the metaorganization`s role in the networks` life cycle

Transcript

Cesit Centro Studi sistemi di trasporto collettivo “Carlo Mario Guerci”
Piazza Bovio 14 80133 Napoli
Working paper series n. 19 2011
THE METAORGANIZATION’S ROLE IN
THE NETWORKS’ LIFE CYCLE
Gilda Antonelli
ABSTRACT
Is there a founder that can be responsible for the creation of the network? Is this actor similar
to a broker? This study will give some interesting findings on the development and evolution
of the broker’s role over the formation process of a network formed by different types of
organizations. Using a deductive method, I conducted a qualitative research analyzing 15
international spin out networks. Spin-out networks are really useful to enlighten broker’s
functions that are common in network creation but at the same time, they have peculiarities
that show a new kind of broker: the rational actor presented by Burt (Burt, 1992), that profits
by bridging structural holes, transforms itself in a no profit player who benefits on connecting
weak ties, as a “social capital” broker (Coleman, 1985). In particular I will give some
interesting findings on how the broker changes from a “traditional” one to an actor who acts
as a social bridge in the first stage of the network creation. I will name it metaorganization for
the focal role that it plays and for the value of its activities such as the selection of other
actors and the structuration of connections and communication channels between different
nodes. Finally, I reinforce my results by planning a pilot project in Italy to develop a spin out
network, and by participating in its implementation.
How It Started
The aim of this paper is to focus on a specific role played by the actor who is more active in
network creation and the co-evolution of its role and the network’s one.
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I describe my research design as grounded and I used a deductive approach starting from the
analysis of 15 spin out (or academic spin off) networks cases collected in different countries.
Academic spin off networks are really interesting to enlighten how networks form and to
point out some peculiarities about the actor who lead the formation process.
I observed and analyzed the networks and I developed a three stages network model, using
Larson & Starr model (Larson & Starr, 1993). I then obtained a spin out network’s life cycle
that allowed me to place the case studies in the different stages and to formulate my
hypotheses. I notice that in all the cases there is a focal role played by one of the node that
change depending of the stage the network is leaving. At first sight, it looks like a broker but
upon further study I found several differences that describe a new kind of actor acting
especially in the first stage of network’s formation. I went back to the cases to observe if my
hypothesizes were confirmed or not.
Once I defined the role of this new actor, that I named metaorganization, I took part in
designing a pilot project that helped me test my conclusions since I contributed as a
participant observer of its implementation. The use of spin out networks as a sample allowed
me to better separate the metaorganization’s functions and differences from the broker and to
follow the whole life’s cycle of a network.
Several studies (Amendola, 1992; Daval, 1999; Fontes, 1998; Mustar, 1995) confirm that
academic spin offs are mostly configured as new technology based firms (NTBF) that are
younger and more innovative than average. They give important direct and indirect
contributions to the creation of knowledge, diffusion of technology and new employment,
wealth creation, especially when the business application and scientific research results need
more extensive transformation activities to acquire industrial scale.
The valid benefits that academic spin off phenomenon offers to any domestic economy have
pressed several researchers and policymakers to investigate how their creation may be
supported and encouraged.
The academic spin off process is a complex phenomenon, characterized by many
peculiarities: the context in which it develops (universities and research centers); the subjects
that underlay its birth (academic and scientific community); technological complexities and
market conditions (high-tech businesses); strong connections with the academic and scientific
world even after the start-up process; strong influence of the law (intellectual property rights
law, incompatibility between academic activities and entrepreneurship in some countries).
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In particular, their creation is strongly influenced by many external factors. (Hansen, 1995)
proved that the systematic occurrence of the phenomenon is favored for being in a
environment characterized from the presence of particular factors (favorable law,
entrepreneurial culture, infrastructures). Several authors (Bruderl & Preisendorfer, 1998;
Dubini & Aldrich, 1991; Hansen M.T., Chesbourgh H.W., Sull D.N., 2000;Roberts &
Malone, 1996; Makinen H, 2001; Neergaard H., 2001) stressed the importance played by the
birth and development of NTBF in the existence of the network in which it operates.
Jarillo (Jarillo J.C. 1988), for example, tested the hypothesis that growing enterprises are
those making greater use of external resources. Studies on new technological enterprises in
China, Zhao and Aram (Zhao L. & Aram J.D. 1995) concluded that networking positively
influences company growth, especially in the initial stage.
Referring to the strong correlation existing between the resources used and the systematic
birth of spin out, Hansen analyzed a sample of 44 companies and concluded that the depth
and the frequency of interaction associated with the degree of connection amongst network
participants exerted a positive influence during the first two years of academic spin off
activity (Hansen, 1995).
Therefore, the presence of several players interacting partly through formalized relationships
and partly through the existence of informal and fiduciary contacts, supports the emergence of
academic ventures in a more systematic way.
Thus, to understand how to support and encourage the birth of spin off processes, it is
essential to stress the importance of creating a background context for systematic support
(Antonelli, 2003; Consiglio & Antonelli, 2003).
The key players in the background context are:
- researchers who want to become entrepreneurs;
- universities and research centers who want to valorize research results in spin-offs;
- local companies interested in obtaining and maintaining collaboration with innovation and
production centers;
- financier players (venture capitalist, business angels, banks, public ventures) who look for
high return investment opportunities;
- public institutions (governments, development agencies, scientific parks, innovation centers,
incubators) interested in starting processes of technology innovation in their territories.
Consequently, the lack of a background context able to meet the needs of potential
entrepreneurs is often the source of problems and obstacles.
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Particularly, negative influences on the creation of research spin-offs are:
•
lack of players able to supply the main services needed to start the process (for
example: lack of venture capitalists or incubators, shaky background contexts);
•
lack of communication and connection among those players which will impede
plenty, articulated and integrated supply of services (silent background contexts);
•
players non proactive in developing actions of promotion and scouting with the
aim of constructing a strong relationship with the potential entrepreneur (blind
background contexts).
RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS
The academic spin-off phenomenon is very common in the USA, although the origins can be
traced back to 19th century in Germany, when three pupils of the famous chemist von Liebig
set up the Basf & Hoechst Company. Silicon Valley and Boston areas developed when
numerous researchers and scientists left their laboratories to set up businesses1. In the United
States the demarcation between pure and industrial research ceased to exist in the Fifties
when Universities began to support Professors who not only created knowledge, but also
applied it. Both in the United States and in Europe this has led to the creation of contextual
networks by different players who link perfectly with one another to support the creation of
new spin offs. Information travels in the network without difficulty and allows each player to
reach his aim. This process involves researchers, universities and research centers, local
extant businesses, investors and public institutions (such as technology and innovation Parks,
incubators, development agencies).
In Europe the phenomenon is less common than in the USA. The most famous studies in
Europe on this theme were conducted in France by Mustar (Mustar, 1995), in Sweden by
several researchers who developed empirical analysis and described university activities to
support spin-off businesses; Autio (Autio, 1995) who has developed the Finnish case. In Italy
one of the first to study this phenomenon was Amendola (Amendola, 1992); recently other
researchers from Pisa’s Scuola Sant’Anna (Arrighetti & Vivarelli, 1998; Piccaluga, 1999;
Piccaluga e Chiesa, 1991, 1996) studied academic spin-offs.
Looking at successful cases of areas where academic spin-off become a real enlighten
phenomenon in changing local economy environment, I discovered a lot of interesting
different realities that made it possible. The most famous cases of Route 128 or Silicon
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Valley, Cambridge phenomenon, Israel incubators or the Welsh spin-out program, the Sophie
- Antipolis or the Warwick Science Park, the IT spin-out from Trinity College and the Dublin
Development Center, are all networks’ cases that are in different stages of life.
I analyzed 15 international cases of excellence in generating academic spin-off selecting them
from internet, books, conferences and research papers and from different direct interviews I
had with the managers of important realities, such as Oxford or MIT (table 1).
Each case addresses the history and the present condition of the relational context existent or
created by an entrepreneurial center leaded by university, a development agency or a
public/private actor who plays the key role in facilitating the spin-out process. This study is
based on data obtained from different sources. Part of the data was collected using
bibliographical sources and case studies written on them; part was collected towards internet
sources and participating in several seminars and conferences; part of the sources were
obtained by mailing information package directly sanded by the leader of the centers who was
contacted by the author; and finally, a large part were collected from unstructured open-ended
direct interviews conducted by the leaders themselves completed between 2000 and 2003.
The interviews were carried out mostly by the author and in part in collaboration with other
researchers.
------------------------------Insert table 1 about here
------------------------------All the managers interviewed were the leading person of the organization that plays the key
role in the network and they were required to give materials and available data to validate
what they declared. Some of them were recalled to have more information and invited to
participate in focused conference on spin-off creation. The managers were told that they were
included in the sample because of the notoriety their center has in the spin-out creating
process and that we were trying to understand which were the activities and the capabilities
that make it successful.
I formulated, with all my data, some hypothesis that I decided to test. I had the opportunity to
be involved in designing a pilot project in collaboration with the Italian Development Agency
(Sviluppo Italia) to construct a spin out network in Southern of Italy. The implementation of
the pilot project was conducted by me as a participated observer.
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It confirms my model about the role and the functions played by the metaorganization in the
formation of the network.
The pilot project to support academic spin-off creation was set up between 2000 and 2001 by
MURST (Department of Universities and Technological and Scientific Research) and
Sviluppo Italia (Italian Development Agency), in collaboration with four Italian Universities
(Benevento, Catania, Naples and Lecce).
A STAGE MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE NETWORK
Analyzing different cases of excellence in which academic spin-offs have arisen, I grouped
them according to the characteristics of the network and their development stage. In this way,
I developed a stage model that shapes 3 different periods using Larson & Starr model (Larson
& Starr, 1993) (Figure 1).
------------------------------Insert figure 1 about here
------------------------------The first stage (t1) is characterized by the absence of the network or even the total lack of
some focal nodes (shaky background contexts). During this time-period, I noticed that the
presence of a player who undertakes the whole support function of the spin-out birth is
essential. This specific player is the leader in the background context and allows the birth of
the network itself.
In the second stage (t2), it is possible to observe an evolution of the situation: the actors of the
background context that are necessary to construct a successful network are there but there are
several structural holes between them that make the network not able to wholly communicate
(silent background contexts).
In the third stage (t3) the network is fully developed and connected: all the nodes in the
background context are present and information flow through spontaneously. Every actor is
aware of all the information about the others.
The First Stage: The Construction of theNetwork
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It is possible to affirm that the first stage is the phase of construction. Several network cases
among the sample are going throughout this stage. One of them was, for example, Israel
when, more than ten years ago, it decided to invest in technology innovation.
The Constitution of the country states that every Jew who arrives in Israel has the right to
become a citizen and with the heavy Russian influx at the end of the Eighties, the population
increased by about 20% in a very short time, creating many logistic and employment
problems. Most of the new citizens were engineers, mathematicians, physicists and other
researchers. This is why the Government decided to create an incentive system to encourage
economic valorization of research results. There was no network and even some of the nodes
that are basic to help the spin out process were missing. Universities were not competitive in
terms of the research done and the number of researchers. There were no venture capitalists or
business angels and the economy was characterized by trade more than the productive sector.
The first step was to invest in innovation. The Ministry of Industry and Trade set up an Office
of the Chief Scientist (OCS) that is responsible for implementing Government policy
regarding support and encouragement of industrial research and development. Support and
incentive programs were governed by the “Law for the Encouragement of Industrial Research
and Development”2.
The most famous measure of economic policy was, certainly, the Technological Incubator
Program. The incubators (24 all over the country, running ten to fifteen enterprises each) are
non-profit support organizations that give fledgling entrepreneurs an opportunity to develop
their innovative technological ideas and set up new business in order to market them. This is a
very risky stage of business development, and commercial money usually does not take this
kind of risk. Furthermore, in the country there was no culture in transforming laboratory ideas
into something that one can buy. Therefore, in order to ensure that good ideas do become real
opportunities, the State assumes the risks via its incubator program, funding this stage of
development. The incubator program is applied under the guidance and with the support of
the Office of the Chief Scientist or the Ministry of Industry and Trade (OCS). Policy is set by
the Steering Committee on Technological Incubators, appointed by the Ministry’s Director
General and composed of a public representative from high-tech industry, one from the
incubators, the Chief Scientist of OCS, the coordinator for industry at the Ministry of Finance
Budget Division and the director for Technological Incubator Program.
To be accepted by the Program the project must be R&D based on an innovative
technological idea meant to develop a product with export marketing potential. Special
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requirements specify that at least half the members of the project teams at the incubator have
to be recent immigrants, that initial ownership has to be stipulated by the rules of the steering
committee; the new product has to be manufactured in Israel.
The incubators support the new entrepreneurs in determining the technological and marketing
applicability of the idea, and drawing up an R&D plan, obtaining the financial resources
needed to carry out the project, team building and tutoring, professional and administrative
counsulting, guidance and supervision, raising capital and preparing for marketing, providing
secretarial and administrative services, maintenance, procurements, accounting and legal
advises; giving professional and business instructions, especially to immigrants, monitoring
every single project. The project should be ready for marketing within two years.
The Government started a virtuous circle of venture capital investment with the creation in
1993 of Yozma. Yozma is super fund to finance the creation of venture capital funds of which
40% is shared by the Government itself and the remain part is managed and shared by private
owners. The private owner could exercise the option to take the total control of the fund in
five years. This policy create an increasing presence of venture capitalist coming from all over
the world. Israelis enterprises in the 1999 attracted one billion dollar of venture capital from
all over the world and there are more than one hundred companies from Israel that are quoted
in the Nasdaq market in US.
In 2001 about 2800 new start up were found in Israel (this result is second only to US) and the
networking policy pushed by this actor allows the creation of the network, that is necessary to
support the spin out company birth on a regular basis. The network is developing from a first
stage in which there were no nodes to a second stage in which all the actors are present and
many are linked among themselves.
In a few years this policy allowed to form the culture insight economy and universities to
form. The first one started to live on high tech companies that first spin out from the
incubators and that still maintain a connection with them.
Universities become very active in linking incubators and enterprises but they offer few
services. The research evaluation system attributes the same importance to teaching activities,
to research and to economic valorization of results.
In Israel there are now many business angels who manage incubators on a voluntary basis.
They decide policies and assess which projects to accept. Moreover, there are large numbers
of venture capitalists in the country, partly attracted by state networking action, partly by the
high number of Israeli companies quoted at NASDAQ.
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This kind of environment results in a high number of start-ups: 2500 (the highest in the
world). The country’s strength lies in the bond between research and industry. In fact, the
amount spent on research and development, in relation to the size of Gross Domestic Product,
is one of the highest in the world, and relative to the size of the labor force, Israel has by far
the largest number of publishing authors in natural sciences, engineering, agriculture and
medicine.
At the end of the 2001 the Ministry invested $ 266,900,000 in the Incubator Program and
almost 200 projects are still assisted by it. The state has recovered its investments and has
earned $200,000,00.
The Second Stage: The “Developing” Network
The second stage is characterized by the presence of a more complex background context. A
lot of the different actors that are necessary for the network are present but they are not
connected to each other. This stage is characterized by the lack of communication and
connection among those players which will impede ample, articulated and integrated supply
of services (silent background contexts) and by players unable to develop actions of
promotion and scouting with the scope of constructing a strong relationship with the potential
entrepreneur (blind background contexts). There are still few structural holes that open the
stage to the presence of broker. Podolny (Podolny, 2001) argues that the information and
control advantages of structural holes should be a competitive advantage for venture capitalist
detecting and developing ventures at an early stage of development. The cases show that the
more the network founder keeps going in its function of connection, the less space is left for
the broker.
Among the spin out networks that I analyzed, one of those that are in the second stage is the
Oxford spin out network.
The Oxford University experience is one of the most successful cases in the United Kingdom.
In this particular case it was the university who acted as a metaorganization.
The success of the Oxford University network in the economic valorization of research results
depends on the high number of researchers who work there3. Of UK universities, Oxford, in
fact, has the highest expenditure for research activities. Moreover, the university allows
researchers to work as consultants for 30 days a year and, with the permission of their own
departments, they are also allowed to become entrepreneurs at the same time, as long as they
do not have a strategic executive role in their businesses. This strategy eliminates many
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barriers to researcher circulation. England has a long history in the attention that Universities
have not only for teaching and researching but also for patenting and commercializing their
researches. That is visible even observing the large number of enterprises that operate in the
country, most of which are technology based.
Beside, the Government supports the birth of new technology start up financing the pre-seed
stage towards the University Challenge Seed Fund and it operates giving money to
researchers to develop alternative ways of creating inventions, studying the market, patenting
intellectual property rights, defining the best dimension of the new firm. This fund is split
among 15 independent funds that are managed by private enterprises and that are used from
single university or their consortium. Venture capitalists and business angels are quite present
and they are both specialized in different sectors, the amount and stage of investment
required.
With all the different nodes of the spin out network present already, the network is in the
second stage of developing of its life’s cycle. What is missing are some of the connections
between the nodes or a more efficient connection with the “right ones” that allow the network
to be more efficient.
At Oxford, the university promotes and supports the academic spin-off toward its technology
transfer enterprise, ISIS Innovation. ISIS is a subsidiary owned wholly by the university and
its task is to promote marketing of research ideas generated by Oxford academics. The
University (stated by the constitution) owns all intellectual property rights on research.
Generally, the University assigns all its intellectual property rights to ISIS which then protects
them by patenting, sells them as licenses or markets the inventions for the constitution of new
enterprises, financed by private venture capital or specific financing funds.
ISIS’ role is then to support the academic spin-off. ISIS selects the projects worthy of
assessment because researchers who proposes them demonstrate business skill in terms of
market understanding, clarity in explanation of the idea, practical sense and risk taking ability.
ISIS set up a business angels network for its activities to allow individuals or private
companies who want to invest time and money to contact the Oxford academic spin-offs. It is
interesting to note that higher potential projects are directed to the Investment Advisory
Committee that is responsible for the assignment both of the University Challenge Seed Fund
and of the ISIS College Fund4.
In the new company the researcher and the university receive almost the same share of
capital, the former for the idea, the latter for services provided. Every academic spin-off has
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an ISIS project manager who supports it in the start-up and monitors the development of the
activity. In fact, if the growth index is not satisfactory there will be a proposal to stop it.
Oxford University does not provide services such as the space in its buildings or laboratory
access to new entrepreneurs but ISIS sets up contacts between academic spin-offs and
specialized layers, business consultants, accountants, potential venture capitalists and others
who want to become entrepreneurs. For that purpose, ISIS organizes several activities:
newsletters and seminars, meetings every year, presenting new ideas in search of financing
and support, and linking people with different roles in the network, in order to talk one to one
and have dinner together. The Ceo of Isis thinks that connecting the right people is the key to
success of his center. The University sets aside one million pounds per year for ISIS
management. ISIS supports seven to ten academic spin-offs each year.
The Third Stage: The “Fully-Developed” Network
In the third stage it is possible to observe a more complex situation. All the key players to the
spin-out process are present and connected to each other. The network is redundant of
connections and it is difficult to find structural holes critical for the process. It is a dynamic
network in which old and new actors alternate and many connections happen without the need
of a broker. This is the life’s cycle of the network stage where the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology case is present. Route 128 is one of the most famous area of excellence for the
presence of successful new technology based enterprises. This is due to the long history of the
area strictly connected with the University activity that raises, during the years, the rest of the
back ground context.
Interweaving the CEO of the Mit Enterpreneurship Center, what was immediately clear was
that the main task of his center, which is to support the University’s name promotion. At MIT,
in fact, companies spin out anyway, even without the center support. The network is fully
present and redundant in its connections: venture capitalist and business angels come to
University spontaneously to look for new ideas to finance; existing companies maintain close
collaborations and connections with several research departments and there are a lot of events
organized by different actors that allow all the nodes of the network to interact. There are
even established and formal institutions, such as the Boston Bank that invest money in
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promising start ups. Information is exchanged between the actors and it is less common to
have structural holes from which a broker can profit.
« ...at MIT things happen by themselves because people believe in them » as the Ceo had
stated during the interview. It is necessary to say, in any case, that success factors of this
network are the entrepreneur culture spread, the huge amount of funds that are invested in
research and, not last, the “name” that the University developed in several years and that
attracts and activates a lot of new connections.
Being in the third stage of the life’ cycle means that there is no need for a single actor that is
more responsible for the creation and functioning of the network. But it doesn’t mean that the
situation was always the same. I noticed, in fact, that even those cases in my sample that are
at the present time, in a situation of fully developed networking stage, passed through the first
two phases. In the MIT case, for example, the process started with the appointment of its vicechancellor in Washington to manage national research funds. Being in this new role the vicechancellor directed research funds to MIT where researchers started to make a thorough study
of National Defense field. This new field made them think in terms of practical research and
raised them to work in team, due to the reports that they have to make government’s
engineers and supervisors. The proximity with this new actor, the Government, helps to
influence the policies that were taken by a technology transfer problem, such as financing
support, the promulgation of the Bay-Dole Act, and even the construction of the Route 128,
that made the area around the MIT more easily accessible and less expensive to live. The
University started financing spin out and supporting applied researches, promoting
entrepreneur culture even in technical degrees (medicine, engineering, social sciences and so
on). This enabled the birth of many technology based companies that remained connected
with the department to where the founders belonged and that become an attraction for venture
capitalist and business angels. The university departments connected the researchers with
financiers and mentors, promoted start up competitions and established several prices for the
best applied researches, playing in this way, the role of a network founder and a social broker.
Is That a Broker?
Analyzing the cases of my sample, I realized that there is an interesting and specific activity, a
particular characteristic of the environment or capabilities of some of the players involved,
that make the successful existence of spin out networks possible. I detected a focal role played
by one of the network’s actor that, at the first moment, I identified as a broker.
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Existing research on brokering and structural holes has focused on how brokering happens in
networks with relatively long history (Burt, 1992, 1997; Di Maggio, 1992; Marsden, 1982),
trying to test the social capital and structural holes theories in the formation of biotechnology
networks (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) or exploring weak ties and social capital (Coleman,
1988; Granovetter, 1985), or brokering in collaboration network (Ahuja, 2000) but on my
knowledge, there is no research published on how brokering happens in emerging networks
with little or no shared history. Moreover, there are very few studies published on how
networks are formed and developed (Larson & Starr, 1993; Starr & Macmillan, 1990). The
contribution of this study is that it fills this gap by identifying a new kind of actor that I
named metaorganization.
I’ve been studying academic spin-off networks for some years and I realized it is a useful
research object to isolate the broker’s role in the different stage of a network’s cycle of life.
Academic spin-off phenomenon is based on the existence of a network of players but there is
always a phase in which it has to be constructed. Analyzing the cases in my sample, I
discovered that they are in different stages of their life’s cycle but they all passed by a
creation stage. A central premise of this paper is that social capital influences how the
network forms. The “founder” always acts as a broader kind of broker, that has more
functions than a traditional one in the first stage, but reduces them as the network evolves. I
named this broader broker metaorganization because it is the player who organizes others by
choosing the different nodes of the network and defining the communication channels and the
ties that connect them.
Several scholars have focused on the importance of the broker role in the network. Boissevain
(Boissevain, 1974) defines a broker as «the one who directly or indirectly connects people..
[…] It fills up the gap of communication between groups, structures and even cultures […]
and it occupies a strategic site in the social relational networks ». According to Marsden
(Marsden, 1982) the broker is « the actor who facilitates the transactions between actors that
do not have trust direct ties ». The broker occupies an important position in the network for a
number of reasons. First, resources (i.e. components of knowledge) proprietary to one
community of people might solve the problems of another, but only if connections and links
between existing solutions and problems can be made across the boundaries between them
(Hargadon & Sutton 1997). Second, when connection are made between previously
unconnected components of knowledge, past experience often take on new creative forms as
different users re-combine existing ideas with new incoming elements of knowledge (Nelson
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& Winter, 1982) “These new combinations are objectively new concepts or objects because
they are built from existing but previously unconnected ideas” (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997:
716).
The broker’s functions then, are primarily two: first, to connect the different actors; second, to
transfer information between them. The mechanism underlying information access in
literature are basically a causal one, the structural holes as Burt proposes (Burt, 1992), or the
strength of the ties, as Granovetter argues (Granovetter, 1973).
Generally the broker has power in the network because it owns information and controls it in
connection with what Burt calls “structural holes” (Burt, 1992). The structural holes are gaps
between non redundant contacts. Burt states that networks can be redundant in the sense that
there are no benefits in information exchanges because all the contacts between nodes are
cohesive (contacts that are strongly connected to each other) or equivalent (contact who link a
node to the same third parties). In this case similar information circulates in the network and
there is no benefits for the different nodes while, on the contrary, non redundant contacts offer
information benefits that are additive and structural holes are the gaps between them (Burt,
1992). Thus, structural holes are a gap in information flows between alters linked to some
ego but not linked to each other. A structural hole indicates that the actors on the other side of
the hole have access to different flows of information (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997).
Following the concept of “tertius gaudens” proposed by Simmel and Merton (Merton, 1968;
Simmel, 1955) the broker derives his control benefits connecting structural holes. The broker
who uses several structural holes has more power in terms of social capital where social
capital is the contextual complement of human capital (Burt, 1997) and it is «a resource of the
organization that inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors»
(Coleman, 1990). While Coleman’s standpoint states that the optimal social structure is the
one in which there are dense ties and the network looks more interconnected, Burt states that
constructing networks consisting of disconnected alters is the optimal strategy.
From the prospective of structural holes theory ego networks in which a firm’s partner has no
links with each other are preferred to networks in which its partners are densely tied to each
other. Walker, Kogut & Shan (Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997) demonstrate that this is not true
for biotechnology firms’ networks. They tested the structural holes and the social capital
(Coleman, 1990) theories by examining network formation in the biotechnology industry.
They discovered that social capital theory is the better predictor of cooperation over time and
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that in the formation of the network it is much better to have a strongly tied network than to
proceed throughout brokering structural holes.
To understand how brokering evolves in a new organization, it is important to study how it
manages its functions. The broker can manage the network in two different ways: centralizing
or decentralizing the information. In the first model that is similar to the wheal model
proposed by Shaw (Shaw, 1978), the broker knows the information that is the core for the
network, where to find it and where to locate it. It can decide how and to whom it is
transferred and it exerts his power in this way. This is coherent with the structural hole theory
proposed by Burt because the brokering opportunities of information flows have greater
economic payoff in terms of power.
The decentralized approach is based on reciprocity. Although the broker has the control of
communication channels, it passes information to the other actors that become aware of all
the social capital in the network. In this case the knowledge is widespread in the network
(Provan & Human, 2000). This argument leads to Coleman’s view of social capital, that firms
in central position with higher social capital are likely to have more relationships and
redundancy of the network’s ties giving them more chances to increase further.
This helps me to frame my propositions:
Proposition 1: in the first stage of a network life’s cycle there is an actor, the
metaorganization, that can be responsible for the foundation of the network;
Proposition 2: the metaorganization is different from a broker and it does not have an aim to
profit;
Proposition 3: the metaorganization role change as the network evolves in the life’s cycle
stages.
DISCUSSION
The Metaorganization: More Than a Broker
Many research studies have been published on networks but few have contributed to the focus
on the first stage of its life’s cycle: the creation of a network. In the model that I presented,
the more interesting findings derive from the analysis of how networks are formed and the
characteristics of their founder. In all but one of the cases that I analyzed, I found the presence
of an actor that is responsible for the network foundation: the metaorganization. It is the one
that starts to create a new network analyzing which are the nodes that are necessary to make it
15
successful in its aim. It is the organization that creates the conditions for the network
existence and defines contextual rules for the various participants. It also brings contextual
knowledge to network construction since it generates knowledge and content applicable to a
specific network. The presence of an outlier, Cambridge UK, can be explained considering
that there are no documents that tell the story about Cambridge University from the
beginning. It is one of the oldest University and that can be considered as one of the
explanation to the so called “Cambridge phenomenon”. The influence that it had on the
economy of the area for such a long time and to the dissemination of knowledge and applied
researches justify the presence of a background context well developed. Things at Cambridge
happen by themselves and there is no need for any metaorganization. The CEO of the
Innovation Research Center at Cambridge University explained the presence of the center
simply for the aim of “having one”. There are no sources to reconstruct how the spin out
network started.
Existing literature (Antonelli, 2003; Consiglio - Antonelli, 2003) and also empirical evidence
point out four main functions of these players:
to build the network by selecting players;
to replace the missing nodes of the network;
to define the functioning and communications rules to be used among network players;
to connect the structural holes.
The main task is to construct a contextual network, choosing different players whose
characteristics and knowledge enable them to support the network aim. And this function is
absolutely central in cases where process players are not able to create these interactive and
collaborative contexts alone as the case of spin out companies. In the spin out networks the
players of the background context that are necessary are researchers, universities and research
centers, local companies, financiers and public institutions. The nodes that starts the
foundation process are always aware of what are the key nodes that are necessary to make the
network successful. For example, the Government in Israel started powering the researchers
and the research centers, then it looked for financiers. The Oxford Innovation Center and the
Project Development Center of Dublin build records for financiers, business angels and even
trained consultant to help the spin out companies. The Welsh Development Agency started
identifying the research centers and the Universities more active in applied studies and then it
connected them with business angels networks and local companies.
16
The second function of the metaorganization is to play the role of one or more of the missing
nodes that are necessary for the network. Replacing the functions played by other actors, in
fact, could be necessary where otherwise the network would not be successful and could
assure a power role to the metaorganization itself. For example, the spin out networks were
often lacking in ventures capitals or management support. The metaorganization decides to
undertake alone some of these activities for many reasons: one of this is the attempt to fill the
gaps existing in some background context; the second reason is aiming to give credibility to
entrepreneurs and finally it can be driven by the willingness of internalizing some critical
services. The Innovation Center at Warwick, for example, started financing groups of
researchers with good ideas who wanted to spin out; the Israel Government created a venture
fund, as I mentioned above; Umea University and the Center of Innovation Enterprises at
Linkoping, in Sweden, ran programs to support technical services and team building to the
spin out companies.
The third main function of the metaorganization is to define the functioning and
communication rules to be used among network players. Facilitating communication,
connections and information exchange among the players in the network, makes it a sort of
promoter of the creation of the network because it:
defines the mission and the strategic guidelines of the network;
explicates the values which have to be shared by the players;
builds the communication and co-ordination mechanisms;
The metaorganization, in fact, defines the strategy because the choice of the players depends,
obviously on the general mission adopted. Trying to define the mission, the metaorganization
analyses the critical success factors that characterize the network and localize the particular
expertise of each player in the market. Moreover, the metaorganization constructs network
communication and co-ordination methodologies. For example, WDA and OCS who
projected the network involving the main players represented by the researchers, first have
tried to motivate them to become entrepreneurs by the offer of both financial support for
economic development of research, and more “physical-managerial” support through the
supply of services particularly useful in the start-up period. An intense promotional campaign
of their programs is at the base of this action and is meant to attract the highest possible
number of investors. The first successes are used then to involve more researchers, some
businesses already present in the territory, universities, incubators, with the scope of enlarging
the network. The exact ways of doing it are many and quite different: Israel has created
17
incubators that are directly controlled by the government and that co-ordinate the different
activities at a high and central level; Wales has operated more locally, through area managers
with the task of involving territorial organizations and agencies in the regional program.
The construction role of the network that this actor plays is related to the creation and
diffusion among the other actors that it choose of some specific communication’s rules that by
time, will influence the structure itself. The metaorganization can give several different norms
of organizational behavior that are not necessarily formalized but that help, throughout the
interaction of the different actors, to create the vision of the network. The role of managing
and connection can be externalized by the distribution of resources such as information,
know-how, access to particular sources, etc. that make it in a position of power to the other
nodes of the network.
Another basic function played by the metaorganization is the connection of structural holes.
That is, the activity that makes it closer to a broker. The metaorganization, in fact, ties the
nodes in the network that are disconnected to transfer information and to develop the network
itself.
The role of metaorganization can be played from any organization but it is worth noting that it
can succeed in creating this network only if it can create value for the players involved. So,
first of all, the meta-organization must have important properties in order to justify its role
and induce other players to create a relationships with it. Mainly, it will need to build a
privileged relationship with the players that are more important to the network aim. In the
spin out network case it has to be really close to the potential entrepreneurs.
In fact, it is not by chance that this role, in the spin out network, is often played by an
university institution who is, of course, the closest player to potential academic entrepreneurs
and, therefore, the most suitable to represent them. There are experiences, as ISIS in Oxford,
SMIL in Linkoping, IC at the Trynity College in Dublin and other similar also in Finland, in
Scotland and in Italy, where the Universities of Bologna, Naples, Ferrara have recently started
the spin-off points, that prove it.
When, on the contrary, the metaorganization’s role is played by a Government or a regional
development agency, its privileged relationship with the potential entrepreneurs derives more
from its capacity to create a range of real and financial incentives and facilities.
To be able to build the network the metaorganization has to have the trust of the other players
and this is possible only if it is legitimate. In other words, it has to be able to generate
18
confidence and trust among the background context players and this is easier, of course, when
the role is held by an institution.
Even if one of the main activity of a broker consists in bringing the structural holes in the
network, the metaorganization is more than a broker as Burt defined it. First of all, the broker
has its aim in maintaining structural holes because they give it power. In fact, since it does not
connect two different nodes who are not aware one of another, it maintains the power of
obtaining information from both, being the only one in the two networks that it bridges to
obtain it. The metaorganization, on the contrary, uses the structural holes not to profit to keep
them a part but to try to activate as many connections as it can. This brings me to define the
metaorganization as a different kind of broker in connecting structural holes: a broker in the
Colemann view (Colemann, 1985). The more the social capital spread throughout connecting
structural holes, the more the network becomes accessible and effective.
Furthermore, another extremely important function of the metaorganization is the
replacements of the missing players in providing services to the network that are critical to
reach the goal, while the broker does not.
Moreover, the metaorganization needs to have a social function to be successful and also trust
for the other players in the network, while the broker acts to reach its own goal and interest.
The metaorganization is a non-profit actor. This is another reason that makes it different from
the broker that, on the contrary, is an actor that acts to reach its own profit.
The metaorganization constructs the network’s structure that allows the existence of the
structural holes that the broker tends to control. Therefore, there is no space for the broker
without the metaorganization’s pre-action.
The Metaorganization’s Life Cycle
The metaorganization’s role changes in the different network’s stages (figure 2). While in the
first stage, in fact, there is an actor that undertakes all the four functions that I previously
described, in the following stages, it loses part of them, transforming itself in a different kind
of actor.
-------------------------------Insert figure 2 about here
----------------------------------
19
In the creation stage the network is not present and even some of the basic nodes are missed.
The metaorganization, then, builds the network choosing the different nodes to involve,
replaces the missing node’s functions, defines the functioning and communication rules to be
used among network players and connects the structural holes that are present. At this stage,
though, it plays all its functions making the existence of a network possible. In this stage there
is no space for the broker activity because there is still no network.
In the second stage of the life’s cycle, it loses some of its functions: the network is already
present and so it does not need to be build; all the strategic nodes are occupied by some
organization already. Therefore, the metaorganization maintains its role of managing the
communication rules and it can do it in two different ways: centralizing or decentralizing. In
the first case, the metaorganization carries out an initial connection activity among all the
players, followed by a centralizing activity of information flow management. Information
management develops according to a centralized wheel model (Shaw M.E., 1978) in which
the metaorganization has an absolutely central role in the contextual network. In the sample
that I analyzed, the centralizing activity is often carried out through monthly newsletters,
private meetings with the different players, which allows all network nodes to connect
without direct contact, but only through the metaorganization. This kind of approach turns out
to be very efficient, due to the fact that all the players know what is going on at any level,
inside and outside of the network. The limit of this approach is the fact that all the information
passes from the hands of the metaorganization and is filtered before being distributed. An
example of this is the Israeli network in which the incubator managers create contacts
between researchers and potentially interested venture capitalists, finance the business idea in
the pre-competitive phase and monitor the business during the initial period of its existence.
In this way, the new businesses obtain information about the market conditions, financial
support and other businesses through the metaorganization itself, which filters the contacts
between all network players. Even the CEEI in Spain and the Sophie Antipolis Science Park
use a centralized communication system.
On the contrary, the second model of relationship management leads to a decentralizing
metaorganization and to a higher reciprocity level in the interactions, in which the
metaorganization has primarily the role of coordinator. Therefore, it organizes formal and
informal meetings, conferences in different places, with the scope of facilitating the contacts
of all the players. But, despite the coordinator function, the position is on the same level as
20
that of other players with regards to the management of information flow (Provan K.G. &
Human S.E., 2000).
English and Swedish universities constitute the main example of such behavior, in which
networking is a very important function, basically conducted through the organization of
meetings among venture capitalists, business angels, businesses, local agencies, etc.
In the second stage some opportunities appear for the broker to profit in connecting structural
holes that the metaorganization has not connected yet.
In the third stage of the life’s cycle, the network is fully developed and redundant in
connection and information. At this stage the metaorganization has no reason to exist and
there is also no space for brokerage.
The Pilot Project
The participation of the planning and implementation of the pilot project gave me the chance
to test my propositions.
The pilot project to support academic spin-off creation was set up in Italy between 2000 and
2001 by MURST (Department of Universities and Technological and Scientific Research)
and Sviluppo Italia (Italian Development Agency), in collaboration with four Italian
Universities, Benevento, Catania, Naples and Lecce.
The four centers of experimentation, which lasted six months, were chosen because of the
awareness that they were fertile contexts for innovation and they were available to participate
in collaboration programs for economic growth. They are, in fact, centers of spontaneous
spin-off and particularly research-orientated universities.
In Italy the academic spin-off phenomenon is not very diffused. Few extant cases are
spontaneous and sporadic initiatives of research groups leaving the academic world. Multiple
limiting factors are currently inhibiting the creation of academic enterprises.
These factors include: the major lack of researchers willing to attempt economic valorization
of their own research results; Universities’ lack of interface in basic research, applied research
and transfer to the business world; the difficulty of going back to the university environment
after leaving its for a business experience; the scarcity of venture capitalists; the certainty that
the failure of an economic activity is a "scar" for all the rest of the entrepreneurs’ life.
Numbers of researchers are correlated to the level of R&D investments that is only 1.3% of
GIP compared to 2% in Europe and 2.7%, in US. The researcher career is not attractive and
competitive for young people. This derives from the rather diffused presence of an "elitist"
21
culture that characterizes the research environment, a too long career path and the low level of
reward. Above all, intellectual property rights are covered by a complex law that does not
motivate researchers to spin out. The Government, however, started to show an increasing
interest in the problem, with the Christmas 1998 Pact and the Law 297 /1998, that envisages
financial support for pre-competitive development of enterprises and opening of liaison
offices, as well as the introduction of several regional laws to support new business start-ups.
The project started signing four collaboration acts, one for each University in the project, in
which where stated the main aims and the organizational tasks to be reached by every actor in
the sperimentation. The first step was the opening in each university of a physical space, spin
out point, to work as an interface between researchers and project consultants.
The pilot action identified three key figures with different organizational functions: the
manager who leases between Sviluppo Italia and the university, with coordination and
management functions; the spin-off point manager, who is responsible for the physical office
in the university, for promotion, first assistance for focusing academic ideas; the Senior
Business Planning Consultant, sent by Sviluppo Italia to assist the focusing idea phase, to
support the research group in the start-up and to activate all the services needed to study the
business plan. The implementation of the pilot project was followed by me as a participating
observer.
The basic idea of the program was the technological valorization of new high-tech business
creation processes, by transferring into R&D organizations the tools and expertise already
experimented by Sviluppo Italia in its enterprise’s creation activity.
The pilot target was mainly academic research employees: professors, PhD students and
PhDs, researchers, graduates students and laboratory technicians. There were several
workshop organized to illustrate the services that the spin out accessing the program can have
and everyone between the target actors who was interested, provided a first level format to the
spin off point. Then the consultant analyzed with the potential entrepreneur the spin out idea
and decided which were the services and the kind of support that it needed.
The key player of this process was Sviluppo Italia, playing the role of metaorganization. It
selected the actors to involve and connected them to make the information flow; it chose the
entrepreneurial ideas, supplied assistance in the business planning description and increased
business awareness in academics (together with universities). Moreover, it played the venture
capitalist’s role financing the profitable ideas with start up’ funds.
22
The universities involved in the pilot project supplied some services such as access to
laboratories and university structures, mentoring new ideas, technical and scientific selection
of business ideas in terms of concrete realization, assistance to patenting, team building and
networking with other players to facilitate spin-off processes.
A project committee met once a month to make the point of the situation and decided the
further strategies to implement. It was formed by the Sviluppo Italia and MURST chiefs of
the program, six consultants (in which the author) who were the project planners, the
coordinator manager of each university and three project managers.
The focusing and developing phase of entrepreneurial process created twenty-four ideas in
which eighty-five researchers took part. Lecce University alone accounted for almost 50% of
the people involved in the academic spin-off.
The pilot project results confirmed and reinforced the propositions on the existence of a
metaorganization, different to a broker, that can create the network. In fact, there were no
other Italian university that reached the some number of spin out in such a short time even in
the most famous technology oriented places, such as Milan and Turin Polithecnic
Universities. It is in part, due to the fact that it was the first time that researchers were
supported to spin out and that surely effected the high amount of the number. But certainly,
the metaorganization’s role plays the rest.
CONCLUSION
Conclusion and Direction for Future Researches
The research that I presented gives a new perspective of network studies, focusing on the key
role played by some nodes especially in the network creation stage. The metaorganization is a
strategic actor that can construct a network to reach a specific goal. I focused on spin out
networks to build an experience based learning of which are the main functions that an actor
has to play to be a metaorganization and which are the properties that it has to have.
The stage model of the network’s life cycle enlightens the co-evolution of the
metaorganization role that loses its own peculiarities as the network becomes more and more
“developed”. It is possible to affirm that the “pure” metaorganization plays a focal role
especially in the creation stage, where it poses the conditions to the broker’s existence by
building the network’s structure. After some time the network emerges as a result of the
seeding efforts of this actor. Then, in the second stage, the metaorganization’s functions begin
23
to become redundant because the network is already there and doesn’t need to be constructed
anymore, and all the nodes are present, so the metaorganization has no need to play a missing
role. It maintains two of its functions: the connection of structural holes and the definition of
the communication rules. It starts to becomes more similar to a broker but with a peculiar
“social” mission: it is a broker in the Coleman’s view.
The transition between the second and the third stage is critical because in the last phase of
networks’ life cycle, the metaorganization extinguishes its functions and it becomes
unnecessary. Given that no organization wants to become obsolete, there is a risk that the
metaorganization with its behavior, starts to impede the transition to the developed network
and. In the battle for continued legitimacy, as its role declines, all that was learned about how
to build a network is forgotten.
What should really happen is that once the metaorganization reaches the last stage, it has to
choose: it can change its role playing the functions of another node of the network or transfer
itself to a new location where it can restart the process from the first stage exporting the
capabilities it has acquired. It can both decide to relocate in networks with different aims or,
simply in different places. In the spin out case, for example, the metaorganization could
decide to become a financier or a services supporter, or in the second choice, it can leave the
developed network, whose aim was biotechnology companies, and restarts using its
experience in nano-technology spin outs.
Future researches may focus on studying why some metaorganization are more effectiveness
than others: is it just a matter of capabilities? Do contextual factors play some role effecting
the co-evolution process?
First of all, capabilities are really important in this process. In fact, being an organization
made by individuals, the success in reaching its own goal depends on the capabilities it has in
terms of human resources. That it why it would be interesting to define which are the core
capabilities that make a metaorganization successful.
The metaorganization selects its resources in the creation stage. As I mentioned above, the
metaorganization has a social goal and needs to be legitimate, so it is, most of the time, a
public or not for profit institution. It means that it chooses its human resources counting on
personal knowledge of the people or simply re-organizes people who are already in the
organization. This can be a limit for its success because if it doesn’t have the right capabilities
inside to play its functions, it will fail its aim or, at least, it will need a longer time and an
higher amount of resources.
24
Furthermore, external factors can play an important influence on the network’s evolution. I
retain that some factors, belonging to the context, mediate the effects of the
metaorganization’s role on network’s life cycle and, at the same time, can influence the
network’s evolution itself. More specifically, the presence of favorable policies or supporting
institutions, the existence in the area of a spread entrepreneurial culture, the amount of skilled
human capital and the high level of what some researchers defined “quality of place” (Florida,
2000; Arora & al. 2000) can facilitate and accelerate the co-evolution of the metaorganization
and network’s life cycle. Further research can be based on measuring the influence of this
contextual factors.
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1 Some examples are taken from Tajani C. (1996) “From the Valley of Heart’s Delight to the Silicon Valley: a
Study of Stanford University’s Role in the Transformation”, in which the author describes the start of many
companies such as Hewlett-Packard, Shockley Transistor Corporation, Syntex, Logitech, Yahoo!, Netscape.
2 The law was drafted in 1984 to encourage and assist technology oriented Israeli corporations to invest in R&D
projects based on independently developed products and technologies.
3 At Oxford University there are 2000 PhD students and 2500 researchers, plus associated and tenure professors
4 The ISIS College Fund was set up in 1999 to finance the first step of academic spin-off firms. It has 27.5
million pounds (mostly provided by the 27 independent Oxford Colleges, and one million by the University),
and it is managed by Quester. The objective of ICF is to contribute to financing and development of business
opportunities emerging from University research and innovation. The fund focuses on growth companies in early
stage technology-related business.
30
T a b le 1
D iffe r e n t d a ta s o u r c e s fo r e a c h o f th e c a s e s p r e s e n te d
D ire c t
C a se s tu d ie s
C o n fe re n c e s &
I n te rn e t
in te rv ie w s
o r p a p e rs
w o rk sh o p s
d ocu m en ts
D o c u m e n ts
o b t a in e d
d ire c t ly fro m
th e M -O
O x fo r d
X
X
X
C a m b r id g e
X
X
X
W a r w ic k
X
X
W e lsh
X
X
D u b lin -T r in ity
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C o lle g e
D u b lin - P D C
X
S w eden
X
F in la n d e
X
S o p h ie -A n tip o lis
X
G erm a n y
X
M IT
X
S ta n fo r d
W h a r to n
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
S p a in
Isra el
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
31
X
X
Figure 1
Spin-out networks life’s cycle
N strength
t1
t2
t
t3
Figure 2
The metaorganizazion’s role in different network’s stages
toconnect
todefinerules
toreplace
tobuild
t1
32
t2
t3
t

the metaorganization`s role in the networks` life cycle

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