potential
market among voters, with original proposals and initiatives which seemed to be pragmatic enough.
How that ended, is a different story, but the situation is similar. Of course, 1994 will hardly repeat
itself, the same proposals that seemd so innovative then are now unlikely to gain consent. The
actual crisis is certainly a consequence of the disappointment caused by the end of berlusconismo,
in which many had believed. But there’s a huge electoral market for those who can project an image
of
novelty
and
pragmatism,”15.
Grillo thrives in the vacuum left by berlusconismo and the crisis of parties – with only 3% of
Italians still trusting them. The data, registered in October by Demopolis’ Political Barometre, is the
lowest ever registered in thirty years of analyses of the country’s public opinion.
14 I twill be shown that, in Berlusconi’s case, the same problems took longer to manifest themselves.
15 See Ispo www.ispo.it and interview by Stefano Caselli “Il fatto quotidiano”, 16 marzo 2012.
11
“The latest scandals – Demopolis director Pietro Vento explains - seemed to have annihilated the
citizens’ trust in politics: the parties’ legitimation itself seems to be in a crisis. Italians’ growing
resentment towards the parties that have governed the country in the last years is bring about an
increase in abstentionism (32% today) and in the number of voters who do not know whom to
choose: it’s mainly voters – Vento concludes – in the moderate area who are looking for good
reasons
to
go
back
to
the
polls”16.
According to Demopolis analysis, if Italy were to vote today, the Partito Democratico would be
around 26%, as the first party in the country, 10 points over PDL, which might aim at 16%, with a
deeply confused electorate. Grillo’s M5S would get 18%, becoming virtually the country’s second
party. Casini’s UDC (8%) and Maroni’s Lega (5.5 %) increase slightly, as do also Vendola’s SEL,
which, as IDV, is between 6 and 7%. All other parties are at the moment under 3%. 17
Both subjects then develop in a moment of crisis if political parties, overcome by scandals: a
situation that manifested itself in 1994 and in both cases citizens, who desire pragmatism and a
16 See http://www.demopolis.it/news.php?
subaction=showfull&id=1350062265&archive=&start_from=&ucat=39&template=HomeDemo&category=39&sort
by=5&PHP_SELF=news.php
17 The survey has been carried out by Istituto Nazionale di Ricerche Demòpolis from 7 to 10 October 2012, on a
sample of 1.206 interviewees, representative of all Italian adult citizens, subdivided according to gender, age and
place of residence. The Barometro Politico is directed and coordinated by Pietro Vento, with Maria Sabrina Titone.
Contribute by Giusy Montalbano; cati-cawi research supervised by Marco E. Tabacchi.
12
renewal
of
the
political
class,
are
given
a
populist
answer.
As to the internal structure, in both cases the two subjects are at first referred to as “movements”,
not as traditional parties18. Forza Italia is thus described as a “free association of citizens”, and the
same description can be be read on M5S website. M5S is not a political party, nor wants to become
one in the future. No ideology, neither rirght nor left-wing, just ideas. It wants to create an effective
and efficiente exchange of opinion, an arena for democratic confrontation, free of associational and
partitical ties, without representative or directive organs, giving back to citizens a decisional power
usually
granted
lucky”19.
some
In both cases can one speak of “political liquidism”, which Forza Italia maintained until 1996, when
it was decided to give the party some organizational structures, similar to those present in traditional
mass-parties. In the history of For a Italia – as Emanuela Poli shows in her essay 20 - three phases
can be distinguished: it was first born as a movement, an electoral committee on which Berlusconi
worked from autumn 1993; then, in the years at the opposition (1996-2001), it became a party well
organized in the whole country; and finally, as a government party, after the electoral success in
2002 (Poli 2001: 34). In the first phase, going into details, five interconnected levels can be
distinguished, on which the new political subject was built. Firstly, different intellectual and
entrepeneurial wre involved, converging on a political manifesto created by liberal political scientist
elites Giuliano Urbani, who in November 1993 founded the association “Looking or Good
Governance”. Secondly, in December, the forst “Forza Italia! Clubs” were launched, supporting
associations whose goal was promoting liberal democratic ideals and activating local activism.
Thirdly, an institute monitoring public opinion and analysing vote tendencies – Diakron, operative
since October – was created in order to identify potential electorial constituency . Fourth, candidates
were selecting for the approaching political elections. Fifth, an advertisment campaign was planned,
of unprecedented strength, which aimed at getting people to know the new political subject, its
symbol,
its
programme
and,
most
importantly,
its
leader
Silvio
Berlusconi.
Once the elections were won and government conquered, the “electorial machine” started to show
some organizational problems and within Forza Italia someone started to lament the absence of
organizational orientation and territorial structures, the dominance of Publitalia and Fininvest staff
members put in the mosto prestigious positions in the movement, and the blurred definition of the
role of the clubs. So, in Autumn 1994, the movement leadership gave a first answer: and extremely
18 On “parties”, their structure, typologies and characteristics see Panebianco 1982; see also Sartori 1982.
19 See http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/elezioni-politiche-2013.html
20 See Poli 2001, capitolo 1.
13
light organization contemplating a central steering level (made up by the movement’s president and
by a closed presidential commitee whose members were nominated by the president) and only two
peripheral levels: regional (with 20 coordinators also nominated by the president) and collegial,
steered by Forza Italia Perliament members. This first organizational model did not contemplate any
representatives for municipality, township and provincial level, typical o traditional parties, and was
highly top-steered: it was decided that in Forza Italia there would not have been elections and
subscriptions rom the lower levels. Institutionalization came only after the defeat in 1996, when
Berlusconi understood that the time had come for Forza Italia to become a real party, with
traditional
structures
but
preserving
the
original
strive
towards
simplicity.
In Summer 1996, a group of Parliament members with organizational skills was chosen to devise a
new model of organization ; in January 1997 the new charter was approved. It contempletad a series
of local coordinations which mirrored Italy’s traditional political-administrative subdivisions in
regions, provinces, municipalities, townships and districts. At the head of regional structures were
coordinators nominated by the president, while for lower levels elections were allowed and
coordinators chosen by committee and assembly members. One of the main innovations was that
the party was now open to all members, a decision which ended one of the biggest anomalies tht
since 1994 had set Forza Italia apart rom all other Italian and Europeaan parties (in Spring 1997 the
first recruiting campaign was started). Between 1997 and 2001 Forza Italia’s structure became
heavier and heavier, until it became a “goverment party”, in which decisions were made at the top
but which had a great local network, to facilitate mobilization before th national elections. We have
then, at first, a movement with a flexible and “light” structure which apparently allows for local
decision-making but is centred aroung a popular leader, which lter becomes institutionalized and is
transformed into a “traditional party”. What about Grillo’s M5S then? Before analyzing the phass of
its development, two aspects have to be stressed out: first, the moment of creation. Forza Italia was
created extremely rapidly – between 1993 and 1994 – and the “electorial machine” went straight to
national confrontation. M5S’s development on the contrary was slower and mirroring local
organization: two dierent paths then, but with peculiar organizational similarities. First of all, the
Movement-phased, anticipated by the creation of the blog in 2005 which set its political and
programmatic tendencies. In the same phase the association “Beppe Grillo’s friends” was born, as
happened in the first phase of Forza Italia with the association “Looking or Good Governance”.
This first stage started presumably in 2005 and went on until 2008, (in the meantime the two VDays took place, the first one in 2007 with the “Clen Parliament” initiative, the second one at the
beginning of 2008 with the “Free information” campaign). Activities started with the creation of the
14
Meet-ups, which were also to gauge the movement’s appeal. These were the one innovative
instrument used by Beppe Grillo to bring his people together. Meetup is a digital platform, a social
network allowing local groups of citizens to get together to discuss political matters and meet on a
regular basis via the web. To this day21 the groups Meetup are 591 and subscribers amount to
90.739; people who take an interest in the activities of the groups (even if they do not subscribe to
any one of them in particular) are 33.386; groups have appeared in 482 cities, not only in Italy, but
in 14 countries. Obviously, meetups have no “physical” premises and they do not respect any
traditionl territorial subdivision and they provide no information to help us map the local consent to
M5S, its supporters and members. In 2008 came the “5 star civic lists”, getting five candidates
elected in Rome municipalities and presented lists in other cities in Northern Italy where communal
elections took place. Here starts the M5S “political” phase strictly speaking: the following year, in
2009, the MoVimento 5 Stelle is officially born. On October 4 Grillo himself announces it on his
blog with the “Political Press Release 25”. From 2009 until 2012 the “electoral phase” starts with
the presentation of the movement’s list, certified by grillo himself through an online procedure
activated on his blog. In 2010 the movement’s candidates run in five regions on 13 which went to
the polls (two regional counselors are elected in Emilia Romagna and two in Piemonte); in 2011 it
runs in administrative elections in 75 municipalities electing his first town counselors. In 2012 it
presents lists in 101 municipalities and gets 300 candidates elected. Finally, in the Sicilian regional
elections, M5S became the first party got 15 councillors on almost 300 in the island’s regional
assembly. A development that still has not started the institutionalization necessary before national
elections: a process called for by supporters and the party’s membership, made up by more than 300
municipality councillors and 19 regional councillors. The same process Forza Italia started in 1996
and which was inevitable after the election of the first Parliament Members. The national phase for
M5S started right after the Sicilian vote, through a press release from grillo who, on 29 October
2012 on Youtube,22 explained the rules for members elegibility and the formation of the momevent’s
lists for the national elections which are to be held in Spring 2013. Before that announcement, to
become a member of Grillo’s non-party one just had to fill in an online form, indicating one’s name
surname, address and e-mail; while only those who have also indicated an ID number by October
might participate to the internal primary elections. No party cards and no premises, so far. Just
online subscriptions and elections: locally, there are only some Spokespersons, who are not equally
21 Up to date as at 19 November 2012, at 16.00.
22 Political Press Realease n. 53, on www.bebbegrillo.it; video messagge “Grillo’s Rules” on You Tube channel
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZnwdrt0lCI
15
distributed in every part of the country: the movement’s map still has to be drawn. Its structure is
thus evolving: born as a movement now it has to become a party, following the same path as Forza
italia, which led to the foundation of the PDL – a transformation M5S still has to complete. What
sets the two political experiences apart is their constituency: in 1994, 53.4% of Forza Italia voters
were women, 46.6% were men (Fiori 2004). The largest group was housewives, 21.6%, in a higher
percentage than other categories who supported Berlusconi (entrepreneurs, traders, freelance
professionals, ruling class and movement members made up, all together, for 17.1%). Among the
original Forza Italia voters, less than a half, 47.3%, has an employment. There’s also a low
percentage of graduates, 3.8%. Those who read a newspaper very day were less than a third, 29.6%.
Still, many of them watched tv: at least two hours a day for 68 voters on 100, most of them were
fans of the soap operas broadcast on Rete 4. Moreover, 48.8% of forza Italia supporters, before
voting Berlusconi, had no interest in politics. On the contrary, the two first web surveys carried out
about M5S show that its constituency is competely different 23; Men and women are evenly present
(men slightly more so, 56.6%); they are quite young, under 50; graduates, habitual Internet users
from Northern-Central Italy dominate. In Parma more the 7 voters out of 10 stated they had voted
M5S not only for its local policies but for national reasons as well. They felt that the party they
voted for in 2008 national elections represented them “not at all” or “just a little”. 43% of them
would vote again M5S to “change the present political class”, 27% “feel no longer represented by
traditional parties”. Moreover, more than 20% of M5S voters come from the “no vote area” as a
Swg survey, carried out immediately after the local elections in May 2012 confirms. On M5S
facebook profile24 its voters seem even younger: followers age ranges from 25 to 34, most are from
Rome; in total, subscriptors are 218.56625. Most contacts took place on 21 October, during the
elections
in
Sicily.
The data, however, might not be confirmed by later surveys, showing a new phase in M5S
development: during the first election phase, 2010-2012, the grillini were mainly voted by web
users, while after the sicilian elections, the campaign abandoned the web as television started to talk
about it, gaining the right wing vote: according to political scientist Roberto Biorcio: “Up to a
certain point M5S developed on the web and among the young. Then it became a global media
phenomenon. Even if Grillo refuses to appear on tv, he has been the political figured who most
23 The first one has a more general character and was carried out on a sample of Facebook users; the second gauged
Trust in Fedrico Pizzarotti six months after the elections. Studies have been carried out thanks to Epokè - Ricerche
Sociali Applicate.
24 http://www.facebook.com/#!/movimentocinquestelle/likes
25 Up to date as at 19 November 2012 at 17.00.
16
frequently appeared on the tv screen during the last electoral campaign. As a tv celebrity, investing
his capital on the web, he went back to occupy television. his constituency has accordingly changed,
from being young and left-wing to collecting votes even from the right field, taking advantage of
the
crisis
of
the
PDL
(Santoro
2012:
152).
Similar structure and leadership but a different constituency, which is mainly due to communicative
strategies. In the first case television is dominant, being the media that allowed Berlusconi’s party to
convince voters who were less informed than those selected by Grillo through the web.
In both cases we find a hierarchic structure - aiming at keeping the leader’s popularity at high levels
and centering on him the electoral campaigns – which has nonetheless met and is still meeting
organizational problems: Forza Italia after two years was in any case institutionalized, still
preserving Berlusconi’s leadership. M5S is still defendig its “liquid” nature, which is already
causing problems of “internal democracy”, due to Grillo’s decisional role and the interactive nature
of
the
web,
which
might
not
be
able
to
stem
“dissenters” 26.
Both political formations have at first launched their “media-populist” message, giving birth to a
“Liquid movement” built around the leader’s image: in the first case, a process of
institutionalization has ensued -still conserving centralizing structures – which brought to the
formation of a “party”: in the second case, we are still in an intermediate phase, which will have to
be monitored under the coming elections. Three aspects will have to be considered: the leadership’s
evolution; the composition, the characteristics and the behaviour of the membership; how the
followers, the party’s present and future constituency will change.
5. Berlusconi's decline and Grillo's boom
The steady rise of M5S takes place against the backdrop of the steady decline of Berlusconi and
berlusconismo: as soon as in 38-39 March 2010 regional elections, the centre-right coalition was in
some difficulty: the economic crisis worsens and citizens show increasing discontents with the
goverment’s decisions. The Prime Minister suffers a low in popularity and the majority sustaining
his government is no longer stable 27. The PDL steady decline has effects on the lists presented for
regional elections. It will conquer six regions out of thirteen: the collapse of the executive is so put
off
by
two
years.
The protagonist of the latest elections was anyhow Beppe Grillo: M5S lists were presented in five
26 On this, see the whole story of the “purges” within M5S, as in the episodes concerning Tavolazzi, Defrancesci, Favia
e Salsi; cfr. al link http://it.ibtimes.com/articles/37885/20121102/salsi-grillo-come-berlusconi.htm
27 Most PMs coming from ex AN are now supporting their ex Secretary Gianfranco Fini, disrupting the unity of
Berlusconi charismatic party.
17
regions, getting almost half a million votes. The best results were obtained in Piemonte and Emilia
Romagna, the regions where the V-days were held in 2007 and 2008 (Turin and Bologna). In
Emilia-Romagna, the centre-left won by large, as is typical in the region’s history, ma the M5S
candidate president, Giuseppe Favia (30 years old) got 6% of votes and two representatives of the
grillini were elected into the regional council. In Piemonte the M5S Candidate President was the
young Alessandro Bono got a little over 4%, while the list that supported him got 3.6% gaining two
seats
in
the
council.
The M5S could already in 2010 fill the void left by traditional parties. The true “boom” anywau
came in 2012, when 941 municipalities went to the polls and the movement presented 101 lists,
gaining almost 200.000 votes (almost 9%). In many municipalities, M5S ran for elections for the
first time. In others it had already run in the 2010 regional elections. In Alessandria for example
M5S votes have increased fourold, going from 1.248 in 2010 to 4.687 in 2012. In Verona they have
increased threefold, in Parma, Monza and Cuneo they have more than redoubled.
The Cattaneo Institute in Bologna has observed, calculating votes flow, that most votes co
ntributing to the movement’s success came from the right. Between three and four votes out of of
ten came from Lega nord, and two or three more from the PDL. Just as many come from nonvoters. It’s voters who felt left behind by Lega and Pdl, disappointed with politics and struck by the
economic crisis. This is the situation in which the M5S “boom” took place, a hard crisis of political
parties to which one has to add the declina o berlusconismo, which made place for the M5S: the
second phase Biorcio talks of and that was mentioned before. In the beginning, M5S was stealing
votes mainly from IDV and Partly from PD; but now, with Berlusconi disappearing, Grillo is a new
charimastic leader catalysing diffused discontent. So, already in May 2012, Berlusconi’s popularity
had gone down below 30%: the chart below shows the leaders over 30%, with Grillo in the first
place.
18
Trust stays high not only for Grillo, but even for the first M5S mayor elected in provincial capital
like Parma, where after six months mayor Pizzarotti’s position has consolidated, as the chart below
shows.
19
The M5S's mayor won on second bellot covering the 20 points that separated him from his
opponent nd gaining 20 more. Votes from all those who on first ballot had not voted for Bernazzoli
(the left candidate) converged on him. Six months later he seems to be able to mantain a consent
etremely precarious in the beginning. 26% of citizens have complete trust in him and more than
30% have enough trust in him. Nonetheless, even negative opinion increases: the “no trust” sector
has
reached
21%.
Even voting intensions are interesting: the PDL condition of weakness is confirmed, with the party
reaching a low, while the M5S is gaining consent reaching 40% in the town. The way Pizzarotti is
playing his role appeals to those voters who look favourably at the movement but still have not
voted for it. To the leading position of the movement corresponds the almost total disappearance of
the centre-right. Pdl is below 5% and Lega Nord below 3%28.
28 For methods see http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/11/tosi-e-pizzarotti-fiducia-10-e-lode/
20
Its success and popularity come not only from the web, but also from its local ties with the voters,
ties which have become stronger after Grillo’s campaign in Sicily. 29 On the one hand we have than
Grillo and his massive use of the web and the social networks, making him the most present
politicians in social network – Facebook and Twitter – as the table below shows:
Silvio Berlusconi is only fourth, which is due to the fact that he doesn’t have an official Twitter
account. In the first positions, one should remrk the presence of the mayor of Milan Giuliano
Pisapia, who pushes out of the Top-Ten Pdl Secretary (11th), with only a few hundreds followers less
than
Brunetta
and
Serracchiani30.
29 http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/11/nasce-la-tv-a-5-stelle-rete-e-territorio-dietro-il-successo-in-sicilia/
30 See http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/10/social-media-la-top-10-dei-politici/socialchart-ottobre/
21
On the other hand we have stronger local ties, which tells the difference between the leadership of
M5S and its membership31; the party is not only based on the web but can combine “new” and “old”
media and means of political participation. A step Forza Italia (for temporal reasons as well) has not
taken, using television as the only means to spread the image of its leader32.
6. Conclusion (Future beyond leadership)
This study has first of all set the case of M5S among populist phenomena, according to the ideas of
Yves Mény and Yves Surel. The new political organ has been analyzed in comparison with other
populist phenomena which have left a mark in Italian history after World War II.
Then some characteristics within the M5S have been highlighted, which can make one thick of the
Movement as a “media phenomenon”, and they have been compared with another similar
phenomenon, Forza Italia, the political movement founded by Silvio Berlusconi in 1994. The two
cases have been put in comparison, and M5S has been put in the context of the decline of
berlusconismo. The populist analogies have been taken up, with regard to their development, helped
by the crisis of traditional parties: something that was actual in 1994 Italy and that has manifested
itself
again
today,
in
2012,
with
an
even
greater
loss
of
trust.
The different levels of articulation of the political forces have then been analyzed: the leadership –
represented by Silvio Berlusconi and Beppe Grillo - the membership and the followers. The most
populist messages come from the leadership: in Berlusconi’s case, we have seen how a “TV party”
has been created in order to keep the leader’s popularity at its maximum and concentrate on him all
party activity. The same characteristics have been maintained when the movement evolved into a
party with a more traditional structure, similar to other Italian parties. In the second case, M5S has
been analyzed as the “web party”, with an as personal leadership, built on the leader’s popularity.
The most interesting aspect is how Grillo came to the web and built his own “media party”. On the
one hand we have Berlusconi as the man of televisione, on the other there is Grillo as the man who
have come from television. The Genoese comedian’s career developed in the years when Berlusconi
was gaining political consent; a career through which Grillo came in contact with tv-pop culture, the
same background Forza Italia came from. Grillo has been able to adapt tv communication to a
different
context,
the
world
wide
web,
and
to
different
needs.
31 More on this in the conclusions. The issue will be the subject of further research.
32 Silvio Berlusconi has tried twice to get on the web. First, with www.forzasilvio.it and then with
www.silviopresidente.it. Both cases were but experiments, quite unilateral and isolated. These instruments might be
reconsidered in case “berlusconi’s party” should be recreated, in opposition with the proposal of holding primary
elections.
22
The last part of this study is mostly centerd on M5S, tracing its development and success in postberlusconismo era, analysing the movement’s constituency, which is draining votes from the decling
centre-left.33
In sum, a few remarks can be made: the context in which the two movements have developed is
one and the sme: a crisis of politicalpopulist parties and citizens’ discontent with traditional
mediating systems; same similarities can be noticed in the structure and development phases of both
Forza Italia and M5S. the analysis focuses on the personal leadership and on the progression from
an initial “liquid” structure to an institutionalized one; analogies can be seen even on the media
image of the two political forces, with the M5S taking TV-communication schemes and transfering
them to the web. Different media, television and the web, which might not yield the same results,
so that thee to forces may have different fates. Irst of all the interactive nature of the web might not
suit a personal leadership, which is the reason why M5s is already having “internal problems”, with
a scattered membership that doesn’t follow the leadership and escapes central control. Prima di tutto
il carattere interattivo del web potrebbe non essere congeniale alla struttura centralizzata della
leadership, per questo il M5S sta affrontando già da subito “problemi interni”, producendo una
membership. Even if the web is not the only media Grillo seems to be using, invoking off-line
mobilization as well (public protests, for example) and featuring also in TV news and other
traditional media. This idea of continuity between media and of a return to TV is supported by
Antonio Tursi, who claims. “Grillo demonstrates that the media are not completely separated from
one another. A new media establishes itself when new needs arise. These new need are often created
by older media. Of course TV and web are different, but there are also similarities, and it would be a
sham
to
deny
it”
(Tursi
2012:
75).
Finally, the way constituency is changing needs monitoring. Both aspects – political class and
voters – will have to studied in connection with the test the next national elections represent for
M5S.
even for the centre-right the future is unclear: there’s is a void in leadership left by Berlusconi, that
PDL will try to fill with primary elections. Grillo’s idea of primary elections is totally different: a
selection of candidates will be presented online, to be chosen by a procedure announced on the M5S
homepage34,
which
will
concern
cadidates
parliament
members
and
senators.
In sum, the grillismo phenomenon can be seen as a sympton of the convergence of new and old
33 One might then ask: “Can Grillo’s ascent be thought of as one of the factors that are leading to the end of a phase in
Italian politics, the Second Republic, characterized by berluconism and started after a period of scandals which lead
to a crisis of political parties similar to the one we are experiencing today.? Can Grillo be considered as a symbol of
post.modern politics and of the advent of a Third Republic, following the government of technicians , the discontent
with political parties and a new wave of populism?”
23
media, capturing the discontent among voters, but that now might face organizational problems,
regarding the use of the web and the evlotion of its structure. Any future study will have to consider
two aspects: first of all the relationship between leadership and membership, to understand whether
one can distinguish the massage of the leader Grillo and that of the M5S. For this reason, a
questionnaire has been devised, to analyze the behaviour of M5S councillors and representatives.
The analysis of the actual political class in the last two years is moving in the same direction. 35 The
procedure
of
candidate
selection
will
also
have
to
be
studied.
A second field of work will be the study of the movement’s constituency, through web surveys
submitted to supported and members, in order to “map” the phenomenon and understand its
characteristics, background and evolution.
34 See www.beppegrillo.t/movimento/candidature
35 The study analyses the documents made public by the Regional Parliaments of Piemonte and Emilia Romagna,
where M5S councillors have operated since 2010: laws, proposals etc are taken into account… The study will later
focus on activities on the web, where representatives maintain contact with voters, through Facebook profiles, blogs
and web broadcast of official meetings.
24
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Fiori, G. (2004), Il venditore, Milano, Garzanti Libri.
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Giannini, M. (2008), Lo statista, il ventennio berlusconiano tra fascismo e populismo,
Milano, Baldini Castoldi Dalai Editore.
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Greblo, E. (2011), Filosofia di Beppe Grillo, Milano, Mimesis.
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Grillo, B. (2011), A riveder le stelle, Milano, Rizzoli.
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Grillo, B. (2012), Alta voracità, Bergamo, Rizzoli.
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Grillo, B. (2006), Tutto il Grillo che conta, Milano, Feltrinelli.
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Hurmet, G. (2003), I populismi nel mondo, Torino, Ballati Boringhieri.
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Lukacs, J. (2006), Democrazia e populismo, Milano, Longanesi.
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Laclau, E. (2008), La ragione populista, Bari, Laterza.
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Mazzoleni, G. (2004), La comunicazione politica, Bologna, Il Mulino.
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Mazzoleni, G., Sfardini, A. (2009), Politica Pop. Da “Porta a Porta” a “l’Isola dei
Famosi”, Bologna, Il Mulino. Bari, Laterza.
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Mény, Y, Surel, Y. (2004), Populismo e Democrazia, Il Mulino, Bologna.
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Melucci, A. (1976), Sistema politico, partiti e movimenti sociali, Feltrinelli, Milano.
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Mingioni, L. (2007), Una storia italiana: la comunicazione politica di Forza Italia e del suo
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Mosca, L. Vaccari, C. (2011), Nuovi media, nuova politica? Partecipazione e mobilitazione
online da MoveOn al MoVimento 5 Stelle, Milano, Franco Angeli.
26
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Novelli, E. (2004), Forza Italia: origini, trionfo e declino del partito televisivo
(Comunicazione Politica a. V, nr. 1 pp. 143-154).
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Orazi, F., Socci, M. (2008), Il popolo di Beppe Grillo: un nuovo movimento di cittadini
attivi, Ancona, Cattedrale.
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Panarari, M. (2010), L'egemonia sottoculturale, Torino, Einaudi.
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Panebianco, A. (1982), Modelli di Partito, Bologna, Il Mulino.
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Pasquino, G. (2010), Nuovo corso di scienza politica, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp.61-166.
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Poli, E. (2001), Forza Italia: strutture, leadership e radicamento territoriale, Bologna, Il
Mulino.
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Raniolo, F. (2007), La partecipazione politica, Il Mulino, Bologna.
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Ricolfi, L. (2004), Elezioni e mass media: quanti voti ha spostato la TV?, in “Il Mulino” v.
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Santoro, G.(2012), Un grillo qualunque. Il MoVimento 5 Stelle e il populismo digitale nella
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28
INTERNET QUOTATION
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Beppe Grillo's Blog, 27 novembre 2012, <http://www.beppegrillo.it>, home page of Beppe
Grillo's Blog (27 novembre 2012)
-
Movimento 5 Stelle, 26 novembre 2012, <http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/>, home
page of Movimento 5 Stelle in Beppe Grillo's blog(26 novembre 2012)
-
Liste civiche Movimento 5 Stelle, 21 ottobre 2012,
<http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/elenco_liste.php>, page about M5S's lists and
candidates (30 novembre 2012)
-
Movimento Cinque Stelle, 30 novembre 2012,
<http://www.facebook.com/movimentocinquestelle>, Facebook's page of M5S (30
novembre 2012)
-
Movimento 5 Stelle, 30 novembre 2012, <http://twitter.com/mov5stelle>, Twitter's page of
M5S (30 novembre 2012)
-
Programma Movimento 5 Stelle, 4 ottobre 2009,
<http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Programma-Movimento-5Stelle.pdf>, M5S's programme (26 novembre 2012)
-
“Non-statuto” Movimento 5 Stelle, 4 ottobre 2012,
<http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Regolamento-Movimento-5Stelle.pdf>, M5S's guide with principles (27 novembre agosto 2012)
-
“Crea la tua lista”, 30 settembre 2012, <http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/crea-la-tualista.html>, online form about creation of political list (30 novembre 2012)
-
Beppe Grillo's Meetup, 27 novembre agosto 2012, <http://beppegrillo.meetup.com>, home
page for research meetup's groups in the world (30 novembre 2012)
-
Epokè – Ricerche Sociali Applicate, 27 novembre 2012, <http://www.epokericerche.it/>,
home page about non profit association of political and electoral studies (30 novembre
2012)
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Beppe Persichella, Repubblica Bologna, “Bologna, Grillo licenzia via web il suo consigliere
regionale, 3 gennaio 2012, <http://bologna.repubblica.it/cronaca/2012/01/03/news
/bologna_resa_dei_conti_online_per_il_movimento_cinque_stelle-27516292>, Repubblica
about Unità's case and M5S (30 agosto 2012)
-
Istituto Nazionale Ricerche Demopolis “Barometro Politico”, 20 ottobre 2012,
<http://www.demopolis.it/news.php?
subaction=showfull&id=1350062265&archive=&start_from=&ucat=39&template=HomeD
29
emo&category=39&sortby=5&PHP_SELF=news.php>, intentions' poll survey and
confidence in parties by Demopolis Institute (30 novembre 2012)
-
Casaleggio Associati – Consulenza per la rete, 27 novembre
2012,<http://www.casaleggio.it>, home page about Gianroberto Casaleggio and his
communication society (30 novembre 2012)
-
Beppe Grillo, “Comunicato politico numero venticinque”, 9 settembre 2009,
<http://www.beppegrillo.it/2009/09/comunicato_politico_numero_venticinque.html>, Beppe
Grillo's Post Beppe Grillo about M5S (30 novembre 2012)
-
Istituto Cattaneo di Bologna, 30 luglio 2012, <http://www.cattaneo.org/index.asp?
l1=seminari&l2=convegni>, home page (30 novembre 2012)
-
You Tube's video, “1994 – Discesa in campo di Silvio Berlusconi”, 19 agosto 2009,
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8-uIYqnk5A>, video (27 novembre 2012)
-
Giancarlo Cancelleri facebook's Profile, 26 ottobre 2012,
<http://www.facebook.com/giancarlo.cancelleri>, “Candidato Portavoce” M5S in Sicilie (30
novembre 2012)
-
Ispo - "Istituto per gli studi sulla pubblica opinione”, 27 novembre 2012, <www.ispo.it>,
home page (30 novembre 2012)
-
Beppe Grillo's Blog, “Passaparola”, 29 ottobre 2012,
<http://www.beppegrillo.it/2012/10/passaparola__comunicato_politico_numero_cinquantatre_-_beppe_grillo.html>, “Comunicato Politico
n.53” by Beppe Grillo (30 novembre 2012)
-
You Tube's video, “Le regole del Grillo”, 29 ottobre 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=pZnwdrt0lCI>, video about Beppe Grillo's Movements and candidates (30 novembre
2012)
-
Stefano Caselli “Partiti in crisi dopo Tangentopoli”, 16 marzo 2012,
<http://www.100news.it/site/2012/03/19/partiti-in-crisi-di-identita-cresce-il-consenso-permonti-che-raccoglie-oltre-il-60-di-fiducia/>, “Il Fatto Quotidiano” (30 novembre 2012)
-
Caso Salsi http://it.ibtimes.com/articles/37885/20121102/salsi-grillo-come-berlusconi.htm
-
Lisa Lanzone “Nasce la TV a 5 Stelle: rete e territorio dietro il successo in Sicilia”, 7
novembre 2012, <http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/11/nasce-la-tv-a-5-stelle-rete-eterritorio-dietro-il-successo-in-sicilia/>, Epoké (30 novembre 2012)
-
Epoké Ricerche “Tosi e Pizzarotti: fiducia 10 e lode”, 9 novembre 2012,
<http://www.epokericerche.it/2012/11/tosi-e-pizzarotti-fiducia-10-e-lode/>, methods about
opinion survey in Parma (30 novembre 2012)
30
-
-
Forzasilvio.it, 26 novembre 2012,<https://www.forzasilvio.it/>, Silvio Berlusconi's official
network (30 novembre 2012)
-
“I Governi Berlusconi” 30 novembre 2012, <http://noveanni.governoberlusconi.it/>, about
berlusconi's politics during his government (30 novembre 2012)
-
“Il Popolo della Libertà”, 30 novembre 2012, <http://www.pdl.it/>, home page (30
novembre)
-
Silvio Berlusconi Facebook's profile, 26 novembre 2012,
<http://www.facebook.com/SilvioBerlusconi?ref=stream>, Facebook's page (30 novembre
2012)
“Movimento
Spontaneo
Cittadini
Silvio
Presidente”,
<http://www.silviopresidente.it/>, home page (30 novembre 2012)
31
30
novembre
2012,