5. The politics of famine and food aid a. Famine: what, when, why? b

5. The politics of famine and food aid
5. The politics of famine and food aid
a. Famine: what, when, why?
b. How to deal with famine? End, response &
prevention
c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences?
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
a. Famine: what, when?
– Famine differs from chronic under nutrition
• Large nr. people die quickly (not enough to eat)
– Several events in history
• China 1333-7 (6 million); Ireland 1845-9 (1
million); India 1876-8 (10 million); URSS 1921-2 &
1932-3 (15 million); China 1958-61 (30 million);
North Korea 1994-8 (3 million); Africa ‘70s-80s
(Sahel, Ethiopia, Sudan)
http://listverse.com/2013/04/10/10-terrible-famines-inhistory/
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
a. Famine: why?
– Causes
• Natural events, e.g. droughts & floods (Africa, India), crop
diseases (Ireland), wars (Leningrad 1941), ideology
(Stalin taking away land&food from private farmers in
Ukraine 1932-3; Mao organizing ag.production through
people communes–no incentives for productivity, farmers
working in furnaces, grains shipped to cities)
• Amartya Sen, economist, Nobel 1998:
– Natural events disrupt ag labour and cut incomes of
landless farmworkers
– Expectation of food shortages&panic  high prices
– Food available but people can’t afford
– Absence of free markets & free elections and
ideology make things worst
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
b. How to deal with famine? End, response & prevention
–
End
• Deaths & migrations reduce the importance of the
problem
• International food aids (e.g. Britain helping Ireland
1849)
• End of wrong political interventions (e.g. Ukraine 1933,
Stalin ends mandatory state procurements from the
region; China 1961, idem; Bengal 1943, Britain ships 1
million ton grains)
• End of civil conflicts (e.g. Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique
1980s)
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
b. How to deal with famine? End, response & prevention
(continue)
–
Response
• Food aid delivery
– Not too soon (not to encourage relocation of
farmers to feeding stations  risk permanent
dependence on food aid
– Reduce nr. meals/day, switch to less desirable
‘famine foods’ (e.g. Cassava)
– Selling off animals, nonessential HH assets
– Selling off essential HH assets  relocation
(camps)
– After crisis: replace food aid with farm implements,
animals, cash (one-time distribution). Allow
displaced people to return to their farming
communities
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
b. How to deal with famine? End, response & prevention
(continue)
– Prevention
• FAO early warning system:
http://www.fao.org/GIEWS/english/index.htm
• USAID early warning system
http://www.fews.net/Pages/default.aspx
• WFP emergency preparedness
http://www.wfp.org/our-work/being-ready
http://www.wfp.org/
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences?
– Food aid is the international shipment of food through
‘concessional’ channels (gifts):
• Donor gvt  recipient gvt (30%)
• Donor gvt  NGO inside recipient country (15%)
• Donor gvt  multilateral organizations (WFP) (55%)
Increasing role of UN (WFP) and NGOs:
– diminishing role of foreign policy calculations on who
gets aid
– risk of becoming dependent on food aid (no political
conditioning,
reduced
urgency
to
escape
dependence (e.g. India vs. African countries)
– Delivery mode options:
• Donor gvt-owned surplus supplies (direct transfer)
• Home market of donor country (direct transfer)
• Local market of recipient country (local purchase)
• Third-country market close to recipient country
(triangular transaction)
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
CHANNELS OF FOOD AID
FLOWS 2000 vs. 2004
2000
2004
NGOs
Bilateral
28%
34%
Multilateral
38%
NGOs
Bilateral
21%
27%
Multilateral
52%
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
Bilateral Donors:1990-2000
5. The politics of famine and food aid
c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? (continue)
– Food aid purposes:
• Address famine emergency & feed refugees
• Cushion food price inflations (e.g. 2008 price crisis)
• Support local work or education activities (e.g. WFP
‘food for work’  pay workers with food in projects with
public benefits
– Weight of food aid on international trade:
• Low on a global scale (3% of all cross-border food
flows)
• Significant share of total food imports for some
individual recipient countries
– Main country recipients:
• 1950s: Europe (Marshall plan)
• 1960s: India & South Asia
• 1970-80s: Vietnam & Middle East (foreign policy
objectives)
• 1990s: SSA
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? (continue)
–
Rich countries disposing their food surplus:
•
Yes, US 1950s: farm subsidy policy generating wheat surplus
(stocks)  food aids to developing countries
– To avoid complaints (unfair trade) ‘payment’ in local
currency spent on local economies (US embassy).
But...long-term low-interest credit: almost free…..
•
No, US from 1960-70s to date:
– no more surplus but cash  useful for foreign policy….
– No more govt-owned surplus: food purchases on US
market (farm lobby), shipments US vessels [‘cargo
preference’] (very expensive,70-80% more costly than
foreign vessels)
– Difficult to change (Congress voted against), shipping
firms & dept of Defense lobbies
» On the contrary: EU, Japan & Canada: purchase
close to the site of emergency
– Sales on local markets, decrease prices, disadvantage
local farmers
» US NGOs use cash from ‘monetization’ of food to
fund their development projects….
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
I.
Average shipping rates (US$/ton)
140
Small number of food vendors
120
100
(11% procurement premium)
II. Very small number of shippers
(78% cargo preference premium)
III. NGOs (resources, esp. monetized)
80
US-flag
60
Foreign-flag
40
20
0
1991-93
1999-2000
80
70
60
Approved Title II Monetization Rate
FY2001 416(b) and Food for Progress Shipments:
Freight Forwarders
50
2%
14%
40
Wilson Logistics
30
BKA Logistics
8%
43%
20
Fettig & Donalty
Panalpina
Other 8
10
Target Title II Monetization Rate
Forw arder not reported
13%
0
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
% Title II non-emergency food aid shipments
5. The politics of famine and food aid
So Who Benefits? The Iron Triangle
20%
Iron Triangle of Food Aid
Producers and
Domestic Food Processors
•
Profits are bottom line (Price
supported Procurement & Sales of
Food Commodities)
Maritime Interests
(Shippers)
•
Receive significant Mark-ups on
FACargo
•
Monetization-Mix of Interna.
Dev’t&Humanitar. Assistance
Mission (Poverty Reduction
Concern) and it heavily depends on
FA as a resource for their
operations.
The NGOs (Washington Based
Lobby Groups-Represent 14 NGOs)
Consequence = poor financial efficiency
of FA as a means of Providing
overseas dev’t & humanitarian
assistance
5. The politics of famine and food aid
c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? (continue)
– Impact on farmers in recipient countries:
• Local consumers hooked on cheap food from abroad
• Local farmers out of business (depressed price)
• Food aid ends and consumers become ‘customers’ of
the donor country (commercial markets)
 Is this so?
o No, it did not work like this for US
o It destroys more commercial sales in the short
run than creates in the long run
o Commercial sales in the long run increase with
income growth  development works better
o Food aid delivered is not large enough inside
local market to encourage change in consumer
behavior
• Aid delivered at the wrong time (e.g. local harvest) can
depress price  better to deliver during off season
• Now better control: UN multilateral & early warning
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
Food Aid Management: Efficiency & Efficacy Issues
• Inefficiency
• Inefficacy
•
•
•
•
Insufficient amount of aid
Timeliness
Low quality of food
Distortion in use of
resources (monetisation)
implies limitations in
targeting the most
vulnerable populations
• Targeting errors & other forms of
mismanagement: HUMANITARIAN &
ECONOMIC IMPACTS
5. The politics of famine and food aid
c. Food aid: what, where, which consequences? (continue)
– Food power of donor govts:
• Conditioning food aid on policy reforms (e.g. president
Johnson and India 1965-6
 Failure: India refused end criticism of Vietnam war
• Embargo on US exports (president Carter)to URSS
 Failure: URSS imported from other countries (and
US exported to other countries) e
• No gains from manipulation of commercial policies (but
risky in ‘political’ terms  accusation to use starvation
as a tool of foreign policy
• Unlike international markets as petroleum, food markets
provide little coercive leverage to big exporters
– Food: NOT scarce non-renewable resource
available in few places; & fixed supply; & often gains
value if not consumed; & free storage (as petroleum)
– Food: abundant renewable resource that most
countries (can) produce; & looses value if not
consumed; & costly to store
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia
5. The politics of famine and food aid
Resources:
Paarlberg R., Food Politics, chapters 5 & 7
Politica economica delle risorse strategiche - Giacomo Branca, Universitá della Tuscia