IUIES JOURNAL

IUIES JOURNAL
Fourmonthly Journal on International Studies
volume 2 – number 2 – August 2008
Editor
Anna Maria Boileau
CONTENTS
pag.
Presentation, Anna Maria Boileau
197
Il Kosovo come mito e identità fra serbi e albanesi, Lorenzo Degrassi
201
Anti-ideological writing and the national question in the Serbian literature of
the eighties, Lidija Opačić
249
The Macedonian question: The old and the new one, Svjetlana Kovačević
297
Support to the interethnic cohabitation and postwar reconciliation by the reactivation of
rural economy, Alice Formagnana
363
The Contributors
381
Editorial Board
Laszlo Boros, Eötvös Loránd
Claudio Cressati, University of Udine
Alberto de Fabris, Isig
Giovanni Delli Zotti, University of Trieste
Marta Kollarova, Comenius University in Bratislava
Alberto Gasparini, president Iuies
Zdzislaw Mach, Jagiellonian University in Krakow
Vasile Puşcaş, University of Cluj-Nápoca
Helga Rabenstein-Moser, Universität Klagenfurt
Lev Voronkov, Mgimo University
Danilo Zavrtanik, University of Nova Gorica
Director
Alberto Gasparini
Editorial Executive Board
Anna Maria Boileau (editor in chief), Luciana Cominotto, Daniele Del Bianco, Maura Del
Zotto, Michela Sterpini, Giulio Tarlao.
IUIES JOURNAL is the fourmonthly journal of the International University Institute of
European Studies (IUIES).
IUIES was founded in 2000 as an International University Consortium among the University of
Trieste (Italy), the University of Udine (Italy), the University of Cluj-Napoca (Romania), the
University Eötvös Loránd of Budapest (Hungary), the University of Klagenfurt (Austria), the
Jagellonian University of Krakow (Poland), the University Comenius of Bratislava (Slovak
Republic), the Mgimo University of Moscow (Russia), the University of Nova Gorica
(Slovenia) and the Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia - ISIG.
Since 2005, IUIES is a member of the CEI - University Network and, in 2006, it got the legal
status with D.M. 12.04.06.
IUIES is an international centre of excellence in post-graduate training with seats in Gorizia
where it organises every year two MAs and PhD programme, which are all held in English.
IUIES is supported by the Board of the Supporting and monitoring institutions, composed by
the Autonomous Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, the Chamber of Commerce of Gorizia, the
Consortium Polo Universitario di Gorizia, the Foundation Cassa di Risparmio of Gorizia, the
Municipalities of Gorizia, the Province of Gorizia.
© International University Institute for European Studies (IUIES)
Printed in: Grafica Goriziana - Gorizia 2008
Fourmonthly journal registered at the Court of Gorizia, no. 4/07 of 17.04.2007
ISSN 1971-9876
PRESENTATION
Anna Maria Boileau
The Balkan area has always been a sort of puzzle for the “western European” minds, both in
term of ethnic composition and in terms of political-historical events. During the last decades,
former Yugoslavia turned out to be the compendium of such a situation, bursting in blood
battles – more often than not, accounted for under aged-old ethnic hatred - and than trying to
restore an acceptable, peaceable coexistence. Following the conceptualization proposed by some
scholars, e.g. Smith and Kaufmann, it seems that the different peoples which made up the
Yugoslav state can be better understood as “national communities”, that is more or less
“integrated community of shared political history, territory, mass culture and mutual
obligations”.
The analysis developed by Lorenzo Degrassi focuses on “mythopoyesis” as a tool for
achieving national identities, using Kosovo as a case study. All along, Kosovo represents a
symbolic space for both the Serbian and Albanian populations. During the centuries, the Serbs
built their own identity over the historical defeat of 1389, which – through group narratives and
its “ideological” exploitation - condenses all what “being Serb” means: sacrifice, heroism,
suffering, pride, Christianity. The Albanians, on the contrary, find in Kosovo their ethnogenesis,
the ancient Illirian origins, the historical resistance spirit of various clans. The work accurately
contrasts the different shaping of the two symbolic “mythomoteurs”, which basically started
from the same facts and events and, through group narratives, succeeded in outlining the mythosymbolic ideal-types, the group’s symbolic boundary criteria and the elements of its ‘ideal
type’, the goals and aims for the future of both parts. The epic Serbian nationalism put a definite
barrier against any republican and nationalist Kosovar aspiration; at the same time, these factors
contributed to the strengthening of a full Kosovar-Albanian identity, with strong cultural
symbols functioning as markers for ethnic-national boundaries.
Lidija Opačić, through a case study conducted over a dozen of successful Serbian literary
works, novels and stories, published in the Eighties, goes in depth into the “anti-ideological”
literature , i.e. the works that did not follow the former official slogan of “brotherhood and
unity” all over the state. After an accurate analysis of the nationalism theories and the
explanations provided by many scholars for the dissolution of the Yugoslav state, the author
presents and analyses some literary works, highlighting the themes, stories, sentences that
singled out the return of old motives of a long dated national history and contributed to the
arousal of old and never mourned sentiments. According to her understanding, the examined
works seem to have been – at least partially – orchestrated by the political élites in order to
bring the imagined heroic past into the conscience of the moment. The literature of the period
expressed a weakening of the Yugoslav national identity: the “Yugoslav nation” is quite never
present, while the characters belong to distinct ‘nations’; however, the overall feelings could not
be defined as “Serbian nationalism”, but rather ‘resentment’ toward the socialist ideology and
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Anna Maria Boileau
‘self pity’ for the victims. The author’s conclusions is that this “resentment” turned to be one of
the many elements that “supported” the new official Serbian nationalist ideology, thus providing
a “context” for everyday life, a sort of “moral” justification for the political actions of the
Nineties.
Svjetlana Kovačević moves to a different area of the former Yugoslavia, Macedonia, and to
the issues of the conflicting identities that its two main ethnic groups - Macedonians and
Albanians - have constructed over time. The hypothesis to be tested, derived from the
theoretical contributions, is that the national identities are not as sound and unitary as nationalist
ideologies maintain and that they are, in addition, multiple, hybrid and ongoing forms of
identification which involve the individual level as well. The fieldwork is an original attempt to
gather information clustered around this general theoretical statement, working with families
comprising three generation who, regardless of their ethnic belonging, have experienced several
dramatic socio-political changes during the lifetime of their middle-aged and older citizens. The
most interesting feature, from the methodological point of view, is that family members have
been presented with a selection of photographs and images showing symbols, social practices
and important events from different historical moments of the community life; these “visual
stimula” acted as a starting point for in-depth non-structured interviews. In the case of the
Macedonian community, the interviewees are generally convinced to belong to the Macedonian
nation and speak Macedonian language; sixty years of common state and the process of statebuilding have erased the substantial differences that existed among them in the past: their
national identity seems to have been in fact an ongoing form of identification. With regard to
the Albanians, their community seems much more ‘imagined’ than the Macedonian one, may be
relying more on cultural myths and less on shared cultural content and cultural symbols. Despite
the fact that the Ohrid Agreement was perceived, at the moment of its drawing up, as a possible
solution to the ethnic conflict, actually - according to both sides – it seems to have created even
a greater gap between them: the majority of the Macedonian interviewees perceives the
Agreement as a severe loss of security and a threat to their national identity; the Albanians, on
their side, argue that the Agreement did not grant them the rights they asked for and are filled
with suspicion and haughtiness toward the Macedonians. From the analysis and testimonies
reported, there seems to be enough ground to confirm that a deep divide between the Albanian
and Macedonian population - that concerns almost all aspects of life - exists and continues in
post-Ohrid Agreement Macedonia as well.
Alice Formagnana brings us to another part of former Yugoslavia, the one which brought the
area to the world attention in the Nineties through war, massacres, ethnic cleansing ...: to
Bosnia-Herzegovina, more particularly to Bratunac, on the eastern border, whose population in
1991 was 64.2% Bosniak and 34.2% Serb, where during the war everything associated to
Bosniaks and other non-Serbian ethnic groups was destroyed, very near to the places were some
of the worst events of the period took place (e.g. the Srebrenica massacre). The previous three
works here presented gave an insight into how different paths - mythopoyesis, ethnogenesis,
political-ideological orchestration, “resentment”, feeling of suspicion and haughtiness – resulted
, possibly together many other reasons here left aside, in the cruel events we knew in the very
recent years and are still there, menacing a peaceable future. But the aim of Alice Formagnana
is to understand whether and how something can be attempted to open some “normal way of
life” in a community where the ethnic divide is still painted with memories of such a terrible
recent past. The answer seems to lie in a strategy made of small steps, starting with efforts to
face the more basic needs of the population: survival, work, revenue, perspectives for the future.
Presentation
199
The project Raspberries of Peace, carried out by the Zemljoradnička Zadruga "Insieme"
(Farmers Cooperative "Together") of Bratunac, appears to be a successful example of such a
strategy. The idea started in 2001, from the experience of Radmila Žarković and Skender Hot in
several peace associations, together with some Italian NGOs and Associations. Since 2003 the
Zemljoradnička Zadruga “Insieme” Bratunac puts together Serbian and Muslim producers with
the immediate aim to encourage the economic growth of Bratunac and its surroundings, that in
turns was considered to be the pre-condition to open again the dialogue between the two
communities, since it had been violently interrupted in 1992 by the war. According to the
presented analysis, the project is evaluated as a successful one. It is an example of how, through
economic activities, it is possible to re-establish contact between two parties and to reduce
hostility. Moreover, a sustainable project, planned to be independent from foreign aid, is a
powerful tool to encourage self-esteem in the local population. This means, in the author’s
opinion, that it is possible to make progress toward the goals only if and when the projects for
reconstructing dialogue and peace are planned over a long period, with proper skills and local
people actively involved.
And this should be a lesson even for organisations acting in the peace-building field: projects
need to be carefully planned on a medium-long term and need to be supported also after the
emergency period.
Once more, the students of the International Peace Operators Master Program prove to be
very involved and concerned not only with the issues of “peace building”: they show a genuine
interest in understanding the evident and less evident “how and why” which led to tensions and
conflicts, even the most violent ones, in order to be able to plan a reasonable course of action
which goes really toward “building” peaceful patterns of life that will appreciate differences and
build upon them, using them as resources and not as problems. This is a matter of pride for a
teacher which attempted to convey them the notion that the theoretical understanding and
analysis is the first step toward “good planning”.
IL KOSOVO COME MITO E IDENTITÀ FRA SERBI E ALBANESI *
Lorenzo Degrassi
Abstract: All along, Kosovo represents a symbolic space for both the Serbian and Albanian populations.
Mythopoyesis had a crucial role in the achievement of the national identities for both parts, but also in
the destruction of all what opposed it. The region remembers the historical Serbian defeat of 1389, when
Christian forces led by Prince Lazar in vain made a stand against the Ottoman invasion. During the
centuries, the Serbs built their own identity over this battle and the main personalities that represent it.
The event condenses all what “being Serb” means: sacrifice, heroism, suffering, pride, Christianity. The
Albanians, on the contrary, find in Kosovo their ethnogenesis, the ancient Illirian origins, the historical
resistance spirit of various clans and some of the main events that led to the birth of the Albanian state in
1912. The resumption of the epic Serbian nationalism – with its oral popular traditions, with its “celestial
understanding”, with the support of the Orthodox Church, with a very strong feeling of historical
‘paranoia’ – put a definite barrier against any republican and nationalist Kosovar aspiration. Paradoxically, at the same time, these factors contributed to the strengthening of a full Kosovar-Albanian identity,
distinct from the national shqiptar identity due to different past experiences and life conditions.
►► ◄◄
Walls
And if a wall, long and thick,
A high wall
Should rise in front of you....
What would you do?
I would close my eyes, I would crouch
And rest my cheek against it,
I would find peace in its cool serenity.
And if this wall were death...
[Lindita Arapi, Muret, 1995 (1)]
Introduzione
Nel corso degli ultimi mesi del 2006, la piccola provincia del Kosovo è divenuta, senza alcun
dubbio, una delle pedine più scomode sullo scacchiere delle relazioni politiche internazionali.
Esattamente ad un anno di distanza dalla morte dei due principali personaggi dell’ultimo
decennio di questo paese conteso (2) e circa sette anni dopo l’inizio dei bombardamenti Nato - il
* Per la contestualizzazione di alcuni passaggi, si tenga presente che il presente lavoro è stato redatto
nei primi mesi del 2007.
1. Tradotto dall’albanese da Robert Elsie, on line: http://www.albanianliterature.com.
2. Ibrahim Rugova, ex-leader dell’Ldk (Lega democratica del Kosovo) e compianto presidente della
Repubblica kosovara albanese, morto il 21gennaio 2006 e Slobodan Milošević, il più famoso dei protagonisti del crollo dell’ex-Federazione jugoslava, morto all’Aia l’11 marzo 2006.
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24 marzo 1999 - l’inviato speciale delle Nazioni Unite, Martti Ahtisaari, ha presentato la sua
proposta per il futuro status della regione. Qualsiasi cosa accada e qualunque siano le reazioni di
Belgrado, è molto probabile che si tratterà di un problema di concessioni verso quella che
sembra essere un’indiscutibile indipendenza del territorio a maggioranza albanese.
Di sicuro, il compito più arduo sarà far accettare alla Serbia e, ancor più, alla minoranza
serba in Kosovo, la perdita definitiva di ciò che essi hanno sempre considerato la culla sacra
della loro cultura e ortodossia, ciò che molti patrioti e nazionalisti serbi hanno emblematicamente chiamato in questi anni “la loro Gerusalemme”. Inoltre, la comunità serba del Kosovo
dovrà radicarsi nella realtà - non ancora ufficiale - di uno stato nuovo, diventando una minoranza tout-court, non solo sotto l’aspetto territoriale, ma anche politico e amministrativo. L’esito
probabile di questo cambiamento politico è che questa minoranza avrà solo una scelta, cioè
riconoscere e partecipare alla nuova vita socio-politica - rinunciando ai legami politici e economici con la madrepatria - o abbandonare la nuova realtà statale e ritirarsi in territorio serbo (3).
Secondo l’Ufficio statistiche del Kosovo, la regione ha una popolazione di circa due milioni
e mezzo di abitanti, dei quali l’88% è albanese, il 7% è composto da serbi e il restante 5% da
altre minoranze [Rom, Ashkali, Gorani e Turchi (4)]. Osservando attentamente queste statistiche
e considerando lo scenario a venire, è facile prevedere un rafforzamento della percentuale
albanese e un’ovvia riduzione di quella serba. Benché l’etnografia serba e quella più recente
albanese continuino a combattere su dati, documenti e ricerche per provare il proprio diritto alla
terra natia, l’unica realtà non costruita è che il Kosovo - come è stato sottolineato da vari esperti
quali Ger Duijzings, Miranda Vickers e Noel Malcolm - è sempre stato un territorio multietnico:
«[…] a pluralistic society where various ethnic groups coexisted, many languages were spoken
and all major religions of the Balkans were represented. […] an ethnic shatter zone, largely the
product of incorporation into the Ottoman state, which embraced and preserved a great variety
of ethnic and religious groups […]» (Duijzings 2000: 9-10).
Nel corso dei secoli, questa isolata area del sud-est Europa è stata il crocevia di popoli e
armate, una porta strategica verso l’entroterra balcanico e, grazie alle sue catene montuose, uno
dei bacini minerari più ambiti (5). L’interazione tra questi popoli e genti ha dato origine - come
è ovvio - a conflitti e guerre, repentini cambi di potere, conseguenti vendette e migrazioni e anche a conversioni religiose di massa, ma anche a periodi di convivenza pacifica e a un ricco bagaglio di cultura pluralistica. Senza alcun dubbio, l’eredità culturale del Kosovo è una delle più
variegate in tutti i Balcani, grazie alle sue numerose tradizioni, contaminazioni e differenti
3. Attualmente la posizione dei serbi in Kosovo è veramente complicata. Essi si trovano nel bel mezzo
dei giochi politici fra Pristina e Belgrado e la maggior parte di essi non parla l’albanese né ha la minima
intenzione di apprenderlo. Uno dei loro problemi maggiori è l’esser ricattati da Belgrado sul sistema
pensionistico poiché, se essi un giorno accettassero di diventare cittadini del nuovo Kosovo albanese, non
riceverebbero più salari né tanto meno pensioni e gli anni precedenti di retribuzioni sarebbero considerati
da Belgrado nulli. La loro situazione si fa ancor più tragica se poi si considera che nemmeno Pristina ha
intenzione di accollarsi tutte le spese connesse alla minoranza serba.
4. Statistical Office of Kosovo 2005, Kosovo in figures, on-line:
http://www.ks-gov.net/esk/esk/pdf/english/general/kosovo_figures_05.pdf. Le statistiche riguardanti la
composizione etnica sono approssimative poiché stimate nell’anno 2000. Probabilmente, nel corso degli
ultimi anni, la popolazione albanese ha raggiunto e superato il 90%.
5. L’intera regione è sempre stata ricca di minerali e pietre preziose: piombo, rame, zinco, acciaio,
magnesio e argento. Il complesso minerario più famoso e conteso è quello di Trepqa, vicino a Mitrovica,
dove - nel 1988-89 - iniziarono le proteste dei minatori contro le limitazione imposte da Slobodan
Milošević sull’autonomia del Kosovo. Durante la Seconda guerra mondiale, questo giacimento era divenuto l’obiettivo principale della Germania nazista e uno dei bacini principali del Terzo Reich.
Il Kosovo come mito e identità fra serbi e albanesi
203
forme di sincretismo.
Benché sommerse in vari imperi per secoli, diverse comunità sono sorte e hanno vissuto
fianco a fianco alla nazione serba, diventando sempre più consapevoli dei legami che le tenevano strette assieme (Anzulović 1999). Con il passare del tempo, molte comunità e gruppi etnici
sono scomparsi (6) e, fatta eccezione per i turchi e l’Impero ottomano, i due gruppi maggiori, da
sempre coinvolti nelle dinamiche politiche del Kosovo, sono serbi e albanesi. Gli ultimi sono
diventati una maggioranza assoluta nella regione durante la prima metà del secolo scorso.
Secondo la mia opinione, è proprio con la nascita degli stati-nazione moderni e delle loro
narrative nazionaliste - tra il XIX e l’inizio del XX secolo - che questi due gruppi hanno iniziato
a confrontarsi in una sorta di scontro bipolare, con perfette dinamiche psicologiche di polarizzazione. La loro prossimità era percepita dalle parti in causa come una sorta di battaglia tra il bene
e il male, tra la civiltà e la barbarie e, infine, un conflitto interpretato - specialmente dai serbi - con
un trend di quel tempo, ma tuttora attuale: Cristianità contro Islam (7). Un conflitto che, sin dalle
Guerre balcaniche, assunse il terribile sfondo di veri e propri tentativi di genocidio e pulizia etnica,
come ci viene raccontato da alcuni viaggiatori e reporter del tempo [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)] (8).
Le prime due decadi del XX secolo furono un periodo dove le atrocità di guerra furono
commesse da ambo le parti, sostenendo che le ragioni principali di tali gesta fossero tutte nella
necessità di vendetta per precedenti ingiustizie subite. Tuttavia, sostenere oggigiorno che
l’origine di tutti i problemi tra serbi e albanesi del Kosovo sia sempre stata una questione di onte
passate - o antichi odi etnici - è un tentativo facile e sbagliato di cercare una soluzione a un problema ben più complesso. Sin dalle origini del Regno di serbi, croati e sloveni nel 1918 - quando la regione fu considerata parte integrante della Serbia - il problema tra i due gruppi nazionali
è sempre stato una questione di chiari interessi politici nell’area.
Si è sempre trattato più di un problema di due gruppi che vivevano due realtà diverse nello
stesso paese che un problema di due comunità che si odiavano per specifiche ragioni ataviche.
Gli albanesi del Kosovo, forti della loro maggioranza nella regione, erano stati esclusi dall’appartenenza allo stato albanese, nato nel 1912. Molti di loro avevano combattuto per quello stato,
avevano creduto che il Kosovo ne avrebbe fatto parte e che la loro voce sarebbe stata ascoltata
dalle potenze europee del tempo. I serbi, d’altro canto, credevano di avere tutte le ragioni storiche dalla loro parte per reclamare la regione che ricordava la scomparsa golden age del loro passato: lo stato medievale serbo della dinastia Nemanjić - del XIV secolo - e la grandezza della
loro Chiesa ortodossa.
All’inizio del XX secolo, la Serbia poteva godere di un’unità nazionale più organizzata e
strutturata, nonché di una forte e neonata etnografia che nel secolo precedente aveva attirato
6. Per esempio, secondo Noel Malcolm (1998), nell’ultimo secolo sono scomparsi: Circassi (presenti
in numero veramente esiguo fino al 1980), Valacchi (per lo più tutti “albanizzati” o “serbizzati” prima e
dopo la Guerra balcanica del 1912) ed Ebrei (fuggiti durante la Seconda guerra mondiale). Nella parte
sud-orientale del Kosovo ci fu fino al 1991-92 anche una cospicua comunità croata. Nel suo libro
Religion and the politics of identity in Kosovo (2000), Ger Duijzings racconta la storia della comunità
croata di Letnica.
7. Sebbene non tutti gli albanesi fossero musulmani e la gran parte dei loro clan fosse cattolica da
tempi immemori, essi furono associati gradualmente ai turchi e di conseguenza alla turco-fobia del tempo.
Inoltre, non si dovrebbe dimenticare che allora anche gli albanesi avevano iniziato i loro moti di ribellione
a carattere nazionale, diventando così una seria minaccia per la Porta.
8. A questo proposito, risultano interessanti le testimonianze di Lev Trotzkij e Edith Durham. A quel
tempo, Trotzkij era corrispondente a Vienna del giornale ucraino Kievskaia Mysl e corrispondente di
guerra dall’area balcanica. Edith Durham, invece, era una viaggiatrice e antropologa inglese interessata
alle tradizioni e ai costumi tribali dell’area. Una delle sue opere maggiori è High Albania (1909).
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Lorenzo Degrassi
l’attenzione di numerose élites europee. Grazie alla letteratura e cultura autoctone, si diffuse
l’immagine romantica di una nazione orgogliosa che aveva sofferto per secoli sotto il giogo
ottomano nel tentativo di difendere i valori della cristianità e della civiltà. La dubbia posizione
degli albanesi suddivisi in clan, non definibili da una particolare professione di fede e generalmente considerati ribelli e incivili, sfortunatamente li ha fatti apparire agli occhi dei politici
europei come un popolo senza storia, indegno di considerazione, anche quando si prendevano
decisioni politiche sul suo conto.
Ad una conferenza alla Sorbona, lo scrittore francese Ernest Renan una volta disse che l’esistenza di una nazione era essenzialmente una questione di «plebiscito di ogni giorno» (9). Si
potrebbe così dire che gli albanesi in Kosovo si trovarono forzati a partecipare ad un plebiscito
per una nazione che non volevano. Perciò, i serbi dovettero fronteggiare il grosso problema che
gran parte della loro supposta popolazione, nell’area in questione, non voleva essere assimilata
o fatta passare per serbi che un tempo avevano perso le loro origini, si erano convertiti all’Islam
o erano stati forzati a riconoscersi come albanesi (10). Per far fronte a questa difficile situazione, i signori dello stato provarono diverse soluzioni per soffocare le ribellioni albanesi e per
dare al Kosovo una connotazione più serba e ortodossa.
In seguito alla conquista della regione, nel 1912-1913, il governo al potere decise di attuare
diverse misure: dalla chiusura di tutte le scuole in lingua albanese per forzare gli alloglotti ad
apprendere il serbo-croato, alla cosiddetta “riforma agraria”, dove la terra considerata abbandonata, incolta o descritta in quanto tale, veniva ridistribuita fra coloni serbi e montenegrini e di
solito fra soldati che in precedenza avevano combattuto in quelle zone. Cercando di incrementare la popolazione slava nell’area, il governo mise in scena una pericolosa rappresentazione,
dove i nuovi arrivati venivano visti come colonizzatori opposti ai kaçak ribelli (11). Nel 1937,
gli intenti del programma politico serbo divennero terribilmente chiari con la proposta di un intellettuale chiamato Vaso Čubrilović. Quest’ultimo credeva che la forte presenza albanese in
Kosovo potesse costituire una seria minaccia per i piani futuri di una “grande Serbia”.
La sua soluzione personale traspariva dal titolo del suo documento: L’espulsione degli albanesi. La sua proposta fu presentata in quegli anni al governo reale e in una seconda e differente
occasione alla Jugoslavia di Tito, con la “soluzione” estesa anche ad altri gruppi etnici. Egli era
sicuro che un semplice processo di colonizzazione non fosse una misura sufficiente: «L’unico
modo di trattare con essi è la forza bruta di uno stato organizzato, cosa in cui siamo sempre stati
superiori» e ancora «quando la Germania può espellere decine di migliaia di ebrei e la Russia
trapianta milioni di persone da una parte all’altra del continente, il trasferimento di alcune centinaia di migliaia di albanesi non farà scattare una guerra mondiale» (Čubrilović 1999: 19-21).
Lo scopo evidente del suo programma era rendere impossibili le condizioni di vita degli
albanesi in Kosovo, suggerendo l’impiego di ogni mezzo possibile e attuabile per raggiungere
l’obiettivo suddetto. Le soluzioni comprendevano: l’aggiunta di suffissi serbi ai loro nomi di fa9. Il titolo della conferenza tenutasi alla Sorbona l’11 marzo 1882 era: Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?.
10. Nel corso degli ultimi due secoli, numerosi nazionalisti e politici serbi hanno formulato teorie assurde secondo le quali tutti gli albanesi del Kosovo sarebbero stati un tempo serbi o comunque sarebbero
appartenuti a comunità slave.
11. Il kaçak - tradotto da alcuni testi italiani come “caciacco” - è per gli albanesi la figura eroica del
bandito ribelle, il più delle volte visto come un patriottico e romantico guerrigliero. A mio avviso, può essere considerato una sorta di versione albanese del croato hajduk. Il movimento dei kaçak diede seri problemi all’amministrazione serba e jugoslava a causa del suo carattere fortemente nazionalista e anti-statale. Nel 1926 una grande ribellione dei kaçak fu soppressa in un bagno di sangue da veri e propri gruppi
commando (Dogo 1992). Si dice che a suo tempo il governo serbo avesse provveduto a distribuire armi e
munizioni a civili serbi e montenegrini per fronteggiare tale minaccia.
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miglia; rifiutarsi di riconoscere tutti i diritti esistenti e documentati di possesso della terra; reprimerli grazie all’aiuto di una polizia ben addestrata; la totale distruzione dei loro cimiteri; la proibizione della poligamia; la ricomposizione di vecchie formazioni cetniche; appiccare di nascosto incendi a villaggi e quartieri urbani e - se necessario - persino aizzare i cani contro di loro.
Inoltre, Čubrilović aveva suggerito che sarebbe stata un’ottima idea negoziare il loro trasferimento di massa in Turchia, con il pagamento addizionale al governo turco di una somma pari a
800 milioni di dinari (ibidem).
Fortunatamente per gli albanesi kosovari, lo scoppio della Seconda guerra mondiale bloccò
la messa in atto del genocidio ma, allo stesso tempo, diede loro la possibilità di coltivare le
ambizioni di diventare parte di una “grande Albania”. Infatti, la regione del Kosovo cadde sotto
giurisdizione nazi-fascista, dove gli albanesi ebbero tutte le possibilità di dar libero sfogo al risentimento anti-slavo accumulato negli anni precedenti. Gli italiani e i tedeschi sfruttarono a
proprio vantaggio questa situazione e ne approfittarono per creare gruppi militari e divisioni albanesi (12), nonché per stimolare l’identità nazionale creando scuole e mass media. Tuttavia, il loro
piano non aveva considerato il rapido successo dei partigiani e la formazione di una resistenza
comunista costituita anche da albanesi. Ciononostante, con il successo della resistenza comunista
in Albania e nella nuova Jugoslavia di Tito, il problema del Kosovo non trovò una soluzione.
La regione rimase parte della Federazione jugoslava a sei repubbliche e, in particolare, uno
dei due territori della Serbia con uno status speciale: il Kosovo era considerato una “regione
autonoma” e la Vojvodina - l’altra zona - una “provincia autonoma”. Tito aveva deciso di placare i serbi e i loro sogni espansionistici dando loro l’area e, allo stesso tempo, Enver Hoxha, in
Albania, non voleva aver alcun problema con i nuovi fratelli e vicini comunisti, lasciando così
la situazione immutata. Quando nel 1948 la Jugoslavia fu espulsa dal blocco comunista del
Cominform, le relazioni con Tirana si raffreddarono e peggiorarono nettamente. Di conseguenza, peggiorò anche la situazione dei kosovari albanesi. La popolazione albanese fu vista dall’amministrazione e propaganda serba come un nido di spie enveriste che cospiravano contro la
Jugoslavia e a favore dell’unione con l’Albania (13).
Nonostante la reale esistenza e attività clandestina di alcuni gruppi marxisti a favore dell’unione con l’Albania, la situazione della regione autonoma era tranquilla ed era decisamente
migliorata negli anni tra il 1968 e il 1974. Nel 1969, Tito aveva favorito la creazione di legami
culturali con l’Albania, la formazione di associazioni culturali albanesi, ma soprattutto l’istituzione a Pristina di un’università interamente in lingua albanese. Ma nulla ebbe un impatto così
devastante sulle aspirazioni serbe come l’approvazione della Costituzione del 1974. Essa fu un
vero e proprio colpo per la Repubblica serba, poiché dava alla regione autonoma - de facto, anche se non de iure - tutti i poteri base di una Repubblica, fatta eccezione per il diritto di secessione dalla Federazione.
Con la Costituzione del 1974 ci fu una sorta di riconoscimento legale del carattere specifico
nazionale di quella che restava ancora la parte più povera della Jugoslavia (14). Gli albanesi
12. In modo molto astuto, queste divisioni e gruppi venivano chiamati con nomi che rafforzavano il
sentimento nazionale degli albanesi. Ne è esempio la creazione - nel 1944 - della “Divisione da montagna
Skanderbeg”, facente parte delle SS e voluta per ordine dello stesso Heinrich Himmler. Alla divisione
veniva così associato il nome dell’eroe nazionale albanese Gjergji Kastriot Skanderbeg (1405-1468).
13. La repressione della polizia segreta jugoslava (Udba), fu veramente dura. Molti furono perseguiti e
ingiustamente arrestati e rilasciati e assolti soltanto nel 1956. Il principale responsabile fu il capo della polizia segreta Aleksandar Ranković, poi forzato a dimettersi dallo stesso Tito che condannò apertamente la
discriminazione degli albanesi nel 1966.
14. Il Kosovo era considerato da tutte le repubbliche il “buco nero” dove finivano tutti i fondi della
Federazione. Era l’area più sottosviluppata della Jugoslavia e quella con il maggior tasso di disoccupa-
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kosovari ebbero la loro banca centrale, la loro forza di polizia separata e un proprio sistema
educativo e giudiziario (Mertus 1999). Da quel preciso momento, molti serbi iniziarono a
guardare con occhi diversi l’idea titina di Jugoslavia. Iniziarono a credere di essere vittime di un
complotto politico dove i loro diritti non venivano rispettati né nella Federazione, né sul “sacro
suolo” del Kosovo. Il vuoto politico lasciato dalla morte di Tito, nel 1980, diede il via libera a
una nuova classe politica, fatta di uomini capaci di risorgere - all’interno e all’esterno del partito
comunista jugoslavo - dalle ceneri di vecchie memorie e da argomenti che un tempo si credevano svaniti nelle parole “bratstvo i jedinstvo” (15).
Gli anni Ottanta furono un periodo in cui le disparità etniche tra i diversi gruppi incominciarono a essere il capro espiatorio per la generale insoddisfazione causata dalla crisi economica e
sociale. Le differenze etniche furono formulate in termini esclusivisti e incominciarono a dominare la vita politica e sociale. Questo processo fu facilitato dal lavoro minuzioso di politici e
intellettuali nazionalisti che sfruttarono situazioni già di per sé complesse e di conflitto latente come quella in Kosovo - per nutrire i loro programmi politici fatti di rivendicazioni e desideri di
grandezza personale.
Molte furono le cause che fecero collassare il sogno socialista jugoslavo e lo trasformarono
in un’amara realtà, ma l’etnicità non fu di sicuro una di esse, o almeno, non fu la miccia che
fece esplodere la bomba. L’etnicità fu solo uno degli ingredienti - probabilmente il più importante - con cui si è combattuta la guerra civile e quasi certamente il terreno più fertile per l’esito
violento della tragedia jugoslava. In un periodo in cui l’insicurezza in tutte le sue facce - economica, sociale e culturale - stava diventando il problema all’ordine del giorno, politici ed intellettuali seppero come trovare un nemico esterno contro cui puntare il dito. Trasformando ogni
singolo episodio e incidente - anche banale - in una questione nazionale, essi crearono un’atmosfera di sfiducia e paura tra l’eterogenea società civile. Facendo ciò, diedero il via a un processo
irreversibile di separazione netta lungo linee etniche, inizialmente solo psicologica e in seguito
terribilmente fisica.
Una silenziosa e segreta guerra psicologica era stata creata ad arte e combattuta, per dieci
anni, prima dello scoppio del conflitto nel 1991. Ridiscutere tutto ciò che sotto Tito era stato
tabù, fu uno degli strumenti più efficaci per la mobilitazione delle masse e del loro consenso
collettivo. Vecchie memorie furono riportate alla luce, riaffiorarono vecchie divergenze d’opinione e i ricordi di ingiustizie e vecchi crimini di guerra furono riutilizzati per rinverdire le
ideologie di un tempo. Vecchi fantasmi come Jasenovac, Bleiburg, Ustaša e Cetnici, riapparvero
più devastanti e pericolosi di cinquant’anni prima (16). Tuttavia, per i serbi, il mito del Kosovo
e della storica battaglia del 1389 è sempre stato lo strumento, per eccellenza, da utilizzare in
momenti di crisi.
Secondo la leggenda e i pochi fatti storici realmente assodati, la battaglia del Kosovo fu
combattuta nel 1389 tra le forze cristiane guidate dal principe serbo Lazar e le armate ottomane
del sultano Murad. Lo scontro si concluse con la vittoria dei turchi e la morte di entrambi i
zione. Come il professor Branko Horvat ha suggerito nel suo Kosovo Pitanje (1989), non si trattava di un
semplice problema di mal distribuzione dei fondi o di corruzione, ma un problema di mancanza di
assistenza tecnica, politica e professionale da fornire alla regione (Dogo 1992).
15. “Bratstvo i jedinstvo”, tradotto “fratellanza e unità”, era il motto usato dallo stesso Tito per sottolineare gli ingredienti principali - e supposti punti forti - della Federazione jugoslava.
16. Jasenovac e Bleiburg erano divenuti luoghi simbolici del martirio nazionale serbo e croato. Jasenovac era il campo di concentramento dove, durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale, molti serbi, rom e partigiani furono uccisi dagli Ustaša e dalle forze nazi-fasciste. Bleiburg, invece, era il luogo dove molti
Ustaša in fuga furono massacrati dagli Alleati. Episodi come questi erano stati trascurati e volutamente
ignorati per favorire l’unità jugoslava.
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leader. Oggigiorno, molti storici hanno provato che la “battaglia” non segnò le precise fasi finali dell’Impero medievale serbo ma, ad ogni modo, per i serbi quella sconfitta costituisce da
sempre il simbolo di una disfatta nazionale.
Nel corso dei secoli, grazie alle cronache religiose e ancor più alla tradizione epica orale dei
guslar (17), il mito della “battaglia” è diventato il feticcio dell’identità serbo-ortodossa, reinvestito e arricchito di particolari, nuovi protagonisti e significati. La reale trasformazione del mito
avvenne nel XIX secolo quando divenne il principio guida di una coscienza nazionale che ancora una volta si trovava a combattere la sua nemesi storica: i turchi. Quindi, con l’aiuto di composizioni letterarie di scrittori come Vuk Karadžić e Petar Petrović Njegoš, si diffuse la sopraccitata immagine romantica dei serbi come un popolo cristiano che aveva sofferto a lungo e
voleva redimersi. Fu proprio in quel secolo che la sconfitta nella storica battaglia fu letteralmente trasformata in una vittoria religiosa e morale. Si disse che il principe Lazar avesse compiuto una scelta votiva alla vigilia dello scontro, sacrificando il suo esercito e la vittoria per il regno celeste e rinunciando così a quello terreno. Da allora, nell’immaginario collettivo, i serbi
vengono visti come una nazione dall’aura celeste, gente prescelta da Dio per l’eternità.
Nel 1989, seicento anni dopo la battaglia del Kosovo, nuovi e moderni guslar hanno cantato
e raccontato la loro versione della storia. I nuovi nemici erano pertanto gli albanesi e gli altri
traditori che li sostenevano all’interno della Federazione. Si diceva che un tempo gli albanesi si
fossero schierati a favore dei turchi e che ora stessero semplicemente dando prova della loro
rabbia islamica contro la cristianità serba. Le élites degli ultimi anni hanno usato il richiamo del
mito e altre menzogne per un richiamo ben più vasto: un invito all’azione immediata.
L’obiettivo di questa indagine è analizzare come l’abuso del mito sia essenziale, ma anche
pericoloso, nei processi di creazione e distruzione di identità, in periodi di guerra e in particolare
nel caso del Kosovo. Il mito è sempre stato uno strumento potente nella delineazione di quei
confini immaginari che nelle dinamiche di gruppo separano l’in-group dall’out-group, ovvero
l’interno dall’esterno.
Coloro che si servono di tale strumento sono in grado di influenzare le masse in maniera subdola e sono responsabili per tutte le dinamiche sociali che generano. Il mito e le sue funzioni
non sono di per sé negativi, ma si piegano facilmente a certe esigenze politiche. Come hanno
sottolineato nei loro lavori Florian Bieber, Alexander Greenwalt e altri esperti, il mito cancella
la distanza tra passato e presente e contemporaneamente getta uno sguardo verso il futuro. A
mio avviso, il mito può essere descritto come una sorta di macchina del tempo o come una porta
temporale che qualcuno può usare per cambiare la realtà a suo piacimento. I gruppi etnici e le
nazioni dipendono da processi di selezione volontaria di cose da ricordare e da dimenticare (18)
(Sofos 1996), e ciò significa che qualcuno rievocando memorie passate - e di conseguenza tutte
le emozioni ad esse connesse - può giustificare le azioni presenti e cercare di definire il futuro.
Come afferma Zygmut Baumann, nella modernità di ogni giorno, ogni cosa è sfuggevole e
fluida (2005), e lo sono anche il mito e l’identità, in costante trasformazione e ridefinizione.
Volgendo lo sguardo all’ex-Jugoslavia e agli eventi ormai noti, si potrebbe dire che la necessità
di una ben radicata identità sia stata e sia tutt’ora una ricerca di sicurezza, un riflesso istintivo e
una reazione alla crisi sociale e al crollo di uno stato. In questo caso il mito è polivalente e può
essere impiegato come mezzo adeguato per dare l’illusione di una comunità esistente; è uno
strumento di auto-definizione, di trasferimento d’identità (19), di comunicazione e ancor più un
17. I guslar erano bardi che cantavano le gesta eroiche dei loro tempi in canzoni epiche, accompagnati
dalla gusla: una sorta di liuto monocorde.
18. Definiti come “selective forgetting and selective remembering processes”.
19. Una nuova identità può venir sovrapposta a un’identità di vecchia data.
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espediente per spiegare il destino e i fallimenti di una nazione. Tutte queste funzioni possono
essere svolte attraverso la celebrazione di rituali, commemorazioni e tramite l’uso di simboli,
elementi chiave della narrativa del mito (Hosking, Schöpflin 1997). Se politici e media decidono di sfruttare tutto ciò per propositi di grandezza, essi sono in grado di divenire i veri padroni delle memorie collettive, capaci di far accettare alle masse il loro volere e in grado di
guidarle fino sull’orlo dell’abisso, come tanti pifferai di Hamelin.
Nei capitoli successivi prenderò in esame il mito del Kosovo come uno spazio simbolico
perfetto per serbi e albanesi. Analizzerò il mito della famosa battaglia, i suoi significati passati e
attuali per l’identità serba, inoltre, mi soffermerò sui personaggi ed eventi mitici più importanti
per la comunità albanese kosovara. Sarà, poi, mio compito cercare di svelare i tratti della nuova
identità albanese kosovara e separarli da quella dei cugini d’Albania. Infine, discuterò l’importanza del ruolo giocato da politici, intellettuali, media ed educazione, nella diffusione di nuovi
miti di tolleranza e coesistenza pacifica.
The children start to follow the pied piper
(illustrazione di Kate Greenaway)
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1. Kosovo-Kosova: lo spazio come racconti di identità (20)
«Sì, mio Dio, fa’ frantumare ben bene la terra attorno a me,
poiché basterebbero poche gocce per ritrovarvi addensata
tutta la memoria del mondo…»
(Ismail Kadaré, Tre canti funebri per il Kosovo, 1998: 108)
Ricordi e racconti sono elementi chiave del nostro essere, fondamenta della nostra stessa
esistenza. Senza di essi, non siamo nulla, poiché perdiamo la nostra identità e la nostra posizione all’interno della società: quel senso di appartenenza a qualcosa, una famiglia, un gruppo, una
comunità oppure una nazione. La memoria è un collegamento diretto con il mondo circostante,
fatta di esperienze personali e altrettanto completata dal retaggio della conoscenza di altre persone. Come detto da George Schöpflin nel suo Nation, identity, power, «la memoria è parte del
corpus condiviso di conoscenza sociale a cui una comunità non rinuncerà volentieri» (Schöpflin
2000: 260; traduzione personale). Non è importante che il “corpus condiviso” sia vero, ma ciò che
noi - come comunità - crediamo di esso. Non avrà alcuna importanza se un insieme di memorie e
racconti accettati da una collettività non sono eventi storicamente appurati. Se essi rappresentano
per il gruppo le basi per la guida della società, saranno praticamente intoccabili.
Il passato è fatto di reminiscenze, eventi, storie - che a volte sono vere e a volte sono false ma ogni singola comunità ha una propria storia personale. Questa è il frutto di una lunga narrazione e selezione di momenti e narrative, considerati punti di svolta negativi o positivi nella memoria collettiva dei suoi appartenenti. Le comunità fanno appello alla memoria e alle esperienze
passate ogni giorno e ogni qualvolta devono compiere una scelta per il bene del loro status
presente e futuro. Episodi cruciali come crisi economiche, sociali e politiche, guerre e, in generale, tutti gli eventi connessi ad un sentimento di insicurezza e minaccia, danno inizio ad un
meccanismo di recupero di tutte quelle memorie ed emozioni che ne derivano. Il tempo può aver
ammorbidito i ricordi e persino fatto sì che la gente abbia dimenticato certi fatti, ma quelle memorie sono lì, pronte per essere riscoperte come se fossero state messe temporaneamente in una
vecchia soffitta (Schöpflin 2000).
Come hanno sottolineato molti esperti, gli albanesi e i serbi del Kosovo condividono praticamente lo stesso passato, lo stesso spazio e luogo, ma hanno sviluppato memorie drasticamente
diverse, tanto diverse quanto il loro modo di chiamare la stessa regione. Kosovo-Metohija (21) è
il nome usato dai serbi per riconoscere l’intera area e, in particolare, la Metohija ne è la parte
occidentale che invece è chiamata dagli albanesi Rrafsh i Dukagjinit (22). Questi ultimi chiamano la regione Kosova, con un’albanese e distintiva “a” finale. Spazi e luoghi non sono semplici
contenitori di bellissimi paesaggi, città, oggetti o persone. Essi sono lo scenario dove rappresentiamo i nostri valori più profondi e sono assolutamente esemplificativi della nostra storia. Le nostre memorie ed esperienze come parte di un tutto vi scorrono all’interno e danno un senso al
nostro vivere (Hopkins, Dixon 2006).
Da sempre, le comunità e gli individui addossano agli spazi una dimensione psicologica. I
20. Kosovo è il nome serbo per la regione, mentre Kosova è la sua corrispettiva versione albanese.
21. Sotto Tito questa regione era nota anche come Kosmet. Metohija è una parola derivata dal greco bizantino metochia che sta ad indicare i possedimenti monastici lasciati ai monasteri dai signori medievali serbi.
22. Si potrebbe tradurre come: “Gli altipiani di Dukagijn”, dal nome di un’antica famiglia medievale
albanese che visse in quelle aree. Il massimo esponente di questa famiglia, Lek Dukagijn, dà il nome al
famoso codice di leggi noto come Kanun. Questo corpus di leggi, regole e raccomandazioni per regolare
la vita di ogni giorno, fu trasmesso oralmente fino al XIX secolo e poi scritto in varie versioni più o meno
complete [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
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luoghi fisici e geografici vengono configurati come la proiezione dei loro spazi mentali o piuttosto dei loro schemi mentali. Nelle nostre menti disegniamo confini, decidiamo chi “è dentro” e
chi è “fuori” e ciò significa che in realtà noi stabiliamo ciò che è “fuori luogo” nel “nostro luogo”. Il senso di radicamento e di attaccamento al territorio sono fattori che non devono essere
sottovalutati se si ha a che fare con le collettività, poiché non si può sempre risolvere tutto sul
piano degli interessi e specialmente quando si trattano problemi di identità (ibidem). Questi sentimenti sono una delle ragioni per cui riempiamo uno spazio di miriadi di significati, commemoriamo e celebriamo certi eventi o persino marchiamo il territorio con simboli della nostra
identità, in modo da sentirci sicuri di ciò che siamo.
Gruppi diversi riempiono spazi e luoghi di significati diversi e a volte - come in questo caso lo stesso spazio. Ma questa non è un’esclusiva del Kosovo, è una situazione che coinvolge un
contesto ben più ampio: accade ogni giorno in ogni parte del mondo. Nell’area balcanica, il confronto con l’invasore ottomano, la resistenza all’oppressore straniero e la lotta per l’indipendenza nazionale hanno caratterizzato le identità di ogni popolo e nazione esistente e scomparsa.
Il modo in cui guardiamo al passato e ai nostri attuali vicini, è la chiave per una convivenza
pacifica. Ciò che noi percepiamo spesso come differente, non per forza deve essere considerato
pericoloso. Il passato può essere un’ispirazione per il presente e per i tempi a venire, ma può
facilmente diventare una palude che impedisce di muoversi e fare progressi. Ciò che conta è non
guardare al passato con troppa morbosità.
In un’intervista con un giornalista italiano, Zygmut Bauman (2005) ha detto che l’identità
nazionale è sempre stata differente dagli altri tipi d’identità. Diversamente dalle altre, l’identità
nazionale ha sempre necessitato devozione totale, senza riserve e compromessi. Costruita grazie
allo stato - o alle sue agenzie, come governi in esilio - ha sempre richiesto il monopolio nel decretare le linee di separazione tra il “noi” e il “loro”, ovvero tra la comunità nazionale e gli altri (ibidem). L’etnografia - intesa come la scienza che fornisce una descrizione delle singole società umane (23) - è sempre stata lo strumento perfetto per questo tipo di partizioni. Stati, istituzioni e politici ne hanno fatto largo uso in passato e continuano a servirsene per rendere più chiare le loro posizioni. Tuttavia, l’etnografia ha un modus operandi veramente preciso nei confronti del passato.
Essa è un minuzioso processo a ritroso di selezione e ricerca di ciò che Anne-Marie Thiesse
ha definito il “sacro graal nazionale” (2001: 17) e che - a mio modo di vedere - può essere
spiegato come la genesi dell’etnicità culturale specifica di un gruppo. È come trovarsi dinanzi a
una strada dissestata a due corsie che lega il presente al passato e che andando indietro verso i
tempi antichi contemporaneamente ristruttura e completa la strada per il presente. Lungo questa
strada si possono trovare numerose rassicurazioni sciovinistiche grazie all’aiuto di discipline
come l’archeologia, l’antropologia, la filologia e la storia. In tal modo “antichità” diventa
sinonimo di “emancipazione etnica” (Hosking, Schöpflin 1997). La ricostruzione di un passato
glorioso e di un’età d’oro, diventano per i nazionalisti un vanto, un motivo per esaltarsi delle
proprie origini, dei propri antenati e della propria terra natia. Come se ciò non bastasse, la
differenziazione etnica è ancor più ricercata se sul suolo natio vi sono anche altre etnie.
Il risultato ottenuto da questo processo di narrativa nazionale è che il presente, con la sua
modernità, viene ridimensionato dal passato. In questo caso, Elisabetta Batini (2000: 74) ha
parlato di “museizzazione”: la modernità diviene una sorta di reliquia da porre nel museo nazionale e la nazione è celebrata nei cinema, nelle radio e in altre forme di iconografia pubblica. Perciò,
l’etnografia apre una traccia genetica attraverso il tempo e lo spazio, cercando di stabilire quella
purezza di relazioni, tradizioni e parentele, che legano assieme i membri delle nazioni contemporanee con i loro antenati. In tal modo, gli ultimi appaiono come l’esatta continuazione dei primi
23. Definizione tratta dal sito web: www.wordreference.com.
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e si crea un legame ontologico tra lo spazio fisico e psicologico del presente e quello del passato.
L’etnografia di per sé non ha alcuna connotazione negativa ed è indispensabile nell’affermazione delle identità collettive, ma se la sua linea di indagine è riposta nelle mani sbagliate, accade
che spesso e volentieri essa risulti irrispettosa di fatti storici assodati e dell’enorme complessità
degli alberi genealogici. In seguito al crollo dell’ex-Jugoslavia, si diffuse l’idea che ciò che era
accaduto fosse l’inevitabile risultato di un barbarico risveglio di tutte quelle identità che erano
state soppresse dall’avvento del regime comunista. Ovviamente il comunismo aveva le sue grosse
responsabilità, ma è un grosso errore affermare che le identità di oggigiorno sono le stesse identiche di cinquanta, cento e più anni fa. È corretto sottolineare il passaggio da un collettivismo socialista a uno di stampo nazionalista, ma è altrettanto importante considerare che, nella Federazione,
tutte queste identità nazionali non erano morte e continuavano a svilupparsi. La disgregazione
della Federazione diede il via libera a tutte quelle etnografie nazionali già esistenti che volevano
rinnegare il recente passato, differenziarsi e riscrivere il racconto della loro nazione.
Durante la guerra civile jugoslava e il successivo periodo di ricostruzione, ogni argomento e
circostanza furono interpretati e affrontati con la massima attenzione verso le memorie nazionali
e tutte le questioni irrisolte di vecchia data, fra le quali anche vecchi regolamenti di conti. I
leader politici e militari furono trasformati in nuovi eroi e visti come eredi di figure storiche e
mitiche del glorioso passato. Personaggi storici e comunità che avevano vissuto tanto tempo prima delle nazioni e degli stati indipendenti, furono allora ritratti con i colori della bandiera nazionale ed etichettati come cittadini onorari di comunità senza tempo.
Nei Balcani, l’accuratezza storica è stata spesso trascurata per permettere a una memoria
distorta di dominare lotte politiche e nazionali (Morozzo della Rocca 1999). Per questo motivo,
il ruolo svolto nel corso dei secoli da alcuni memorabili personaggi è stato considerato importante solo se interpretato e ambientato nel contesto di orgoglio e liberazione patriottica. Ciò che
essi hanno fatto per aree più vaste dello stato e per cause diverse da quella nazionale viene spesso tralasciato e considerato superfluo. Non sarà una sorpresa scoprire che certi dettagli, su questi
uomini-simbolo, sono stati volontariamente ignorati nelle pagine nazionali di alcuni libri di
storia. Alcuni interessanti esempi ci vengono forniti dai lavori di Marco Dogo, Noel Malcolm e
Rade Mihaljčić.
Per esempio, si dice che l’Athleta Christi Skanderbeg, eroe nazionale albanese, fosse figlio
di una serba; o che János Hunyadi, storico reggente d’Ungheria, fosse di origini valacche; oppure persino che Djordje Petrović (24), più conosciuto come “Karadjordje” - Giorgio il nero avesse sangue albanese nelle sue vene (Dogo 1992). Una di queste dicerie riguarda anche il mito
del Kosovo e una delle sue figure più celebri: Miloš Obilić, il misterioso eroe che - secondo la
leggenda - aveva pugnalato il sultano Murad dopo aver coraggiosamente violato il campo nemico. Quest’ultimo personaggio - le cui origini e la cui esistenza sono ancora oggi argomento di
dibattito - è una delle icone centrali e intoccabili della consapevolezza storica serba. Il suo nome
ricorda la “terra sacra” del Kosovo ed è considerato rappresentativo del carattere eroico dei serbi
e del loro storico sacrificio.
Ciononostante, è anche vero il fatto che Miloš fosse popolare presso gli albanesi di Kopilić
(25), un piccolo villaggio nella parte nord-occidentale della regione dove si crede fosse nato da
origini valacche-albanesi [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.); Mihaljčić 1989]. Ad ogni modo, molti sono i
villaggi che rivendicano i natali dell’eroe, tanti quanti le tombe di Omero in Grecia. Oggigiorno,
queste dicerie, dettagli e considerazioni, sono ritenute dagli amanti della purezza nazionale come blasfemie e pericolose offese. Malgrado ciò, ci sono anche episodi appurati come quello di
24. Re del Regno di serbi, croati e sloveni, sorto nel 1918.
25. Secondo altre versioni il nome esatto è Kobilice o Kopilovice.
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Mehmet Sokoli o Sokolović. Originario di una famiglia ortodossa, fu portato quand’era giovane
a Istanbul per il devşirme (26) e fece carriera fino a diventare Gran Visir. Quando fece ritorno
nei Balcani assieme alle forze ottomane, fu colui che nel 1557 reinsediò la sede del Patriarcato a
Peć [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
Questo episodio e quelli precedenti - siano essi veri o falsi - sono importanti per comprendere la complessità delle relazioni interetniche e l’assurdità di certe pretese nazionali che sognano linee etniche chiare e separate. Tutto ciò è assurdo specialmente quando queste linee vengono ricercate nello studio del passato e spiegate per mezzo di prove storiche inventate. Come afferma il professor Marco Dogo nel suo libro Kosovo: albanesi e serbi, le radici del conflitto:
«[questi sono] Casi diversi […] che in diverso modo illustrano quanto poco politicamente
significativa fosse l’identità etnica, nei Balcani e nei dintorni, prima dell’avvento degli stati
indipendenti cristiani e della loro progressiva nazionalizzazione durante il XIX secolo» (Dogo
1992: 21; corsivo nell’originale)
Quindi, si può dire che le linee etniche esistono, ma che la storia non è fatta di tratti ben
delineati. Nei Balcani, l’appartenenza etnica è sempre stata marginale rispetto alla posizione
assunta nella lotta tra le forze ottomane e quelle cristiane e la mescolanza razziale era una caratteristica comune ad entrambi gli schieramenti. Durante la battaglia del Kosovo - nota anche come battaglia del Campo dei merli o battaglia del Kosovo Polje - entrambe le formazioni presentavano tra le loro fila numerose genti straniere e non era strano trovare anche serbi che servissero il sultano, poiché egli vantava molti vassalli.
Ancora oggi, è praticamente impossibile stabilire con precisione quali fossero i gruppi e il
numero di combattenti schierati con una parte o con l’altra. L’unica certezza è che le due
formazioni erano più o meno miste, con una maggioranza serba a guidare uno schieramento e
una prevalenza ottomana a guidarne l’altro. Ogni tentativo di interpretare e ricostruire la battaglia con un’ottica moderna di nazionalismo (27) è indiscutibilmente una pretesa assurda. Prima
di tutto, perché non si può parlare di nazioni in termini moderni quando si fa riferimento al XIV
e XV secolo e poi perché non bisogna tralasciare il fatto che ogni razza si è mischiata alle altre
nel corso del tempo. La convivenza con la differenza è sempre stata una realtà quotidiana e
come Noel Malcolm ha evidenziato: «[…] l’identità continua a svilupparsi nel tempo: “serbo”
era un’etichetta tribale del VI ma non nel XVI secolo, cosicché trattare i “serbi” come una categoria immutabile non ha senso, è come cercare di identificare iuti e angli tra i sudditi della regina Elisabetta I» [Malcolm 1999: 53 (ed. it.)].
Da questa citazione è evidente come sia sbagliato credere nell’esistenza di “categorie immutabili”. Infatti, Malcolm afferma che qualsiasi persona non avrebbe torto nell’affermare che
“quelli” erano i suoi antenati, ma si sbaglierebbe completamente nell’affermare che tutti i suoi
antenati facessero parte di quella popolazione o gruppo (ibidem). Quindi, fomentare il mito della
battaglia con questo tipo di voci e invenzioni nazionali, è solo un tentativo di strumentalizzare il
mito per altri scopi. Alla luce di ciò che è accaduto nel secolo scorso e più specificatamente negli ultimi trent’anni, l’opposizione tra serbi e albanesi è stata interpretata da politici e media come una moderna trasposizione dell’antica battaglia. Entrambi i gruppi hanno costruito le loro
identità nella piana del Kosovo e spesso con reciproca avversione. L’abuso del mito è stato fondamentale per l’istigazione all’odio e alla violenza fra le due comunità.
Il termine “mito” deriva dall’antico greco mythos che significa: parola, dialogo, sentenza,
26. Il devşirme era il reclutamento di giovani cristiani che venivano addestrati per diventare giannizzeri o funzionari imperiali.
27. Una rilettura moderna che trasforma la battaglia in un conflitto tra gruppi nazionali ben definiti e
differenziati.
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racconto, ma anche leggenda, fiaba e bugia (28). Da una semplice analisi dei significati sopraccitati, è facile comprendere a prima vista quale sia la qualità principale del mito: il suo essere
comunicativo. È una vera forma di narrazione, un linguaggio verbale e simbolico e, inoltre, uno
strumento potente per riformulare la realtà o semplicemente per farla apparire più semplice.
Potrebbe esser visto come un’interpretazione poetica ed incantata della realtà, ma il mito è
qualcosa di ben più complesso. È una sorta di narrativa, come l’etnografia, con cui condivide
molti punti in comune. Prima di tutto, è un altro modo di legare il passato al presente. Poi, si basa sulle memorie collettive e, infine, è un altro fattore chiave nella creazione di identità collettive. Tuttavia, a differenza dell’etnografia che usa per la sua narrazione i contributi di diverse
discipline (29), il mito riguarda maggiormente le credenze popolari e le percezioni piuttosto che
assodate verità storiche.
La sua efficacia e il suo legame inscindibile con i processi di creazione-distruzione di identità dipendono dal suo aspetto sociale. Per essere forte, il mito deve coinvolgere tutti gli strati
della società e le sue forme di identificazione. Perciò, la nazione sarà importante, ma lo saranno
anche altre forme quali, per esempio, la religione, la famiglia, la scuola e tutte quelle istituzioni
attraverso le quali il mito viene ricreato e attraverso cui si plasmano le identità. Secondo George
Schöpflin, il mito fornisce una struttura alla cultura, definita come «un sistema di nozioni detenute collettivamente, convinzioni, premesse, idee, disposizioni e comprensioni» (2000: 16;
traduzione personale). Ne risulta che i miti sono rappresentativi di come le collettività percepiscono ed esprimono i loro valori più profondi. Ma come Schöpflin aggiunge nel suo lavoro
assieme a Geoffrey Hosking, i miti d’identità sono anche miti di alterità o significante diversità
(Hosking, Schöpflin 1997).
In questo caso, miti come quelli dei serbi e degli albanesi del Kosovo, sono la proiezione di
due schemi di valori che, forse, non sono così differenti e distanti tra loro, ma sono percepiti
dalle due comunità come diversità potenzialmente pericolose. Da sempre, i miti hanno raccontato le guerre e le gesta di divinità ed eroi, oppure le imprese di mortali impegnati a combattere
creature disumane. Tutti questi scontri hanno sempre avuto un’ambientazione mitica, un luogosimbolo dell’incontro tra ciò che è divino e ciò che è umano. Come nelle favole più classiche,
c’è sempre un periodo e un luogo in cui “tanto, tanto tempo fa” è avvenuto qualcosa di speciale:
la storia del Kosovo non fa alcuna eccezione.
Nel suo saggio Identità politiche e conflitti. Definizioni a confronto (2000: 13-28), Furio
Cerutti fornisce due interessanti tipi e definizioni di identità: identità specchio e identità muro.
L’identità specchio può essere descritta come l’identità prodotta dalla selezione collettiva di
valori, principi e stili di vita con i quali il gruppo si identifica e vi vede riflessa la propria immagine. L’identità muro, invece, è la forma di identità che prevale ogniqualvolta c’è una situazione
di crisi e il gruppo si unisce, si separa dagli altri e cerca di preservare l’unità della comunità.
Questo tipo di identità funge appunto da muro che protegge il gruppo dall’esterno.
Secondo l’autore, queste due identità non sono complete. Le identità mature si hanno solamente quando c’è un equilibrio tra i due oggetti: tra lo specchio e il muro. Gli stati e i gruppi
che abusano dell’uno o dell’altro o semplicemente scambiano il primo per il secondo, non comprendono le varie possibilità di compromesso, tra le quali, quella di aprire un canale di comunicazione attraverso il muro. Coloro che si affidano unicamente all’identità muro, sembrano identità forti, ma in realtà dimostrano tutta la loro debolezza, insicurezza e l’incapacità di saper affrontare difficili situazioni socio-politiche. Di solito, queste identità adottano meccanismi difensivi che a livello psicologico rischiano spesso la neurosi. Se poi vi si aggiunge anche l’impiego
28. Definizione tratta da Rocci (1961: 1257).
29. Queste discipline già citate in precedenza sono: archeologia, antropologia, filologia e storia.
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del mito come mezzo per rafforzare la sicurezza collettiva, allora le possibilità di avere un
conflitto aumentano a dismisura.
Per questo motivo, due comunità che usano la loro identità specchio come identità muro non
possono lasciare intatto il luogo che le ospita. Esso diverrà lo scenario di un conflitto d’identità,
l’ostentazione di queste, e non la semplice manifestazione del senso di appartenenza e attaccamento descritti in precedenza. Ogni cosa può diventare un simbolo e un’arma da usare nella
guerra psicologica contro il “diverso” e contro coloro del gruppo che non sono abbastanza convinti della loro appartenenza. Rituali, commemorazioni, monumenti, bandiere, inni nazionali,
canzoni, nomi di strade, ristoranti, piazze e persino cimiteri, tutto può diventare uno strumento
di demarcazione territoriale. Gli individui vengono coinvolti a livello collettivo in processi che
dal pensare all’agire denotano un comportamento territoriale.
Se oggi qualcuno volesse visitare di nuovo il Kosovo che conosceva un tempo, noterebbe
rilevanti cambiamenti. L’intero sistema topografico è stato cambiato. Nella segnaletica stradale i
nomi serbi sono stati sbarrati o cancellati, fatta eccezione per quella delle enclavi serbe. Molte
strade e aree geografiche hanno abbandonato i loro nomi precedenti per far spazio a quelli degli
eroi nazionali della storia albanese o ai più recenti protagonisti dell’Uck. Altre sono persino dedicate ai politici americani che hanno sostenuto la lotta contro l’esercito serbo (30). Alberghi,
società private e associazioni sportive portano nomi che ricordano origini illiriche e dardane.
Sono stati eretti nuovi monumenti per ricordare ciò che è accaduto durante il conflitto e altri andati distrutti - sono stati ricostruiti.
Paradossalmente, il motto serbo ultranazionalista “La Serbia è là dove si trovano ossa serbe”
(31), è stato completamente capovolto. Il paesaggio della regione kosovara è oggi pieno di
tombe e cimiteri delle recenti vittime di guerra. Molte lapidi sono situate senza un preciso ordine, vicino alle strade o ai luoghi dove sono stati compiuti massacri. Tutte le vittime sono percepite indistintamente come martiri per la causa albanese. Su ogni lapide c’è una bandiera albanese e in alcuni casi anche una rappresentazione a grandezza naturale di un soldato dell’Uck.
Gli antichi monasteri ortodossi sono ancora là vicino ad antiche moschee, ma sono sotto il
controllo delle forze internazionali, pronte a proteggerli da eventuali attacchi.
Durante l’ultima guerra, secondo le stime dell’International Crisis Group (Icg), sono state distrutte 218 moschee e sono state bruciate le case di 302 imam. Sono state attaccate anche le
strutture dell’Ordine dei dervisci e dei sufiti e con esse sono andati persi numerosi testi e manoscritti antichi. Nemmeno le chiese cattoliche albanesi sono state risparmiate. Quando la guerra
stava terminando a favore dell’esercito di liberazione, gli albanesi iniziarono a prendersi la loro
rivincita contro gli edifici e le infrastrutture serbe. Tra il giugno e l’ottobre 1999, sono accaduti
settantasei incidenti e importanti siti religiosi del XIV secolo sono stati distrutti o danneggiati
seriamente. Durante il conflitto, le chiese e le moschee di più recente costruzione furono
considerate segni dell’occupazione straniera e furono perciò i bersagli preferiti dai mortai di
entrambi gli schieramenti (32). Non rimasero esenti da attacchi tutte le istituzioni e strutture
considerate nemiche, come associazioni culturali e scuole.
30. A Pristina, la strada principale è intitolata a Bill Clinton e a Peja (Peć in serbo), c’è una via dedicata a Madeline Allbright. Lungo la strada per Peja c’è anche un ristorante-pizzeria che si chiama Aviano,
come la base americana del Friuli Venezia Giulia dalla quale partivano i bombardieri che nel marzo 1999
hanno colpito Kosovo e Serbia.
31. Secondo i sostenitori di una Serbia etnicamente pura e secondo un volume dal titolo preoccupante
Serbia pura. Nuove pratiche eugenetiche, la terra si segna con le tombe e l’entità nazionale si genera nel
sangue. Cfr. Circolo di Belgrado (1996: 79-82).
32. Icg, Religion in Kosovo, Icg Balkans Report N° 105, Pristina/Brussels, 31 January 2001, on line:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1591&l=1, pp. 14-15.
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L’indagine dell’Icg dimostra come tutti questi episodi di vandalismo e reciproca aggressione
sono stati motivati da un forte desiderio di sradicare le testimonianze della presenza altrui.
Eliminando i simboli di appartenenza e i centri di identificazione dell’altro, un gruppo può esorcizzare il suo doppelgänger nella lotta per il possesso dello spazio mitico e territoriale delle origini. Sullo sfondo di questo scenario di distruzione, i due gruppi si sono affrontati demonizzandosi a vicenda. Infatti, rendere evidente la mostruosità altrui ha fornito un’ottima giustificazione
per l’impiego di ogni mezzo e violenza possibile onde ottenere il controllo totale sull’area (33).
Per comprendere a fondo i miti contrapposti di questa regione contesa, è necessario non
dimenticare e sottovalutare il ruolo svolto dalla stessa regione, in quanto essa rappresenta gran
parte dei suoi miti e viene santificata dalle sue diverse comunità. C’è un legame inscindibile tra
il mito, il suo spazio e le identità che vi abitano, specialmente se il mito in questione appartiene
ad una determinata tipologia. Secondo Schöpflin si può identificare una grande varietà di miti.
Molti possono sovrapporsi, coesistere o contraddirsi a vicenda, ma tutti mirano a rassicurare l’integrità del gruppo e la sua riproduzione culturale. Inoltre, essi fanno sì che gli individui possano
concepire la propria identità sia come singoli sia come componenti di una comunità (Schöpflin
2000). Gli albanesi e i serbi del Kosovo hanno generato due miti differenti ma entrambi legati alla
tematica del territorio.
I serbi hanno associato il suolo del Kosovo a un racconto di redenzione e sofferenza, di elezione divina e nobile discendenza. Essi hanno cantato la grandezza della loro cultura ortodossa,
la bellezza dei loro antichi monasteri e la perdita di tutto per un mix di sacrificio celeste e
tradimento terreno. Gli albanesi, invece, hanno sviluppato, specialmente nell’ultimo secolo e in
tempi più recenti, un mito di resistenza, fatto di un carattere indomabile, di insurrezioni armate,
ma anche di proteste pacifiche (34). Tuttavia, il mito più forte per i kosovari albanesi resta quello della loro etnogenesi: il sostenere di essere presenti nella regione da tempi immemori, molto
prima dei serbi, e perciò il diritto di rivendicare la terra degli antenati.
Su entrambe le comunità grava il peso del vittimismo e un forte complesso di persecuzione
basato su memorie vicine e lontane. Sebbene il sentirsi vittime possa essere giustificato, questo
stato mentale porta spesso a un forte desiderio di vendetta. Se il vittimismo serbo è sempre stato
una sorta di costante nella storia serba e nel XX secolo sia servito come propulsore di nuovi
conflitti, il risentimento albanese si è appena rinvigorito e il suo potenziale distruttivo può costituire una seria minaccia per il futuro. Perciò, comprendere i miti e ciò che essi ci raccontano, è
fondamentale per analizzare la mentalità politica di alcuni paesi, identificare le loro glorie e i
lori traumi passati e cercare di trovare diverse modalità d’intervento per sopperire ai loro bisogni nella maniera più pacifica possibile.
33. Uno degli esempi più importanti di questa pratica di de-umanizzazione è rappresentato dalle dichiarazioni razziste e stereotipate di alcuni politici serbi all’inizio del secolo scorso. Per esempio, Vladan
Djordjević - ex-presidente del Consiglio dei ministri - provò a spiegare scientificamente, nel 1913, che gli
albanesi erano un popolo inferiore poiché avevano la coda. Protić, un suo collega del tempo, sosteneva
che gli albanesi erano reazionari poiché sentivano il richiamo della foresta [Dogo: 1992; Malcolm 1999
(ed. it.)]. Tutte queste voci sono state ripetute costantemente nel corso degli anni fino a completare la
supposta bestialità degli albanesi con versioni più recenti che li ritraevano come incorreggibili e violenti
stupratori. Queste affermazioni sono state smentite da varie ricerche e statistiche (Per maggiori dettagli su
questi stereotipi si consiglia: Mertus 1999).
34. Ne sono esempio le attività dell’ex-presidente Rugova e la nascita della “società parallela” degli
albanesi kosovari.
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2. Kosovo: il mito come identità
«The Kosovo tradition has been more a subject for the
researches of literary historians than for historians proper.
[…] Even though inadequately researched, one cannot
deny its role in our wars of liberation»
[Rade Mihaljčić, The battle of Kosovo: In history and in popular tradition, 1989: 51].
2.1. La battaglia
Il 28 giugno 1389 (35), le armate del sultano Murad incontrarono nella piana del Kosovo le
formazioni cristiane guidate dal principe Lazar. In quel tempo, l’Impero medievale serbo si era
già frantumato in un numero di distretti governati da diversi signori. Sin dalla morte dell’imperatore Dušan nel 1355, il suo erede Uroš aveva dovuto far i conti con le mire espansionistiche
dei suoi alleati e numerosi vicini. Come se ciò non bastasse, la minaccia ottomana si stava facendo sempre più concreta e quando la battaglia di Maritsa (1371) segnò l’avanzata turca nell’area balcanica, i resti della dinastia Nemanjić erano ormai suddivisi in vari principati. La sconfitta cristiana del 1371 diede il via ad una penetrazione che negli anni successivi avrebbe fatto
crollare, uno ad uno, tutti gli stati medievali dei Balcani. Fu così che, nel 1389, Murad apparve
in Kosovo alla testa del suo vasto esercito, al fianco del figlio Bayazid e appoggiato dai suoi
vassalli (36). La controparte cristiana era invece composta dai maggiori rappresentanti di quei
territori e principati divisi.
Il principe serbo vantava al suo fianco il genero Vuk Branković, signore di larga parte del
Kosovo e Vlatko Vuković, comandante delle forze bosniache di re Tvrtko. Lazar Hrebeljanović
era fra i maggiori possidenti terreni dell’epoca e signore di una vasta area centrale della Serbia
attorno alla città di Kruševac, nonché proprietario di una parte del Kosovo orientale. Egli era
considerato uno dei maggiori sostenitori della Chiesa ortodossa e uno dei nobili più influenti.
Oggigiorno, la sua figura rappresenta la perfetta fusione tra realtà e mito, poiché di lui si sa ben
poco e perché i primi quarant’anni della sua vita sono un vero e proprio mistero. Nei testi di
culto, scritti in seguito alla battaglia, egli appare come il martire del Kosovo e molte sono le
voci che lo ritraggono come erede diretto della dinastia imperiale. Tuttavia, queste dicerie sono
quasi sicuramente false e dovute, per lo più, alla necessità degli scrittori medievali di stabilire
una sorta di continuità con la casa regnante e con l’agonizzante stato serbo. Il principe Lazar era
probabilmente il figlio di un ricco magnate, accolto ed educato a corte e poi distintosi per le sue
qualità fino ad ottenere il titolo di knez (37) (Mihaljčić 1989).
L’esatto numero dei partecipanti alla battaglia è praticamente sconosciuto. Secondo le stime
di alcuni esperti occidentali di storia medievale balcanica, si può ipotizzare che l’esercito di
Murad fosse composto da circa 27-30.000 uomini, mentre quello cristiano da circa 15-20.000
35. Il 15 giugno 1389 secondo il calendario giuliano.
36. Si sostiene che fra questi fossero presenti anche le armate dei signori serbi di Macedonia e Bulgaria, ovvero di Marko Kraljević e Konstantin Dejanović. Inoltre, un’antica cronaca italiana afferma che
la battaglia è stata decisa dalla presenza di balestrieri greci e cristiani tra le forze ottomane. Anche bulgari
e clan albanesi cattolici - come i Mirdita e i Këlmendi - hanno combattuto dalla parte dei turchi. È pressoché certa la presenza d’albanesi dalla parte di Lazar: ne è esempio la famiglia dei Muzaka che inviò sul
campo di battaglia un suo rappresentante [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
37. Principe.
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[Malcolm 1999 (ed.it.)]. Ciononostante, è impossibile stabilire un numero preciso, poiché le stime variano a seconda delle fonti consultate. Se ci si riferisce a testi ed approssimazioni antiche,
le cifre cambiano notevolmente a seconda dell’autore che vuole esaltare la vittoria, oppure
giustificare la sconfitta. Inizialmente c’erano stati dubbi persino sull’esito della battaglia. Solo
dopo un po’ di tempo, si comprese che le forze ottomane avevano inflitto a quelle cristiane una
sconfitta di misura, ma molto importante, poiché nello scontro erano morti entrambi i leader
degli schieramenti. Secondo la leggenda più diffusa, Murad era stato pugnalato con l’inganno da
un misterioso soldato cristiano che aveva finto di arrendersi, mentre Lazar era stato catturato e
decapitato. Le forze cristiane ne uscirono notevolmente indebolite e ridimensionate. Le restanti
voci sulla battaglia sono miticizzate e romanzate.
I serbi continuarono ad opporsi all’invasore turco per altri settant’anni circa prima di arrendersi definitivamente, ma la loro opposizione fu debole e discontinua. Nel 1445, la regione
kosovara fu interamente occupata dai turchi e quattro anni più tardi cadde anche Smederevo,
ultima delle fortezze settentrionali della Serbia medievale. Nel 1448, la piana dei Merli fu lo
scenario di un secondo conflitto con le forze ottomane, ma l’esito fu altrettanto disastroso. La
seconda battaglia del Kosovo si concluse con la sconfitta delle forze cristiane guidate dall’ungherese János Hunyadi (38). Tuttavia, la “battaglia” del 1389 resta, agli occhi del popolo serbo,
il tragico punto di svolta della loro storia nazionale, la perdita dell’indipendenza e l’inizio di una
sottomissione che sarebbe durata per altri quattrocento anni. È perciò facilmente comprensibile
come questa sconfitta sia percepita tutt’oggi come un trauma nazionale, impresso a fondo nella
memoria collettiva dell’identità serba.
Le prime leggende e racconti riguardanti la “battaglia” nacquero subito dopo la sconfitta e la
morte di Lazar. In questo contesto, i testi religiosi conservati nei monasteri e la ricca tradizione
orale-popolare, svolsero un ruolo-chiave nello sviluppo e nella diffusione del mito della
“battaglia” e fecero altrettanto per il culto di Lazar. Sermoni ecclesiastici e agiografie iniziarono
a celebrare il principe serbo come un martire che si era sacrificato per la vera fede. Egli fu visto
come una personificazione di Cristo morto in difesa della Chiesa serbo-ortodossa, ma anche
come ultimo leader serbo. Infatti, la sua rappresentazione cambia a seconda del tipo di testo
preso in analisi. Nelle cronache del tempo, egli è ritratto in maggior misura come un condottiero
militare, mentre negli scritti di carattere religioso è descritto come un santo, le cui reliquie
vantano qualità curative miracolose.
Ciò che colpisce di più, è il fatto che egli sia la prima persona all’infuori della casa regnante
ad essere stata canonizzata nella storia serba. La sua santificazione - avvenuta probabilmente
durante l’inumazione delle sue ossa nel monastero che egli aveva fondato a Ravanica rappresenta un concreto riconoscimento politico e religioso della sua persona e stabilisce l’inizio
preciso del suo culto (Mihaljčić 1989). Sotto il potere ottomano, la Chiesa serbo-ortodossa era
diventata l’unico centro di identificazione della comunità serba, una comunità, che aveva subito
una dura perdita di potere in seguito al crollo del suo regno e dei suoi principati. Di conseguenza, la Chiesa rimaneva l’unica istituzione a carattere etnico-nazionale presente in territorio straniero. La venerazione dei suoi santi era perciò - a tutti gli effetti - l’adorazione della famiglia
Nemanjić e del suo passato. In tal modo si rafforzavano le basi di ciò che molti studiosi ed
esperti avrebbero poi definito come “Sansavismo” o “Sansavità”, cioè la futura e potente sintesi
38. Gjergji Kastriot Skanderbeg avrebbe dovuto partecipare a questa battaglia e soccorrere le forze di
Hunyadi. Sfortunatamente, egli rimase bloccato nella parte nord-occidentale dell’Albania, impegnato a
confrontarsi con le forze veneziane. Quando arrivò sul campo di battaglia, le truppe cristiane stavano
ormai battendo in ritirata [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
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Lorenzo Degrassi
serba di Chiesa, stato e nazione (39).
Nel corso dei tre secoli successivi, il mito della battaglia si è arricchito di nuovi aspetti e
dettagli che assumeranno un carattere nazionale spesso anti-turco, ma che daranno alla comunità
serba una maggiore consapevolezza storica e un forte desiderio di rivalsa.
2.2. Dalla battaglia all’ideologia nazionale
Pochi anni dopo la disfatta del “campo dei Merli”, nelle cronache del tempo si diffusero due
quesiti all’apparenza irrilevanti e motivati dal desiderio di far luce sui fatti della battaglia. Circa
tredici anni dopo il fatidico evento, una cronaca della città di Peć si interrogava sulle cause
effettive della sconfitta cristiana, chiedendosi se fosse dovuta a qualche tradimento o semplicemente alla volontà divina [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)]. L’altro interrogativo in questione, riguardava invece l’identità segreta del misterioso eroe che aveva ucciso il sultano Murad. Non si sapeva
nulla della sua identità, delle sue origini o del ruolo svolto all’interno dell’esercito cristiano.
Con il passare degli anni, questi due quesiti furono oggetto di opinioni spesso differenti e frutto
più di elaborazioni letterarie che di effettive indagini storiche. Le prime risposte dettagliate
giunsero dalle testimonianze di resoconti scritti lontano dall’area interessata e, in particolare, da
greci, turchi, bulgari e persino catalani.
L’eco della battaglia aveva raggiunto varie zone e scatenato la fantasia di vari autori. Attorno
ai primi anni del XV secolo, una cronaca bulgara affermava che il sultano Murad era stato colpito a morte dalla lancia di un cavaliere di nome Miloš. Lo stesso nome riapparve verso il 1484 in
una cronaca turca, dove questa volta si forniva anche il cognome dell’eroe: Miloš Kobila (Mihaljčić 1989). Nei secoli successivi, questo nome fu soggetto a numerose variazioni come numerose furono le interpretazioni del gesto eroico. Nella tradizione popolare il nominativo più diffuso
fu quello di Miloš Kobilić, trasformato poi nel XVIII secolo in Miloš Obilić, che resta attualmente la forma più usata [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)]. Come si è detto nel precedente capitolo, questo personaggio è la figura più discussa e miticizzata del racconto kosovaro. Non vi è nulla di
certo sulle sue origini ed è perciò difficile stabilire persino se Kobilić fosse il suo vero cognome,
se egli fosse serbo o ungherese, quale sia stato il suo grado militare e in che modo abbia posto
fine alla vita del sultano.
Nell’immaginario popolare, la sua identità misteriosa fu oggetto di elaborazioni fantastiche.
Per fronteggiare nemici dalla forza sovrumana come i turchi, servivano qualità soprannaturali e
un coraggio eccezionale. Perciò, come tutti gli eroi dell’antichità, gli furono attribuite origini
magiche e divine. Si diceva che fosse stato allevato e nutrito da una cavalla (40), che fosse figlio
di un drago o addirittura di una veela (41) e che poi fosse stato trovato e battezzato direttamente
dalla casa regnante (Mihaljčić 1989). Ciò che è certo, è che la sua figura è divenuta per il popolo
39. Svetosavlje dal nome di San Sava, fondatore della Chiesa ortodossa autocefala nel 1219. Sava era
figlio del capostipite della dinastia Nemanjić. Con questo concetto si va a sottolineare il forte legame tra
la vera fede, la nazione e lo stato, dove la nazione è santa, in quanto temporale e terreno sono un’unica
cosa (Anzulović 1999).
40. Kobila in serbo significa appunto “cavalla”.
41. In uno dei vari canti popolari giunti sino ai nostri tempi, la madre di Miloš è identificata con una
veela. La veela è una creatura fatata simile alle ninfe greche, presente sia nella mitologia slava sia in quella celtica. I suoi poteri sono molto simili a quelli delle sirene, ma il suo habitat è nella maggior parte dei
casi terrestre: boschi, prati e stagni. Il suo canto ammaliatore è capace di rapire l’anima di chi lo ascolta e
il suo modo di danzare è altrettanto potente. All’apparenza erano donne normali, dalla pelle pallida e i capelli chiari, ma in realtà - se adirate - svelavano la loro vera natura: mostri dalla testa d’uccello e dal becco affilato.
Il Kosovo come mito e identità fra serbi e albanesi
219
serbo il simbolo-chiave di eroismo e sacrificio, un vero esempio di coraggio nazionale. Se Lazar
è il simbolo del martirio e della sofferenza di un popolo e della sua Chiesa, Miloš Obilić ne rappresenta l’orgoglio, il gesto estremo dell’eroico sacrificio e l’opposizione incondizionata alla
resa. La storia di Miloš è però legata a quella di un altro personaggio realmente esistito: Vuk
Branković, tacciato dal mito come l’anti-eroe della battaglia del Kosovo.
Branković è la risposta tanto attesa alle voci che sostenevano la tesi del tradimento come
causa della sconfitta. Nel suo Regno degli sclavi (1601), il monaco ragusano Mavro Urbini fu la
prima persona a sostenere che il comandante Branković avesse cospirato a favore dei turchi. Secondo la leggenda, egli avrebbe osservato la battaglia da lontano, lasciando Lazar e le sue truppe al loro destino. Sebbene l’innocenza del genero di Lazar sia stata storicamente provata (42),
oggi il suo nome è ancora sinonimo di bassezza e codardia ed egli è ritenuto l’immagine per
eccellenza del traditore. Come ricorda Noel Malcolm, la figura del cospiratore non era una
novità nelle composizioni epiche dell’epoca ed è molto probabile che anche Branković sia
rimasto vittima di questa tendenza. Basti pensare alla Chanson de Roland e all’epica orale francese, dove l’opposizione tra un signore leale e uno sleale erano vicende comunemente narrate
[Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)]. Nel discorso mitico della battaglia, Vuk Branković diviene quindi
l’esatto contrario dell’eroe Miloš Obilić.
La mitopoiesi della battaglia si arricchisce notevolmente della simbologia offerta da questi
personaggi che lentamente iniziano a presentarsi come archetipi comportamentali. Il mito si rafforza ancor di più nel 1690, data della Velika Seoba, ovvero della “grande migrazione”. A quel
tempo, le forze imperiali asburgiche si erano insediate di forza nella regione ed avevano iniziato
una strenua lotta contro quelle ottomane. Nel 1690, l’esercito austriaco è costretto a una brusca
ritirata verso nord, lasciando l’area kosovara e le zone circostanti in balia di truppe tatare e ottomane. Assieme agli austriaci fuggono anche migliaia di famiglie serbe e con esse anche Arsenije III Crnojević, patriarca di Peć. Vari dipinti lo ritraggono alla testa di una fiumana di gente
che, secondo le stime serbe, corrispondeva a circa 400 mila persone. Anche in questo caso, le
stime sono abbastanza esagerate ed è difficile stabilire quante di queste persone fossero provenienti dal Kosovo e quante fossero effettivamente di etnia serba [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
La “grande migrazione” resta comunque un ulteriore evento fondamentale per la coscienza
del popolo serbo. Essa rappresenta un secondo duro colpo inflitto alla Chiesa ortodossa e alla
sua comunità. L’esodo dei serbi sarà spesso paragonato alla shoah del popolo ebraico e usato
per sottolineare, ancora una volta, il lato tragico e sofferente della loro storia. Da questa migrazione ha origine anche la teoria serba del “vuoto etnico”, secondo la quale, gli albanesi avrebbero ripopolato la regione abbandonata imponendovi la loro maggioranza. Ciononostante,
l’esodo del 1690 è importante anche per un ulteriore motivo: la diffusione nelle regioni settentrionali del culto e del mito di Lazar. Infatti, alla migrazione parteciparono anche i monaci di
Ravanica che non dimenticarono di portare via con sé le cose più preziose del loro monastero e
fra di esse la più importante: le reliquie di Lazar. La seconda inumazione delle spoglie avvenne
nella località di Srem, nel nuovo monastero di Vrdnik, nei pressi della zona attualmente confinante con la Bosnia (Mihaljčić 1989).
Il trasferimento delle reliquie assume così un ruolo fondamentale nel far sì che il mito del
Kosovo e del suo martire, non siano la semplice celebrazione e adorazione di una comunità mo42. Secondo vari storici, Vuk Branković ha mantenuto una condotta esemplare durante la battaglia, ritirando le sue truppe dal campo solamente quando gli esiti erano ormai decisi. Ne sarebbe prova ulteriore
il fatto che in seguito al conflitto egli si sia ancora opposto ai turchi e abbia rifiutato il vassallaggio, accettandolo solo nel 1392, per poi essere deposto e rinchiuso in prigione sino alla morte [Malcolm 1999 (ed.
it.); Mihaljčić 1989].
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Lorenzo Degrassi
nastica isolata, ma l’oggetto di venerazione di un’intera comunità religiosa. Le junacke pjesme
(43) continuarono ad essere il mezzo più adatto a diffondere su larga scala le gesta dei martiri
del Kosovo. La loro tradizione orale permise che questa conoscenza non restasse più unico monopolio di una classe nobile ed ecclesiastica, ma uscisse dalle corti e diventasse cultura popolare. Tuttavia, il mito della battaglia e i suoi personaggi dovettero pazientare ancora poco più di
un secolo, prima di essere insigniti del riconoscimento e del compito più alto della loro storia.
Grazie all’attenta e minuziosa opera di Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (44), il racconto del Kosovo
diverrà letteratura nazionale e fonte d’ispirazione per il rinascente stato serbo. In un’epoca di
rinnovata ostilità con i turchi, Vuk Karadžić inserirà questi canti popolari e feudali in un contesto di liberazione nazionale che vedrà la Serbia lottare nuovamente per imporsi con un nuovo
regno e un nuovo sovrano (45) (Greenawalt 2001).
Con Karadžić, il mito si arricchisce di un ulteriore racconto. Infatti uno dei canti raccolti dall’autore, La caduta dell’impero serbo, introduce altri nuovi particolari alla trama già complessa
della battaglia. In questo canto si narra che il principe Lazar avesse ricevuto la visita di
Sant’Elia nelle sembianze di un falco. Prima dello scontro, il santo avrebbe offerto a Lazar la
possibilità di decidere il destino del suo popolo: consegnarlo alla gloria del regno dei cieli o
relegarlo alla celebrità materiale di una vittoria terrena. Il principe serbo avrebbe quindi optato
per una vittoria morale e spirituale. La storica sconfitta viene perciò negata e trasformata in una
vittoria celeste che, automaticamente, trasforma i discendenti di Lazar in gente prescelta da Dio,
con una chiara missione civilizzatrice nei Balcani ottomani.
La sconfitta è smentita per ben due volte: con la scelta voluta del regno celeste e - come visto
in precedenza - con il tema del tradimento (Pick 2001). Nella storia della tradizione orale, il racconto si configura in una versione biblica già nota, fatta di un’ultima cena e di un Messia
(Lazar) tradito da un Giuda redivivo (Vuk Branković) che a sua volta aveva accusato di slealtà il
vero martire [Miloš Obilić (46)]. Nella neonata letteratura del tempo si sente la pressione della
causa nazionale e la necessità di servirla, come dimostrano le ultime linee di questa stanza dove
le ipotetiche parole di Lazar servono da chiamata per il presente:
Ko je Srbin i srpskoga roda
i od srpske krvi i kolena,
a ne doš’o na boj na Kosovo:
ne imao od srca poroda,
ni muškoga ni devojačkoga!
Od ruke mu ništa ne rodilo,
rujno vino ni šenica bela!
Rdom kap’o dok mu je kolena!
(Duijzings 2000: 187)
Whoever is a Serb and of Serbian descent
Serbian blood and Serbian ancestry,
And does not come to fight at Kosovo,
May he not have a single descendant
Be it either a son or a daughter!
And may nothing of his bear fruit,
No red wine and no golden wheat!
May all he has rust, while his kin exists!
[Mihaljčić 1989: 230 (47)]
43. Canzoni eroiche.
44. Vuk Stefanović Karadžić è considerato uno dei padri fondatori della nazione serba. Figlio di contadini, riuscì ad ottenere un’ottima istruzione e ad entrare in contatto con altri intellettuali del suo tempo,
tra cui lo sloveno Jernej Kopitar. Kopitar lo introdusse nei circoli di Vienna e lo presentò a Jacob Grimm
e in seguito anche a Goethe. Karadžić pubblicò nel 1814 la prima grammatica serba e quattro anni più tardi anche un dizionario serbo-tedesco-latino. Le opere che l’hanno reso famoso sono le sue raccolte di
canti popolari e in particolare i volumi delle Narodne srpske pjesme pubblicate tra il 1841 e il 1866.
45. Il Regno di Serbia verrà proclamato nel 1882.
46. Secondo una delle tante leggende, durante una cena, la sera prima della battaglia, Branković
avrebbe accusato Obilić di voler tradire la causa cristiana. Il giorno seguente, Miloš avrebbe dimostrato la
sua lealtà uccidendo da solo il sultano Murad e soccombendo alle sue guardie.
47. Questa stanza è parte del poema Musić Stefan, presente nel cosiddetto “Ciclo del Kosovo”.
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221
Nell’epoca delle prime rivolte serbe contro il dominio ottomano, le raccolte di Karadžić
aiutano il mito a creare una cultura nazionale e ad assumere una dimensione politica attiva.
L’autore che però ne trarrà maggiore spunto per la sua opera sarà il signore e vescovo del Montenegro: Petar Petrović Njegoš. Il suo Gorski Vijenac (48) (1847) non tratta come argomento
principale il Kosovo, ma la lotta contro il turco per il trionfo della fede cristiana. Gli eroi del
Kosovo e il gesto di Miloš Obilić sono però il modello da seguire e onorare, lo sfondo su cui si
dipana la trama della sua storia. Njegoš si basa su un episodio presumibilmente accaduto agli
inizi del XIX secolo: lo sterminio di un gruppo di montenegrini che si erano convertiti alla fede
musulmana. In quest’opera, l’opposizione al turco e all’islamico trova una soluzione dura: coloro che si rifiutano di tornare alla vera fede e si oppongono al battesimo dell’acqua, vengono
forzati al battesimo del sangue. In tal modo, i martiri del Kosovo vengono finalmente vendicati.
L’opera - che va chiaramente analizzata nel suo contesto storico - fu dedicata a Karadjordje che
aveva scatenato la prima rivolta serba e “cristianizzato” le terre (Duijzings 2000).
Nei programmi politici della Serbia ottocentesca, il Kosovo sarà considerato uno degli obiettivi geo-politici principali per la costruzione della nazione. L’allora primo ministro Ilija Garašanin rese chiaro questo concetto nel suo Načertanije (49) (1844), considerando la conquista
della regione come un dovuto risarcimento per l’antica perdita dell’Impero medievale e come un
passo obbligato per la creazione di una “Grande Serbia”. Da questo momento, il tema del Kosovo diventa una vera e propria ossessione. Verso la fine del secolo, la data della storica battaglia il giorno di San Vito - entra a far parte del calendario della Chiesa serbo-ortodossa, come festività per ricordarne l’evento. In precedenza, la stessa Chiesa aveva stabilito il culto dell’eroe del
Kosovo: Miloš Obilić viene rappresentato in vari dipinti con l’aureola del santo e celebrato in
Montenegro come un vero eroe nazionale. Lo stesso Petar Petrović Njegoš creò in suo nome
una medaglia al valore militare, assegnata ai combattenti che si distinguevano nella lotta per
l’indipendenza (Mihaljčić 1989).
In occasione del 500° anniversario della battaglia, il ministro degli esteri Čedomil Mijatović
definì l’evento del 1389 come «[…] una fonte inesauribile di orgoglio nazionale […] più importante della lingua e più forte della Chiesa stessa, […] una stella che ha brillato nelle notti buie
per quasi cinquecento anni» (Judah 2000: 16; traduzione personale). Il racconto del Kosovo
diventa la musa ispiratrice dei patrioti e assume tutti gli aspetti di un’ideologia politica, diventando uno degli elementi portanti del movimento di liberazione nazionale. Nel 1912, allo scoppio della Prima guerra balcanica, questo era lo stato d’animo di un giovane soldato serbo prossimo al combattimento nella regione contesa: «The single sound of that word - Kosovo - caused
an indescribable excitement. This one word pointed to the black past - five centuries. In it exists
the whole of our sad past - the tragedy of Prince Lazar and the entire Serbian people. Each of us
has created for himself a picture of Kosovo while we were still in the cradle. Our mothers lulled
us to sleep with songs of Kosovo, and in our schools our teachers never ceased in their stories of
Lazar and Miloš. My God, what awaited us! To see a liberated Kosovo. When we arrived on
Kosovo Polje and the battalions were placed in order, our commander spoke: “[…] This place
on which we stand is the graveyard of our glory […]”. […] The spirits of Lazar, Miloš and all
the Kosovo martyrs gaze on us. We felt strong and proud, for we are the generation which will
realise the centuries-old dream of the whole nation: that we with the sword will regain the
freedom that was lost with the sword» (Emmert 1989: 20).
48. La corona di montagna.
49. Načertanije significa “programma” ed era il piano politico di Garašanin per la creazione di un
grande stato serbo. Il “programma” prevedeva anche l’obiettivo storico di uno sbocco sul mare.
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Come ha sottolineato Florian Bieber, il mito si lega al nazionalismo serbo in tre modi diversi: diventa parte del calendario della nazione, ovvero un evento da ricordare e celebrare ogni anno; è sinonimo di rivendicazione del territorio e, infine, definisce la nazione serba del presente
come una continuazione naturale di quella passata e medievale (Bieber 2002). I temi del sacrificio, della sofferenza, dell’eroismo e del tradimento, non sono svaniti con il passare dei secoli,
ma si sono rafforzati come caratteristiche distintive dell’identità serba. Il legame particolare con
Dio, la disposizione a sacrificarsi e a soffrire per i propri ideali e l’eroica lotta di difesa e liberazione, saranno ancora leitmotiv ricorrenti nella vita politica di questo paese e lo sosterranno nei
momenti determinanti del XX secolo.
2.3. Il mito dalla Prima guerra mondiale alla Jugoslavia di Tito
Con le vittorie nella Prima e Seconda guerra balcanica, la Serbia acquisisce tre aree abitate in
maggioranza da popolazioni non serbe: il Sangiaccato, il Kosovo e la Macedonia. L’allargamento territoriale verso nord è invece contrastato dall’Impero austro-ungarico che diventa il primo
opponente all’espansionismo serbo. Gavrilo Princip, serbo di Bosnia, sceglie il giorno di San
Vito del 1914 per assassinare a Sarajevo l’arciduca Franz Ferdinand. La scelta precisa della data
rievoca ancora il mitico passato. Gli appartenenti alla società segreta nota come Giovane Bosnia
- collegata al gruppo nazionalista serbo della Mano Nera del colonnello “Apis” Dimitrijević vedono in Princip un nuovo Miloš Obilić che si è sacrificato per la morte di un nuovo invasore.
In questi anni e durante la Grande guerra, il mito del Kosovo serve da sostegno alla dinastia dei
Karadjordjević che ne farà largo uso anche dopo il 1918 e la fondazione del Regno di serbi,
croati e sloveni (Anzulović 1999).
Alla fine della Prima guerra mondiale, la Serbia aveva perso un quinto della sua popolazione
e aveva dato prova di notevole valore militare, catturando l’attenzione di potenze come Inghilterra, Francia e Stati Uniti. Per ricompensare il coraggio dimostrato, nel 1918 gli Stati Uniti
considerarono l’anniversario della battaglia del Kosovo come un giorno di commemorazione
speciale in onore della Serbia. Nelle varie letture e sermoni del tempo, i serbi furono spesso
paragonati al popolo di Israele. In Inghilterra l’anniversario della “battaglia” fu celebrato con un
tributo nazionale, furono aperte librerie di letteratura serba e prodotti film sull’argomento. Inoltre, l’inno nazionale serbo venne suonato in alcuni teatri prima delle rappresentazioni. Anche la
Francia non fu esente da questa specie di Kosovo-mania e i serbi furono considerati un popolo
che lottava contro l’oppressione della propria identità (Anzulović 1999; Vickers 1998).
La “battaglia” e i suoi protagonisti divennero argomento di studio nelle scuole, nei circoli
intellettuali e l’élite serba cercò, da subito, di applicare questo mito in chiave panslavica, ma
dovette fronteggiare le preoccupazioni degli altri popoli. I croati, per esempio, erano preoccupati da una possibile egemonia serba e dalle sue mire centriste che puntavano ad unico stato unitario. Le loro preoccupazioni furono poi rafforzate nel 1921, quando la Costituzione che essi
non appoggiavano pienamente fu promulgata con il nome di “Costituzione del giorno di San
Vito”. Dare alla Costituzione questo nome non fu una mossa astuta, poiché ricordava la “battaglia” del 1389 e la volontà di affermazione serba, legittimando di conseguenza le paure dei
croati (Anzulović 1999; Schöpflin 2000). Quando nel 1934, a Marsiglia, un attentatore macedone uccise il re Aleksandar Karadjordjević, un giornalista belgradese scrisse che il re aveva scelto
il regno celeste per assicurare il futuro della Jugoslavia (50) (Anzulović 1999).
L’intesa celeste continuò ad appoggiare la vita spirituale della nazione serba e ad esserne
50. Il nome di “Jugoslavia” fu scelto nel 1929 dalla monarchia per alimentare l’unità dei vari popoli e
scongiurare moti separatisti. “Jugoslavia” significava appunto “stato degli slavi del sud”.
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motivo d’orgoglio anche nei confronti delle altre popolazioni cattoliche. Durante la Seconda
guerra mondiale, nel 1941, il patriarca Gavrilo si oppose all’alleanza del governo serbo con
l’asse nazi-fascista. Egli definì errata la scelta politica del governo e giustificò la sua opposizione secondo i principi morali del modello kosovaro. Il patriarca interpretò l’alleanza come una
sconfitta terrena dove l’integrità del popolo serbo poteva essere preservata solo nel regno dei
cieli. Il vescovo e teologo serbo Nikolaj Velimirović rafforzò il concetto della Chiesa ortodossa
come una chiesa sofferente e allargò l’immagine di afflizione all’intera nazione serba. La
distruzione dei monasteri e le uccisioni di preti e civili serbi furono prove portate a sostegno di
questa tesi (Duijzings 2000).
L’alleanza fra Stato e Chiesa ortodossa è stata da sempre essenziale nella diffusione del mito
e nella sua rappresentazione rituale e religiosa, nonché nella sua piena applicazione politica. La
forza delle istituzioni statali serbe e il legame con la Chiesa hanno fatto della regione kosovara
un affare di stato e un mito decisamente potente a sostegno di una forte identità nazionale.
Tuttavia, con l’avvento della Jugoslavia comunista, questo apporto statale ed ecclesiastico è
stato decisamente ridimensionato. Sotto i partigiani di Tito, la Chiesa ortodossa denuncerà nuovamente la sua sofferenza e sentirà venir meno il nazionalismo a cui era legata. Il mito del Kosovo - ispiratore in precedenza di una serbo-Slavia - verrà sostituito da miti di lotta partigiana e
da altre battaglie e altri protagonisti. Benché non fosse del tutto scomparso, il mito ebbe meno
influenza nella neonata federazione e fu un tema più attinente e caro alla sola Serbia. La
“battaglia” del Kosovo Polje fu sostituita dalla celebrazione di quelle partigiane più recenti,
come la Sutjeska e la leggendaria battaglia sul fiume della Neretva in Bosnia-Erzegovina (51)
(Vickers 1998; Udovički 1995).
Né le forze nazionaliste croate né quelle cetniche serbe furono in grado di opporsi alla diffusione del mito partigiano che emerse come unica forza interetnica dalle macerie della Seconda
guerra mondiale. L’ideologia comunista e l’idea jugoslava del croato Tito, iniziarono a infastidire i serbi nazionalisti attorno alla seconda metà degli anni Sessanta. Nel 1966, in un vertice
del partito comunista a Brioni (52), il responsabile degli interni e capo della Udba (53) - il serbo
Aleksandar Ranković - fu costretto a congedarsi. Ranković fu cacciato in seguito alla sua politica di repressione anti-albanese in Kosovo e perché contrario ad alcune decisioni politiche
dello stesso maresciallo [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)]. Con il passare degli anni, Tito denunciò la disparità dei diritti fra serbi e albanesi e cercò di favorire una maggiore autonomia ai secondi. Nel
1969, Tito concesse agli albanesi l’esposizione del vessillo nazionale e, successivamente, la
costituzione dell’università di Pristina e numerosi legami culturali con l’Albania.
Come già detto nell’introduzione, la Costituzione del 1974 segnò la rottura tra gran parte dei
serbi e il comunismo titino. Il riconoscimento ufficiale del carattere albanese della regione andò
contro ogni aspettativa storica della popolazione serba. Nel 1968, un altro esponente ed intellettuale serbo del partito comunista - Dobrica Ćosić - era stato cacciato dal comitato centrale. Egli
si era lamentato della politica attuata nei confronti del Kosovo e aveva accusato apertamente gli
albanesi di forzare la migrazione di serbi e montenegrini. Queste voci erano solo il preludio al
crescente risveglio nazionalista che avrebbe caratterizzato gli anni Ottanta e il dopo-Tito.
51. Nella battaglia della Sutjeska (estate del 1943) settemila partigiani persero la vita contro le forze
nazi-fasciste. La battaglia della Neretva è invece diventata famosa perché, nel febbraio e nel marzo 1943,
19 mila partigiani resistettero contro 117 mila fra tedeschi, italiani e cetnici. I partigiani vinsero la battaglia dopo tre settimane di dura lotta, distruggendo gran parte del contingente nemico.
52. Località croata prescelta da Tito per le sue vacanze estive.
53. Polizia segreta jugoslava.
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2.4. Il dopo-Tito: Milošević e la ripresa del nazionalismo epico
Gli anni Ottanta si presentano come il decennio decisivo per la politica della federazione
jugoslava. Orfana del maresciallo Tito, morto nel maggio 1980, la Jugoslavia deve fare i conti
con le emergenti richieste nazionaliste delle varie repubbliche e in particolare con il crescente
dissapore serbo. La scelta di una presidenza collettiva e la selezione a rotazione di un presidente
annuale, non forniscono la stabilità necessaria per la sicurezza politica, economica e sociale. Nel
1983, il funerale di Aleksandar Ranković è salutato da un’enorme folla di persone che, a voce
alta, scandisce i primi slogan nazionalisti contro la Federazione e denuncia il maltrattamento di
serbi e montenegrini in Kosovo. Il suo precedente allontanamento era stato celebrato dagli ungheresi in Vojvodina e dagli albanesi in Kosovo come una liberazione, ma era stato interpretato
dai serbi come un attacco al paese e alla sua posizione nella Jugoslavia. Il decentramento di
potere e la riduzione dei fondi stanziati alla regione kosovara, fecero pensare alla minoranza
serba del Kosovo di non aver nessun sostenitore all’interno delle restanti repubbliche.
L’enorme crisi economica e l’alto tasso di disoccupazione furono fra le principali cause dell’emigrazione di molti cittadini dall’area. Secondo fonti serbe, a questi fattori andavano aggiunte le pressioni e violenze albanesi che avevano forzato molti serbi e montenegrini a fuggire
dal Kosovo, abbandonando case, terreni e lavori perché costretti a vendere tutto (54). Il sentimento anti-albanese stava crescendo notevolmente e vari intellettuali e politici serbi, come Dobrica Ćosić, ne approfittarono per appoggiare altri leader nazionalisti locali nella loro campagna
per la causa kosovara. L’attività di questi leader segnò l’inizio di una serie di petizioni di protesta che gradualmente assunsero sempre più importanza e furono sponsorizzate dai media. I confronti con la sofferenza passata della Velika Seoba si fecero più frequenti e la Chiesa ortodossa
iniziò a sostenere strenuamente la tesi del genocidio serbo in Kosovo.
La piccola regione divenne l’argomento più discusso all’interno della Federazione e motivo
di dissidi tra le varie repubbliche. Nel 1985, esce il libro Knjiga o Kosovu di Dimitrije Bogdanović. Il testo è solo uno dei primi volumi del periodo che accusano apertamente gli albanesi di
voler attuare una pulizia etnica e che presentano la storia della gente serba come la narrazione di
un martirio etnico senza fine [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)]. La stampa dedica sempre più attenzione a
storie ed episodi sensazionalisti che mettano in risalto l’emergenza nella regione. Sempre nello
stesso anno, accade un episodio che scatena la fantasia e lo sdegno del popolo serbo. È il caso
dell’agricoltore Djordje Martinović, rimasto vittima - all’apparenza - di un’aggressione albanese. L’uomo di cinquantasei anni - residente allora nei pressi dell’attuale città di Gnjilane - venne
ricoverato d’urgenza all’ospedale di Pristina per lesioni all’ano dovute alla penetrazione di una
bottiglia. Egli dichiarò di essere stato aggredito da un gruppo di albanesi che l’avrebbero legato
e seviziato per obbligarlo ad abbandonare la sua terra.
La comunità albanese (55) smentì l’accaduto sostenendo che Martinović avesse semplicemente praticato dell’autoerotismo, procurandosi da solo tutte le ferite. Il caso si diffuse così
rapidamente da coinvolgere una vera e propria interrogazione politica. Si aprì un’inchiesta dove
varie e diverse commissioni mediche furono invitate a fornire una loro diagnosi. Tuttavia, gli
esperti non seppero fornire un responso univoco e i media jugoslavi - specialmente quelli vicini
al partito - cercarono di far passare l’episodio per un caso di depravazione. I media serbi non fe54. Le stime sull’emigrazione variano ancora a seconda delle fonti consultate: si va da un numero più
contenuto di 30 mila persone ad uno più roboante di 200 mila persone comprensivo anche del periodo dei
due decenni precedenti. Stime più attendibili parlano di circa 26 mila persone, fra serbi e montenegrini,
che avrebbero abbandonato il Kosovo tra il 1981 e il 1988 (Vickers 1998).
55. I presunti aggressori non furono mai identificati.
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cero altrettanto. Martinović divenne l’esatto opposto di un depravato: l’uomo simbolo del vittimismo serbo in Kosovo. Gli furono scattate foto in compagnia del vescovo nazionalista Amfilohije Radović e sulla sua presunta tragedia fu persino scritto un libro di quasi cinquecento
pagine (56). Il suo personaggio divenne presto popolare e appassionò le masse così tanto da
attirarle nel gioco mediatico che urlava nuovamente alla minaccia islamica.
L’autore del libro su Martinović definì l’accaduto come un problema di vecchia data, dove
gli islamici albanesi ripetevano le gesta dei turchi che usavano impalare le loro vittime. L’immaginario popolare fece il resto, ricordando i tempi bui del dominio ottomano e le immagini
crudeli degli oppressori, tramandate dalle canzoni popolari e dalla letteratura nazionale. Il caso
Martinović servì da metafora del martirio nazionale, ma - come sostiene Julie Mertus nel suo
Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war (1999) - ci fu anche chi usò paragoni più recenti,
come l’accademico Brana Crnčević che comparò l’accaduto al campo di concentramento di
Jasenovac. L’esaltazione nazionalista aumentò con la pubblicazione nel 1986 di un documento stilato dagli esperti dell’Accademia serba delle arti e delle scienze (Sanu): il Sanu Memorandum.
Questo documento è passato alla storia come una delle accuse ufficiali più efficaci della
classe politica serba alle altre repubbliche, al comunismo di Tito e agli albanesi in Kosovo. In
esso si denuncia apertamente la situazione di inferiorità a cui è stata relegata la Serbia per mano
degli altri stati e si punta il dito contro il genocidio di serbi e montenegrini in Kosovo, nonché
verso il comunismo che permise l’approvazione della Costituzione del 1974. Negli anni seguenti, il Memorandum fu preso come modello d’ispirazione per la nuova politica della Repubblica serba. L’euforia nazionalista fu sostenuta passo per passo dalla Chiesa ortodossa che prontamente ripropose il mito del Kosovo. Attorno alla metà degli anni Ottanta, furono tenute una
serie di celebrazioni tematiche e processioni dove si esponevano le reliquie del principe Lazar e
dove si continuava a dibattere sull’intesa celeste (Duijzings 2000). Nel 1987, il clima già teso fu
esasperato dall’incidente di Paraćin.
In questo paese della provincia serba, un soldato albanese di nome Aziz Kelmendi aveva
aperto il fuoco contro i suoi compagni commilitoni dell’esercito jugoslavo e poi si era suicidato.
Furono uccisi un serbo, un croato, uno sloveno e due bosniaci musulmani. La stampa non si
lasciò scappare l’opportunità per catalogare l’accaduto come un attentato di ispirazione separatista albanese. Le dinamiche dell’incidente, seppure poco chiare, furono messe in secondo piano
per sottolineare come Kelmendi fosse stato aiutato da altri sei albanesi, un musulmano e un rom,
per organizzare una vera cospirazione contro lo stato jugoslavo. Ciò che era apparso a molti come il gesto isolato di un pazzo, fu definito da quotidiani come Politika e Borba: «un attentato
contro la Jugoslavia» (Mertus 1999). Si diffusero velocemente una miriade di pregiudizi contro
gli albanesi, che vennero ritratti come terroristi, criminali e stupratori di donne serbe (57). Le
donne albanesi furono invece considerate delle vere e proprie fabbriche di bambini che contribuivano ad un tasso di natalità impressionante e mirato, secondo i serbi, esclusivamente alla
cancellazione della loro presenza in Kosovo.
Queste voci sono state smentite da varie statistiche. Julie Mertus, per esempio, sottolinea
come dal 1981 al 1987, il tasso di criminalità in Kosovo è stato il più basso di tutta la Federazione: ci sono stati cinque omicidi interetnici, di cui due dove albanesi hanno ucciso serbi e tre
dove è accaduto esattamente l’incontrario (Mertus 1999). Inoltre, anche i casi di stupro sono
stati fra i più bassi della Jugoslavia: mentre negli anni Ottanta la Serbia contava circa 2,43 casi
56. Il libro in questione fu intitolato Slučaj Martinović (Il caso Martinović) fu pubblicato nel 1986 da
un giornalista del giornale Nin e vendette quasi 50 mila copie [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
57. Nel 1984, l’archimandrita ortodosso Atanasije Jevtić accusò gli albanesi di stuprare donne giovani
e vecchie nei conventi [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
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ogni 10 mila abitanti, il Kosovo ne contava lo 0,96 e per circa il 71% dei casi l’assalitore e la
vittima erano della stessa nazionalità [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)]. In Kosovo, il tasso di natalità
delle donne albanesi era praticamente simile a quello delle donne serbe ed elevato in entrambi i
casi. Solo con il passare degli anni la popolazione albanese ha aumentato la propria percentuale
rispetto ai serbi. Ciò fu dovuto, probabilmente, ai cambiamenti sociali apportati dall’urbanizzazione e al conseguente calo di natalità fra i serbi, nonché ad un alto tasso di aborti (58) [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.); Mertus 1999].
La società serba rimase violentemente scossa dal diffondersi di queste voci e pregiudizi,
dalle notizie di questi incidenti recenti e dalle testimonianze non sempre attendibili che arrivavano dalla regione kosovara. Un clima di tensione e insoddisfazione generale permeò gran parte
della collettività che iniziò a sentirsi insicura e minacciata dall’esterno. In questo contesto, la
ripresa del mito in chiave politica fu decisiva per la mobilitazione delle masse. Infatti, il mito
del 1389 ha da sempre rappresentato la coscienza nazionale serba, profondamente radicata nella
sua cultura popolare. Poco tempo prima del massacro di Paraćin, Slobodan Milošević seppe
sfruttare con astuzia il momento propizio che gli venne offerto da una situazione socio-politica
esasperata. Quando nel 1987 egli si recò in Kosovo per la prima volta, come vice di Ivan Stambolić (59), egli avrebbe dovuto trattare solo un problema di leadership del partito locale, e
invece si trovò a raccogliere le lamentele dei serbi e a farsene portavoce.
In un incontro con le rappresentanze della minoranza serba scoppiarono dei tafferugli e la
polizia reagì duramente (60). Milošević disse allora che nessuno doveva osare toccare la
popolazione serba e che essa doveva restare là dove si trovava, poiché quello era suolo serbo.
Bastarono poche parole e Slobodan Milošević divenne per i serbi del Kosovo “Slobo” e fu associato al termine sloboda che in serbo significa “libertà”. Grazie all’appoggio dei media belgradesi e di una nutrita schiera di sostenitori diffusi in tutto il paese, Milošević non impiegò molto
tempo ad ottenere il successo politico ai danni del suo mentore Stambolić e a far buon uso di
tutto ciò che il Kosovo poteva offrirgli: come regione e come mito. L’euforia nazionalista si
stava diffondendo ovunque grazie soprattutto ai numerosi “incontri della verità”: veri e propri
raduni di massa in tutto il paese, dove si diffondeva la causa patriottica per una grande Serbia e
si celebrava un passato glorioso ed eroico (Mertus 1999).
La letteratura del periodo, con i suoi autori, aveva già contribuito a surriscaldare gli animi
dei lettori, diffondendo una rinnovata “turco-fobia” o piuttosto una pronunciata avversione al
mondo islamico. Ne sono esempio studiosi ed intellettuali estremisti come Radovan Karadžić discusso psichiatra e poeta, a lungo ricercato per crimini contro l’umanità - e Vuk Drašković allora eccentrico leader politico del Spo (Movimento per il rinnovamento serbo) e più recentemente ministro degli esteri per la Serbia. Nel 1982, Drašković aveva dato alle stampe Nož (coltello), un romanzo che proponeva una tematica molto diffusa anche nei romanzi di Dobrica
Ćosić: il culto del coltello, che rimanda al personaggio di Miloš Obilić e al suo gesto leggendario (Anzulović 1999). Il coltello riveste nella letteratura del periodo un doppio ruolo: è ciò che
simboleggia la minaccia ai serbi, ma è anche lo strumento da utilizzare come reazione contro il
nemico demonizzato (Anzulović 1999). Drašković aveva dato prova di questa tematica quando
si presentava alle manifestazioni politiche come una sorta di santone, ricoperto da crocefissi e
58. Secondo le ricerche svolte da Noel Malcolm, la Serbia nel 1994 era il paese con il tasso di aborti
più alto in tutta Europa: per ogni cento nati vivi c’erano 214 aborti.
59. Allora presidente del partito serbo.
60. Gli scontri furono pensati e preparati in precedenza, come testimoniò in seguito uno dei leader
locali: Miroslav Šolević. Un camion carico di pietre era stato parcheggiato poco distante dalla sede
dell’incontro per permettere ai serbi di avere delle armi con cui difendersi [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
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con i capelli lunghi e la barba incolta, quasi a voler ricordare il Messia (61). In queste occasioni
egli non dimenticava mai di ritrarre i musulmani come assassini di Cristo.
Nel 1989, Milošević revocò l’autonomia della regione, scatenando le proteste degli albanesi
kosovari e delle altre repubbliche, Slovenia su tutte. In occasione del 600° anniversario della
“battaglia”, “Slobo” si presentò in Kosovo arrivandovi dal cielo con un elicottero. Il portavoce
del vescovo Artemije ricorda che l’arrivo del leader lo lasciò esterrefatto e preoccupato, perché
Milošević sembrava un dio appena sceso in terra (Bieber 2002). Il discorso del leader serbo a
Gazimestan è un esempio di politica e retorica populista, dove l’oratore riesce a sfruttare
l’agitazione e il consenso della massa per creare un effetto di solidarietà e unione tra i presenti.
Il mito è attivato dalla complicità della massa e il suo significato e i suoi valori vengono trasmessi dall’alto, ma l’effetto è quello di una voce sola, come se attraverso Milošević avesse
parlato il popolo stesso. Se il mito non fosse stato già radicato nella popolazione, tutto ciò sarebbe risultato inutile, compreso il precedente lavoro degli intellettuali nazionalisti (Anzulović
1999; Duijzings 2000).
A Gazimestan, Milošević ricama sul mito e lancia un messaggio chiaro alla nazione, alle
altre repubbliche e al milione di persone presenti. Egli elimina da subito la differenza tra realtà e
leggenda: «Today, it is difficult to say what is the historical truth about the Battle of Kosovo and
what is legend. Today this is no longer important» (da: http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spchkosovo1989.htm).
Poi, passa a chiarire la purezza storica della Serbia e ad evidenziarne la missione civilizzatrice: «[…] the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others.
Their national and historical being has been liberational […] They liberated themselves and
when they could they also helped others to liberate themselves» (ibidem).
Quindi, dopo aver rifiutato il possibile ruolo di essere ancora vassalli di qualcuno, egli
chiama a raccolta il suo popolo, per un urgente bisogno di unità nazionale in un altro momento
decisivo della storia: «[…] no place in Serbia is better suited than the field of Kosovo for saying
that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity to the Serbian people in Serbia and each one of its
citizens, irrespective of his national or religious affiliation» (ibidem).
La sua attenzione passa poi a sottolineare il rischio di cospiratori e traditori che possano minacciare la multiculturalità della Jugoslavia e identifica il Kosovo come il luogo dove il tradimento e la disunità sono costati una sofferenza di sei secoli: «The threat is that the question of
one nation being endangered by the others can be posed one day - and this can then start a wave of
suspicions, accusations, and intolerance […] This threat has been hanging like a sword over our
heads all the time. Internal and external enemies of multi-national communities are aware of this
and therefore they organize their activity against multinational society […] unity, solidarity, and
cooperation among people have no greater significance anywhere on the soil of our motherland
than they have here in the field of Kosovo, which is a symbol of disunity and treason» (ibidem).
Alla fine del discorso, dopo i temi della sofferenza e del tradimento, egli chiama in causa
anche l’eroismo e ribadisce ancora la dignità e la gloria del passato serbo, tutte qualità
necessarie per affrontare un futuro ancora incerto: «The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our
creativity for 6 centuries, and has been feeding our pride and does not allow us to forget that at
one time we were an army great, brave, and proud, one of the few that remained undefeated
61. Negli anni Novanta, durante alcune conferenze nella zona del Sangiaccato, Drašković minacciò di
mozzare la mano di ogni mussulmano che avesse sventolato bandiere che fossero diverse da quella serba.
Inoltre, nel 1991 definì così la situazione dei serbi di Krajina: «The Ustaša knife is being held to the
throat of the Serbian people in the western Serbian Krajina and only Serbia can and must help them […]»,
tratto da Srpska Rec, 14 ottobre 1991, http://www.srpska-rec.co.yu/.
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when losing. Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing
battles. They are not armed battles although such things cannot be excluded yet. However […]
they cannot be won without resolve, bravery and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were
present here in the field of Kosovo in days past. […] Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the
bastion that defended the European culture, religion and European society in general» (ibidem).
In tutto il discorso scompare il concetto di fratellanza associato un tempo a quello di unità.
Fraternità e unione ci sono, ma non nell’ottica titina del già citato concetto di bratstvo i
jedinstvo. Il mito è servito alle masse con una celebrazione altrettanto mitica, dalla quale Milošević esce come un nuove eroe atemporale, degno erede dei suoi leggendari predecessori. Quando nel 1991 scoppiano i primi scontri in Croazia e in Bosnia, i comandanti dei vari reparti militari vengono immediatamente ritratti come reincarnazioni degli eroi passati. Questo avviene grazie all’aiuto dei media, ma specialmente grazie alla intramontabile tradizione delle canzoni popolari che continuano a imperversare nella società civile e tra le fila dell’esercito. L’ispirazione
del mito guida i soldati serbi all’attacco dei territori bosniaci ancor prima di quelli kosovari. La
rabbia contro il musulmano si sfoga in una sorta di vero estremismo cristiano militante, sulle
note del suono di nuove gusle che cantano nuovi eroi. Avviene ciò che Dubravka Ugrešić ha definito come “gusle laundering”, ovvero un processo attraverso il quale un assassino o un folle
viene trasformato dalla canzone epica in un eroe senza macchia [Ugrešić 1998 (62)].
I giornali come Nin rimpiangono che Lazar non avesse Milošević al suo fianco (Bieber 2002).
I cantanti turbo-folk compongono nuove melodie, dove Radovan Karadžić viene cantato come un
“uomo d’acciaio, primo leader dopo Karadjordje” e Željko Ražnatović detto “Arkan” - noto criminale di guerra - è identificato come il nuovo Miloš Obilić e un moderno Robin Hood (63).
Ratko Mladić è visto dai suoi soldati e dalla stampa come il principe Lazar redivivo in Bosnia.
Mentre, secondo il giornalista olandese Westerman, Dragoslav Bokan - leader della formazione
paramilitare dei Beli Orlovi (Aquile bianche) - non uccide in nome di Lazar, ma anzi crede
direttamente di essere Lazar risorto (Anzulović 1999; Duijzings 2000; Drakulić 2004; Glenny
1996). Il tempo del passato è consegnato a quello del presente e queste figure, alquanto discutibili, si fanno rappresentanti anche di valori cristiani, appoggiate per di più da vescovi nazionalisti della Chiesa ortodossa come Atanasije Jevtić e il già menzionato Amfilohije Radović.
Le masse vengono gettate nella politica con una facilità disarmante proprio perché quest’ultima viene servita sotto forma di cultura popolare. Infatti, attraverso il mito, la politica è ridotta a
schemi semplici e l’azione militare viene giustificata e spiegata con la polarizzazione: “noi”
contro “gli altri” che negano e tradiscono la nostra causa. L’apporto della Chiesa nazionale
facilita inoltre l’intromissione - nel piano degli interessi politici - dei valori più profondi e
distintivi dell’identità di una comunità. La nazione si unisce e si sente minacciata non solo dal
punto di vista materiale, ma anche e specialmente da quello identitario e spirituale. Nel 1992, a
Belgrado, scoppiarono delle rivolte studentesche contro Milošević. Queste proteste furono note
con il nome di Vidovdanski Sabor (Assemblea del giorno di San Vito). Questo dimostra come
62. A questo proposito è interessante il documentario Serbian Epics girato in Bosnia dalla Bbc nel
1992 su Radovan Karadžić. Nel documentario, lo psichiatra recita le proprie poesie di distruzione su Sarajevo, accompagnato dal suono della gusla, mentre rievoca la grandezza Serba dinanzi ai suoi compagni.
63. Così recita l’epitaffio sulla sua tomba a Belgrado: «[…] He punished insatiable dragons/His ways
led him to Robin Hood […] Born to be a leader, he remained the first», in Anzulović (1999: 144). L’accostamento con Robin Hood - di questo criminale ricercato dalla polizia internazionale - è decisamente
strano. Esso appare assurdo specialmente se si considera che tutti i beni materiali che aveva portato in
Kosovo erano appartenuti, un tempo, a famiglie che egli stesso aveva massacrato con i suoi paramilitari in
altre zone dell’ex-Jugoslavia (Pettifer 2005).
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persino l’opposizione studentesca al governo non fosse in grado di evadere dal simbolismo nazionalista del Kosovo (Bieber 2002).
Il mito del Kosovo è parte fondamentale dell’identità serba, sia essa nazionalista o meno, ed
è il pilastro su cui la società nazionale si è costruita. Oggigiorno, la battaglia per il possesso
completo del Kosovo è ormai persa, ma il peso economico e culturale della regione è ancora
argomento di dibattito tra i politici che si oppongono all’indipendenza albanese-kosovara. Pesano le ricche miniere attorno alla zona settentrionale di Mitrovica e pesa il valore culturale e religioso dei monasteri. Tuttavia, la realtà è diversa dal mito e se ne sono accorti anche molti politici serbi che, negli ultimi anni, hanno visto svanire il sogno di una grande Serbia per la realtà
di uno stato sempre più piccolo e che ultimamente è stato abbandonato anche dai cugini montenegrini. È cambiato anche il peso politico della regione all’interno dello stato. Il Kosovo, che un
tempo aveva concesso di emergere a molti politici della Serbia, oggi è un’arma a doppio taglio
nella politica di Belgrado: un argomento scomodo da discutere che, a seconda degli sviluppi
futuri, potrebbe rafforzare un governo o farlo crollare in fretta.
Nel 1999, pochi giorni dopo la fine dei bombardamenti, Milošević fece un discorso alla nazione, rifiutandosi di riconoscere la sconfitta che gli era stata appena inflitta. Anche i media belgradesi si unirono a questa visione dei fatti e celebrarono la vittoria serba sulla Nato. Secondo i
giornali e le televisioni di stato, la Serbia non si era arresa al terrorismo delle due aquile: quella
americana e quella albanese. Come in un romanzo di Drašković - Molitva (La preghiera - 1988)
- dove uno dei protagonisti spiega che ci sono individui martiri, ma anche nazioni martiri
(Anzulović 1999), Milošević disse alla televisione: «Our nation is a hero. That may be the
shortest conclusion about this war. Our nation is a hero and that is why it must feel heroic, and
that is why it must act heroically, which means with dignity, generously and responsibly. Early
this year there were numerous rallies throughout our country. One slogan could have been heard
there: we won’t give up Kosovo. We haven’t given up Kosovo…» (Judah 2000: 285).
Si assiste così, ancora una volta, al rifiuto di una sconfitta e alla trasformazione di questa in una
vittoria morale, fatta di martirio ed eroismo. La nazione subisce l’ultima trasformazione ad opera
di una politica epica: essa diviene l’eroe incontrastato dell’eterna battaglia. La storia del Kosovo e
della Serbia si arricchisce di un nuovo capitolo dove la trama è sempre la stessa: il regno terreno
non è raggiungibile e la sua perdita viene giustificata dalla gloria nel regno dei cieli. Non c’è
un’elaborazione del lutto e della sconfitta e tutta la rabbia e il rancore vengono accumulati in un
sentimento di ingiustizia subita e in un forte desiderio di rivalsa. Le vere cause della tragedia
vengono ignorate, le proprie colpe vengono dimenticate e il senso di vittimismo ne esce rafforzato.
Appendice
Cronologia degli eventi politici legati al giorno di San Vito
La celebrazione di una particolare data o l’anniversario di un particolare evento sono spesso occasioni
per ricordarne i valori e le emozioni più profonde. Ogni nuova ricorrenza e commemorazione del momento storico, lo fa rivivere nel tempo e lo ricopre di nuovi significati che si tramandano di generazione in
generazione. Vittorie, sconfitte, nascita e crollo di società, stati o imperi, sono eventi cardinali per tutti i
popoli e le nazioni. Tali ricorrenze possono essere usate per ribadire dei principi e rinverdire delle ideologie, ma anche per negarli e dare una dura lezione simbolica a coloro che li rivestono di tanta importanza.
Il giorno di San Vito - Vidovdan - è una data che per il popolo serbo ha significato esistenziale ed inequiparabile. La “battaglia” del Kosovo Polje stabilì la sacralità di questa data nel 1389, ma il 28 giugno (15
giugno secondo il calendario giuliano) è stato usato e strumentalizzato nel corso del tempo per segnare
altri particolari episodi storici e per comunicare precisi significati politici e morali. Nelle tabella seguente
sono riassunti alcuni di questi momenti.
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Lorenzo Degrassi
anno
1389
1890
(1 anno dopo il 500° anniversario)
1914
1919
1921
1948
1989
1990
2001
2006
Vidovdan
Le armate del principe Lazar combattono le forze ottomane del sultano
Murad
Il giorno di San Vito diviene uno dei giorni festivi dello stato
L’arciduca Franz Ferdinand viene ucciso a Sarajevo e scoppia la Prima
guerra mondiale
Il trattato di Versailles segna la fine della Prima guerra mondiale
Viene promulgata la nuova Costituzione del Regno di serbi, croati e sloveni,
nota come Costituzione del giorno di San Vito (Vidovdanski Ustav)
Stalin sceglie appositamente questa data per espellere la Jugoslavia dal
Cominform
Milošević celebra il 600° anniversario della “battaglia” con un discorso a Gazimestan - che preannuncia grossi cambia-menti politici in Jugoslavia
e specialmente in Kosovo
L’ex-presidente della Croazia, Tudjman, rivela che, nella nuova Costituzione croata, i serbi non vengono considerati una nazione costituente della
Croazia
Milošević viene portato dinanzi al tribunale dell’Aja per i crimini nell’exJugoslavia
Il Montenegro entra a far parte delle Nazioni Unite come 192° membro
Fonte: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vidovdan
3. Kosova: l’identità come mito
«Wake, Albanian, from your slumber,
Let us, brothers, swear in common
And not look to church or mosque,
The Albanian's faith is Albanianism!»
[Vasa Pashko, O moj Shqypni, ca. 1878 (64)].
3.1. Sotto il segno dell’aquila
Negli ultimi trent’anni, la società albanese kosovara si è trovata impegnata in numerose lotte
politiche. All’inizio, la comunità albanese aveva lottato per il conseguimento di maggiori diritti
civili e per l’ipotetica creazione di una repubblica kosovara all’interno della Jugoslavia. Verso la
fine degli anni Ottanta, la situazione politica era però totalmente diversa. Sotto il pressante
nazionalismo serbo, la conservazione dell’autonomia era diventata un’utopia e anche la minima
idea di una repubblica era semplicemente un sogno proibito. Infine, negli anni Novanta, la
società autoctona si è trovata a combattere - prima pacificamente e poi con le armi - per la liberazione e l’indipendenza della regione. Nel corso dell’intero XX secolo, il desiderio di un’unione con la madre patria non è mai venuto meno e sono state numerose le fazioni che hanno lottato a tal fine, ma le diverse strade percorse e le recenti esperienze di guerra hanno ridimensionato il senso di appartenenza kosovaro.
Come se ciò non bastasse, il percorso intrapreso negli ultimi otto anni di amministrazione
internazionale ha dato il via a un ricco dibattito sulla creazione di un nuovo stato e sull’esistenza
di una nuova identità albanese separata. Politici, sociologi, intellettuali albanesi ed internazionali si sono interrogati sul futuro della regione e su quello della sua popolazione. Molti sono gli
64. Tradotto dall’albanese da Robert Elsie, on-line: http://www.albanianliterature.com.
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esperti che si sono opposti alla creazione di un secondo stato albanese nei Balcani. Serbi,
macedoni e parte dei montenegrini non hanno visto di buon occhio la possibilità di un risveglio
nazionalista albanese nei lori territori e tanto meno la possibile creazione futura di una grande
Albania che destabilizzi l’area balcanica. Ciononostante, il dibattito è imperversato nelle pagine
dei quotidiani di Pristina e Tirana e tra le varie fazioni politiche e i loro rappresentanti. Una cosa
è certa: non potranno esistere due stati albanesi con la stessa bandiera, la stessa iconografia e gli
stessi simboli nazionali.
Nell’ottobre 2000, il compianto presidente Rugova aveva presentato il nuovo vessillo kosovaro e aveva proposto di chiamare il Kosovo “Dardania”, in onore delle origini illiriche - e precisamente “dardane” - dei kosovari albanesi (65). Il nuovo vessillo proponeva l’aquila bifronte
nera, derivante dal sigillo di Skanderbeg, su uno sfondo blu e sotto una stella gialla a sei punte
che ricordava la rivolta del 1912 e la successiva cacciata degli ottomani (Quercia 2006: 120121). La bandiera fu esposta il 28 novembre, giorno in cui gli albanesi d’Albania celebrano l’indipendenza nazionale e l’anniversario della presa della fortezza di Kruje, ad opera di Skanderbeg nel 1443. Il 28 novembre è sempre stato per tutti gli altri albanesi il “giorno della bandiera”
e motivo d’orgoglio per esporla in chiave nazionale e panalbanese. Quando nel 2000 la nuova
bandiera fu esposta al fianco di quella nazionale, i reduci dell’Uck scesero in piazza per protestare e la diedero alla fiamme.
Oggigiorno la società albanese del Kosovo è spaccata in due. Vi sono coloro che percepiscono la futura indipendenza come un semplice momento di transizione verso l’unione con l’Albania e coloro che invece la considerano come il coronamento di una lotta di liberazione durata un
secolo e che deve dar vita a uno stato diverso da quello dei cugini. A complicare questo argomento, già di per sé complesso, c’è poi il discorso linguistico e la recente lettura in chiave nazionalista del dialetto Gheg. Questo dialetto rappresenta la forma d’albanese parlata in tutto il
Kosovo e in alcune zone dell’Albania settentrionale, mentre nella restante parte del paese si
parla il dialetto Tosk. Quest’ultimo fu la forma favorita nell’Albania comunista di Enver Hoxha
e divenne lingua ufficiale degli albanesi in una convenzione del 1972 a Tirana (66). Di conseguenza, il Tosk fu il modello prediletto sia nella forma orale sia in quella scritta.
Negli ultimi anni, la comunità kosovara non aveva dato tanta importanza alla lingua ufficiale. Il linguaggio formale veniva impiegato senza alcun problema dov’era necessario, ma recentemente gli intellettuali si sono divisi sull’uso del dialetto (67). C’è chi sostiene la necessità
di apprendere il cosiddetto letrare, simbolo di un’unica lingua e identità ufficiale, e chi invece
scrive e parla solo in Gheg, sostenendo l’importanza di un’identità kosovara. Tuttavia, il dialetto
Gheg ha assunto per gli albanesi anche un valore simbolico di libertà, come segnalato nella letteratura kosovara e, in precedenza, dal best seller dal titolo Rrno vetem per me tregue (Vivi solo
per raccontare - 1995), scritto in Gheg dal prete francescano At Zef Pllumi. In questo libro, il religioso racconta la sua prigionia sotto il totalitarismo comunista e usa il dialetto del nord come
simbolo di libertà e di opposizione al passato Tosk enverista. Il fatto che anche in Albania si sia
65. La scelta del nome fu probabilmente dovuta anche al desiderio di sostituire l’immagine mitologica
associata al termine serbo “Kosovo” con l’immagine delle origini illiriche e albanesi della regione.
66. Fra i firmatari della convenzione del 1972 c’erano anche Rexhep Qosja - scrittore e politico da
sempre favorevole ad un’unica identità albanese - e il famoso scrittore Ismail Kadaré. Si dice che Enver
Hoxha sospettasse di coloro che parlavano il dialetto del nord. Secondo il dittatore, da quella zona arrivavano tutti gli anti-comunisti. Inoltre, la scelta del dialetto Tosk era per lui una questione ideologica che
sottolineava l’unità degli albanesi e quindi identificava i kosovari come albanesi e non come jugoslavi
(Judah 2000).
67. Per esempio, il giornalista Migjen Kelmendi - oggi capo-redattore del settimanale Java - a suo
tempo aveva deciso di scrivere in lingua Gheg la sua colonna sul giornale Koha Ditore.
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ripreso l’uso del dialetto Gheg, sta ad indicare una maggior elasticità del linguaggio, ma anche
la difficoltà della lingua albanese nel rappresentare tutta la sua popolazione (68).
Nessuno osa rinnegare le proprie radici e l’unica madrepatria, ma gli albanesi della diaspora,
quelli macedoni e specialmente quelli kosovari, non possono dimenticare di aver vissuto la loro
vita in altri paesi, in altri contesti politici, sociali ed economici. Il mito della terra natia ha sempre sostenuto queste comunità ovunque si trovassero, stabilendo un legame fortissimo con queste persone che volenti o nolenti - per cause politiche o economiche - erano diventate degli espatriati. L’Albania e il Kosovo rappresentano per tutti gli albanesi il luogo dove ha avuto origine
l’esistenza collettiva della loro comunità. Queste aree geografiche costituiscono un mito di
etnogenesi, dove l’antichità dei “primi venuti” stabilisce la priorità sul possesso del territorio.
Come spiega George Schöpflin, con questo tipo di miti persino il diritto di cittadinanza si piega
dinanzi al concetto di etnicità, poiché, di solito, i “primi arrivati” dettano tutte le regole (Schöpflin 2000). Inoltre, gli albanesi - oggi una delle popolazioni più giovani d’Europa - amano definirsi uno dei popoli più antichi d’Europa, uno dei primi nel Continente e perciò molti di essi ci
tengono a sottolineare il carattere europeo della loro nazione.
In un’intervista del 1999, lo scrittore Carmine Abate ha usato una metafora particolare per
definire il legame profondo tra tutti gli albanesi. Egli ha definito «l’arbëresh, l’albanese e il kossovaro come fratelli nati nella stessa famiglia, ma poi separati ancora in fasce e affidati a famiglie diverse. Le condizioni di vita, la storia, la cultura di ognuno sono state diverse, però il
sangue è lo stesso». Lo scrittore ha poi continuato la sua analisi aggiungendo immediatamente
una spiegazione fondamentale: «[…] io per sangue intendo i miti, i canti, la memoria storica,
Skanderbeg: questo è comune» (69). Quest’ultima definizione è molto interessante poiché il
concetto di “sangue” richiama le origini comuni, quella discendenza e legame di parentela che
sta alla base di un gruppo etnico, lo rende particolare ed esclusivo e fornisce un senso di identità
e di appartenenza. Il mito che più rappresenta le origini comuni degli albanesi è la loro discendenza - o presunta tale - dagli Illiri.
Gli albanesi si definiscono diretti discendenti degli Illiri, abitanti - in epoca pre-romana e romana - della zona occidentale dei Balcani. Infatti, gli storici albanesi preferiscono questa tesi a
quella che li vede in linea con il popolo dei Traci, residenti nello stesso periodo nella parte
orientale balcanica. L’origine illirica serve perciò anche a fornire una testimonianza della presenza albanese in quelle aree, sin dai tempi antichi. Studi linguistici sui vocaboli e sui toponimi
hanno dato maggior sostegno a questa tesi, identificando la lingua albanese nella famiglia delle
lingue indoeuropee, ma senza particolari legami con altri idiomi e grammaticalmente più affine
a parole illiriche invece che a parole derivanti dai Traci.
I kosovari hanno richiamato in causa il carattere “dardano” della loro regione. I Dardani
erano quasi certamente una o più tribù appartenenti al gruppo degli Illiri e “Dardania” era molto
probabilmente l’antico nome dell’area kosovara (70) [Kelmendi 2005; Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
Negli ultimi anni, queste tesi e queste affermazioni sono state usate dagli storici di Pristina e
68. Cfr. in http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org: Devole, Rando, La lingua albanese verso nuove sfide,
18.05.2007.
69. On-line: http://www.questotrentino.it/99/11/Albanesi.htm: “Fra arbëreshë, albanesi e italiani. Intervista sulla minoranza albanese in Italia con lo scrittore Carmine Abate”, n. 11, 29.05.1999. Con la parola arbëreshë si indica la minoranza albanese in Italia, presente con le prime migrazioni già dal XIII secolo. Credo che la definizione di Abate possa essere intesa in senso ancor più vasto ed essere rappresentativa anche delle altre comunità emigrate albanesi.
70. In albanese dardhë significa pera e molto probabilmente deriva dalla parola illira dardan che fu
tradotta dai romani con il latino pirus, ovvero pera. Per quanto riguarda il carattere illirico-dardano dell’area kosovara è molto interessante l’articolo dell’archeologo albanese Neritan Ceka (2005: 267-277).
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233
Tirana per controbattere le indagini storiografiche serbe. Infatti, archeologi e storici serbi ritraggono gli albanesi come una popolazione arrivata nell’area in questione solo in seguito a quella
serba. Perciò, essi venivano e vengono considerati come genti che hanno invaso il Kosovo
durante i grandi periodi di migrazioni serbe.
Secondo gli studi svolti da Noel Malcolm, gli albanesi - in quanto tali - vengono citati per la
prima volta attorno al 1043 in un conflitto al fianco di un generale bizantino. Successivamente,
il nome di queste genti si ripeterà più spesso e verrà citato anche in un manoscritto della
Chanson de Roland e in un documento italiano del 1281, dove si attesterà l’esistenza di un famoso personaggio albanese: Ginius Tanuschus Albanensis, ovvero il duca che governava la regione tra Durazzo e Scutari, il duca Gjin (71) [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)]. Il nome più utilizzato per
definire queste persone fu quello di albanenses o arbanenses in latino, albanoi o arbanitai in greco bizantino. Le varianti che ne seguirono furono numerose. Arbanon era anche il nome con cui
nell’XI secolo veniva identificata un’area dell’Albania settentrionale (ibidem).
Tuttavia, nella lingua nazionale il nome dell’Albania è Shqipëria. Le origini di questa parola
sono abbastanza confuse e risalgono più o meno alla fine del XIV secolo. Il termine potrebbe
derivare dall’albanese shqipojnë che significa aquila e che, secondo Malcolm, ricorderebbe il
simbolo antico di una tribù. L’aquila in effetti fu l’effigie assunta come stemma dal più famoso
eroe nazionale albanese: Gjergj Kastriot Skanderbeg che nel 1443 - dopo essersi convertito al
Cristianesimo - si ribellò e iniziò una rivolta contro gli Ottomani, facendo della fortezza di
Kruje la sua base e resistendo per buoni venticinque anni. Egli rappresenta il capostipite degli
eroi e delle figure ribelli della storia albanese. Come ha giustamente sottolineato Carmine
Abate, Skanderbeg è un personaggio “comune” a tutti gli albanesi. Il suo mito travalica i confini
e la sua immagine è oggi celebrata da monumenti e sculture presenti nelle principali città
albanesi e kosovare. In un periodo storico in cui la rivalità fra i clan era elevata, Skanderbeg ha
rappresentato la difesa degli interessi della collettività albanese e, alla pari di altri eroi del
passato, è stato adottato come simbolo di unità di una pre-esistente e supposta comunità
nazionale.
3.2. L’animo ribelle tra kaçak e minatori
Uno dei miti ricorrenti e comuni a tutta l’area balcanica è la celebrazione della resistenza e
della ribellione all’oppressore straniero. La lotta contro l’invasore ha formato la coscienza e la
storia nazionale dei vari popoli della penisola. Gli albanesi vantano un carattere fiero, patriota e
una fama di “gente indomabile”, non inferiore a quella dei loro vicini. Seppur separati e divisi
per secoli in vari clan, essi sono stati capaci di sopravvivere a numerosi domini diversi, adattandosi con astuzia ai vari cambi di potere e religione, e combattendo per cercare sempre di preservare i loro beni e le loro tradizioni. Ancora oggi sono famose le rivolte dei clan di montagna
contro le tasse e contro l’imposizione della leva obbligatoria ad opera dell’Impero ottomano. I
territori dei signori albanesi erano conosciuti per essere zone precluse, temute ed evitate dagli
emissari turchi e stranieri. Nella storia della nazione, il carattere indomito di queste genti è stato
fonte di ispirazione per le lotte, che alla luce del XX secolo, hanno portato alla creazione dello
stato albanese.
Il periodo più importante in questo contesto riguarda gli anni a cavallo tra il 1878 e il 1912,
famosi come Rilindje Kombëtare (rinascita o rinascimento nazionale). In questa parentesi temporale sono emerse numerose figure politiche ed intellettuali che sono entrate di diritto nel pan71. Fondatore della casata dei Dukagjin, dalla quale prenderà poi il nome l’altopiano occidentale della
regione kosovara.
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Lorenzo Degrassi
theon degli eroi albanesi. Il Kosovo ha svolto un ruolo decisivo nell’azione politica di questi
eroi. La regione è stata lo scenario degli eventi principali che hanno portato alla creazione dell’Albania e, tuttavia, essa ne è rimasta esclusa. In Kosovo sono nate la Lega di Prizren (1878) e
quella di Peja (1899) che, sotto la guida e l’ispirazione di personaggi come Abdyl Frashëri e
Haxhi Zeka, hanno lottato per annullare le differenze tra i Tosk e i Gheg e per unire i vari territori albanesi in un’unica provincia (72).
Queste organizzazioni a carattere militare erano sorte per difendere i territori dallo straniero
e avevano giurato fedeltà al sultano, al quale chiedevano maggiori garanzie per la propria gente.
Erano persino riuscite a unire i vari clan per una causa comune e a imporre loro una tregua, ponendo fine alle faide secolari che li separavano. Tuttavia, il loro carattere autonomista preoccupò la Porta che iniziò a perseguitarle e a combatterle. I loro intenti politici continuarono con i
programmi di altri personaggi - quali Ismail Qemal e Hasan bey Pristina (73) - e contribuirono
alle numerose rivolte che si concretizzarono a Valona nel 1912. Quando il Kosovo rimase separato dalla madrepatria, la causa nazionale assunse un carattere decisamente irredentista e ostile
ai nuovi padroni slavi.
Le figure che maggiormente rappresentano il valore militare e rivoltoso degli albanesi sono
senza alcun dubbio i kaçak. Questi banditi e ribelli - sostenuti anche dall’aiuto di parte della
neonata Albania - divennero la spina nel fianco della Jugoslavia monarchica. Le loro azioni di
guerriglia all’inizio apparvero come semplici atti criminali, ma divennero invece vero e proprio
strumento di lotta politica contro Belgrado e contro la sua strategia di colonizzazione delle terre
kosovare. Nel 1919, i kaçak lanciarono la prima di una serie di offensive per liberare il Kosovo,
ma furono respinti dall’artiglieria pesante dell’esercito jugoslavo. Negli anni successivi, il governo reale aumentò la pressione e il controllo sui villaggi, puntando a disarmare tutti i cittadini
albanesi, armando quelli di origine slava e formando altre bande da contrapporre a quelle nemiche. Alla lunga, grazie anche all’appoggio del monarchico albanese Zog, Belgrado ebbe la meglio, massacrando quasi tutti i ribelli e forzando i rimanenti a fuggire.
Nell’immaginario collettivo albanese, ma soprattutto in quello kosovaro, i kaçak hanno un
posto speciale. Essi rappresentano l’immagine romantica dell’indomabile guerrigliero eroico. Ancora oggi, in Kosovo, la zona di Drenica è considerata una terra dove sono nati e hanno combattuto i più valorosi eroi nazionali. Questa valle settentrionale del Kosovo era l’area dove padroneggiavano i kaçak e fra di essi lo storico capo Azem Bejta e sua moglie Shota (74). Essi avevano
a loro disposizione più di duemila combattenti e circa 100 mila sostenitori; esortavano la gente dei
villaggi a insorgere per i loro diritti, a non pagare le tasse e a non sottostare a un’occupazione
straniera [Judah 2000; Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.); Vickers 1998]. Questi combattenti sono serviti
come ispirazione alle generazioni successive che si sono opposte al dominio di Belgrado.
Lo spirito di Drenica è stato importante anche in occasione dell’ultimo conflitto. I combattenti dell’Uck hanno fatto di questa zona una delle loro roccaforti e hanno usato come rifugio
72. Abdyl Frashëri faceva parte di una famiglia di intellettuali altrettanto famosi e progressisti. Suo
fratello Naim è considerato il padre della cultura albanese e uno dei maggiori poeti albanesi di tutti i
tempi. L’altro fratello, Sami, era autore prolifico e giornalista. Haxhi Zeka era invece un famoso religioso
musulmano che in precedenza aveva fatto parte della Lega di Prizren e nel 1893 aveva scatenato una
rivolta poi soppressa dagli Ottomani [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
73. Ismail Qemal pubblicò il Libro rosso: una lista di tredici punti e richieste autonomiste, tra le quali,
il rispetto delle usanze religiose e delle tradizioni. Hasan bey Pristina fondò il Comitato per la difesa nazionale del Kosovo e si adoperò moltissimo per diffondere la causa kosovara tra tutte le potenze del
tempo, inviando lettere di protesta sia negli Stati Uniti sia alla conferenza di pace a Parigi nel 1919. Il
Comitato del Kosovo fornì poi numerosi aiuti alle bande dei Kaçak [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
74. Conosciuti anche con il cognome di “Galica” dal nome del loro villaggio.
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i boschi e le montagne circostanti, come un tempo facevano i loro predecessori. La tradizione
dei kaçak è continuata attraverso figure come i fratelli Adem e Hamza Jashari, entrambi appartenenti all’Uck. La loro famiglia viveva nel paese rurale di Prekaz (75) e più volte aveva respinto l’intrusione e gli attacchi della polizia serba. Il 5 marzo 1998, i due fratelli furono
massacrati assieme agli altri 50 membri della famiglia. Da quel momento, essi furono consacrati
come martiri della causa kosovara e - come sostenuto da Tim Judah - Adem Jashari fu visto come l’Azem Bejta degli anni Novanta. Anche in questo caso, la canzone popolare è servita a collegare il presente agli eventi del passato e a dipingere l’eroe moderno come l’erede di una
battaglia generazionale. La canzone seguente ne è un esempio palese:
«O red Kosova,
We will bring you light one day,
Through the red hot barrel of a gun!
Azem Galica comes back to life,
We are cleansing our burned land with blood!
We give our lives but that’s too little,
We are building our castles and turrets with gunslits,
New Adems and Hamzas are growing,
Bent on victory,
With the gun.
We save Kosova and make Albania proud!»
(Judah 2000: 101).
Il mito del carattere fiero e indomabile del popolo albanese ha origine proprio in queste figure che hanno celebrato il valore militare e il coraggio eroico come soluzioni da opporre all’oppressione altrui. Il Kosovo ha fatto nascere l’Albania e l’idea dell’Albania ha tenuto in vita il
Kosovo. La collettività kosovara insorta negli ultimi anni si è dimostrata estremamente grata del
supporto generale di Tirana, ma anche estremamente orgogliosa di questa insurrezione a
carattere nazionale e personale. La rivolta armata è stata la soluzione finale (76), ma non è stata
però l’unico volto mostrato dalla società albanese-kosovara. Per larga parte degli anni Ottanta e
buona parte degli anni Novanta, gli albanesi del Kosovo hanno dato prova di una maturità politica sbalorditiva. Il merito va a politici e intellettuali come Ibrahim Rugova, ma specialmente a
un consolidato movimento di massa che aveva già dato prova di coraggio nelle proteste del
1968, del 1981 e, infine, in quelle dei minatori del 1988-89.
Mentre le proteste del 1968 e quelle studentesche del 1981 sfociarono in duri scontri con la
polizia jugoslava e furono viste come l’ideazione di gruppi filo-Tirana, quelle del 1988-89
ebbero un risultato e un valore totalmente diverso. Nel 1988, i minatori del complesso di Stari
Trg, vicino a Mitrovica, marciarono per protesta fino a Pristina, per un totale di 70 chilometri.
Nel 1989, altri minatori, dell’area di Trepqa, iniziarono uno sciopero della fame che durò otto
giorni. Queste manifestazioni spontanee contro la politica serba in Kosovo e la revoca dell’autonomia, unirono la popolazione albanese-kosovara come un’unica entità politica e sconvolsero
la Federazione jugoslava (Vickers 1998). La gente si unì a queste proteste in maniera pacifica
per denunciare una situazione intollerabile e non per attaccare la Jugoslavia o per sperare in una
separazione dalla Federazione.
75. Villaggio sito nella zona settentrionale della Drenica e distante pochi chilometri dal paese di Galica.
76. Dopo il mancato riconoscimento della causa kosovara a Dayton nel 1995, gli albanesi-kosovari
persero definitivamente la fiducia nella politica pacifista di Rugova e nella sua Lega democratica del
Kosovo (Ldk). Da allora il potere dell’Uck aumentò esponenzialmente.
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Secondo il filosofo Shkëlzen Maliqi, i minatori - rappresentanti della classe più sfruttata ed
esausta - sono entrati nella leggenda albanese, ma il loro gesto non li colloca nel mito, bensì nel
mondo della politica moderna. Essi hanno dimostrato che gli albanesi non potevano essere
ignorati dalla politica jugoslava e raccolsero inaspettatamente l’ammirazione delle altre repubbliche (77) (Maliqi 1998). Inoltre, i minatori sono stati i precursori di quella resistenza pacifica
che ha caratterizzato la politica dei kosovari nei primi anni Novanta: «Non violent resistance as
a response is somewhat surprising for Albanians. They had believed in some different ideals
until then, they thought of themselves as a war-fighting people, but this is what the situation
imposed. I think that the first stimulus for this kind of struggle came from the Trepqa miners,
this at least is what I wrote in my articles: since the Serbian press accused them, and, the Albanians in general, of being murderers, looters…that they desecrated graves, they wanted to demonstrate a different kind of will, organization and discipline» (Maliqi 1998: 235-236).
Lo stesso partito di Rugova - la Lega democratica del Kosovo (Ldk) - scelse la non violenza
come simbolo della gente albanese, per dare un‘immagine diversa da quella proposta dai serbi.
Rugova e i suoi vollero internazionalizzare il problema della regione partendo dalla creazione di
una società parallela e separata dalla Serbia [Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
La nascita di questa società si basò sul boicottaggio delle elezioni e delle istituzioni serbe,
sul rifiuto di pagare le tasse a Belgrado e sulla creazione di un sistema sanitario, educativo e politico che fosse interamente kosovaro-albanese. La maggioranza albanese della regione arrivò ad
auto-tassarsi per rendere possibile questo sistema e fu aiutata dalla diaspora albanese in Europa
e in America. Le comunità emigrate ebbero un ruolo fondamentale nel mantenere le famiglie a
casa e nel diffondere e tener vivo lo spirito nazionalista per la causa kosovara. Queste associazioni finanziarono la società parallela ma, allo stesso tempo, alcune di esse iniziarono a raccogliere fondi per la preparazione di una resistenza militare.
Durante gli accordi di Dayton il Kosovo non fu menzionato e non si parlò nemmeno di violazione dei diritti umani nella regione. Il colpo di grazia fu poi inferto dalle dichiarazioni dell’allora presidente albanese Sali Berisha che, in linea con i politici occidentali, preferì che la soluzione fosse mantenuta e risolta all’interno dei confini serbi (Vickers 1998). Alla fine del 1995,
la politica ghandiana di Rugova non aveva ancora ottenuto le risposte tanto attese e il malcontento della società e degli altri gruppi politici era aumentato notevolmente. L’impazienza e la
mancanza di risultati concreti, associate alla continua noncuranza delle potenze internazionali,
fecero riemergere la necessità di contrapporre la violenza alla violenza e fecero smettere ai
kosovari le vesti dei minatori per rimettere i panni dei kaçak.
3.3. Verso un’identità kosovara
Oggi la società kosovara è immersa in un difficile periodo di transizione. Gli albanesi del
Kosovo hanno appena vissuto la loro Rilindje Kombëtare, il loro personale rinascimento nazionale e stanno per assaporare - per la prima volta nella loro storia - la possibilità di far parte di
uno stato tutto loro. Come ha sostenuto Morozzo della Rocca, la battaglia dell’Uck ha rispecchiato «il massimalismo di un popolo in pieno Risorgimento [...] qualificandosi come movimento di liberazione di tipo anticoloniale» (1999: 84). Ogni anno, nei mesi di marzo e aprile, si
celebrano gli eroi dell’Uck e l’epopea del Kosovo. Feste, celebrazioni e commemorazioni ricordano gli eroi del tempo lontano e di quello recente. Gli albanesi kosovari sono passati dal77. La Slovenia fu molto critica nei confronti della Serbia e appoggiò la protesta dei minatori. Anche
la Croazia espresse il proprio disappunto per la politica serba nei confronti della maggioranza albanese e
soprattutto per la decisione di revocare l’autonomia alla regione.
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l’essere una minoranza nella Jugoslavia all’opportunità di diventare le prime persone a godere
della cittadinanza di un nuovo Kosovo. I serbi kosovari, già in inferiorità in precedenza, stanno
perdendo il sostegno statale che hanno avuto in questi anni e stanno per ritrovarsi ancora più
soli nelle loro enclave.
L’identità kosovara-albanese non è mai stata così forte come adesso. In passato, gli albanesi
del Kosovo rimasero isolati e sospesi tra la realtà jugoslava - prima monarchica e poi socialista e il sogno di un’Albania che essi immaginavano come uno stato libero e benestante (78). Per
questo motivo, essi non ebbero mai la possibilità di sviluppare liberamente la propria identità e
la propria cultura. I kosovari albanesi vennero oppressi, da un lato, e illusi, dall’altro. A differenza dei vicini serbi, essi non avevano né un apparato statale, né un’unica fede religiosa che li
appoggiassero e permettessero loro di evolvere una narrativa nazionale (79). Questo è, a mio
avviso, uno dei motivi principali per cui la loro identità rappresenta il loro mito più grande. Essi
non hanno potuto godere di uno stato che creasse ed elaborasse miti nuovi e diversi. I loro miti
nazionali sono rimasti per larga parte quelli creati nel XIX secolo e appartenenti all’Albania del
1912. In seguito, essi hanno solo potuto conservare ciò che avevano e coltivare quanto possibile
le loro tradizioni all’interno della Jugoslavia.
Oggigiorno, dopo essersi liberati dal giogo serbo e dopo aver accolto a braccia aperte le
forze internazionali, essi stanno testando solo una piccola parte dello state power che avranno in
futuro. La loro pazienza è agli sgoccioli e fanno fatica ad accettare un eventuale ed ulteriore rinvio della loro indipendenza. I recenti incidenti di piazza a Pristina - durante la manifestazione
organizzata a febbraio 2007 dal movimento Vetëvendosje (autodeterminazione) di Albin Kurti hanno dato prova di un crescente nervosismo. Questo stato di agitazione ha coinvolto tutta la
società e ha sollevato un animoso scambio di vedute tra i politici, ponendo seri interrogativi sul
futuro immediato della regione.
Gli intellettuali stanno dibattendo sull’identità albanese e su quella kosovara, se collocarle
nell’Occidente filo-americano, europeo e cattolico o considerarle come parte di un Oriente islamico ma moderato (80). Tuttavia, Islam e Cattolicesimo fanno parte entrambi della storia dell’identità albanese. Ne sono testimonianza le varie forme di sincretismo religioso e di cripto-cat78. Gli albanesi del Kosovo sapevano assai poco o nulla della reale situazione dell’Albania enverista.
Plagiati dalle trasmissioni patriottiche di Radio Tirana, essi credevano si trattasse di un paradiso terrestre.
Il miraggio dell’Albania benestante, tramandato negli anni Settanta e Ottanta, svanì con la morte stessa di
Enver Hoxha nel 1991. Quella di Hoxha resta una delle più violente e peggiori dittature comuniste mai
esistite nell’Europa orientale. Sotto Tito, i kosovari albanesi vissero un’esperienza completamente diversa
e, per certi aspetti, forse addirittura migliore di quella dei loro compagni d’Albania. Non a caso, gli albanesi del Kosovo amano scherzare e definirsi “tedeschi” rispetto ai cugini d’Albania, per il loro senso di
organizzazione sociale, disciplina nel lavoro e rispetto delle gerarchie (Morozzo della Rocca 1999), ma
anche per il livello delle infrastrutture dell’ex-Jugoslavia.
79. La questione religiosa è uno dei motivi storici per cui gli albanesi fecero fatica a sviluppare un’organizzazione statale e un discorso nazionale condiviso. Benché oggi la religione musulmana sia il credo
predominante fra tutti gli albanesi dei Balcani, gli albanesi hanno sempre diviso il loro credo tra le seguenti fedi: sunnita, cattolica, bektashi e ortodossa. Il poeta Pashko Vasa cercò di stimolare un nazionalismo albanese che non fosse basato sulla religione e che accelerasse la creazione di un unico stato albanese. Infatti è famosa la sua frase: «La fede degli albanesi è l’albanesimo». Hoxha la usò nella sua Albania per creare un falso mito di tolleranza religiosa e definire la sua Albania il primo stato interamente laico al mondo [Duijzings 2000; Malcolm 1999 (ed. it.)].
80. Negli ultimi mesi del 2006, la stampa albanese è stata scossa da un libro dello scrittore Ismail
Kadaré: L’identità europea degli albanesi. Ne è nato un dibattito animato fra vari intellettuali; i più accesi
furono l’accademico kosovaro Rexhep Qosja - favorevole a un’identità albanese filo-islamica - e lo stesso
Kadaré, favorevole alla tesi della cristianità della cultura albanese.
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tolicesimo, presenti nel passato ottomano. Inoltre, nel corso del XX secolo, nella società albanese la religione non è mai stata concepita come strumento di potere. Solo recentemente, dopo
la caduta del comunismo, il credo religioso ha ripreso importanza e ha assunto un peso maggiore nella società civile, specialmente in Albania. In Kosovo, l’Islam non ha influenzato particolarmente il recente conflitto e non ha mostrato quell’estremismo terrorista tanto accusato dai
serbi. Tuttavia, non si può escludere che ciò avvenga in futuro. Starà alla nuova società kosovara saper escludere - come ha fatto finora - la religione dalla politica e far sì che essa non diventi
strumento dei governanti, specialmente per occasioni di vendetta contro la minoranza serboortodossa.
Il senso di vittimismo sarà il primo ostacolo da superare perché ciò non accada. Il “sentirsi
vittima” è ciò che il politologo Besnik Pula ha riconosciuto come una delle caratteristiche dell’essere albanese in Kosovo. Secondo questo intellettuale di Pristina, i kosovari hanno sofferto
proprio a causa del loro essere albanesi e sono stati perseguitati dallo stato (Besnik 2005: 23).
Ora che gli albanesi saranno lo stato, dovranno cercare di evitare di usare il loro potere per discriminare e vendicarsi o per generare eventuali miti di un Fushë Kosova. Questo termine è la
traduzione albanese del serbo Kosovo Polje e anche il nome albanese dato alla località dove si è
presumibilmente svolta la storica battaglia del 1389. In tal caso, la vittoria dell’Uck potrebbe
venir strumentalizzata e costituire la base per la creazione futura di un mito opposto a quello
serbo e altrettanto distruttivo. Questa sarà forse la principale delle sfide per una società democratica che sotto il termine “kosovaro” dovrà includere anche gli appartenenti ad altre etnie e
minoranze. Il tema del vittimismo dovrà essere affrontato con serietà, con senso critico, ma anche facendo autocritica, perché si rischia di condizionare negativamente la nascita di nuovi miti
e lo sviluppo di un’intera società.
I kosovari dovranno poi vedersela con i futuri problemi economici di uno stato. Le organizzazioni internazionali non rimarranno per sempre a fornire mercato e lavori, e finora l’economia
del paese si è basata moltissimo sulle rimesse degli immigrati. La diaspora è stata ed è tuttora
una gallina dalle uova d’oro per la popolazione albanese, ma è una condizione destinata a
svanire. Secondo le stime dell’Esi (European Stability Initiative) le entrate derivanti dai numerosi immigrati sono andate calando di anno in anno. Uno dei motivi principali è che più di 100
mila kosovari sono rientrati definitivamente dalla Germania, portando con sé tutti i loro beni in
quella che è stata, praticamente, una transazione a senso unico. Ci sono ancora numerose associazioni e comunità di immigrati in America, in Svizzera e nel nord-Europa, ma il loro supporto
economico non basterà alla gestione di uno stato (81). Bisognerà avviare un intero sistema
economico indipendente e creare nuovi posti di lavoro. Infatti, il tasso di disoccupazione nella
regione resta ancora altissimo e la maggioranza degli albanesi lavora presso le organizzazioni
internazionali che sono arrivate dopo i bombardamenti del 1999.
Nel frattempo, il rapporto con l’Albania si è intensificato. Berisha, oggi primo ministro, si è
detto entusiasta di una soluzione indipendentista. Inoltre, il Ministero della cultura dell’Albania
ha organizzato nel settembre 2006 il “Mese della cultura nazionale comune Albania-Kosovo”,
evento che d’ora in poi si ripeterà annualmente. Il festival settembrino ha celebrato i valori della
storia comune attraverso iniziative culturali e sportive tra Pristina e Tirana, dove si sono tenuti
spettacoli teatrali, mostre artistiche, concerti e balletti. Uno di questi spettacoli ha riscosso
enorme successo: il suo titolo era “Shota e Azem Galica”, dedicato ai due storici leader dei kaçak.
Lo scopo annunciato di questo mese di festa era unificare la cultura albanese, ma le parole del
vice-ministro Suzana Turku sono apparse molto più rivelatrici. La vice-ministro albanese si è detta
fiduciosa nella possibilità che un giorno i confini amministrativi tra i due territori siano cancellati
81. Cfr. in http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org: “Se non si può emigrare”, 17.10.2006.
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e che i due paesi si sentano uniti nella cultura, nella lingua e nell’identità albanese (82).
Non si può ancora stabilire con precisione quali saranno in futuro gli intenti politici dei
kosovari. La fusione di due stati in un’unica entità politica è un sogno che oggi attira molti albanesi, ma - personalmente - credo che prima si assisterà al riconoscimento ufficiale di un’identità
kosovara, una sorta di sottoinsieme nell’identità albanese. Il mito delle origini comuni persisterà
in un’identità nazionale più vasta, nell’origine etnica di tutti gli albanesi e nelle sue figure storiche, ma l’identità kosovara si svilupperà e si differenzierà partendo dallo stato kosovaro.
4. La guerra dell’informazione
«Quando c’è la guerra,
quando si sentono le trombe di guerra,
la prima vittima è la verità»
[Dragan Petrović (83)].
La produzione e il consumo di notizie sono fattori-chiave per la politica di uno stato. La
parola è da sempre lo strumento più potente nelle mani di un politico che mira a raccogliere il
consenso delle masse, a presentare o imporre il proprio programma e a ottenere successo. Nel
recente contesto balcanico, l’appoggio dei media ha determinato le sorti politiche dell’exJugoslavia. Alla fine degli anni Ottanta e all’inizio dei Novanta, chi controllava i media controllava il potere e trasmetteva alle masse la propria volontà, camuffandola sotto le vesti di tante
presunte verità. La relazione tra le istituzioni statali e la gente è stata influenzata in maniera negativa da una classe dirigente che controllava mezzi di comunicazione, associazioni culturali e
un intero sistema educativo nazionale. Il nazionalismo etnico si è presentato sotto le spoglie seduttive di un cesarismo plebiscitario che aveva promesso mari e monti alla nazione, basandosi
su una propaganda che esaltava lo statalismo come la soluzione dei problemi sociali e la cieca
fiducia nella classe dirigente come l’unica strada percorribile per la grandezza nazionale. La vita
sociale veniva avvelenata costantemente da una miriade di illusioni e bugie che, alla lunga,
avrebbero fatto crollare l’intero sistema sociale jugoslavo (Ugrešić 1998).
La mobilitazione e preparazione delle masse al conflitto è avvenuta grazie alla collaborazione di scrittori, storici, giornalisti, psicologi ed intellettuali di vario tipo, che invece di
denunciare i discorsi e le politiche xenofobe dei loro leader, hanno preferito tacere e abbracciare
la causa nazionalista. Coloro che si sono opposti ai propri governi sono stati licenziati, uccisi e,
nel migliore dei casi, sono stati costretti a fuggire all’estero (84). Dušan Reljić - redattore della
rubrica esteri del settimanale Vreme e giornalista dal 1980 - ha definito questi collaboratori
“criminali dietro la scrivania”, usando la stessa immagine che avevano usato in precedenza i tedeschi per definire gli schreibtischtöter, ovvero questo tipo di esecutori di crimini, quali Göeb82. Cfr. in http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org: Niccolai Francesca, “Albania, Kosovo, Albania”,
20.10.2006.
83. Dragan Petrović, ex-redattore della Rts (Radio Televisione serba) e di Radio Belgrado, oggi corrispondente presso la sede Ansa di Belgrado, intervistato da Francesca Rolandi, in http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org: Rolandi, Francesca, “La memoria storica, i media e le guerre balcaniche”, 14.12.2006.
84. È celebre il caso del giornalista Slavko Curuvija, ex-capo-redattore del Dnevni Telegraf, ucciso
l’11 aprile 1999. Qualche giorno prima, egli aveva scritto e pubblicato una lettera contro Milošević e sua
moglie Mira Marković, criticando le politiche del governo. Nel 1990 e nel 1991, la Rts (Radio Televisione serba) licenziò circa mille persone che furono immediatamente rimpiazzate da lavoratori più fedeli al
governo. In http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org: Rolandi, Francesca, “La memoria storica, i media e le
guerre balcaniche”, 14.12.2006.
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bels, Eichmann e Julius Streicher (85). Come ha sostenuto Reljić, nel conflitto civile jugoslavo
vi sono molte persone che, con l’uso della parola, hanno macchiato le mani altrui di sangue e
che oggi sono state riabilitate dalla società come se non fosse accaduto nulla.
Queste persone hanno contribuito al compimento del disegno di morte progettato dai loro
leader. Sfruttando le memorie del passato, essi hanno manipolato i traumi della gente e hanno
fatto leva sulle loro emozioni per scatenare il consenso collettivo all’azione. Gli storici hanno
raccontato le loro verità, gli psicologi hanno spiegato le dinamiche attraverso cui si è verificato
e i poeti hanno scritto nuove opere per cavalcare lo spirito del tempo e celebrare nuovi eroi
(Anzulović 1999). Essi hanno svolto un lavoro da veri e propri necrofili. Hanno disseppellito la
memoria storica e ne hanno abusato a lungo, andando a ritroso fino a riportare ai giorni nostri il
Medioevo. Rievocando il passato essi hanno cercato di stabilire dei diritti sul presente e sul
futuro della loro terra (ibidem). In un discorso all’International Press Freedom Awards a Toronto, Louise Arbour - un tempo procuratore capo del Tpi (86) per l’ex-Jugoslavia - ha definito come “patologia della storia” questo abuso delle memorie passate per motivare e perpetrare nuove
ingiustizie (Klarin 2001: 153).
I media e la classe intellettuale sono stati senza alcun dubbio responsabili dei crimini orrendi
che hanno infangato l’ex-regione jugoslava. Essi sono colpevoli di non aver informato le masse
in modo decente e di averle ingannate sfruttando le paure popolari. Le reti televisive principali e
i quotidiani con maggiore tiratura si sono piegati alle esigenze delle élite nazionalistiche e
«hanno agito per anni come reattore nucleare di paura, ostilità e vendetta» (ibidem: 152-153).
Nei loro lavori e nei lori studi, essi hanno adoperato una precisa scelta di linguaggio, di termini,
di immagini e metafore, che potessero evocare emozioni forti nella mente degli ascoltatori e dei
lettori nazionali. Essi hanno messo in gioco eroi, vittime e villani, unendo la nazione e
contrapponendola all’immagine negativa di un nemico esterno (87). Un’adeguata retorica nazionalista ha poi fatto propri valori nobili come la civiltà, la libertà e la democrazia, opponendoli
alle barbarie e all’ignoranza altrui.
Nel caso del Kosovo, la guerra mediatica si è svolta su più fronti e queste dinamiche di informazione-disinformazione hanno coinvolto anche i paesi della Nato e delle Nazioni Unite. Mentre la macchina propagandistica di Belgrado richiamava alla memoria il glorioso passato serbo e
la resistenza contro gli oppressori nazisti-fascisti, la Nato definiva la sua missione come un
compito di civiltà e una dovuta necessità di porre fine al totalitarismo serbo. Gli albanesi del
Kosovo accusavano i serbi di essere colonialisti e, a loro volta, i serbi dipingevano gli albanesi
come terroristi. Tutte le parti avevano in comune una cosa: paragonavano il nemico al nazismo,
cercando di evocare le immagini della Seconda guerra mondiale per veder sostenuta la propria
causa (88) (Paris 2002). Inoltre, tutte puntavano alla diffusioni di pregiudizi e stereotipi che
caratterizzassero negativamente i loro avversari.
Secondo il giornale inglese The Indipendent, la guerra del Kosovo è stata anche la prima
85. Cfr. Reljić (1996: 135-136). Julius Streicher era l’editore del giornale antisemita Der Stürmer che
istigava le masse allo sterminio degli ebrei. Streicher fu processato a Norimberga e condannato a morte
per impiccagione.
86. Tribunale Penale Internazionale.
87. Cfr. Popović, Radmila, Enemy construction in the media during the kosovo conflict - A comparative view, on-line: http://sparky.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW3/Radmilla_Popovic.pdf.
88. L’associazione con il nazismo e con il fascismo è una delle immagini più usate da giornalisti e
politici per rappresentare un’idea di male supremo e richiamare il consenso pubblico. La stampa belgradese definiva la Nato un “mutante fascista” e quella americana ha spesso associato Milošević a Hitler. L’associazione con il nazismo non è passata di moda nemmeno in questi mesi: poco tempo fa, il presidente
George Bush ha definito la lotta americana al terrorismo come una lotta contro i “fascisti islamici”.
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241
guerra informatica della storia. Attraverso internet si è combattuta una vera battaglia di informazione e comunicazione. I media serbi ed europei si sono smentiti a vicenda, la Nato ha cercato
di oscurare i canali d’informazione belgradesi e quest’ultimi hanno cercato di censurare le informazioni che giungevano dall’esterno. Ma la rete non è stata usata solo per creare una guerra psicologica e un clima di tensione e propaganda. Entrambe le parti hanno ammesso l’uso di armi
cibernetiche. Sono stati impiegati virus elettronici per bloccare la rete di difesa serba, il traffico
aereo e anche i conti bancari del presidente Milošević. Gli hackers serbi hanno provato a intasare i siti delle principali testate americane e a penetrare nei sistemi di difesa del Pentagono
(Stajner 2001: 160).
Il peso dell’informazione è stato decisivo per l’ascesa e lo sviluppo della guerra civile nei
Balcani e per la diffusione di miti nazionalistici come quello del Kosovo, ma anche per l’esito
stesso dell’intero conflitto. I riflettori internazionali hanno giocato un ruolo fondamentale nel preparare un intervento militare nell’ex-Jugoslavia. Anche in questo caso, i potenti hanno dovuto
ottenere il consenso generale prima di dare il via alle operazioni e hanno dovuto fornire prove che
testimoniassero la gravità della situazione. Le televisioni hanno portato alla ribalta la causa
dell’Uck, mostrando le immagini di alcuni massacri nei villaggi kosovari ad opera di paramilitari e
polizia serba. Purtroppo, in precedenza, nemmeno le visite diplomatiche del presidente Rugova
erano riuscite ad ottenere tanto successo nel promuovere la causa kosovara all’estero (89).
L’informazione e coloro che oggi vi lavorano, hanno il compito di non ripetere gli errori del
passato recente, di non prendere parte al gioco del potere, di raccontare, criticare e accusare,
anche senza mantenere per forza uno spirito imparziale. Tuttavia, essi devono avere la totale
consapevolezza che stanno comunicando alle masse. Essi devono sentire la responsabilità che
grava sulle loro parole e, per quanto possano essere attratti dalle sirene della fama e del potere,
essi devono mantenere viva la verità, in quanto sono garanti della sicurezza sociale di un paese,
alla pari di tanti politici e capi di stato. Un intellettuale che si rispetti deve concedersi la possibilità del dubbio, non essere fermamente convinto delle sue posizioni e sbandierarle come unica
saggezza. La ripartenza dell’intera società balcanica e il futuro di molte altre società democratiche - o presunte tali - è riposto anche nelle parole di questi uomini che possono denunciare le
ingiustizie e combattere contro la diffusione di falsi miti, promotori di divisioni sociali, odio e
celebrazione ostentata della propria nazionalità.
La società odierna gode di migliaia di canali di comunicazione, la tecnologia ha fatto passi
da gigante e per questo motivo politici, intellettuali e giornalisti hanno maggiori responsabilità
verso la comunità globale. Essi possono diffondere miti di convivenza pacifica e tolleranza,
combattendo - a mio avviso - contro quelle persone che Riccardo Cappelli ha definito “imprenditori etnici” (90). Queste persone usano da sempre l’etnicità come un’arma politica per ottenere
il comando e raggiungere i propri obiettivi, senza curarsi degli enormi danni e delle terribili dinamiche psicologiche e sociali che innescano. Inoltre, affinché le classi dirigenti di oggi possano garantire un futuro stabile e pacifico alle loro società, si deve partire dalle fondamenta, ovvero, dai giovani e dalla loro educazione.
L’informazione scolastica è un altro tassello fondamentale per il futuro di molti paesi e nel
nostro caso dei Balcani. In passato, il sistema scolastico è stato usato per creare generazioni di
89. Come ha testimoniato a suo tempo il professor Morozzo della Rocca: «Affinché il Kosovo sia percepito nel mondo come una grande Sarajevo occorre almeno qualche mese di devastanti immagini televisive. Per liberare Sarajevo, del resto, sono stati necessari tre anni di riflettori internazionali e una
Srebrenica» (1999: 90-91).
90. «L’imprenditore etnico è quella persona che, per fini diversi e in maniera continuativa, provoca,
supporta o aggrava, con azioni verbali e/o materiali, situazioni di tensioni o violenza che favoriscono l’affermarsi di sentimenti di odio-interetnico» (Cappelli 2000: 147).
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esaltati amanti della patria, senza dare ai giovani la possibilità di un’istruzione libera e multiculturale. Secondo le ricerche di alcuni esperti (91), i testi scolastici in Serbia, durante gli anni Ottanta, erano farciti di ideologia e politica nazionale. Già a partire dalle elementari, la maggioranza dei testi era standardizzata e presentava un approccio collettivista che dava meno attenzione ai valori individuali ed esaltava invece in maniera etnocentrica la storia della nazione.
Sotto la tutela dell’organizzazione belgradese Most e del Center for AntiWar Action, un
gruppo di autori dell’ex-Jugoslavia ha svolto un’analisi sulle tematiche dominanti nei testi scolastici serbi. La ricerca - pubblicata nel libro Warfare, patriotism, the patriarchal element
(1994) - ha dato risultati sconcertanti: il modello da seguire, proposto nei vari testi dell’epoca, è
interamente ispirato ad una socializzazione di stampo militare. Non vi è libro delle elementari e
delle medie che non esaltasse l’onore di morire per la propria patria. Le tematiche più ricorrenti
sono l’elogio dell’eroismo, del sacrificio, la glorificazione della sofferenza per la propria terra
natia e la celebrazione della nazione a scapito di altri paesi. I vari manuali presentano la storia
del popolo serbo come un racconto di vittimismo e presentano immagini e illustrazioni cruente
dei conflitti passati (92).
Negli ultimi decenni, il controllo dei libri di testo ad opera di certe élite governative ha permesso la programmazione di migliaia di giovani menti, preparate per eventuali chiamate nazionali. Il problema è tuttora d’attualità nel rinascente Kosovo. Nella regione kosovara, i testi di
storia raccontano verità contrapposte. I libri in uso nelle scuole della minoranza serba provengono da Belgrado, mentre quelli dei kosovari albanesi - un tempo stampati in Albania - vengono
pubblicati in Kosovo e sottoposti al monitoraggio degli organi internazionali. Benché entrambe
le comunità dichiarino l’assenza di riferimenti xenofobi nei loro testi, le modalità di esposizione
delle reciproche e recenti vicende nazionali sono motivo di offesa per le due comunità. Il dibattito è molto complesso ed è difficile stabilire come trattare nei programmi scolastici i periodi bui
della guerra. Ci si interroga se sia giusto o meno omettere dai libri figure come Milošević e i
fratelli Jashari (93).
A peggiorare le cose ci sono poi gli insegnanti stessi e i familiari degli alunni. I primi esulano spesso dai loro normali compiti d’insegnamento per calarsi nei panni di promotori della politica nazionale e i secondi non sempre riescono a crescere i figli nel rispetto della diversità.
Ovviamente, ciò che è accaduto negli ultimi anni è ancora troppo fresco e impresso nelle menti
delle persone, per aspettarsi che le due comunità vadano immediatamente d’accordo. Gli eroi
degli uni sono ancora i terroristi degli altri e lo saranno per molti anni a venire. Il tempo potrà
lenire la tensione tra le comunità kosovare, ma per partire con il piede giusto bisogna lavorare
con coscienza sulle nuove generazioni. Forse, un giorno, delle commissioni storiche miste potranno rendere giustizia alla storia e strapparla dalle mani di chi vorrà ancora utilizzarla come
un’arma. Tuttavia, ciò non sarà possibile se i politici in primis e coloro che amano chiamarsi
intellettuali, non misureranno le proprie decisioni e le proprie parole.
Ora più che mai, la regione kosovara ha bisogno di una politica che sia fatta pensando alla
sua società e a tutti i suoi futuri cittadini. Belgrado dovrebbe smetterla di rincorrere il sogno che
il Kosovo possa fare ancora parte della Serbia e i nuovi governanti albanesi hanno il compito di
91. Cfr. Crawford, Keith, Culture wars: Serbian history textbooks and the construction of national
identity, on-line: http://www.centres.ex.ac.uk/historyresource/journal6/Crawfordrev.doc. Secondo alcune
indagini relative alla Jugoslavia e alla Serbia degli anni Settanta, l’86.6% del contenuto dei testi storici
era dedicato alla politica. In una successiva analisi del 1987, risultò che il 62% dei testi di scienze sociali
e il 30% di quelli storici per le elementari, presentavano contenuto politico e ideologico.
92. Cfr. Simonović, Veselin, Vreme news digest agency, 137, 09.05.1994, on-line: http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/137/t137-7.htm.
93. Cfr. in http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org: Terdevci, Fatmire, “Le due storie del Kosovo”, 20.12.2006.
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guidare la comunità, scossa dalle violenze, senza cedere alle tentazioni e alle scorciatoie di
nuovi vittimismi nazionali e desideri di rivalsa (94). Come hanno testimoniato sia il giornalista
Dragan Petrović, sia il politico e intellettuale serbo Mirko Tepavac, la Serbia e i suoi politici
oggi dovrebbero concentrarsi maggiormente sui profughi e sulla minoranza in Kosovo. Anziché
usarli per proteggere se stessi e la loro posizione all’interno del governo, essi dovrebbero assicurare loro una futura convivenza pacifica con gli albanesi e prepararli alla realtà futura di un
Kosovo indipendente. Ciò che ha detto Tepavac è assolutamente convincente: «Invece di illudersi, occorre pensare al Kosovo come un futuro stato-vicino. È difficile ma bisogna usare le
forze della ragione per non peggiorare la situazione in Serbia, soprattutto perché i nostri demagoghi, già da anni ci prendono in giro promettendo che “sarà ciò che non può essere” [...] Non è
vero che la Serbia non può esistere senza il Kosovo. I diritti territoriali non possono essere mai
al di sopra, o prima, dei diritti umani. I politici saggi accettano ciò che è inevitabile, come propria scelta; gli ignoranti preferiscono cercare i colpevoli, piuttosto che una soluzione» (95).
Infine, vorrei concludere sottolineando l’importanza di un’azione politica che parta dal presente, che non dimentichi ciò che è accaduto, ma che sia attuale e che valuti le necessità correnti
di tutte le comunità kosovare. Solo accettando le proprie responsabilità odierne e una convivenza pacifica, si potrà procedere verso un futuro più libero da condizionamenti storici.
Conclusioni
Se si potesse scegliere una parola che rappresenti la situazione della regione kosovara negli
ultimi venticinque anni, non avrei alcun dubbio: opterei per “indipendenza”. Questa condizione
politica, oggi tanto agognata dagli albanesi del Kosovo, è stata anche il risultato del programma
nazionalista serbo alla fine degli anni Ottanta. Nel 1981, le manifestazioni studentesche e gli
incidenti di Pristina, furono i primi segnali di una crisi imminente nella Jugoslavia di allora,
destabilizzata dalla recente scomparsa del maresciallo Tito. La politica di affermazione nazionale, operata in seguito dalle varie élite repubblicane, non fece altro che mettere in luce la crescente instabilità della Federazione. Infatti, la prossimità della disgregazione jugoslava si manifestò palesemente in Kosovo nel 1989, quando - in occasione del 600° anniversario della battaglia del Campo dei merli - Milošević pronunciò il fatidico discorso alla nazione serba.
Nel 2007, a ventisei anni di distanza dagli incidenti di Pristina, il Kosovo sta per porre fine a
questa ormai lunga storia di separazione e differenziazione etnica. Per giustificare l’indipendenza
nazionale, le varie repubbliche hanno scomodato politici, storici, intellettuali vari e infine militari
e paramilitari, allo scopo di ottenere l’edificazione della propria nazione. Ogni repubblica ha
scavato nel proprio passato per cercare un mito fondante e per trovare le origini del proprio essere
e della propria cultura. Per fare ciò, esse si sono servite di rivendicazioni, di ricostruzioni storiche
spesso approssimative, delle memorie di un glorioso e lontano passato medievale, nonché di tutti
quegli episodi storici e bellici che testimoniassero uno spirito di lotta e sofferenza nazionale.
La mitopoiesi ha avuto un ruolo fondamentale nell’affermazione di queste identità, ma anche
94 Gli incidenti del 16-18 marzo 2004 sono un esempio di come sia facile riaccendere il conflitto. Tre
bambini albanesi erano morti per annegamento nei pressi di Mitrovica, a causa - a quanto sembra - di altri
ragazzi serbi. I media kosovari diffusero immediatamente la voce, senza avere piena certezza delle
dinamiche dell’incidente. La società albanese esplose di rabbia e diede alle fiamme le abitazioni serbe di
numerosi villaggi e città in tutta la regione. I media kosovari finirono sotto accusa dell’Osce e del Tmc
(Temporary Media Commission) per come avevano diffuso la notizia in maniera sensazionalista. In
http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org: Lama, Alma, “Kossovo e media: tra prudenza e censura”, 17.05.2004.
95. In http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org: Tepavac, Mirko, “Kosovo: non sarà ciò che non può essere”, 16.05.2007.
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nella distruzione di tutto ciò che le poteva ostacolare. I miti del passato sono serviti da strumento
per mobilitare le masse, per destare ricordi e memorie sepolte e poi riutilizzarle in chiave presente.
Idee di grandezza nazionale ed elezione divina hanno favorito l’etnicizzarsi dei rapporti sociali,
hanno letteralmente ubriacato la collettività e l’hanno resa partecipe di un processo violento di
nation building. La crisi sociale, politica ed economica jugoslava, ha fornito alle élite nazionalistiche l’opportunità di sfruttare la situazione a proprio vantaggio. Invece di indagare sulle reali
cause dei problemi e invece di provare a porvi rimedio, esse hanno preferito creare un clima di sfiducia e cercare nemici esterni sui quali scaricare tutte le colpe e le responsabilità. La violenza del
conflitto jugoslavo non è stata il frutto imprevisto di un risveglio barbarico di identità etniche
soppresse, ma è stata un risultato razionale e preparato da alcune élite nazionali.
Il Kosovo rappresenta da sempre uno spazio simbolico sia per la popolazione serba, sia per
quella albanese. Questa zona meridionale dei Balcani è stata un crocevia di culture e popoli, una
delle aree principali dell’impero medievale serbo-ortodosso, ma anche la terra dove parte degli
albanesi colloca le proprie origini etniche. La regione ricorda la storica sconfitta serba del 1389,
quando le forze cristiane del principe Lazar si opposero invano all’invasione ottomana. Nel
corso dei secoli, i serbi hanno costruito la propria identità su questa battaglia e sui personaggi principali che la rappresentano. Nell’evento è condensato tutto ciò che oggigiorno rappresenta l’essere
serbi: sacrificio, eroismo, sofferenza, orgoglio e cristianità. Gli albanesi, invece, trovano nel
Kosovo la loro etnogenesi, le antiche origini illiriche, lo storico spirito di resistenza dei vari clan e
alcuni fra gli eventi principali che hanno portato alla nascita dello stato albanese nel 1912.
All’interno della Federazione jugoslava, gli albanesi-kosovari erano forse il maggior gruppo
nazionale a non avere origini slave. Essi erano rimasti tagliati fuori dallo stato albanese e
sebbene costituissero una maggioranza nella “terra dei monasteri” (96), erano stati costretti a
sottostare alla giurisdizione serba, prima sotto la Jugoslavia monarchica e poi sotto quella titina.
Il desiderio sempre vivo di unire la regione kosovara alla madrepatria albanese andava però
contro ogni idea politica di Belgrado, che da sempre ha concepito il Kosovo come culla della
cultura serba e territorio di una preesistente entità nazionale. Sotto Tito, la situazione dei kosovari albanesi era migliorata e sotto certi aspetti era forse addirittura preferibile alla situazione
dei connazionali nell’Albania di Hoxha. Tuttavia, subito dopo la morte del maresciallo, i kosovari manifestarono dapprima per l’unione con l’Albania e poi per la creazione di una repubblica
kosovara separata dalla Serbia ma che restasse all’interno della Federazione.
La ripresa del nazionalismo epico serbo - con le sue tradizioni orali-popolari, con la sua
“intesa celeste”, con l’appoggio della Chiesa ortodossa e di un fortissimo senso di vittimismo
storico - ha posto fine ad ogni aspirazione repubblicana e indipendentista dei kosovari. Paradossalmente, allo stesso tempo, questi fattori hanno contribuito al rafforzamento di un’identità tutta
kosovara albanese, distinta da quella nazionale “shqipetara” per esperienze passate e condizioni
di vita. La lotta contro il nazionalismo serbo ha reso la comunità kosovara più cosciente della
propria storia e della propria identità. Benché la natura sovranazionale di questa identità albanese non si discuta, la guerra del Kosovo ha portato alla ufficializzazione di un’identità kosovara
separata e al riconoscimento di una storia che non era più comune dal 1912.
La morte di Milošević non ha segnato la fine del nazionalismo serbo. Il ruolo del Kosovo e
del suo mito, sono ancora fattori determinanti nella politica della regione balcanica. In Serbia, i
radicali dell’estremista Vojislav Šešelj ottengono ancora numerosi consensi quando si schierano
apertamente contro l’indipendenza albanese della regione e si dichiarano pronti a tutto. Gli altri
partiti moderati fanno invece fatica a trattare un argomento ormai pericoloso per le sorti e la
politica del governo. D’altro canto, i kosovari albanesi oggi vivono la frenesia di un nazionali96. Così i serbi chiamano il Kosovo.
Il Kosovo come mito e identità fra serbi e albanesi
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smo risorgimentale e il loro risentimento e il senso di vittimismo sono elementi da non sottovalutare per la sicurezza futura della regione. A tutto ciò va poi associata la ripresa, seppur minima, di un discorso politico panalbanese che ha numerosi sostenitori tra gli ex-combattenti dell’Uck. L’idea di un’Albania etnica - proposta per la prima volta dalla Lega di Prizren nel 1878 è infatti lo spauracchio che terrorizza molti politici vicini e internazionali. In questo caso, il mito
dell’identità albanese costituirebbe il collante di un’unica Grande Albania che, oltre al Kosovo,
includerebbe anche i territori del Montenegro meridionale, della Macedonia occidentale, le regioni greche della Çiameria (Giannina ed Epiro) e parte di alcuni territori oggi in possesso della
stessa Serbia (Eichberg 2006: 208). Affinché le comunità serbe e kosovare possano un giorno
godere di una situazione sociale pacifica e di una politica democratica, esse dovranno opporsi alla
propaganda populista dei centri di potere e sviluppare un maggior senso di responsabilità
individuale e civile. I media e gli intellettuali hanno il compito di non ripetere gli errori del passato
e di rivestire dignitosamente l’incarico che spetta loro, ovvero quello di garanti della verità e della
sicurezza sociale. Assicurando la promozione di una cultura pacifica, essi getteranno le basi per
una società democratica. Inoltre, con il proprio lavoro, essi potranno fornire alla gente la
possibilità di comprendere la falsità di certi miti che andrebbero strappati dal discorso politico e
inseriti piuttosto in un contesto più adeguato, come quello di un semplice patrimonio culturale.
In questi anni, le istituzioni politiche, culturali e scolastiche serbe e kosovare sono state lo
specchio di una politica nazionalista. Oggi, esse hanno il dovere di aiutare la costruzione democratica di queste due società, opponendosi alla riproduzione di certi miti esclusivisti e al condizionamento delle future generazioni. La rinuncia a una giusta politica di dialogo, mediazione e
diplomazia, porterà solo all’incapacità di ottenere una riconciliazione futura tra le parti.
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ANTI-IDEOLOGICAL WRITING AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION
IN THE SERBIAN LITERATURE OF THE EIGHTIES
Lidija Opačić
Abstract: Through a case study conducted over a dozen of Serbian literary works, novels and stories,
published in the Eighties, some hypothesis are tested. The sharing of the official political ideology by both the
examined works and the speeches of the political élites seems to confirm that the former was orchestrated – at
least partially – by the latter in order to bring the imagined heroic past into the conscience of the moment.
Also the hypothesis that the Serbian literature of the period expressed a weakening of the Yugoslav national
identity seems confirmed with little doubt: the Yugoslav nation is hardly ever present; the characters almost
always belong to the Serb, Croat or Muslim ‘nations’; there is no work which tries to build a common future
and forty years of common state and life are simply left apart. However, in the examined literary work, no
excessive presence of the Serbian nationalist thought was noted, disconfirming the hypothesis that through the
literary content, the awakening of the nationalist thought and the arrival of the conflict could be perceived.
The overall feelings could rather be defined as ‘resentment’ toward the socialist ideology and ‘self pity’ for
the wars victims, which turned to be part of the many elements that ‘supported’ the new official Serbian
nationalist ideology: the negative sign easily detected in the writings probably left, among the readers, a sort
of internal justification for the political actions in the nineties.
►► ◄◄
Introduction
With the perfect media coverage the roaring fall of Berlin wall found its place in every house of
Western world and announced something completely new in the rigid form of the bipolar system of
the international relations. Even before the cement dust settled the Cold War became past and
millions of people decided that their ideologies were old or that those ideologies weren’t their at all.
Bipolar system left space for the multipolar international system and with it arrived also the number
of various changes and processes, today also known as globalisation. Globalisation processes -mostly including economy, institutionalisation of new transnational legal regimes and media - became so
widely spread that almost every segment of our life could be connected to a larger net of elements.
Politics, culture, economy and media became global issues together with regional crises awaken by
the weakening of the previously rigid political control.
The end of socialism and the immediate consequent arrival of the steady democratic and liberal
values proved to be more complicated than it seemed at the beginning. Rise of nationalism took
over the primate against the more peaceful options creating instability in every area where the
vacuum of political values was detected. In a new situation, shaken by the external and internal
changes, new political elites forged the sense of national belonging and pushed the national identity on
the first place of their interest. An already weak political culture completely missed its targets when
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confronted with the nationalist wave that found its strength in the ethnical roots of the population.
New nationalism from the end of twentieth century proved to be very different from the wellknown forms from the end of the previous century. New nationalism demonstrated to be not the
integrative nation state bonding movement, but quite the opposite: its exclusiveness caused fragmentation and growing complexity of the existing multinational states into miniature ethnically
defined states. Unfortunately new nationalism together with the new national symbols developed
also the forms of extreme political actions hiding itself behind the new wars - defined as civil wars
between the successor states or the wars between the minority ethnic groups and successor states and behind the old ethnic cleansing.
Not every violence is as direct as the ethnic cleansing but the multiplicity of its shapes leaves
enough space for the different elaborations of its existence and continuous presence in the society.
According to Johan Galtung (2000: 375-377) the concept of violence can be framed into a triangle
of three forms that define three different types of violence: cultural, structural and direct. Cultural
violence refers to those aspects of the culture, with its common symbols such as: religion, ideologies, art and science that could be used for justification and legitimisation of direct and structural
violence, and it is considered as something permanent. Difference between the last two could be
detected in their way of acting: direct form is also seen as personal, where violence is considered an
event, while the structural violence is accepted as a long lasting process. Dividing the essential
human needs in four different categories - need for survival, for welfare, for identity and need for
freedom-it is possible to identify their various mechanisms. Continuous interaction between the
categories shows their interdependence and it’s very difficult to isolate one type of violence that is
not connected with some other violent form.
Unfortunately for its population, former Yugoslavia provided all the examples and the confirmation that the violence triangle is much more than an abstract drawing. In explaining its collapse
scholars primary directed their attentions towards two guiding ideas: age-old religious hatreds and rivalries that gave rise to the violent conflicts basing themselves on the historical causes and the political
causes in the form of the harnessing of the nationalism by Serbian and Croatian political leaders.
Marek Waldenberg summed his judgment by highlighting the failure of the economic system,
failure of the official ideology and changes on the international scene as concrete reasons for the
dissolution (1992: 297-302). James Kellas, following a track similar to Waldenberg’s, described the
Yugoslavia’s dissolution as a movement that began from the bottom towards the core, promoting
the idea of the rising nationalism as a consequence of the economic dissatisfaction in the regions
where economic development was unbalanced and where there was the cultural division of labour
and the immigrant workers. Yugoslavia had it all: the lack of resources, unbalanced development
and the tendencies towards the inner colonialism (Kellas 1993).
Sabrina P. Ramet, following the political motivation, saw the cause in the failure of the balance
of power system - the political elites that supported the centralist idea found their opponents in the
political elites that were favourable to the particularistic vision of the state organization - that was
empowered by the constitutional change in 1974 which created a possibility for a sort of Yugoslav
confederation (Ramet 1992: 17).
Spyros A. Sofos, still in the line with the political causes but with the important reflection towards the Yugoslav nations, described the post war period as a failure of the Yugoslav Federation
to provide and sustain a collective political imaginary which would not suppress the multicultural
character of Yugoslav society, and address issues of socio-economic justice and development. This
Anti-ideological writing and the national question in the Serbian literature of the eighties
251
provided a fertile ground for the re-emergence and strengthening of mono-ethnic nationalist movements and discourses (Sofos 1996).
Vesna Pešić, not satisfied with the definitions that were primarily concerned with the end of
Yugoslavia as a pure struggle for power with the mobilization of nationalism aimed to the creation
of the independent national states and the “exit” from the old regime, suggested the widening of the
analytic perspective towards the constant dynamics of national question, which disabled the
establishment of the balance between the ethno-national and civil principle without which it was not
possible to imagine a political nation: the common state was conceived as unnatural (Pešić 2002: 30).
Duško Sekulić, in the analyses of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, begun from the legitimacy with
which the Yugoslavia was created and finished with its consequent break-up. Sekulić refers to the
Webber-Collins approach (based on the geo-strategic approach) which defined the difficult geostrategic situation as a real explanation for the Yugoslavia’s survival after the Tito’s death. The end
happened because of the changes on the large political environment and the total loss of the inner
legitimacy that came out from it. Hardly sustainable unity between communist and anticommunist
parts of the country, failure of the communism in the world caused the lack of the balance in the
Yugoslavia. Bipolar world kept Yugoslavia entire in front of the pressures from both sides. Geostrategic pacts acted on the three levels: on the level of the international actors and their understanding of creation and dissolution of the entity such as Yugoslavia, on the level of interaction of geostrategic circumstances and strategies of inner elites and on the level of the production of legitimacy
as a result of geo-strategic success or failure (Sekulić 2004).
According to Andrew B. Wachtel, in Yugoslavia’s dissolution motivations connected to economy and the political struggle were secondary to the disintegration of the very concept of the Yugoslav
nation. He saw Yugoslavia as a quintessential battleground between collectivistic national visions
based on ideals of synthesis versus those of particularity (Wachtel 1998 17).
All these hypothesis are mostly built from the same elements combined in a different way with a
different choice of dominant cause: Waldenberg and Kellas chose the economic dissatisfaction as a
major agent for the dissolution; Ramet and Sofos put strike on the lack of common political vision
and a struggle for power; Pešić agreed with the struggle for power and added the national question
as a result of the non existence of the political nation; Sekulić highlighted geo-strategic changes and
the loss of inner legitimacy. Only Wachtel expressed the opinion of the secondarity of the political
and economic factors in front of the cultural one. His idea that the particularistic national ideals that
challenged supranational Yugoslav vision drove the country to destruction and led to the rise of
figures such as Milošević and Tuđman, could seem romanticized and simplified, confronted to the
ideas that took origin in the large field of economic science and in the monumental changes of the
international relations, but this idea could lead us to another interesting direction: the violent dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
The consequences of the violent outcome are still in the present of its population, definition after
definition tried to explain how in the end of twentieth century a country in the heart of Europe ended
in the bloodshed. The logic conclusion that is being pushed forward is that the war was only the
consequence of the long-time problems but in which way and in which measure is still not very clear.
Missed possibilities for the peaceful dissolution, spreading of violence, total number of casualties
and the tragic sum of the victims after the last battle was fought, made real the idea that the peace was
something not particularly distant from the violence triangle. The peaceful time of the eighties
traced the lines towards the probable end, but the exalted approval from the beginning of the nine-
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ties, or at least the indifferent acceptance from the Serbian population, gave some evidence of the
quiet and long lasting process of the justifications for the events that followed.
The first section of this work can be read as an outline of the origins of the national question in
the history of former Yugoslavia. The topics that will be discussed are connected with the Yugoslav
history background and the presence of nationalism in its various periods. I’ll try to put the different
sociological theories of the origins of nationalism into the area of former Yugoslavia and with them
also the theories concerning causes of its violent dissolution. In the end of first chapter, based on the
collected information, I’ll list the hypothesis that will be firmly connected to the Serbian literature
of the eighties and their possible role within the Serbian society as a message coming directly from
the intellectual elites.
The second section will provide the historical base for the case study and it will contain the
information regarding the building of a uniform Yugoslav culture and the expression of the national
ideas through culture, more precisely, through literature. This part will give information that will
make possible both a comprehensive reading and a proper contextualisation of the third chapter,
that is a case study and primarily concerned with the anti-ideological aspects of the Serbian literature of the eighties.
As already mentioned, the case study - the third section - will be dealing with the literature texts
and their possible effects on the readers and not with the personal life or publicly expressed political
ideas of their authors. The case study can be read as an exploration of anti-ideological writing and
nation visions among the Serbian authors and their political attitudes that were detected in their works.
My intention is to search for the reflections of the “shaky” political situation and the thin presence
of something that Galtung defined “cultural violence”, in the artistically filtered literature works.
1. Nationalism in the former Yugoslavia
1.1. Nationalism theories
Until the seventies, the theories about nationalism were generally concentrated on the classification based on the movement’s origins: West or East. Authors, such as: Hans Kohn, Helmuth
Plessner and Istvan Bibó, created a division based mostly on the idea of the intellectuals’ political
action on the West and political action of the aristocratic origins, with a strike on the ethnicity, on
the East. Others like Louis Snyder and Hugh Seton-Watson tried to divide the types of nationalism
into categories based on the reactions towards the subjects that caused its arrival for example: anticolonial, black-African or populist Latin-American (Katunarić 2003: 139-150).
In a period that goes from the Second World War till the seventies, American sociologist Karl
Deutsch was the author of the most influential theory concerning the nationalism. He imagined the
nation as a social system that in a specific way combined general processes of industrialization and
urbanization with local features of a common culture, under which he implied the needs of the
people for the new community. The processes of industrialization and urbanization were new; they
mobilized people and from them came the need for the new community: the new community was
nation. Up to the eighties initiatives started from two hypotheses: evolutionist, in which nationalism
appeared as a phase in the development of every modern society and cultural-relativist, in which
European model of the nation-state was not valid in the other countries and subsequent nationalism
Anti-ideological writing and the national question in the Serbian literature of the eighties
253
was seen as a manifestation of lower importance (ibidem: 140).
According to the scholars who sustained primordial theory, nationalism had its background in
the older forms or in the deeper layers of group identity and inter-group relations. One of them, Clifford Gertz - whose main interests were postcolonial societies -, affirmed that because of the modernization the primordial boundings were getting weaker and, on the contrary, the civil boundings based
on the respect of civil commitments and legal norms were strengthening. The idea seems interesting
because of the possibility of hypothetical conflict between the primordial connections and the
constructions of the institutions and norms of the civil state; this can be easily transferred to the
European soil and the primordial connections can be easily used for different purposes instead of
consideration as a social fact (Katunarić 2003: 151).
Primordial interpretations of the ethnic conflicts as ancient hatreds among different populations
didn’t leave much space for the peaceful solutions and the lasting overcoming of the problems.
Anthony Smith moved from primordial thought because of its minimization of the elites’ role in
creation and reformulation of the ethnical myth. According to him the nations seem to be based on
the permanent ethnic group; therefore he thought of two dimensions of the ethnical: conscience marked by a common myth - and social structure. He considered the nation as a modern continuation
of ethnicity and saw the nationalism as a new variant of ethnic mythology. Smith imagined nationalism as politically necessary; he perceived national identity as socially functional and nation as historically founded. Nationalism was being offered instead of religion and the ideologies of nationalism
changed the image of the past in order to make it acceptable or politically useful (ibidem: 172).
Modernist thought defined the nation as a product of industrialization, political democracy, mass
education and media. Before the period of industrialization, the sense of social belonging could not
exist because it was created according to the ideas of the new cultural and political elites. Hence,
according to modernists nationalism preceded the nation.
Modernism branched into different currents: situationism, interactionism, developmentalism,
constructionism, modernism and, very interesting because of its further elaborations, instrumentalism which considered ethnicity and nation as means for the fulfilment of the political, economic and
military goals that came from the current interests of the elites. They all considered that industrial
modernization and media revolution had a decisive role in the creation of the nation, that it is
impossible to determine its age and that a new idea in the national conscience was desire towards
egalitarian rights for all its members. Cultural belonging to the nation was marked by the same language or only by the story of the common historical destiny.
Based on the thoughts of sociologists in the eighties, we can deduce that nation is not a social
reality of a special kind but an ideological project that can’t be accomplished in the social reality. New
perception has to be introduced by a special way of demonstration of the social reality with ideological change of real social ties and belonging. The state is seen as a central institution, which, with
abstract procedures and language, creates categories that include space and population out of the
reach of the common sense. Media create a simple perspective where a complex reality has to be in
some way betrayed and which mostly depends on the method of the demonstration of the new reality constructors: journalists, politicians, writers etc. From the “bird perspective” the common truths
come out (Katunarić 2003: 188).
The strength of the conflicts based on the national or ethnic belonging proved the existence of
nation and for many sociologists represented a motive for the development of ideas regarding the
connections between nation and nationalism.
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In his theory of ethnic relations and nationalism, Frederick Barth joined primordial and instrumentalist explanation. At the macro-social level he affirmed that the ethnic groups could be connected on
different ways that are very variable and uncertain. At the micro-level ethnical identity dominates on
the rest of the social statuses. Because of the industrialisation and the modernisation in the third world
countries almost everything is being changed in the relations inside and between ethnic groups. Ethnic
groups are being dragged into the political arena as a part of new political strategies (ibidem: 197).
Ernest Gellner defined nation as “a politically invented community”. He saw nationalism as one
of the consequences of industrial social organisation, based on deeply internalised, educationdependent, high cultures, each protected by its own state. Nationalism sometimes invents preexisting cultures or uses them selectively and transforms them radically. A produced new high
culture tends to become the basis of a new nationality. Nationalism is not seen as natural and selfgenerating. Gellner points out the conditions for the proliferation of nationalism such as: culture of
printing capitalism (1), spreading of education, mobility of population and he handles the sources of
power and the behaviour of the population (Gellner 1997).
In a similar way Benedict Anderson defined nation as an imaginary community. He elaborated
the idea of the image of the community that has been created in the novels and in the newspapers in
order to create the image of simultaneousness of the events and it’s not driven by the selfish interests. Anderson introduced nationalism into the modern forms of the utopian conscience (Katunarić
2003: 219).
Not far from his colleagues, Eric Hobsbawm (1991) gave his definition of the nation in the form
of the invented tradition. He defined nationalism of the end of 20th century as negative national
movements turned towards the division and the independence of the states. According to him,
nationalism is loosing its importance due to the reduction of the importance of the states and nations.
Liah Greenfeld dated nationalism to the remote sixteenth century. According to her, national
pride was the result of the spreading of the dignity sentiment, characteristic for the aristocracy,
among the whole population. At the beginning, nationalism spread horizontally among European
elites based on the resentism: ambivalent feeling with which the model is being imitated but at the
same time envied or hated (Katunarić 2003: 219).
Etienne Balibar connected the idea of the project and the destiny in the intervention of the state
in the school education, intervention aimed at the ideological change the life outside the family into
the categories of ties and similarities. National identity is seen as an illusion: conviction that the
generations for centuries lived on the same territories and transmitted one unchanged substance and
belief of that evolution as the only possibility which represented destiny (ibidem: 235).
Manuel Castells rejected the attempts of Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm to differentiate the
real from the imagined communities; he found, instead, four base points of the nation and nationalism: orientation on the construction of the state, mixing of the European and non European models
of sovereignty, passage from elite phenomenon to a mass phenomenon, becoming reactive and
focusing on the cultural forms of expression. In this way the nationalism is seen as a better resistance towards the globalisation. Another interesting consideration came from Rogers Brubaker in his
1. During the industrial revolution and the following development of the technical possibilities the
publishing sector passed through the changes imposed by the capitalist economic system. The written works
were distributed like any another industrial product and they were considered successful according to the
number of sold copies. Mass book production allowed pocket editions and low book prices which made them
available to the large number of population (Escarpit 1992)
Anti-ideological writing and the national question in the Serbian literature of the eighties
255
reflections over nationalism and citizenship, where he saw the nationalism as a force of restriction
towards the possibilities for the exploitation of the material resources (ibidem: 276-280).
Piles of ideas, of previously mentioned scholars, cannot be connected into a unique and definite
response of what creates nationalism and in which situation it could be engendered in the society.
The notions of the “invented tradition”, “imaginary community”, “invented community” that are being confronted with the ideas of “mass phenomenon”, “construction of the state” or “restriction of material resources”, are not only aspects which exclude each other, but provide useful parts in the understanding of the various particularities that can have part in the birth and spreading of nationalism.
The role of political elites in the creation of ethnic myth makes mass education, media and
culture continuously change their position in the society from subjects of the elite’s projectionsthrough the institutions that act towards the large number of objects in a uniform way-to objects
when these projections have to execute previously agreed strategies: journalists, artists and teachers
becoming the objects of the political actions. The processes of implementation of new ideas in order
to accomplish the approvals of the large population with the offered content, confuses the image of
the subject-object relation and creates the permeability in which the different institutions are at the
same time the subjects and the objects of the political action.
The dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the resulting, or probably previous, rise of nationalism
became the place for the testing and combining of known theories in order to arrive to a closer
explanation of national movements that became part of its history. In this case “the bird
perspective” with consequent loss of details and the revision of less known points of history, could
represent the effective beginning of the creation of new ethnic believes. The contribution of any of
the above mentioned theories could be put in a sort of patchwork from which the nationalism in
former Yugoslavia rises in its full image.
1.2. Yugoslavia: Historical background and national question
For centuries the South Slav lands were dominated by different European powers (2) that divided and formed their territories as a doorway separating Eastern and Western Europe. These externally influenced separations created different directions in the development of the area, especially in
state administration, education, land cultivation, social interaction and self-perception (Udovički
1995: 280). The Northern lands, today’s Slovenia and Croatia, which were under Central European
and Venetian influence, embraced Catholic Christianity; the Eastern territories, on the contrary, liv2. Slovenia established its state in the 7th century, in the 8th century it was overtaken by the Bavarian
invasion; in the 13th century by Hapsburgs and remained under Austro-Hungary until the end of World War I.
Serbia, the largest of south Slav medieval states, fell under Ottoman Empire in 1389 and remained under
Turkish power till 1878. Croatia, was an independent kingdom until the end of the 11th century, in the in the
last decade of the 11th century was overrun by Hungary and stayed connected to it till the 19th century.
Dalmatia, most of the Croatian littoral, was sold in the 14th century to Venice which ruled it for four hundred
years. In 1463 Bosnia was overrun by Mehmet II the Conqueror and it stayed in its power till 1878 when at
the Berlin congress was given to Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Montenegro, thanks to the inaccessible mountain geography, obtained autonomous position in the Ottoman Empire and built and independent state (18601918). Macedonia was an independent state up to the 10th century, and then it was ruled by other South Slav
and non-Slav peoples. In 17th and 18th century, Albanians converted to Islam began to populate Kosovo;
Serbia conquered Kosovo again during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913).
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ed a completely different situation. Bosnia and Herzegovina had a serfdom system up to the late
19th century; Montenegro was a tribal society of cattle breeders; Serbia suffered by inefficient agriculture in a prevalently agrarian society and inherited Orthodox Christianity and Islamic traditions
that were foreign to the influences of Renaissance culture, which in contrast left profound traces on
the Croatian littoral and its cultural expressions.
Even though the cultural and economic differences were visible, the unifying forces were driven
by a common Slavic origin, common language and the determination of the South Slav peoples to
resist absorption by their colonizers and to preserve their identities despite a long foreign domination. The resistance towards the assimilation into a non-Slavic world helped to preserve ethnic
pride, spirit and a sense of the past history of each of the groups through time, but the same qualities
- transferred into the sphere of interethnic relations - became a source of conflict and often a
nationalism itself (Udovički 1995: 282).
The project of South Slav unification in the nineteenth century was a multifaceted idea because
of the number of territories and nations that lived divided (3) and hoped for the liberation from
occupying powers and their consequent self-determination. All the ethnic groups - Croats, Serbs,
Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims and Albanians - had their own history and most of
them once had a medieval state, but the sense of common origins and language was a strong
unifying force.
From the remote times Slovene lands were exposed to the Germanic colonisation and therefore
also to a germanisation. The only ones to preserve a Slovene language were farmers and serfs. In
1910 Slovenes represented 4.4% of the Austrian population. The beginnings of the Slovene literature go back to the 16th century, but they remained without an immediate response. The eighteenth
century brought the compulsory schooling until 13 years in German language. Under the Napoleonic rule, as a part of Illyric provinces, in 1809 Slovene language got a new impulse in the elementary school teaching. National conscience wasn’t very developed and the lack of national
institutions left more radical political vindications without any mass support; Slovenian politicians,
fearing the Great Germany, supported the monarchy. Because of the strong emigration, Slovene
lands faced a poor demographic growth and the presence of Germans and Italians who had notable
economic, political and cultural potential. The end of the eighteenth century testified the arrival of
the first Slovene political parties which presented more radical vindications for the unification of
the Slovene lands under the monarchy and schooling in Slovene language. The Yugoslav federation
found its supporters among young and educated people.
As it was mentioned before, Croatia was strongly linked to Hungary from the twelfth century,
with the short interruption from 1809 to 1813, while Croatia was a part of Napoleon’s Illyric
provinces. Cultural heterogeneity and different political circumstances postponed the birth of the
national conscience, which started its formation only in the beginning of the eighteenth century. In
1848 in Zagreb, the National Assembly declared the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, in
the Hapsburg monarchy and under the Hungarian crown, the declaration served as a prologue to the
Austro-Hungarian war. During the fifties of the eighteenth century Croatia was exposed to the
Bach’s absolutism and to Germanisation. In 1868, an agreement was accomplished with Hungary
3. Slavonia and Croatia belonged to Hungary, Dalmatia and Slovenia to Austria, Serbia and Montenegro
were semiautonomous Ottoman principality, Macedonia lived under Turkey, Bosnia belonged to the Ottoman
Empire until 1878 than was occupied by Austro-Hungary and annexed in 1908.
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and Croatia was allowed to control administration, education, culture and justice; in this way the
Croats were defined as a political nation.
In Croatia, already in 1835, a project of national unification was articulated: “the Illyrian
project” which brought the political emancipation of the South Slavs through a cultural renaissance
and was primarily put forward by elites. The “Illyrians” Ljudevit Gaj, Josip Juraj Štrosmajer and
Franjo Rački stressed the linguistic unification as the basis for their unification and saw the unification as the only possibility for achieving a level of autonomy from Austro-Hungary and for gaining
self-determination. The unification was possible in two circumstances: within the Hapsburg monarchy or within a sovereign Yugo-Slav state; another thought, independent and opposite to the other
two, under the lead of Ante Starcevic and the Croatian Right Party, was the orientation “The Great
Croatia” which sustained Croatian independence without any contacts with Serbs. The first idea,
unification of Serbs, Slovenes and Croats under Hapsburg Empire with the centre in Zagreb, seemed more realistic. The idea was acceptable to the Croats because they all lived on the same territory;
Serbs on the contrary declined the proposition because the two thirds of their population and their
historic territories would have been left out from the new unified state. Until the end of nineteenth
century there wasn’t any party in Serbia that backed the Yugoslavism as its political programme.
Serbs, who lived in the regions of the Hapsburg Empire, didn’t represent a majority in any of
them. Voivodina, being a wealthy and educated area, had an important role in the Serbian national
movement and Novi Sad had the first Serbian permanent theatre and cultural society. Serbs, who
lived on the Croatian territories in Lika and Krbava, represented 24% of the total population of
Croatia. Even though their number was high, the high rate of analphabetism (67.5%) and poor
social and economic condition precluded any national awakening movement. The disagreements
with Croats started with the school reform in 1874, mainly supported by Catholic Church, when it
was perceived as a direct menace to the schools administrated by the Orthodox Church, at the time
the only Serbian nationalist current. Having a very heterogeneous population, Bosnia and Herzegovina found themselves between two ideas: Great Croatia and Great Serbia.
Serbian civil nationalism under the Ottoman Empire was expressed in 1804 during the first
insurrection of Karadjordje, provoked by the suspension of the self-administration and the return of
janissaries. Insurrection was abolished together with the established sovereignty. The second insurrection against the Ottoman Empire was guided by Milos Obrenovic in 1815 and it was successful.
Milos Obrenovic took the title of “Oberprince” and Serbia obtained some sort of self-administration
with the monarchy as a central institution. In 1838 Serbia became a principality with expansionist
ideas towards Bosnia, Herzegovina and Voivodina. After the Balkan Wars, Serbia experienced the
confrontation of its nationalism with other nationalisms: Albanian and Macedonian which stood in
front of the Serbian territorial expansions and Serbia also managed to increase its prestige within
Yugo-Slav and anti Austrian forces. (Perić 2005: 100)
Favourable political circumstances for the Yugo-Slav unification appeared in 1918, at the end of
World War I, with the dissolution of Austro-Hungary. At the end of the war Serbs and Croats
occupied different positions due to the fact that Serbs fought on the side of the allies and lost 23% of
their population, while Croats and Slovenes fought on the Austro-Hungarian side and lost the war.
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes promoted the idea of national equality but Serbs
occupied a more privileged place, for the creation of the new state, based on the war events and their
casualties. In the new kingdom the Muslims, Albanians, Montenegrins and Macedonians didn’t receive any national recognition. The kingdom was divided into thirty-three provinces, twenty of which
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belonged to Serbia. The kingdom was very poor; cities were without urban tradition and illiteracy
varied from 44 percent to 94 percent. Great differences existed between the regions. Croatia and Slovenia were the most developed; Serbs contributed with only one-fifth of the capital but occupied
four-fifths of the political and administrative positions in the kingdom. The dissatisfaction of Croats
and Slovenes followed very soon, especially after the imposition of the centralized state, where a lot
of space wasn’t left for national autonomy and national identity.
In June 1928 a member of the Serbian Radical Party murdered the Croatian moderate representative in the parliament Stjepan Radić, whose political action was concentrated on obtaining a
more favourable position for Croatia inside the kingdom. King Alexandar proclaimed an absolute
monarchy in 1929 and changed the name of the country into Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The already
weak alliance among the three nations became politically unbearable. In 1938 King Aleksandar was
murdered by the Croatian secret terrorist organization Ustashe. In 1939, Prince Paul granted Croatia
the status of self-governing province. The arrival of Second World War interrupted the process that
could have brought the pacification of the Serb-Croatian differences. Yugoslavia was invaded and
parted between Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, which caused a civil war of big
proportions.
Two most important nationalist groups were Ustashe - who were the ruling party in the government of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and supported by the forces of Axis - and the Serb
Chetnik army, loyal to the escaped King, anticommunist and antigerman. On April 10, 1941, after
the declaration of war and dissolution of Yugoslavia Hitler created an Independent State of Croatia
(NDH) with Ante Pavelic as a leader; the state included a big part of Bosnia and Herzegovina but
without Dalmatia, which went to Italians. From its creation till the end (NDH fell two days after
German forces withdraw from Zagreb), the Croatian state exterminated thousands of Serbs, Jews,
Gypsies, Communists and Croats who expressed their disagreement with the regime. Most of the
massacres took place in the areas mostly inhabited by the Serbian population (Lika, Kordun,
Banija). The leader of the Chetnik movement was Draza Mihajlovic; the movement represented the
interest of Yugoslav monarchical government in exile. Mihajlovic was antifascist and anticommunist and therefore his opponents were not defined by nationality but by the blame they had for the
exile of the king. He fought without distinction against Croats, Muslims, Albanians and Serbs.
Between 1941 and 1945 there were different battlegrounds on the Yugoslav territory (Nazi fascists
as occupational force, nationalist Serbian and nationalist Croatian forces, Yugoslav partisans against
all of them). The communists sought for allies among the patriotic people irrespective of their
nationality, religion or political commitments. By 1944 there were 350,000 partisans who endured a
huge number of human victims and won the recognition and respect of the international community.
At the end of the war they were the only force that triumphed. Yugoslav communists emerged from
the Second World War with the program for a “new Yugoslav socialist culture”. Their project for
all Yugoslavs was the national unification, with the image of Yugoslavia as a federal state of
peoples equal in every respect, the creation of one Yugoslav nation that was historically interrupted
and the elimination of the nationality question by eradicating its historical sources. The permitted,
mainly traditional, cultural cults could not have been easily harmonized with the new political system
and they frequently expressed irreconcilable cultural and national aspirations (Banac 1996: 15).
After the war Yugoslavia besides Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, recognized also Macedonians and
Montenegrins; Kosovo Albanians and Hungarians received the status of national minorities. Muslims
were recognized as a nation in the reforms of 1967-68. Even though the new Yugoslavia was founded
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on the equality of nations, the cohesive force of the new centralized state was the League of Communists, which enjoyed primacy in all spheres of political life. Tito broke with Stalin and USSR in
1948 but maintained the one-party system. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was politically and culturally
the freest of all Eastern European countries.
Until the mid-1960s the federation was economically weak. In the 1960s it got involved in rapid
economic growth in order to increase the standard of living, thanks to foreign loans and Tito’s
status in the West and by opening its borders and allowing its workers to temporarily migrate in
Western Europe. Saving their money in the banks at home workers contributed to the increase of
the foreign currency supply. During this period the Kosovo was granted a greater autonomy and the
status of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina was changed form minority into nation.
The 1970s brought changes in the state organization with respect to centralization, the suppression of nationalist movement in Croatia, which demanded greater economic autonomy, and also the
suppression of Serbian liberalist who sought for a greater democratisation of the country. The
standard of living rose rapidly and the well educated urban middle class increased. Even though the
living standard was increasing, the differences between the regions increased two. The enactment of
the Federal Fund for the Development of the Less Developed Regions didn’t give any positive
result. The more developed regions considered their resources wasted and insisted on their right to
keep their capital and invest it for their own development, neglecting the fact that thanks to the
strategy of the federal economy they managed to increase economic development in their republics
surpassing the other regions. The 1974 Constitution granted to each republic and autonomous
province an independent administration and economy, as well as a veto power in the Federal
Assembly, which turned Yugoslavia in a confederation of independent states. This resulted into a
drop of the inter-republic communication, traffic of goods, investments etc.
The consequences of these policies were perceived in the eighties. The League of Communist
split into eight independent regional parties. Yugoslavia felt in a deep economic crisis, additionally
burdened by a foreign debt. The death of Tito in 1980 left a vacuum in the political leadership.
After his death Yugoslavia accepted the system of “collective presidency” where, each year, the
new president of the federation was chosen from different republic. This system blocked any longterm political strategy that was relevant on the whole territory of the state. Separate regional
projects were the only possibility for the development of the economy.
In Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, president of the Serbian League of Communists from 1986 to
1989, put together a plan that aimed at the protection of Serbian national interests. Two major issues
were at the centre of his programme: the Kosovo question (rights of the Albanian minority) and the
Serbian question (Serbs living outside Serbia). In 1981 Albanians, through demonstrations, claimed
their right for a separate republic based on a “natural right” to the territory that Albanians occupied
centuries ago and on a “demographic right” based on their numeric prevalence in Kosovo. During the
eighties the situation didn’t improve; on the contrary, it got more and more intricate when the Serbian
population in Kosovo became the heart of the issue. In 1990 Milošević enacted a new law by which he
abolished the provincial government, took full powers in Kosovo and cancelled the autonomy.
In March 22, 1990, Croatia held its first multiparty and democratic elections. Franjo Tuđman
forwarded his campaign with promises: to end Serbian hegemony, to affirm Croatian identity and
sovereignty and to rid Croats of their “Nazi collaborators” complex. The Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ) won the elections with its leader Franjo Tuđman. Tuđman insisted that Croatia had been one
of the oldest medieval states in Europe, whose culture was formed in the Roman Catholic, Western
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European tradition, and that among the South Slavs, Croats represented a people apart, more
cultured and worldly than the Serbs (Udovički 1995: 299).
The new Croatian constitution was adopted on 22 December 1990. One of the new elements
was: that there was no special position for the Serbs in front of other ethnic groups, which polarized
an already tensed situation. During August of the same year, parts of the Serbian population in
Croatia, started to resist the political decisions from Zagreb, and the Parliament representatives
coming from the territories with Serbian majority stopped coming to the Parliament meetings. Serb
demonstrations became very frequent and tensions increased. The Yugoslav army, did not stay out
of the incoming conflict, but gave their complete approval to the Serbian side.
Rebelled Serbs, in the end of 1990, declared the independence from Croatia and stated their wish
to stay inside Yugoslavia. Many parts of Croatia were occupied by the Yugoslav army (Lika, Banija
and Slavonia). Towards the end of 1994, with the intervention of foreign diplomats, a plan known
as Z-4 was offered to Serbs, which included more then a simple autonomy, but it was refused.
Croatian leaders concluded that the peaceful reintegration wasn’t possible, so they programmed two
military actions in August of 1995, with the intention to return those territories under their sovereignty. Actions were successful, territories were reintegrated, but most of the local Serbian population abandoned the Croatia.
In Bosnia the population was 43.7 percent Muslim, 31.4 percent Serbs, 17.3 percent Croats, and
5.5 percent who declared themselves as Yugoslavs (Udovički 1995: 303). In October 1991, without
Serbs who walked out, the Muslim and Croatian parts approved the draft document that contained
the details of secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia. In November 1991 the
Bosnian Serbs held a plebiscite demonstrating their full support for the republic to stay in the
Yugoslavia and in February 1992 Muslims and Croats held their referendum choosing the secession. Even though one third of the population was against the secession, European Community, on
April 6 1992, recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbian nationalists in Bosnia
and Croatia forwarded the idea that Serbs were not supposed to be cut off from their homeland. This
idea caused the major bloodshed on the Bosnian territory.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina the war among three parties, for the strategic positions, begun in 1992.
Croatia was, unofficially, backing up the Croatian side in Bosnia and Bosnian Serbs declared their
intention to link with Serbia. The Yugoslavia Peace conference started in Den Hague in 1991, with
Lord Carrington as a chairman, but with no results; also without results was Moscow meeting between F. Tuđman and S. Milošević. By mid of 1992 the international community started to react
more actively with joint interventions for peace initiatives, from United Nations and European
Community, led first by C. Vance and Lord Owen and than by Lord Owen and T. Stoltenberg. In
1994 to the Serbs plan Z4 was offered, which included cultural autonomy for Croatian Serbs, but
Milošević refused it. The U.S. decided to end the conflict and obtained on March 18 the agreement
of confederation of Muslim-Croatian regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In April 1994 "The Balkan
Contact Group” was formed-with representatives from Russia, Britain, France, Germany and U.S.
The proposal they put out was division of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory, on the basis of 49%51% in favour of Muslim-Croatian side. Since Serbs didn’t agree with the proposal, the U.S. peace
initiative, which begun in middle of August, reacted with NATO bombings and made them accept
the invitation to negotiation table. Peace talks in Dayton (Ohio) started on November 1, 1995. Three
main issues were negotiated: territorial, constitutional and the issue of Sarajevo. The chief of Serbian delegation was the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević, of the Croatian delegation the Croa-
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261
tian president Franjo Tuđman and of the Muslim delegation Alija Izetbegović; the U.S. mediator
was Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs. The
Dayton Peace agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.
1.3. Theories of the war solution
The dissolution of Yugoslavia provided a “good” ground for the analyses of the agents of nationalism and their effects on one European state at the end of the twentieth century. It is known
that Yugoslav socialism-communism was the most free among all Eastern European countries and
because of this, it is even more paradoxical that the end of Yugoslavia involved an armed conflict,
bloodshed of the civil population and extreme, and disputed, efforts of international intervention.
In his book Conflicts and Tolerance (4) Dusko Sekulić and his collaborators analysed four
theories that could have provided a dominant motive for the armed conflict in Yugoslavia.
The conspiracy theory put the weight of the end of the Yugoslav communism on the activities of
the Western powers. By attacking Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia the Yugoslav Federal Army was attacking the “Western enemy”. Serbian nationalists pursued the idea of a conspiracy against Serbs.
Latent function attributed to this theory considers it as a mean for the mobilisation of people from
the part of the political elites in order to accomplish the national goals that they have defined.
The theory of ethnic hate considered the war in the former Yugoslavia as a “normal” way of
solving conflicts among “wild Balkan tribes”. This theory is contrary to the historical facts: up to
1918 there were no conflicts or ethnical hatreds between Serbs and Croats. Latent function
attributed to this theory explains that if the war was the result of the ancient hatred, than nothing
was possible to stop it. Diplomatic inability to resolve the Yugoslav crisis and mistakes made in
finding its solution have induced Western leaders to accept this formula which permitted the
possibility of they being correct in the conduct of the Yugoslav conflict.
The theoretical interpretation of equal guilt defined political leaders of the new independent
states as aggressive nationalists and according to it considered them equally guilty for the war. This
explanation would be plausible only in the case that all the parts had the same goals and available
means. In the case of Yugoslavia there were large differences in the available means and use of
force for the goals’ achievement.
In media theory, politically controlled media produced and spread the ideas that gave impulse to
ethnical and national hate and intolerance. Once created, intolerance and hate were transformed into
collective violence. In this theory the first topic was that media production and spreading of negative contents about other ethnical groups would, as a consequence, provoke high level of intolerance
and hate towards the other groups. Second topic was that high level of intolerance and hate towards
the other groups would necessarily result into the collective violent behaviour of those groups. In
Serbia, after the breakdown of communism, the media had a function: of mass disinformation campaigns, urging of mutual acceptance, extension of mistrust and pointing out of the so called theatrical mini-insurrections and eliminations of “old regimes” in Kosovo. In other republics the difference
remained in the mobilization: for the conquest or for the defence of the country. Other republics
4. Sukobi i Tolerancija, The part of this book which considers the theories of bloodshed was previously
published as an article written together with J. Županov and Ž. Šporer, “A breakdown of the civil order: The
Balkan bloodbath”, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 3 (9): 401-422.
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didn’t need the propaganda, but the consequence of their media campaigns was the consideration of
all Serbs as enemies.
The conclusion in front of these theories is that the prevailing authoritarian political culture in all
the regions of former Yugoslavia made possible to all the national leaders to monopolise the media
and increase the level of intolerance, independently from the already existing tolerance. Previously
existing authoritative political culture, in interaction with the media monopolisation, erased the once
high rate of tolerance and produced violence among the people that did not exist before (Sekuli:
2004: 115-135).
The previously summarized theories of nationalism, saw it as a substitute for religion, as an
agent of change of past’s image in order to make it acceptable or politically useful (Smith), as inventor or transformer of pre-existing cultures (Gellner), as one of the modern forms of the utopian
conscience (Anderson) or a result of resentism (Greenfeld). In this perspective nationalism, with all
its characteristics, enters into subjective and psychological vision of a nation, where the Anderson’s
imaginary community, created in the novels and newspapers, corresponds to the perception that the
national feelings could be easily guided and built on the simplified projections of the presumed past
or transformed according to needs of the current political situation.
Thanks to an instable and very dynamic past, the Yugoslav background was able to provide
various possibilities for the different historical reconstructions and, thanks to the communist idea of
“brotherhood and unity”, unsettled relations between Serbs and Croats were forgotten on purpose.
For sake of the new country and common prosperity, war crimes or revenges were never publicly
discussed. Thirty years later, Serbian media were full of historical defeats, traumas and sufferings.
Direct method of entering homes of the nation had a significant function and the effect on the
creation of public opinion ready for the “clarifications” of the medieval battles or “recent” Second
World War happenings that had a little to do with a unified synthetic Yugoslav culture.
Basing its proceeding on the resentism, Serbian nationalism managed to obtain necessary recognition and the majority of the people were convinced about centuries-old Serbian sufferings and
disproportionate Serbian victims for the common state. Scared by the foreign enemy, exposed to the
“eternal” sufferings, and shaken also by a big economic crisis, the Serbian nation was psychologically prepared for the acceptance of the inevitability of the war and those social and psychological
conditions probably made possible the accession of extreme political leaders (Pešić 1996: 33). The
creation of resentism - usually ascribed to the intellectual elites of the state - highlighted the Serbian
intelligentsia and their role in the Serbian nationalism.
As much the daily TV programme and newspapers served as continuous reminders of political
feeling, another type of expression managed to transmit the spirit of the time. Serbian literature and
Serbian writers expressed their vision of reality in the publications that was possible to read in the
eighties. Since the respected intellectuals had an impact on the people different from the politicians,
it is possible to deduce that the shared ideology would have encountered a positive feed back from
the Serbian population. The positive reactions coming from the well-known artists could have narrowed the passage towards the idea of the “historical right” of Serbs to live in the same country or
to revive the utopia about the lost Serbian state. This way there is a vision of the art of literature
from the independent creator of the thought addressed to a large public, changing its role into a
position of the object in a form of the replicator of the official ideology.
The existence of literature works that could be defined as politically involved will be elaborated
through the hypothesis analysed in the case study.
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263
The first hypothesis is that the Serbian literature of the eighties was exploited by the political
elites in order to bring an imagined heroic past into the conscience of the present. This premise will
be concerned with the Serbian historical background and the way, in which the reconstructed past
was transferred to the contemporary literature works.
The second hypothesis is that the Serbian literature of the eighties was a sufficient stimulus for
the perception of the awakening of the nationalist thought and the arrival of the conflict. This part
will question the general thematic tendencies of the politically involved literature works and the
possible domination of some issues.
The third hypothesis: the Serbian literature of the eighties expressed the weakening of the
Yugoslav national identity; it will be concerned with the general idea and presence of the Yugoslav
nation as a possibility for a common solution of the national question.
This research will not question the Serbian literary life of the eighties nor will it judge the
political orientation of writers. The only field for the analyses will be the literary texts and their
artistic expression. Literature, itself, often considered as a mirror of reality, will provide the materials for the research of the national spirit and the political tendencies, even though presented in the
reflected and distorted form.
2. Building up the Yugoslav culture
2.1. Yugoslav culture before the Second World War: The beginnings
In the historical background was already mentioned that the South Slav peoples lived separated
under the rule of different powers. The movements developed under those administrations were
strongly influenced by the cultural tendencies and political situation in those countries. By the 1840
most of the minority nations of the Habsburg Empire expressed their cultural renaissance, defined
in national terms and pursued by the intellectual elites. Slovenes, Croats and Serbs had three
possibilities:
• creation of separate national movements on the basis of the distinguishing linguistic, religious
and custom traditions;
• creation of a pan-South Slavic (Yugoslav) national identity, in which recognized differences
between the peoples with time and effort would become irrelevant;
• achievement of a “national” consciousness by stimulating the population around pan-Slavic feeling while maintaining recognized differences.
During the course of the 19th century all the three forms existed at the same time.
The South Slavs who lived under the Ottoman Empire didn’t feel the impulse of nationalism.
Through the 19th century Serbs in Serbia developed their own national ideology independent from
the events in the Hapsburg Empire. Together with the South Slavic groups under the Hapsburgs
they shared the idea of nation as composed by groups of people rather than as an aggregation of
otherwise unattached individuals (Wachtel 1998: 24).
The linguistic reforms among Serbs began in the first decade of the nineteenth century with the
work of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić; until then the Serbian written language had been based on the
liturgical language of the Serbian Orthodox Church. V.S. Karadžić directed the Serbian literary language away from the Slav-Serbian language favoured by the church, toward a regularized version
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of the peasant-based dialect spoken in Herzegovina. His effort was recognized in the collection and
publication of the South Slavic oral tradition and the collection “Serbian Folk Songs” brought
Serbia on the world’s cultural scene. The songs were collected in Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina
and Croatian littoral, the areas inhabited by South Slavs but not exclusively Serbs.
The cultural revival in Croatia arrived with the Illyrians (1830-1840) and their leader Ljudevit
Gaj. It should not be forgotten that the cultural awakening was based on the already solid ground of
the literary and lexicographic works such as the poems of Andrija Kačić Miošić, Tito Brezovački
and Antun Reljković, the grammars of Bartol Kašić (1604), Antun Reljković, Alojzije Brlić and
from 1700 the historic work of Pavao Ritter Vitezović, with the hypothesis of Slavs as one people
(Šicel: 1997, pp. 30-45). At the time of the Illyrian movement (1830-1843) in Croatia three dialects
were spoken: Štokavian (chosen as official), Čakavian and Kajkavian.
During his studies in Vienna in 1827, Gaj already started to assemble the intellectuals who
shared his political ideas (5). His short publication about the spelling (6) created the precondition
for the development and organization of the Illyrian movement. Besides Gaj, the most active members were Ivan Derkos, Janko Drašković and Ivan Mažuranić. Through the period, various newspapers were published in the Croatian language: “Novine Horvatzke” (Croatian Newspapers),
“Danica Horvatzka, Slavonszka y Dalmatinzka” (Croatian, Slavonian and Dalmatian Morning Star)
and “Danica Ilirska” (Illyrian Morning Star). Gaj pursued the South Slav idea as the essential guiding light for the political action. In 1850 during the conference in Vienna it was proclaimed that the
Serbs and Croats were one people and therefore they were supposed to have a single literature with
a common literary language (Štokavian dialect and Ijekavian pronunciation). The most important
Slovene writer of the period to join the Illyrian movement was the poet Stanko Vraz who in his
poetry glorified the Slav feeling and all-Slav context (Šicel 1997: 51-55).
The most famous epic works of the period were I. Mažuranić’s “Smrt Smail-age Čengića”(“Death
of Smail-Aga Čengić”) which described the battle against Turks and P.P. Njegoš’s “Gorski Vijenac”
(“Mountain Wreath”) with the same theme; Njegoš never advanced pan Slav idea, he remained a
Serbian (Montenegrin) writer, while Mažuranić was one of its founders.
The new Yugoslavism at the beginning of the 20th century was completely devoted to the
multicultural synthesis; Serbia was allowed to dominate in the political sphere but not in the cultural. There were two different approaches to the creation of the national culture: to emphasize the use
of themes and figures drawn from traditional folk poetry or to abandon the folk tradition entirely
and to express Yugoslav solidarity with the willingness to collaborate with fellow Yugoslavs in the
creation of modern European culture for their nation, culture which was not specifically based on
the national past (Wachtel 1998: 53). Crucial figure and representative of the latter political inclination was the sculptor Ivan Meštrović.
The consolidation of this idea and the possibility for the stronger development of Yugoslavism
was interrupted by the beginning of the First World War and the fact that Croats and Slovenes
fought on the opposite side from Serbs. The end of the war brought the dissolution of the great
Empires and therefore the unification of South Slav became a reality. South Slav elites proposed the
5. Gaj also performed the activities of collection of oral tradition and foresaw the necessity of the official
orthography book which meant the base for the common literary language and therefore for the beginning of
the political action.
6. In 1830, in Budapest he published “Short base for the Croatian-Slav spelling” where he also addressed
the need for the purification of language from foreign words.
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cultural model for the unification in the form of a multicultural model that would be drawn on the
traditions of the three South Slavs tribes that were going to be joined in the Kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes.
The central issue that the new state had to face was how to integrate peoples of different
religious, linguistic, ethical and political background. The political centre in Belgrade used the
political centralisation also as a cultural mean for the creation of the common culture that on their
opinion was supposed to be folded into the existing Serbian culture. It was pursued the idea that
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs were the same people known under different names and that the national
goal was the creation of the Yugoslav people and a unified Yugoslav culture on the basis of national
unity. The worsening of the situation was also due to the drastic change in the Serbian population,
most of the young educated males were killed during the war and the political life remained in the
hands of old and conservative politicians.
After the war, in the state, there were three possibilities for the creation of a national culture:
• an existing culture could have been chosen as a standard (probably Serbian),
• a new culture could have been created from the elements of the existing cultures (multicultural
model) and
• a culture could have been created without basis in the existing “tribal” culture (supranational
model).
Different tendencies were present: cultural cooperation (interaction between various Yugoslav
nations in order to eliminate national differences) and cultural tolerance (separate cultures were to
tolerate each other without melding) that stood on different poles and utterly complicated the
political situation.
The most radical attempt to create a multicultural Yugoslav culture was provided by the journal
“Književni jug” (“Literary South”), which published writers from Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia and
affirmed artists, which supported the idea of a unified Yugoslav culture. Even though the SerboCroatian language was publicly accepted, the idea that Slovenes would abandon their language for
the sake of the linguistic unity proved to be useless. The Macedonia didn’t have the privilege to
refuse the common language, so linguistic coercion was pursued vigorously. The idea of the unified
culture was followed on the track that every people contributed in a separate way to the culture:
Serbs with their boundless idealism and an ethnic self-sacrifice, Croats with their talent for cultural
and scientific work and Slovene with their hard work and rationalism. In the school textbooks,
authors were grouped thematically and not by the geographical origin. The literary works such as
“Mountain Wreath” were reinterpreted in a Yugoslav key, concentrating not so much on the plot but
rather on a more abstract philosophy (Wachtel 1998: 84-93).
The most important precursor of the multicultural Yugoslav idea was Ivan Meštrović, internationally recognised sculptor; this however wasn’t sufficient to block critics coming from Serbia, his
Vienna schooling was considered to be too influential in his Yugoslav creations. His work symbolised an artificial attempt to create the impression of a unified nation (Wachtel: 1998, 112). In the
literature sphere, many writers spent many years in Europe and got influenced by the modernist
current (T. Ujević, A.B. Šimić, A.G. Matoš, M. Krleža); others instead, followed more national inner
tradition, quite distant from the Europe (Ivo Andrić, Dinko Šimunović). The strong critics towards the
individualistic creation of the national thought was expressed in the Krleža’s novel “The return of
Philip Latinovics”, calling for resistance, self reliance and affirmation of the native values and
strengths. There were different possibilities for the Yugoslav cultural affirmation: to borrow from all
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three tribes as a source for the new artistic creation (the major representative was Ivan Meštrović), to
follow the Western oriented modernists or Soviet-oriented leftist internationalists. The break out of
the Second World War temporarily stopped any type of cultural or political development.
2.2. Yugoslav culture after the Second World War: Brotherhood and unity
The Second World War, besides interrupting the weak continuity in the building of the synthetic
Yugoslav culture, imposed a political situation that brought the interethnic relations to an unbearable
level. As it happened in the Great War, Serbs and Croats ended fighting on the opposite sides. The Independent State of Croatia (NDH) created an enormous loss of non-Croat population through concentration camps and planned ethnic cleansing. One half of the war’s total casualties were the consequence of the interethnic fights. The end of the war brought the victory of the Tito’s partisans, which
at the time managed to find the best key for their combats: Yugoslav solution. The Communist Party
controlled the government, Yugoslavia became a federation and Yugoslav peoples were seen as one.
The official strategy became the creation of the new and unified Yugoslav culture with the idea
that a new supranational culture was compatible with the awakening of the individual “national
cultures” in single republics. The concept of “brotherhood and unity” was supposed to replace the
concept of the “three-named people”. Citizens were still viewed as members of a given nation and the
state was understood as being constituted by agreements among the nations (Wachtel 1998: 132).
The creation of new myths was in the form of the recent past (the story of war and heroic battles)
and in the form of a desired present (worker self-management), with the new all-Yugoslav events:
Pula film festival of Yugoslav film, Yugoslav book fair, NIN award for the best Yugoslav novel,
The Day of Youth (national celebration of Tito’s birthday).
Education had an immense importance in the creation and unification of the new culture. Even
though the government incited the unified and universal system, differences between the regions were
not easy to eliminate. The first published programmes appeared in 1947 and the single republics had
the responsibility of realisation. Very soon the school curricula became similar and certain subjects,
like history, were identical. The decision brought in Novi Sad in 1954 - Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins speak the same language - facilitated the creation of the new unified culture based on the same
language. Cultural works had a major role in the creation of the national literary canon; again
“Mountain Wreath” underwent new interpretation, this time in the “Brotherhood and Unity” key.
New literary works were supposed to reflect the experience of the war years or the reality of the
socialist country that was being created. These official inputs didn’t produce any positive result and
very soon writers started to create works according to their own vision and perception. The projects
of unified literature and unified Yugoslav culture were slowly abandoned in the sixties, proving the
lack of collaboration between the republics.
Even though a unified culture proved to be more an illusion than a defined goal, one literature
genre enjoyed popularity in all the republics: it was partisan literature that with its narration
excluded any sense of national belonging and managed to gain reputation among the readers of all
ages. It seams quite paradoxical that this genre became representative of the concept of “brotherhood and unity”, while the other works of the “higher” artistic expression and form didn’t manage
to capture the spirit of belonging to the same cause. One of the reasons was probably the fact that
the most of the partisan literature was written for the children who for the first time, thanks to the
collective inner migrations of the period, read those works as a “city brought up” youth irreversibly
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different from the members of the pre-war agrarian society, happy to enjoy the benefits of urban life
in a new country. The most eminent representatives of the partisan literature were: Vladimir Nazor
with “With Partisans”, Dobrica Ćosić with the partisan novel-epic “Far away is the sun”, Branko
Ćopić with “Breakthrough” and others. The works had in common a very similar plot: the small
group of partisans fought the bigger enemy against all odds, they were all of a single nation and the
role of the partisan fighters was given to women characters too.
A writer who recognized differences and difficulties in the interaction of population in the new
created country was Ivo Andrić. In his work Andrić eliminated the temporal limitations, diachronically exploring history and focusing on only one physical place. His historical narrative showed the
permanency of conflict and the inevitability of interaction and interrelationship. Andrić imagined
the Yugoslav nation as unified by its common legacy of change and stasis, and every separate group
as sharing its historical space with other nations (Wachtel 1998: 152-157).
In the sixties Yugoslavia abandoned the idea of creating some form of unified culture for all of
its citizens, embracing instead something that could be called a multi-national self-image. This view
guaranteed the strengthening of the separate, nationally oriented cultural blocks within Yugoslav
society (ibidem: 174). Three events in the cultural life marked the change from the unificatory fifties
to the separatist trends of the sixties. In 1961 Ivo Andrić won the Nobel Prize for Literature, Dobrica
Ćosić entered a controversy over nationalism with Dušan Pirjavec and Krleža’s novel “Banners”
challenged the Yugoslav thought. The situation in schools was reflecting the political tendencies of all
republics. School curricula of literature were mostly based on the authors of the single republics;
others were represented only in minor quantity and according to their origin.
From the late sixties, nationalist political movements awakened in almost every region of
Yugoslavia. The strongest initiative came from the Croatian intellectuals gathered in the lexicographical and cultural society “Matica Hrvatska”. In 1967, “Declaration Concerning the Name and
the Position of the Croatian literary language” was published refusing the Novi Sad agreement from
1954. The leading Croatian publications did everything possible to stress the autochthonous nature
of the Croatian culture. Even though Croatian separatism at the political level was interrupted in
1971, nothing was done regarding the national orientation of the school curricula in Croatian
schools; this was only the beginning of a complete change in orientation towards the history and
culture of the individual republic. The strong accent on the literature and history of one republic
was followed only by a general overview of what happened in other ones.
It was possible to follow in the level of person’s education the general attitude towards the
national identity. In 1969 a research analysed the city population, and discovered that those, provided with good and high education, had a greater attachment towards the Yugoslav orientation, while
the vocational school pupils were significantly less involved in and attached to the Yugoslav idea.
Another research, regarding the level of authoritarianism, had the opposite outcome: among the
youth from villages and with poorer educational backgrounds the level of authoritarianism was
much higher than that of those from towns (Wachtel; 1998, pp. 194-195)7. The change of constitution in 1974 and the economic crisis in the end of the decade pushed the ideas of unitarism far behind the principal interests of single republics. Practically functioning as a confederation, the
7. This outcome could be a seen as a small indicator for the political consent that in the eighties helped the
rise of extreme political figures such as Slobodan Milošević, who in his campaign was primarily supported by
the population from the rural area and those with weak education.
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republics provided resources only for their population and the national identification as Croat, Serb
or Slovene became ordinary idiom. In Serbia, liberal and intellectually mature politicians of those
years, thanks to the economic crisis and political currents of the time, never got a chance in the
political arena which became the centre of different and more conservative tendencies. Nationalistoriented intellectuals distanced themselves from the unitarist supranational policies of the early
sixties and started to favour particularist and nationalist views.
The eighties brought the ultimate solution in the political and cultural debate. After Tito’s death
Yugoslavia was surviving on the leftovers of the forty years of common past, the still unchanged
international scene and the lack of a better solution. The rotational presidency was unable to provide
any concrete and long lasting programme and political decay was detected by the lack of any central
power, the League of Communist ceased to exist as an organizationally unified and politically
meaningful unit and the real powers were the regional party organisations. The main issues that
emerged were debates of liberalisation against retrenchment and re-centralisation against presservation of the decentralised system (Ramet 1996: 10). In 1987 Milošević rose to power and the Serbian
national revival took-off. Giving enough of space to the Serbian nationalists, Serbian media were
covered with ideas of Orthodox origin of Dalmatian Croats, Serbian origin of Montenegrins, Tito’s
anti-Serb feeling and the revival of the Orthodox Church. All these premises resulted into the general approval of the Milošević’s politics in Kosovo and the clear breakdown in the communication
between the republics.
The press became one of the most important sources of power in the republics, since the
population read exclusively the newspapers coming from their republics. In this period particularly
newspaper and TV journalism played an important role in the creation of the public meaning and
the political developments that brought to the final polarisation in the relationship between
republics. Through the eighties, political elites struggled for the control of the media in the form of
official party censorship or in the appointment of the more “obedient” editors, transforming in this
way a traditionally independent part into the service of the political power (the Slovenian “Mladina”
was the most controversial anti party journal, the Croatian “Society of Journalist” was strongly
against the use the press as the long hand of the party system, while the Serbian “Politika” became
an obedient instrument of Slobodan Milošević) (Ramet 1996: 81).
The Church was one of the institutions that radically changed its position in the society in the
eighties. In all the republics, but especially in Serbia, the Church started to play an active role in the
creation of the public opinion and the political inclination of the population. Until then the political
leaders were never seen in public accompanied by members of the clergy, Slobodan Milošević
instead regularly appeared escorted by the highest exponents of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
During the “golden age” of the communist rule the Church, particularly in the years immediately
after the Second World War, occupied a marginal position in the society and only the rural areas
managed to maintain some sort of relationship with the clergy (8).
The most difficult period in the Catholic Church-State relation was immediately after the war; in
the years to come, the pressure against the believers was reduced and the priests started to make part
of the “Priests Associations” which provided them with health insurance, subsidies and better
8. During the Second World War, hundreds of churches were burnt during the fights especially in the
ethnically mixed areas. After the war, following the general policy of the communist party, they were never
rebuilt. During the eighties most of those churches were rebuilt or renovated.
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269
relation with the state bureaucracy. The most eminent representative of the Church in the state’s
early years was Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac. Famous for his anti-fascist activity during the War,
Stepinac was seen well in the eyes of the new politicians but when he refused to cut all relations
with Vatican he was immediately pursued as a traitor and collaborationist. Even though his penalty
was to be sentenced in prison, soon after the trial he was released to his home village where he died
few years later. The issues that complicated Church-state relationship were the school curricula that
included so many hours of Marxism and no Religion Studies, the questioned legitimacy of believers
excluded from the League of Communists and the continuous preoccupation regarding the human
rights (Ramet 1996:135-159).
During the Second World War 25 % of churches and monasteries of the Serbian Orthodox Church
were destroyed and 50% were seriously damaged with all the consequent deaths of the clergy. Like
for the Catholic Church, the most difficult time was till the half of the fifties but than the situation
improved. Only with the arrival of Milošević the Church became an active political actor, especially
in the sphere of redefinition of nationality and the creation of negative feelings towards the other
nationalities and peoples of Yugoslavia (Ramet 1996: 165- 181).
The eighties brought turbulence in all spheres of public life. Economy that faced an enormous
crisis, pushed in the second row all the cultural events but it didn’t manage to cover up, the always
more frequent leaking of mutual mistrust and the arrival of different political figures. Serbian
literature perceived the coming changes, some in the form of warning and other more concordant
with the coming. Literary works such as “Knife” by Vuk Drašković (later a very successful politician) or “Time of Death” by Dobrica Ćosić (later president of the Yugoslavia’s leftovers) contributed to the expression of the national/nationalist conscience but in this case it’s justified to put into
evidence the possibility that their works didn’t only collect newly awakened tensions but collaborated actively in their creation.
The Croatian literature of the time didn’t manifest exclusively nationalist ideas. The tendencies
of the politically engaged literature were mostly addressed against the political ideology that during
the years sacrificed many young and talented individuals who didn’t manage, or more likely didn’t
want, to become a part of the state apparatus (9).
The last years of one state are very often considered to be the beginning of the end this usually
arouses the interests towards its last movements and events searching for the elements that could
have influenced its finish more than the others. Some will search for the beginning of the conflict in
ages-old constitutions and first discontents of the parliamentary representatives; others will consider
the events as a complete surprise that caught all the interested parts unprepared. The facts remain
that on the territory of the former Yugoslavia the nineties will be remembered as war years and
eighties as last years of one state. It is not possible to search for the beginning of the end but it’s
possible to single out some elements that, in certain period of history with their participation, made
possible the uncontested spread of violence.
9. A good example could be found in the novel “A frame for hate” by Ivan Aralica.
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3. Case study: Anti-ideological writing and the national question in the Serbian literature of
the eighties
3.1. Introduction: The mirror of reality
Some literature works seem to be written for a negligible number of readers and able to reach the
profound sense of the most elevated poetic lines without showing the least need for the collective
appreciation till the point where we can perceive the almost inexistent edge between the individual
artistic expressions in the occasional, and fortunate, publications for the small number of readers
and private confessions written on the pages of the diary. Who were Kafka’s (10) readers? Did they
feel judged and manipulated while they were reading his Process or Castle? It is not possible to
know who where his ideal readers since he never published his most important works, it was his
friend Max Brod who after his death decided to make public his novels, transforming his friend into
the legend of a world of which he never really made part of.
The research after the ideal reader comes from the same beginning of writing, the means of
communication and the symbols are being formed according to the probable and expected receivers
of the published work in order to obtain necessary agreement with the offered content. The characters exist in their own fantastic space where they create and live situations decided by the author. In
order to give sense to their existence and to the possibility for this presumed reality, the act of
creation is not sufficient if the new created space can not find an accurate observer ready to identify
himself with the situations in the “parallel” world. At the moment when the gate towards the new
reality is opened not only the reader enters the new experience but also the new experience using
the same passage abandons its imaginary space and the same reader, through the identification with
the characters allows the penetration of the literary work in his common everyday experience. Not
every time the gates open, only in the case of the right reader the exchange happens and if we consider every character as a symbol than we can consider it as such only in the proper context: social,
literary or historical.
The symbolic characters should become a part of experience of every individual that belongs to
a certain society; that is where the proper situational context allows the efficient understanding of
the literary symbols. To know the human actions it is necessary to know the system of symbols
through which they get represented; in this sense the literature becomes one of the symbolic means
through which it is possible to express emotional phases of the experience, with the very concentrated interest towards the comprehension of the human actions in the way they exist in the society.
Literature can perform at least three types of roles: it represents which considers truthful of the
human actions in general, of the actions of one specific class or institution or of an individual
action; in this way one of the primary functions of the literature becomes the converting of feelings
into general values or, in some cases, expressing the contradictions and limits of the dominant
ideology (Duncan 1972: 147).
The formulation of the symbols able to assume common meanings has the aim in the need for
10. Franz Kafka, considered one of the biggest German writers of all times, lived most of his life in Prague
were he was born in 1883. He worked as an insurance company clerk. Afflicted by tuberculosis he died in
Vienna sanatorium in 1924. His most important works are considered to be America, the Castle and The
Process, all published posthumously.
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271
the general consent among the public. The communication of the text with its readers depends on
how much they are able to understand which was written and not only how much they can identify
with it. The message can be missed simply by lack of cultural understanding of a different tradition
or by lack of consideration of the spirit of time when the work was written. The communication
changes with every new generation of readers and it seems natural that since times are continuously
changing the starting points for the interpretation are changing too. If we consider literature the
mirror of reality or more precisely the mirror of the perception of the reality, than it is necessary to
approach the text as if it was a filter for the impressions that marked a certain moment of history.
What will be taken into consideration during the reading usually is much less then what the
subtext of the work offers. The presence of the “reading key” makes possible any type of interpretation and at the same time its absence makes impossible any understanding at all. How many
elements compose a literature work and how the non-consideration of some of them can alternate
the final judgement depends on which aspects we are interested in. Unfortunately, or luckily, there
is no little black notebook with the instructions about how to find the hidden treasure and it remains
impossible to capture completely the spirit of the time; in the artificial space created by an artist the
only thing that is left for us is to catch the occasional hints which he or she left and to hope not to
get lost while returning home.
In the more concrete universe of the Serbian literature in the eighties the same elements build the
way towards the hoped understanding of content. Who were the readers of the politically engaged
writers and how these works affected their perception of the reality? The great number of works
oscillated from the obvious targeting of the ideal reader to other more sophisticated ways of the
artistic expressions. The potential readers of the literature works were found in all layers of the
Serbian society and since some works managed to obtain a large popularity it is deducible that those
works promoted values familiar to most of the population and were expressed in simple and clear
forms. It doesn’t seem correct to separate the works of “quality literature” from those of populist
tendency and designated to middle and low-class readers, because it could limit the analyses and
isolate the “reading key” only to certain layers of the written works. The potential readers should
not be classified socially since a high-educated person without reading habits or social awareness,
cannot be a part of an intellectual milieu.
The literary works written at the time were affected by the political changes that were affecting
the country; some works only interpreted the social environment and the need for change, others
participated, voluntarily or not, to the creation of the general atmosphere. The return of old motives
of a long dated national history such as the battle of the Blackbird valley, the First World War or the
more “recent” Second World War contributed to the arousal of the old and never mourned
sentiments. The official politics of “Brotherhood and Unity” favoured the common future and left
little space for the national vindications; after the death of Tito the old motives repapered in a new
form, ready to be relived among the new urban generation, which never got the chance to verify the
exactness of the historical events.
3.2. A book about Milutin
In 1985, the Serbian writer Danko Popović wrote the short novel Knjiga o Milutinu [A book
about Milutin (Popović 1985)], and in the same year he won the prestigious literary prize “Isidora
Sekulić”. The story in itself has a very simple structure; the protagonist, the old man Milutin, tells
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his personal history in first person. He’s a farmer, obedient to the state and leaves for every war he’s
called to. In the last one, the Second World War, he also loses his only son. Soon after the end of
the war he gets arrested as a wealthy farmer and taken into prison where he dies beaten to death
among real criminals.
The story presents a very clear antiwar ideology in which the only thing that takes everything
away is war, from “whom” the “simple” individual, well presented in the form of the old and honest
farmer Milutin, cannot escape. On this level of understanding it’s possible to obtain the consent of
the large public; the simple language and the shortness of the story are the favourable elements for
reaching a big audience. The communication with the public happens through the thoughts of an old
and experienced man, which by himself is able to carry the burden of personal tragedy that
represents the tragedy of an entire nation. The sense of pity towards him is increased by his personal
background; he’s a farmer in a still agrarian society and distant from the centre where the destiny of
his nation is being decided. Up to this point the reading is quite simple, but the ideological subtext
does not present only the antiwar message, it also points out that the tragedy of the nation
represented in the person of Milutin is not that of the Yugoslav nation.
The identification with the antiwar message reached the large public but the presence of the
Serbian sacrifice restricted the receivers of the second ideology. The following lines will enact the
mechanism that will follow the antiwar message:
They say, we paid back to our Slav brothers, who will if Serbs won’t, just well that we died
again for our Slav brothers […] if we didn’t decide to sacrifice this much, no unification of
South Slavs would have happened […] Well, Milutin, can’t any war end until all Serbs die? I
heard that also in this war most of the shed blood was Serbian, how come that we don’t have
anyone ours who will save some of Serb lives, that our blood is not always shed more than any
other nation’s […] This is how it goes with us Serbs, first we die and than they think if this way
was suppose to be […] (BM, pp. 15/ 23/ 24/ 112/ 40) [personal translation and italicisation].
In the lines above the ideological passage goes from “dying again for Slav brothers” to direct
strike on “the Serbian sacrifice for the unification of South Slavs”, and the continuous shedding of
Serbian blood without any reserve towards the personal sacrifice. The lines don’t end with this
“denunciation”: the writer goes further, in the following lines, in expressing the presumed attitude
of other peoples towards the Serbs, especially Albanians, called by the old name of Arnauts:
They say, we should go back to kill Arnauts in those houses, they killed our boys, smashed their
heads with the axes, they didn’t even spend bullets, they killed them and took their clothes of
[…] It’s not nice that we argue among ourselves and get to knives while the Arnauts are killing
our exhausted soldiers and children […] But wait, they don’t kill Serbs only in Croatia they
also kill them in Macedonia, in Kosovo and in Voivodina […] (Ibid., pp. 24/ 29/ 79) [personal
translation and italicisation].
The above cited lines represent the denunciation of the Serbian sufferings caused by the Albanians and by the other nations in Yugoslavia; in this way the Serbian victims, besides any external
enemy are also inflicted from inside by “ungrateful allies”. Serbs are invited not only to kill but to
revenge, expressing the motivation for the bloodshed as a natural right towards the undergone
violence.
The political ideas presented by the old man could even not to be the ideas of the author and his
political ideology, but since the novel is written in the form of a confession in first person we could
Anti-ideological writing and the national question in the Serbian literature of the eighties
273
deduce that the motive of the eternal Serbian sufferings is probably shared between the writer and
his character. The time of the narration goes back to past, with even more distant reminiscences that
perceive the cycles of the past in the repetition of the Serbian victims and the repetition of their
error. Through the simplifications of time, space and events the novel is comprehensible to the large
public in Serbia, clearly sensitive to the sufferings of its own people. The old and tired farmer who
gave his only son to the benefit of ungrateful others, arouses the sense of pity and therefore, his
invitation for Serbs to kill the Albanians, can be hardly considered, as hatred speech, but on the
contrary, justified measure for the suffered injustice. The promoted ideas besides the first layer of
the antiwar novel are also present in the form of continuous Serbian sufferings for the others and
the justified violence in the form of the revenge for “dead children and exhausted soldiers”.
The antiwar ideology - where every warrior denounces a defeat because the winner always remains only the war - communicates with the reader in the pacifist dimension of the collective national sufferings seen through the eyes of an old man. Everyone in former Yugoslavia who ever
heard his grandfather war stories, saw a Sunday war movie on national Channel Two or went to
school for at least four years, was able to pick the resigned message of a man who lost his only son,
and therefore everything. This however is not the only message that the old man is bringing to the
reader. The complete absence of the Yugoslav national idea, with the accent only on the Serbian
suffering during the wars for the common state and justified violence in Kosovo don’t seem that
harmless if we know that political currents around the Slobodan Milošević’s coming into power
were hardly called pacifist.
In this perspective the element of the political situation and the “spirit of time” taken into consideration significantly influence the literary interpretation. The readers of the novel were the same
TV viewers who in the prime time watched Gazimestan events and heard the promises that no one
will ever harm the Serbs again (11). The coincidence of the promoted ideas could have provided the
strengthening of the Serbian nationalist thought and the separation from an old “brotherhood and
unity” ideology. On the other hand, the absence of the social contextualisation of the novel allows
the most evident idea of the antiwar message to perform the main ideological task for the novel.
Understanding of the text is very flexible in consideration of the elements that are being used for its
interpretation.
3.3. Timor Mortis and Friends
These two novels are written by Slobodan Selenić and talk about a completely different theme
from A Book about Milutin. The first novel Timor Mortis (1991) is a story about three people forced
by historical events to live next to each other. Dragan Radosavljević, a medicine student, whose
parents died in the bombings of Belgrade during the Second World War, narrates the story. On the
ruins after the bombings he found a hundred and four years old man Stojan Blagojević and took
him home. After confiscation of his apartment, Dragan moves to Stojan’s home and starts to write
down Stojan’s life story, a very interesting one since the Stojan was a wealthy lawyer active in the
11. In 1987 S. Milošević held a speech in Kosovo, Gazimestan where he promised protection to Serbs. In
1989, on St. Vitus Day-June 28, during the celebrations of 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo,
Milošević held another speech where he sustained that Serbs always scarified themselves for the others, never
conquered and exploited others and that there is a need for their unification because of the external threat.
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political life of the country. The third person is the young Biljana, a dancer and a prostitute, who
doesn’t see any harm in dating the German soldiers since she doesn’t take any money and they are
nice to her. After the initial shock they realise the purity of her soul and her attempt to survive in
those circumstances. For a while their life goes on without changes and they get use to each other’s
company. The arrival of the Serbian refugees from Croatia changes their relationship, the stories of
the people escaped from a certain death by the hand of the Croatian soldiers, introduces a new reality in their life. Soon after the old man death, the partisans liberate Belgrade and Biljana is reported
to the police as a Nazi collaborationist. The crowd impales her and she dies at home cured by
Dragan. He remains alone.
The other novel Prijatelji (Friends) (Slobodan 2000) tells the story of relationship between the
member of one of the oldest Serbian families, Vladan Hadžislavković, and a young teenage
Albanian, Istref Veri. Belgrade has been liberated and a new civil society is being built from the
ruins of the war. The young Albanian Istref, in order to escape the clan fighting, arrives to Belgrade
to work as a digger in the reconstruction of the city. Istref lives in Vladan’s aunt’s house with his
friends and cousins. Vladan convinces him to come to his big house since he’s living alone. Istref
can hardly read and speak the Serbian language, but with Vladan’s insistence and help he manages
to finish high school. Very soon Vladan’s attentions to Istref are explained by his homosexual
inclination towards the young boy, who grateful for his mentor’s kindness doesn’t react negatively
even though he’s disgusted even by an accidental touch by Vladan. Vladan is happy only by having
Istref in the house and by the possibility to speak to him and to treat him well. The situation
changes when into their house come new people, and they are all forced to live together. Vladan is
horrified by the presence of those “primitives”, while Istref feels very comfortable with them and
one of them later becomes his wife. Mad of jealousy after killing the pigs in the pigsty, Vladan
disappears forever from Istref’s life. Years later, the engineer Istref receives a long manuscript from
Vladan’s lawyer where he describes his vision of their life together and this actually represents the
beginning of the novel.
In the first novel Timor Mortis there are three layers of narration: the first layer is the historical
context on which the main action in the novel is founded, the life of the three characters during the
Nazi occupation of Belgrade and it’s characterized by the objective time passage. The second layer
consists of the psychological conditions of the characters, with a subjective passage of the time. The
third layer has the confessional nature and the possibility to take the narration years into past. The
composition of the novel is dynamic since the narration goes back and forth very often and big time
wholes are bridged only by the narrator’s interventions. The fact that the old man is hundred and
four years old opens the possibility for a writer to cover a large period of time through his
memories. From the Stojan’s confessions we find out about his youth in Croatia, a good carrier, the
marriage with the rich and politically aware Croatian Serbian Smilja, the birth of the son, his son’s
death and immediately after, the death of his wife. His political convictions weren’t too important
in his life and often he adapted them for sake of a better carrier, during his life in Croatia he supported the idea of Serbs in Croatian Parliament and the common life. His time was long gone and
he attended the end without any offspring, completely alone and completely forgotten by the rest of
the world, shocked by the news coming from Croatia.
The second novel Friends can be also divided into three layers of narration even though the
structure is more complicated. The first level of narration describes the present time while Istref is
reading the manuscript sent from the Vladan’s lawyer. The second layer, made of Istref’s memo-
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ries, is inserted in the form of recollections while he’s reading the manuscript and the third layer is
inside the manuscript that Istref is reading and it consists of Vladan’s memories. All the three layers
constantly intertwine, crossing the time limits and providing the general view of personal changes
together with social the one.
Even though the novels have completely different stories, the “real” narration time is almost
identical. The key period is the Second World War with its social and political changes. It can’t be
by chance that in both novels the new and official political ideology is forwarded by the primitive,
rude and uneducated partisans and members of the communist party, and that the well educated
intellectual middle class elite is represented by a decadent hundred and four years old man and a
homosexual (described as if his homosexuality was a sickness of spirit and body). The hypothetical
end of the middle class arrives with the destruction of Vladan’s old and beautiful house by new
tenants arrived from the villages with new and powerful political functions. The new generation represented in the engineer Istref is ready to substitute the old representatives of the Serbian history
full of traitors and murderers, which through their history managed to reduce their existence to
failed marriages, fortune dissipation and individuals unable to bare the spirit of time. The intruders
ready to take their position are not coming from the outside world but belong to the same nation
and to a different social class.
These two texts can be easily understood by the large public: the main topic of the failure of the
Serbian middle-class in the Bolshevik revolution can reach even the most occasional reader but also
the same reader can find the lines of the Croatian massacres of the betrayed Serbian population. It is
not possible to consider the descriptions of the Serbian sufferings a sort of glue that keeps together
the narration and think that it won’t cause the emotional reaction of the reader. The lines below
show the style and language with which the Croatian-Ustasha crimes are being described:
He put the head on the table. The Ustashas cut his throat. “Sing now”. As he sang the blood
flushed from his throat, two or three metres long […] “Hit him with the knife, that mother
fucker…” they hit him with the knife two or three times, and when he fell, others jumped in,
specially designed, who smashed heads […] When they slaughtered almost everyone in the
church and when the number of us survived came to ten, I was in one corner of the church.
Ustashas stopped a little with killing, they carried out bloody people. Blood was everywhere in
the church […] A man shouted “Ouch!” and then they throw him on the ground and smash his
head. They stabbed him with knife in his ribs and everywhere. While there were smashing his
head, pieces of the skull were flying all around and they also ended up on me. (TM, pp.
143/144/145) [personal translation and italicisation].
These lines in a very strong and dominant way transport the sufferings from the past to the
present of the reader obtaining a deep emotional effect. The unprotected civilians are being eliminated, in the most brutal way by Ustashas, with the help of the Catholic clergy, inside the Catholic
church. Whatever ideological message the author wanted to send, the image of the dead bodies is
not easy to neglect.
A similar process happens in Friends. The descriptions of Belgrade life during the war, the
complete destruction of the beautiful Vladan’s house, the homosexuality of Istref friend Sadik, the
new generation of Albanians ready to live and earn in Belgrade and the primitive and uneducated
partisans, are all elements that reach the reader sooner than the ideological message of the extincttion of the Serbian middle class. The vivid representation of former partisan fighters and their new
social position leave little space for doubts regarding the main attitude towards the new forces. The
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first passage is dedicated to a new tenant of the Vladan’s beautiful house, ex partisan Mirčetić:
The greatest, if not the only one, weakness and passion of Mirčetić-were reunions and demonstrations. Like a manicured warrior he lived from one mass meeting to the following, from one
protest to another plebiscite support to various decisions of the management. (F, p. 229) [personal translation and italicisation].
The role of the ex-partisan, of the fighter for the new country, is reduced to a useless and
ridiculous figure whose life finds the only sense in the mass approval of the decisions of the political
management. A similar treatment is also for the new chief in the Vladan’s office:
Not even in my dream I want to see her […] horrible woman, horrible wo-man! Please, she’s
taller then me! [...] Still in boots, with heals, uncombed hair […] head like an African lion […]
the cigar is hanging glued to her bottom lip-please! She’s never without cigar, yellow nails on
two fingers […] she screams on the telephone. (Ibid.: 141) [personal translation and italicisation].
The two descriptions seem the representation of the completely futile members of any society:
rude and ignorant on positions inappropriate for their capacities.
The text communicates through the role of the protagonist as the last representative of the
declining middle class, and so far so good, but also the partisans and communists have their role as
representatives of the new primitive and unstoppable Bolshevik force that will destroy all culture
and history; quite far from the vision of liberators from Nazi-regime and saviours and creators of a
new unified culture.
The main ideas advanced in these works are not only the disappearance of the already weakened
Serbian middle-class but also the disappearance caused by communism and socialism. There is no
Yugoslavia and no “brotherhood and unity”, there is only regret towards the disappearance of a
social class that didn’t know how to resist the new society after the Second World War.
3.4. Pigeonhole and other stories
In 1989 Serbian writer Jovan Radulović published a collection of short stories (1989). His
characters live in the social and historical reality where the consequences of the events that affected
their lives on large and personal scale are still present. Tragedy of characters is often seen through
the innocent eyes of children, which allow the non-understanding of the historical events too big
and too complicated for their age. The realistic representation of the hard life in the geographically
isolated area contributes to the perception of the characters as cold and rational witnesses, which
can tell exactly what happened without being emotionally distracted by personal tragedy. The stories are frequently built as a puzzle with a firm centre around which the writer enlarges the area of
literary narration introducing the second narrative time that goes back to past. The narration time is
mainly situated in the fifties, just after the Second World War and during the arrival and the
stabilization of the new social class.
The first story “Golubnjača” (“Pigeonhole” [personal translation]) takes the input from the
natural hole in one isolated Croatian village known among the population as a place where during
the Second World War the corps of the Serbs were thrown after being slaughtered by the Croatian
Ustasha. The story is narrated by a young boy and seen through his perception of reality of life in
the isolated area behind the Dalmatian littoral. The narration goes back and forth in time, circling
around the hole that is an indirect witness of the historic events. The connection that ties the boy to
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the hole is the fact that he and his friends irritated by one maverick decide to throw the animal inside it; in a way it is the maverick that opens again the recollection of the Second World War and
the sufferings and tortures of Serbian civil population. During one church ceremony in the village
with all the people around the hole, the boy seems to see the ghosts of all the creatures that died inside; maverick was playing again on the grass; other dead were coming out looking what was
happening and he also saw his grandfather and his aunt coming out with the others.
The other story “Pilip Koluvija i njegovi sinovi” (“Pilip Koluvija and his Sons” [personal translation]) tells the life of Pilip Koluvija, an old man, who arrives to Belgrade searching for his missing sons. During the war the sons ended up fighting in different armies, Milan went to the king’s
army while Gojko joined the partisan movement. Pilip arrived to Belgrade with his niece and saw
everything very big and unfamiliar, full of people who migrated from other parts of the country and
old Belgrade inhabitants who became poor or simply gone to an unknown direction. After the war
Milan disappeared and Gojko, accidentally hurt by a gun died because of the infection. Pilip
managed to collect their remaining and return home.
The possibility for understanding of the first text is very high even among the average readers,
but on the other hand, the possibility that the text will be appreciated among non-Serbian readers
doesn’t appear very high. The explicit description of cruelties done by the Croats would unlikely
find the approval in Croatia. The second story promotes the antiwar message and again the war is
seen as the only evil in the story. The message of peace goes to the point that considers all victims
equal but also the armies too. The Chetniks army is seen in the same way as the partisan movement
and both ideologies are considered useless since they harnessed only victims.
The first story communicates through the narration of one boy. Serbian victims thrown in the
pigeonhole embody the tragedy of Serbs during the Second World War and, with the narration of
their tragedy, the past events come in front of the present readers. The pigeonhole witnesses the
annihilation of the civilians and priests that, in the form of ghosts, come out as a reminder during a
celebration in the new unified country. Their victims remained unwept and unburied in the new society, so they come back in the conscience of a young and pure boy to instruct him, and us, about
what should never be forgotten and what was quickly swept under the rug by the communist political elites.
The second story communicates through the narration of the old man Pilip, and he can be identified as a representation of the general loss caused by war. In this case the old man loses his offspring and through them his future. The others substitute his sons and he leaves Belgrade streets to
them while he’s returning to his home village.
It could seem too hard to judge the ideological subtext of the first story as anti Croatian, but it
seems that the only clear message is not to forget Serbian victims and Croatian cruelties expressed
in the coming back of the dead spirits to our world. If the text was presented immediately after the
war, the resentment could have been understandable, but to present the issue of the massacre of the
innocent Serbs in Croatia in the eighties couldn’t have meant only the need for a poetic expression.
A similar conclusion can be referred to the second story; even though it has the ideological antiwar
coverage, the equalisation of the communist and Chetnics activity in the Second World War in the
common country with many still alive partisans, expressed the disagreement with the official ideology. The partisans arrived to Belgrade are seen as primitive intruders and not as liberators. So, it is
possible to deduce that the dominant political ideology that characterises the short story, besides
being antiwar is also anticommunist.
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3.5. Heavenly fiancés (short stories)
In the collection of short stories Nebeski Zaručnici (“Heavenly fiancés” [personal translation])
written by Mirko Kovač (1998) the theme of the sacrifice of the civil population during the Second
World War returns in the stories “Dan i Noć” (“Day and Night” [personal translation] and “Propalo
Društvo” (“Broken Company” [personal translation]).
“Day and Night” narrates the events during the Second World War in one Serbian village in the
Croatian countryside. Just before the beginning of the war, the new priest Veselko Kuljić arrived in
the Catholic parish. He was beloved by all the population because he looked the same way on all
the believers, regardless their religion. Veselko was a good friend with the Orthodox priest and
helped the reconstruction of the Orthodox church. He was fascinated by the night and as the time
passed he started to feel suffocated by the day. During the first slaughtering of the Serbs he was
against it, but then one night in the company of Ustashas intentioned to kill a wealthy local Serb, he
felt different and changed, and his feet seemed clogs. After the death of the man, he killed his
daughter and received as a gift a knife kama. During the following nights he also killed the Serbian
priest and in the morning he opened the Orthodox church. Even though during the day he felt heavy
and suffocated during the night he assumed a satanic appearance. Due to a mistake he was accused
for helping the young communist and executed by Ustasha soldiers. The narrator found his notebook and a knife in his church.
“The Broken Company” tells the story about the attempt of making a movie that was never filmed and about Ustasha’s crime over the Serbian population. The company travels in the area behind
the Dalmatian littoral searching for the right village. During one dinner the director listens to the
personal story of a man whose family was assassinated by Ustashas. The movie was never finished,
all the members of the company continued more or less unhappily with their lives.
The lines taken from “Night and Day” recall the story from the “Pigeonhole”:
[…] on that scaffold where, six months before on the San Vitus Day, was slaughtered Serbian
population. I remember the request of the parish priest not to throw the corps into the Neretva
river, so that the bright water’s flow doesn’t get infested. From then on they were taken away by
trucks and thrown into the holes […] Poor man! You’re bleeding poor man! And what I heard is
still too little for what you have deserved! […] Until even one Serb is alive there won’t be any
peace, you blasphemous race! […] (DN, pp. 141/162) [personal translation and italicisation].
This passage describes the violent death of the Serbian population, but this time, besides the
Ustashas, the responsibility falls mainly on the Catholic Church. The priests are seen as main collaborators and supporters of the Ustasha movement. A very similar approach is used in the second
story “Broken Company” but in the opposite sense. In the following lines the local Serb talks to the
director on the Christmas Eve:
[…] And you have to dedicate yourself to the Christmas Eve, because this is the evening of every
Christian, this puts us together despite our misunderstandings. Between you and me there’re only
a verbal duels, yet, in fact we’re one in Christ. Unified through bites. […] We argue so that we
could love each other in Christ […] (BC, p. 93) [personal translation and italicisation].
Pronounced on page 93, the words of the Serb sound very peaceful, full of understanding and
without any resentment. The unity of Christ, body and soul, shared during the dinner keep the
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believers united and the different religion in the Serbian house doesn’t have any importance in the
celebration of Christ. These lines would leave the reader in the feast atmosphere, unless the man
continues his narration, two pages after, with these lines:
[…] My father was slaughtered on 26 July 1941, near the house. Those slaughters lasted two or
three days till late in the evening […]. If you really want to know, the biggest criminal in this
area was a woman. She dressed like the Virgin, and while she was doing her job she would put
the veil on her head […]. They can’t swallow their history […] (BC, pp. 95/96) [personal
translation and italicisation].
The previously pronounced words achieve a different effect when these lines follow them. The
first impression of the unity in Christ changes into the image of sacrifice and forgiveness, with the
reminder that the Croats can’t accept their actions and their past.
In the narration of “Night and Day” the most of the story describes the events during the Second
World War in Croatia. Only the end of the story reconnects the past with the present in the form of
a found diary and events narrated inside; together with the knife, with which the atrocities were
committed and in a way the narrated story confirmed. Also this time one character could represent
the entire population, the priest is seen as a symbol of the Catholic clergy and of the Croatian
nation, while the Serbian villagers can be identified with all the Serbs in Croatia and their tragedy
during the Second World War.
It is possible to synthesize the main ideas that are promoted in the story in the thought that
Croats have slaughtered the Serbs (innocent women, children and men) and the Catholic Church
participated actively.
The description of a priest and his nocturnal transformation into the devil symbolically transfers
the characters into the higher level of a mythical fight between good and evil. If we add to the
Devil/Bad a natural counterpart Angel/Good, than the closing lines that God sees everything while
He’s punishing the priest connect the Serbs with the concept of “heavenly people” revenged by God
and Croats as a people connected with Devil. Ideologically we have the passage Croat/Devil/Hell
that leads to the opposite concept of Serb/Angel/Paradise and, as a consequence, close to God.
The ideal receiver and the real receiver of this text are in this case probably the same person.
Among all the Serbs the sacrifice of the Serbian population outside Serbia could have provoked a
profound compassion with the probable neglect of the identification of Croats with devils. The
innocent victims, as in “Pigeonhole”, have the same strong effect on the reader. In the social
context of the eighties the return of the old theme, Serbian sufferings in the Second World War, did
not provide a new approach to the events but on the contrary, maintaining the idea from the
collective memory, it elaborated it not with historical facts but with the impressions that
emotionally were present among the population. In this sense historic memory did not provide any
actual facts but on the contrary it gave to the reader an emotional interpretation and reached the
receiver through the emotional effect.
In the Serbian political environment of the eighties, texts of this type had the potential to polarize, at least among the readers, an already sensitive social climate. Thanks to the social climate and
the probable identification with the victims it was possible to imagine that if Serbian victims in the
Second World War symbolize Serbs in general, than their sufferings, present or past, are the result
of the enemy’s action, in this case the Croats, who are connected with the devil through their
Church; the Serbs unable to defend themselves left the revenge to God who vindicated his people
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showing no forgiveness for anyone.
In “Broken Company” there’re two layers of narration. One is presented by the member of the
film company, the other one by the villager, and it considers his memories of the Second World
War and the history of his family. The message of the short story is expressed through the description of crimes that were committed by the Croats with the help of Catholic clergymen. The objects
of the violence, the Serbs, were willing to forgive applying the Christian ethics but the Croats
weren’t able to deal with their history so they denied it.
Oppressed by the political pressures the director gives up the movie, and indirectly the presentation of the non-recognised Serbian sacrifice for the common state, he runs after a carrier and unfortunately he ends up as an alcoholic and a failure. The last scenes of the story, describing the
funeral of one of the most important politicians of early post-war years, Aleksandar Ranković, indirectly describe the burial of the “brotherhood and unity” since he was one of the main supporters
of this political ideal.
The ideological subtext that could be read between the lines of the linear narration is that the
Croats not only caused the biggest slaughtering of the Serbian population during the Second World
War, but also they were unable to accept it later. For the sake of the common political idea in the
new unified country, indirectly defined by the author as ”to sweep everything unpleasant under the
rug” ideology, the movie which was supposed to present some uncomfortable truth for the Croats
was forbidden. At the symbolic reunion at the funeral, the director saw his political ideas disappearing and an old man claims coming into life. The ideological passage could go from: innocent Serbian victims in the war were caused by Croatian Ustashas; after the war, because of the “brotherhood and unity” project, victims were unwept and forgotten without justice; with the death of the
politician, no more sense in the political unity and therefore besides the funeral of the man there is
also the funeral of his political idea. No need for forgiveness, only giving up.
These two stories brought back forty-years-old events into the eighties in Serbia. The message
was very clear, without any historical doubt, for the average Serbian reader with the consequence of
the polarisation towards the other nation without considering the probable effect on the Serbian
readers outside Serbia. The social and political environment when the book was published was
significantly different from the one of the previous years. The notions of massacres, collaborationist
Catholic clergy or lack of punishment for the murderers were presented at the same time with the
national Serbian and Orthodox Church revival, sharing the ideas of official political ideology.
3.6. The dictionary of Khazars
The structure of the second Pavić’s novel (12) is particular since the work is divided in three
books. All three parts, red, yellow and green book, tell the same event from a different point of
view. The plot seems very simple. The long disappeared and forgotten Khazar people lived between
the Caspian and Black Sea. They disappeared with their state, after they converted to the one of
three known religions. After the conversion the dissolution of the Khazar Empire arrived. Russians
destroyed the Khazar capital on the outlet of Volga in 943. One special dictionary, written by certain Daubmanus, contains three versions: Christian, Hebrew and Islamic version of conversion presented in three books. There is no confrontation and the Dictionary doesn’t offer any final solution.
12. Pavić Milorad (1992), Hazarski Rečnik, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1992 [title personal translation].
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In 1692 the Inquisition destroyed all the copies of the publication, only the poisonous and silver
copy remained but they were probably destroyed afterwards. The conversion happened after the
Khazar kagan had a dream and he invited three philosophers of different religions to obtain the best
interpretation, with the intention to be converted to the religion of the best interpreter. All the three
versions conclude that the Khazars were converted to their religion.
Already with the presentation of Khazar state, it isn’t difficult to recognize that the described
land reminds the structure and administration of the former Yugoslavia:
The organisation of the Khazar state is very complicated, and its subjects are divided among
those born under the wind (those are Khazars) and others, who are born above the wind, which
means that they come into the country from different sides, like Greeks, Jews, Saracens or Russians. In the empire the most numerous are Khazars, all the others are in very small groups. The
division of the administration tries to make this not so evident. The state is divided into regions,
but they are- where there is Jewish, Greek or Arab population- called after them, while the biggest part of the Khazar state, where only Khazars live, is divided in several regions under different names. That is made in a way that only one of those regions carry the name of Khazar region, and others got their name and place in the state in other ways. (DK, p. 232) [personal
translation and italicisation].
Even though in at moment of the first publication of the Pavić’s novel the metaphoric representation of Khazars was quite doubtful (were Khazars Yugoslavs or maybe Serbs?) with the following
passages the dilemma is slowly disappearing:
Regarding all the circumstances and the unfavourable position of the Khazars in the empire,
many Khazars are giving up their origin and language, their region and customs and they hide
who they are, they present themselves as Greeks or Arabs and they consider that this way they
will be better. (Ibid., p. 232) [personal translation and italicisation].
On the same page we realise that the Khazar people, even though the most numerous one, occupies
the most unfavourable position in the whole empire and its inhabitants, in order to obtain better social
recognition, change their identity. The following passage describes the economic and military situation in the empire, other regions with a majority of other population are considered hostile towards
Khazars, while they are willing to share everything, including the burden of military operations:
This way the Khazars, in their part of the state share their bread with everyone, and in other
regions nobody gives them even the crumbs. The Khazars usually carry the biggest burden of
the military operations as the most numerous, but the commanders are equally from other
regions. So this way the Khazars are in charge of keeping the state together, they are in charge
to protect the empire and to fight for it, while the others, naturally, Greeks, Arabs, Jews, Goths
and Persians, living in Khazaria all pull on their own side, towards their motherland. During the
danger of war, from understandable reasons, described ‘relations are changing […] (Ibid.: 235)
[personal translation and italicisation].
The reflection on the cultural situation in the state goes with the same attitude towards other nations; Khazars are not allowed to deal with their history or at least not on the level they would like
to; the same is with the religion question where all other nations, besides Khazars, have their external protector:
In the Khazar state people can meet well educated Jews, Greeks or Arabs, that are acquainted
with Khazar history […] but the Khazars are not allowed and they can not, regarding their own
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history, talk or write books. […] Because, while the Greek and Arab religion are rooted also in
the other states and have strong foreign protection from our tribesmen and other people, the
Khazar religion is the only one in the state not to have such foreign protection and under the
same pressure it gets hurt, which means that other three get stronger. (Ibid.: 309/313) [personal
translation and italicisation].
The final reflection of the novel reveals the explicit political nature of the text; its strange form, its
fantastic environment and the inexistence of protagonists, left a lot of room for possible interpretation “games”; even though its contextualisation into present day, leaves no space for the possible
variations of meaning of the contents:
Look at the results of your democracy: until now the big peoples oppressed the small. Now is
the opposite. Now in the name of democracy small people are terrorising the big. Look at the
world around us: the white America is afraid of the blacks, the blacks of the Puerto Ricans,
Jews of the Palestinians, Arabs of the Jews, Serbs of the Albanians […] Instead of the minorities being terrorised, the democracy introduced new fashion […]. (Ibid.: 395) [personal translation and italicisation].
The message of the novel, presented through the use of different techniques, mixing real facts
with an invented story, seems to be that the great teachings are competing for domination over little
ones; people that didn’t manage to cope with the history had to disappear from the historic scene
(Palavestra 1991: 238). In this novel, maybe more than in the others, the need for the reading key is
expressed. The existence of three parallel stories, very similar but with different solutions, it’s not
guided by the classical protagonist; on the contrary, the main protagonist is the mystery of an extinct nation that with the conversion to one of the three main religions lost its integrity and disappeared from the history scene. The three parts of the novel are three different dictionaries containing three versions of the truth. The three stories, even if read carefully, don’t give any final solution
and it seems that with the dictionary also the potential truth regarding the Khazar polemics is lost.
The ideological message of the compulsory disappearing after acceptance both of the compromise and of the presence of the foreign and bigger forces cannot be addressed to any reader. Even if
the occasional or average reader gets in contact with the text it is little probable that he or she will
find any satisfaction with a literary product that offers no concrete solution. If the desired reader is
of high profile able to capture the relativity of the narrated history and the consequent disappearance of the historic truth, than also the identification with the presented work becomes possible.
The identification could happen if the Khazars are considered to be the Yugoslavs, fighting to resist
pressures coming from East or West, or if the Khazars are considered to be the Serbs, the most
numerous nation in former Yugoslavia with one third of its population living outside Serbia. The
second option seems to be the more probable since the perception of the Serbs as the nation that
bears the highest burden and sacrifices its own population for the protection of the common state, is
often encountered among many Serbian writers of the eighties.
The narration time is divided in different layers: the historical layer of the time of the presumed
conversion, fantastic episodes describing the dreams and the different times when various characters tried to put the story together. The narration doesn’t follow a linear course of events; it’s instead
divided according to the alphabetical order of the dictionary, reading it linearly could cause a slight
confusion among the readers and difficulties in an already complex history. The closure of the novel
is in present time with the reflection on the effects of the democracy on our contemporary world.
The ideological layers can be expressed through the various ideas of the radically relativised
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vision of the historical truth, which implied that no agreement or mutual understanding could be
reached among peoples who begin from different starting points (Wachtel 1998: 213). Wachtel
suggests that the novel can be read in two ways: as a specific warning against Serbian assimilation
into Yugoslavia and also as an attack on the very basis on which the country was constructed
(ibidem: 218). This, even though an interesting and possible interpretation, seems a bit reductive
towards a well built “unusual” novel. The assimilated Khazars were probably a message against the
assimilation for the Serbs, but this excludes that every state has its own Khazars that didn’t manage
to pass the test of time. Therefore, the reduction of the meaning on exclusively Balkan territory can
prove to be limiting towards the work, which promotes also the ideas of the historical truth as only
one of the possibilities written by the temporary winners. The truth, hidden in dreams, remains
undetectable for those who are trying to find it and they disappear in the attempts of reaching it, in
the same way as the dreams disappear in the morning. The fact that the any attempt of resemblance
ends in ruins for those who are trying to obtain it, leaves small space for the hypothesis: some truths
can’t be discovered simply because they don’t exist and different ideas cannot create a common truth
equal and acceptable for all. The acceptance of the compromise, in the form of a bigger and stronger
religion, brought the Khazars to the end of their nation and the end of their language that was able to
express divine presence within its words. The belief in a common future seems to fade in front of the
century long research for a once existed nation; as the research gives no positive result, the possibility
for the final understanding among those who have remained seems to be fading too.
3.7. Wide doors
The story in the novel of Aleksandar Tišma (1989) Široka Vrata [Wide Doors (personal translation)] begins from the end, with the execution of the protagonist. The beginning of the story is
connected to the end of the Second World War and the forced enlisting of the protagonist into the
army. Thanks to his connections, in order to avoid the regular army, he manages to enter the
military music band even though he doesn’t play any instrument. Since he’s not very active, too
much of free time earns him a venereal disease. He changes the unit and thanks to the knowledge of
Hungarian he ends in the press office. One day, he meets his ex friend from the communist youth
who begs him for help. Afraid that the friend could report him, he decides not to help him and the
man is sent to the battle. One day he’s sent on the same front-line as a translator and meats his
friend who is in prison. Afraid that some information from his history could come out he organises
the friend’s escape but the guards see them and he’s sentenced to death as a deserter.
Again the time of the plot is situated in the period of the Second World War. As other authors do,
Tišma represents the futility of an individual who uses a favourable situation to avoid the enrolment
into a war he doesn’t perceive as his one. The members of the liberating army are not seen as liberators against the stronger enemy, but as just another invading force that was going to change the life
they lived before. The following lines describe the arrival of the new class with incoming changes:
The new power didn’t look back on the reputation and the sufferance of the serious and decent
citizens caused by the enemy, it brought to a leading position its own, primitive people, which
no one knows; the military administration occupied the factories, and there have been talks
about confiscation of the stores and the workshops […]. (WD, p. 13) [personal translation and
italicisation].
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The members of the Yugoslavian Popular Front are considered to be primitive people who don’t
know how to produce but instead confiscate the goods of more capable individuals. The protagonist
doesn’t want to get killed, sacrifice himself, as if the liberation from the enemy was a question of
choice and pleasure performed mainly by cowards who showed off with dead trophies:
Should I tell him that I don’t feel the need to sacrifice myself, especially not to get killed; that
I’m actually, terrified by the army, that the wave of patriotism is filling me with the bitterness,
wave that wants to sweep away the years long cowardice and to show off with the figures of the
fallen enemy heads […]. (Ibid.: p.22) [personal translation and italicisation].
The poor consideration for the army goes further till the point where the soldiers are seen as a
drunk mass of people boasting about how they are going to win, disgusting the observer who
doesn’t feel part of the company:
And of course they got busted already after the first glass. Now they are howling, drinking and
not letting anyone to go away. First good peoples party, spiced, of course, with sentences of
how they were going to beat the enemy, right! With the glass in the hand and the singers around
us, it was disgusting [...]. (Ibid.: 171) [personal translation and italicisation].
The story narrates the events of an individual who during the war years doesn’t feel part of the
events that are embracing the whole territory and its population. A weak man, eventually punished
with execution, passes near the changes only as an observer disgusted with what he’s seeing. The
message, the impotence of an individual in front of the history events, can be easily addressed even
to an average reader but more probably to a well-educated one. The pointless death of the man in
the political prison, for something he’s not even done, resembles the thousands of Yugoslavian political prisoners, closed behind the ideological doors of political “brotherhood and unity” processes.
The political newcomers, considered as primitive and incapable, created prisons and with this reflected their creative maximum, since the factories and knowledge were confiscated from the
previous owners. Political ideas communicate from both opposite directions, from the end when he
dies as a political prisoner, only one of many; and from the begging where he avoids enrolment to a
liberation army because he is too afraid and the army is too full of primitives. The connection between the new primitive social forces and the consequential prisons is in the protagonist. The strong
anti-war ideology covers the whole novel; the same destiny is for all nations and nationalities, as
victims of a political regime that didn’t allow difference and individualism. The old well-educated
middle class is represented by a weak individual afflicted by a venereal disease, confronted with the
partisan soldiers, rude but healthy and strong, to whom he irreversibly loses his previous social
position. The spirit of time and political events, taken in the consideration during the analyses, only
confirm the ideas presented in the text: there’s no spirit of unity that works for a common future.
All of a sudden the projects developed in the forties seemed a bad idea.
3.8. The Encyclopaedia of the Dead
The book of Danilo Kiš The Encyclopaedia of the Dead (1988) is a collection of short stories
and deals with the main preoccupations of the individuals in the course of history. His previous
book A Tomb for Boris Davidovich (2005) mainly dealt with the topics that identified in one individual the destiny of many. The theme of the dream returns relativising the whole history, what
actually happened and how it was remembered.
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In the story that also gives the name to the collection, a woman finds herself in Stockholm for a
theatrical performance, Waiting for Godot. She enters a library and remains inside for the whole
night. At the end of a long corridor she finds the work called The Encyclopaedia of the Dead, a
massive work containing the total history of every individual on this planet who was never mentioned
in any other publication. She looks for her father, died two months before, and she finds him at the
beginning of his life, feeling every emotion or sentiments that he felt to. She reads about all the
phases of his life till the moment when he dies from cancer. Years before his death he became
unhappy with his life and obsessed with the floral motive which he drew all over the house. She
thought that the form of the flower was wrong, the only mistake she managed to find in the book.
Suddenly, she woke up screaming, wrote down all from the dream and, once home, got the
confirmation that the flower drawn in the book was actually a form of the sarcoma that grew in her
father for years.
The revelation of her father’s life, his deepest fears and experiences, arrives one night in a foreign land, observing the strange Encyclopaedia of the Dead. In her dream she realises the particularity and uniqueness of every individual in the infinite course of history:
[…] nothing ever repeats in the history of the human race, all which on first sight seems
identical, is at most similar; every man is a separate world, everything happens always and
never, everything repeats till infinite and unrepeatable […]. (ED, p. 55) [personal translation].
Reading further the text she arrives to the first post-war years, the feeling of an obscure presence
appears in the text together with a discrete, but very suggestive description of the direct consequences
of the actions of the political authorities:
[…] heavy and painful silence, is interpreted by the book as a contagious terror […] with the
black face swollen from the slaps and from the lack of sleep, and this every single morning, at
dawn, for about six months, until he didn’t confess the names of other persons who divided his
errors regarding the Russians and listened to Radio Moscow […]. (Ibid.: 60/62) [personal
translation].
The description of her father as a person disappointed with life, prone to alcohol, obsessed with
painting the floral motive, represents a story of disillusion with the once believed ideals and its
expression in the form of the cancer that grew inside his body for years. Even the theatrical performance Waiting for Godot emphasises the illusion with the arrival of the expected. But as Godot
never comes, the sad characters continue with their absurd life and her father continues painting/representing the disappointment he carries inside till the point he loses, or surrenders, the game to the
illness, or to some other greater power.
The history created by individual stories, the universal right to be an equally important part of
every story we ever made part of, allows the perception of the individual as the main force that has
the capability of changing something, or on the contrary, its giving up or impotence in front of the
too powerful “opponent” represents an irreparable loss for the history. The dream, relativising all
that was presented, instead of taking away the credibility of the narration, sets free the ideas imprisoned in the everyday experiences, providing to the human thought a larger space for expression.
Everything could have been the truth, or something similar to it. The dream could have been dreamt
by her father or by someone else, in any case the experience of dreaming and reading remains unique.
Contrary to the A Tomb for Boris Davidovich, where and individual was sacrificed to a larger
context of political ideas, the short story Encyclopaedia of the Dead, presents a different attitude
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towards the history, full of doubt because its not clear if it belongs to the dreams or it is really lived.
The message that comes out from the story is anti-ideological in itself; political ideals perceived as
unrealistic, are identified with dream, which is an illusion. The ideal reader of Kiš’s poetry can
hardly belong to the mass of middle or lowbrow readers. His message, presented with sophisticated
lines, can easily remain non-transmitted or non-understood. The story is narrated through two layers
of narration, “the real time” of narration in Stockholm and the dream, which narrates the “real” life
of the father. The spirit of time testified the end of one political ideology and saw the rise of others
as automatic substitutes for the previous one. The critics defined Kiš (Palavestra 1991: 264) as the
first post-war writer who completely identified himself with Europe: the unconditioned belief in
Europe that is conceived as an alternative to the barbarisms and vulgarity. The same Europe that
forty years before allowed six millions of Jewish victims.
3.9. Knife
First published in 1982, Vuk Drašković’s novel Knife (2000) was banned by the Communist
authorities. The structure of the story is quite complicated, the time line includes a period longer
than twenty years and the novel builds two parallel stories independent from each other with
continuous flash backs in the form of memories, thoughts and dreams. The book begins with the
massacre of the Jugović family on Orthodox Christmas Day, January 7, 1942, by their neighbours,
and “blood brothers”, the Moslem family Osmanović. The only one to survive the murders, a
newborn child, is immediately taken to hodza who decides that the child will be brought up as
Moslem. Returning to their village Osmanović family meets their fellow riders carrying another
newborn baby, whose family was killed by Chetniks. Both of them are taken to the widow Rabija
and told to be Moslem orphans. The following day the Chetniks attack the Osmanović village and
kill most of the men who knew the truth about the children. Rabija manages to save only one child,
Alija, and her own son Fahrudin, the other baby Selim is taken by Chetniks, never to be seen again.
After the war Alija is brought up in a Moslem village by his stepmother Rabija and raised to
hate Serbs. The story moves to the early sixties, Alija is a university student in Sarajevo eager to
find out his family history and the events that made him an orphan. His Serbian girlfriend Milica is
helping him with the local newspapers that decide to publish his personal story with the request for
information concerning the case.
Parallel to the Sarajevo events, the other story takes place in Trieste and it’s about the old
Moslem shopkeeper Atif Tanović, alias Sabahudin Muratović. Atif Tanović was a shopkeeper in
Sarajevo before the war. When the war started local Ustasha leaders told him that he was going to
get all the goods and the shop from his good Serbian neighbour Đorđe Vilenjak: the only condition
was to kill him and his family. Atif, afraid of the possible consequences in case he refused the
proposal, obeys the order. With the end of the war Atif escapes with the Ustashas and along the
way meets the man who participated in the massacre of the Jugović and knew the whole story about
the children; Afit confides him his personal story too. The same day the man dies and Atif manages
to get new identity papers and becomes Sabahudin Muratović; with the money he has he opens a
store in Trieste. The story moves again to 1963 when in his store appears young Hamdija pleading
for help, in getting to Germany. Atif convinces him to stay with him in Trieste. One day Atif, by
chance, sees the newspaper article about Alija and confides to Hamdija that he knew about the
story, and Hamdija secretly writes to Alija. In Sarajevo, Alija receives an enigmatic letter and goes
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to the old man Sikter Efendij, hoping to receive some explanations. An old man collects the parts of
the story and reveals to Alija that he’s a Yugović’s baby. Alija is desperate and starts to hate all the
Moslems and also his family. In Trieste arrives the other revelation. One day Hamdija’s relatives
arrive wanting to take him away, Atif receives them but soon is discovered that they are not
Moslems but the remaining members of the Vilenjak family and that they waited twenty years to
kill him; Hamdija’s real name is Milan Vilenjak. They force Atif to sign his testament in favour of
Milan. Used to the old man, Milan refuses to kill him but Atif, after signing the documents, dies of
a heart attack. The novel ends with the arrival of Milan to Sarajevo and the clearing of the remaining mysteries with Alija.
The beginning of the novel connects this story to Njegoš’s Mountain Wreath, only this time
instead of Moslems, the victims are the Jugović family (Jug=South) on Orthodox Christmas 1942.
The large number of coincidences inserted into the plot helps to maintain the structure of the novel
and the story connected. The novel is full of political messages that are presented through the
frequent reoccurrence of certain scenes in order to stress the guiding light for the actions, which is a
justified revenge for the infliction of physical and psychological pain. The opening lines of the
novel show how the mechanism of “realistic” descriptions works in the creation of the horrifying
atmosphere of tortures and how it’s able to create the unnatural reaction of the tortured who seems
outside his own body and the hate and fear that could be expected in the situation; not by chance the
image of a saint is associated to his image:
Elderly Vukasin was from the village of Kepac in Herzegovina. When the Ustasha murderer in
Jasenovac cut off his hair, Vukasin answered him with the patience of a saint: “Child, just do
your job!” After the Ustasha ripped off his other ear, his nose, and even gouged out his eyes, he
received the same answer: “Child, just do your job!” […]. (K, p. 1) [personal italicisation].
The description of the tortures of an old man, that provokes an automatic sense of pity and
horror, is only one of the numerous and repeated descriptions that use the same theme of the
destruction of the Serbs. Tortures of Serbs are described through the novel nine more times (ibidem:
29, 117, 170, 189, 190, 215, 218, 231, 252-272), with the last description that lasts exact twenty
pages. The description from page 170 shows the language and stile with whom Drašković obtains the
horrifying effect on the readers:
My first blow was fatal, which saves me from the unforeseen torments that the others around
me are subjected to. Many of the Ustashas have to endure the sight of their scythe carrying off
toes and feet or getting stuck in shinbones. The victims die only when the cutting edge hammers
into their intestines and tears up their insides. Others have hands, ears, and parts of their faces
sliced off, eyes knocked out, jaws hacked off, and teeth broken while they’re still conscious
[…]. (Ibid, p. 170) [personal italicisation].
The first confrontation with the Moslems arrives already on the seventh page of the novel:
A man went to war with a heavy heart- but singing. It was disgraceful to exhibit visible fear,
evade the call to arms or avoid putting on a uniform. That was how it was among the Jugovići,
unusual and thoroughly unwise, perhaps, but it was no doubt in harmony with the frank and
unschooled sentiments these young men felt for their home and their country.
A total of about thirty young men went to war from Osmanovići, a large neighbouring village
whose boundaries extended along the length of the upper course of the Neretva, although five
times as many had been called upon to serve. (Ibid.: 7) [personal italicisation].
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The object of the confrontation is the willingness to depart for war. Already from this short
description it is clear that the Moslems are not brave as the Jugovići and even worse, they are not
willing to defend their country. The Serbian Jugovići are the incarnation of the solid warrior ready
to die for his country, contrary to Moslem Osmanovići who by avoiding their duty represent less
trustworthy individuals. This idea comes into realisation on pages 31-47 where Drašković, with the
previously introduced stile, describes the annihilation of the entire Jugović family by their blood
brothers Osmanovići. This “vivid” style is also used to describe the partisan cruelty:
[…] some fellow told me a few days ago that they dragged the dying knez Sekula Tosković
out of his deathbed, loaded him onto an old nag, and executed him by firing squad in the first
valley they reached. (Ibid.: 8) [personal italicisation].
Similar descriptions with the theme of partisan torturing could be found also on pages 21 and 25
of the book. It could be interesting to notice that while the Moslem Ustasha crimes could be found
on several places together with partisan crimes, Chetnik’s crimes are only nominated but never
described. Serbian crimes are on the other hand nominated, but only in the context of revenge:
But they are a race of people who weight everything, remember everything and put everything in writing. They would not be at peace until they had completely annihilated Osmanovići, and had destroyed all trace of them! Only then would revenge be complete, and only
then would justice, dispensed by the knife, find satisfaction. (Ibid.: 89) [personal italicisation].
The story presents several messages connected to religion and ethnicity. In fact, when young
Alija founds out that he’s actually a Serb and reacts as if his whole world clashed on him, his old
uncle Sikter explains him that all the Bosnian Moslems were once Serbs and to deny the common
ancestors could produce only an incomplete personality, therefore: Moslems are Serbs of different
religion. The other message proposed by the author is that Ustasha crimes remained unpunished and
that Ustasha even received pension in the new state. The last clear message regards the Serbs: they
also committed crimes but only as a reaction to others’ atrocities.
These ideas are presented in a quite simple and clear way. The clear message coming from the
author can easily find its way towards the receivers. The communication with the public is
obtained, as always, through characters, but this time not only through the protagonist’s personal
tragedy, but also through the described tragedy of the anonymous victims that can easily represent
the whole nation. The main character, young Alija, disturbed by his plight in search of his true
identity, sets into motion the narration wheel and thanks to his actions we manage to go into the
past and find out before him the mysteries of his life. In the beginning he’s a young and angry man
who hates Serbs, brought up in his “native” village, isolated form the world with only hate in his
heart, that doesn’t allow the tolerance and acceptance of the other. When he arrives in Sarajevo, his
first girlfriend is Serbian, as are so many of his friends. This is the beginning of the ideological coexistence in his person, which ends with the discovery that he’s a Serbian. The strange explanation
that eventually makes him accept this idea is not, as could be expected, the ascertainment that war
creates victims and that coexistence is the only possibility for the peace and a common future;
instead, the young man talking with his “old and wise” uncle discovers that all Moslems are
actually Serbs since they have common ancestors. This radical solution to the ethnicity problem, in
the form of non-existence of an officially recognised nation, could be at least perceived as a bizarre
historical interpretation, not to say a direct political provocation. The claim that Moslem Ustashas
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are walking freely and even receiving state pension goes in the same context. The idea that
Moslems were only members of the Ustasha movement, Nazi collaborators and also rewarded by
the state, could have created a potential tension in the Serbian perception of the Moslem neighbours. The only character that is able to go behind the idea of revenge and to break the violence
circle is the young Serbian Milan Vilenjak: the symbol of sufferings becomes the symbol of
forgiveness and reason. The search for the ideal reader doesn’t seem very long; it’s hard to imagine
that the novel could be appreciated by anyone but the Serbs. Even the low and middle-brow readers
are able to understand the hate that Alija feels towards the Serbs and especially the mercy and
forgiveness coming from their co-national Milan Vilenjak, promoting the idea of Serbs as a
peaceful and forgiving nation.
The narration technique uses time layers to tell the story, which very often switches from one
period to another in short narration intervals. The story begins in 1942 with the murder of Jugovići
and that is a first time layer; than it cuts off twenty years and moves to the early sixties, which
become the real historical layer. The psychological condition of the characters is expressed through
their thoughts and memories that go along with the main narration. By narrating the past events, the
author opens another time passage towards the past and transports the past events into the present of
the readers. The narration uses real historic figures and mixes them up with the invented characters,
creating a narrative web of the historic novel represented through personal stories.
The book, without any doubt presents an antiwar ideology that can be deduced at least from the
first ideological layer. The representation of Serbian sufferings, with an accent on the necessary
revenge and in this way its justification, could be read as a second layer, but its strong descriptions
and the very clear identification of the guilty part, make this aspect of the novel dominant in the
post-reading impressions. The ideas that remain imprinted in one’s memory are not the peaceful
coexistence but the suffering and tortures inflicted to Serbs. The partisans are not seen as liberators
but as another mechanism which brought more harm than good, with them comes the conclusion
that the Jugović family (representing the essence of the South Slav existence) killed at the
beginning of the story, remains dead together with the idea of South-Slav unity. In the whole book
there is no Yugoslav national idea.
The social aspect in the interpretation of the novel could prove to be very important if we’re
familiar with the years when the book was published. The raise of Slobodan Milošević, the political
situation that made it possible, the revival of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the political
aspirations of the author (13) change the perspective towards the novel. If we take into consideration the ideal receivers, the low and middlebrow public, the effect obtained on such public can
hardly be defined as one in favour of interethnic tolerance and coexistence. The particularly targeted nationality are Moslems who, besides being represented as cowards not willing to fight in the
war and slaughterers of unprotected and innocent Serbs, are also ethnically denied. For Drašković
they are only Serbs who changed religion, but in this understanding their position is even worse because not only they separated from the co-nationals, they also turned against them openly supporting the much stronger enemy, thus providing the Serbs with the aura of martyrdom. Unfortunately it
13. In the early nineties Vuk Drašković abandoned literature to form an opposition political party called
The Serbian Renewal Movement and he also led the political demonstrations on the streets of Belgrade
against S. Milošević. Drašković was arrested and later released. He performed the function of Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Milošević’s government from January until April of 1999.
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is possible to deduce that in this case the hatred speech was well disguised among the ideas of
justice, revenge and forgiveness.
3.10. Other works
Other interesting reflections can be found in Radovan Pavić’s (1990) novel Predeo slikan čajem
[The Land painted with Tea (title personal translation)]. The novel is divided in two books: the first
book Mali noćni roman [A small night novel (personal translation)] tells the story of an unsuccessful architect Atanasije Svilar. Atanasije, always full of great ideas but without any concrete
realisation, decides to find out the truth about the man he believes to be his father. The road takes
him to Hilandar monastery in Athos (Greece). Parallel to his story, we can follow the story of
Hilander’s monks and their orders. They are divided into two different orders, with two completely
different life philosophies, solitaries and kenobits. The first group is characterised by an individual
approach towards the life, very social and fond of foreign languages, with the Virgin as a protector.
The other group, kenobits, is very faithful to their community, they don’t have any need to communicate with anyone else besides their brothers, they don’t speak any foreign language, don’t have
any personal property and their highest saint is Saint Sava (14). Atanasije doesn’t find his father but
he realises that he always belonged to the solitaries and since the whole world is under the influence of kenobits, he is never going to reach the success. Traditionally kenobits were the architects, they built another city independent from the celestial constructions, and they depended on it.
They represented the city and only the destruction of them could have destroyed the city.
The second book is Roman za ljubitelje ukrštenih reči [A novel for those who are fond of
crosswords (personal translation)]. After returning home Atanasije Svilar becomes Atanasije Razin,
because he takes the surname of his real father who was a Russian dissident and mathematician. He
leaves his wife, becomes a successful businessman in America and marries another woman. In his
secret diary he paints pictures using the tea. The buildings are the most famous houses of Josip
Broz Tito. After the death of his second wife he sells the firm and becomes again Atanasije Svilar.
He builds a copy of Brioni Islands, the famous leisure area of J.B. Tito, on the Potomac River near
Washington. One day, there is a huge snowstorm and inside the house he sees a baby, representing
death, and the shadows above him.
The first part of the novel presents the life of the protagonist and takes the story to Hilandar monastery where we discover the existence of two types of people: the individualists and collectivists.
Atanasije, impressed by the discovery that he lived all his life among the wrong group of people,
decides to change it. In the second part we discover the consequences of such a change. His business
success is followed by an internal change: he becomes the representation of evil and a secret admirer
of J.B. Tito and he constructs the copies of Tito’s most famous residences with all Tito’s trophies as
well. In the end, with the arrival of the shadows, as the secret police or the devil, comes also the
punishment for his misdeeds and for the reproduction of Tito’s residences.
The interesting story of the destiny of the intellectual in Russia is represented through the story
of Atanasije’s real father, a mathematician. In order to escape the communist persecutions, his
father runs to the north of the country where he works as a snow cleaner. The local administration
eager to educate all the semi-alphabetised workers sends them all to a local school. One day, unable
14. The highest saint in the Serbian Orthodox Church.
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291
to control himself, he corrects the teacher explaining her complex mathematic theories but when he
gets stuck during his elaboration, all other students correct him, proving to be scientists like him.
Another interesting story is “Florijan” from Mirko Kovač’s Heavenly Fiancés (1998). It deals
with the theme of political prisoners and the feeling of inexistence after the prison. The feeling is so
strong that the man is not even sure he’s alive. The narrator discovers that eventually Florijan committed suicide. The story doesn’t deal with national topic; it denounces the political system and the
consequences that it leaves on the individual.
A similar attitude can be encountered in The Death of Ruben Rubenović (Albahari 1989) where
the author narrates the stories of one family and the memories connected to the family friend Ruben
Rubenović, who survived the Second World War. His presence reminds the family of the difference
between the official history and the personal history that every individual has. From that point of
view it seems that an objective history doesn’t exist, since the history is created by individual
experiences that very often are not compatible with the official version.
3.11. Common features
The books chosen for this case study were not the only works that handled political issues, the
national question or the political system included. The choice was more or less random, paying
attention that the works had at least some difference among them and that they were read and
accepted by the public. Almost the only leitmotiv after thirteen works can be defined as a revival of
the Second World War and the unpunished sufferings of the Serbian population. Unfortunately for
the interethnic relations, to the Catholic clergy the role is reserved of the main Nazi collaborators
with the detailed description of their crimes. Other works, which managed to avoid the presence of
the Croatian misdeeds, left their space to the criticism of the political ideology. There is no trace of
the heroic Second World War partisans, in these works often described as a mass of ignorant crowd
who occupied someone else’s place.
The possibility for the understanding of the presented works is very high, since the most of the
themes are narrowly connected to the events, or presumed events, of the Second World War. Forty
years later, many still alive warriors and their disturbed memories of the war horrors, the mixture of
the historical events, literary interpretations and personal recollections, created a socially acceptable
body that didn’t recognise, in the existing political ideology, a quality force able to satisfy and keep
together all the population. The anti-communist attitude, encountered in several works, was usually
followed by the detailed presentation of the Serbian sufferings, an anti-Croatian position and the
negative perception of the members of the new Socialist society.
The works communicate through the characters, from young boys and their innocent observations
to the weak members of the middle class. Most of them represent one social class or become the
witnesses of the big historical changes. The great number of the unknown victims functions as a sole
body in the representation of the sufferings, prompting within the reader the sense of pity and horror.
The political ideology encountered in the works is somehow hidden among the descriptions and
the literary narration, and it doesn’t surface till the very end of the story. Even though the works
employ different techniques, using several layers of narration, the political ideology manages to
find its complete form by putting together all the elements that created the text. The promoted
ideologies are not numerous; through the familiar themes they present the rejection of the current
political situation and the resentment towards the neighbours of other nationalities. The feeling of
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resentment not only denounces the events, it also opens the gate for a new ideology ready to substitute the old and failed one. The presence of the political ideology could or could not significantly influence the perception of the literary work; the elements that remain impressed more than theoretical
observations are certainly the passages in the novels recalling the innocent deaths and sufferings.
Conclusion
The dynamic history of former Yugoslavia saw the violent failure of the ideology that provided
more or less secure home for millions of people. The spread of the direct violence in the nineties
opened the debates regarding the causes of the war solution and the origins of the violent conflict.
The existence of cultural violence in the eighties seemed an inevitable assumption in front of the
indifferent attitude of the population towards the open violence in the nineties. The role of institutions, media and art, was to be seen in a new light as probable producers of the new national
feelings. The identity question, the complex of many different elements creating a uniform feeling
of belonging to something, was submitted to various influences in order to obtain a different scale
of importance of the various elements that made part of the everyday life. The factory workers besides being Serbs, Slovenes or Croats were also workers, fathers, husbands or sons, and somehow
the first identification became the dominant and the only important one.
The world of media and art, traditionally independent transmitters and creators of the free
thought, and therefore subjects of the civil action, started to assume the form of politically dependent bodies and consequently objects of the political action. In this probable change of role, the civil
society remained without the important whistleblowers and also without knowing it. The previously
obtained credibility, served as a “pass-par-tout” in front of the population struck by the economic
crises and tired of the ideologies. The elite’s projections, spread through the institutions acting in a
uniform way towards a large number of subjects, became the objects of the previously agreed strategies among the political leaders. The process of implementation did not necessary include a forced
action especially among the artists. The world of journalism depending largely on the state and
editors in this analysis can’t be compared to the world of writers or intellectuals, who most of the
times acted freely in the open space of the art creations. The works containing parallel worlds were
able to guide the receivers towards the simplified projections of the presumed past and the established national feeling. The Yugoslav background, with its various possibilities for different historical reconstructions and its favour for the official ideology for the common prosperity, never cleared
the war events, thirty years later this politics created the space for “free” interpretations and the
possibility for manipulation. The media updated the population on the contemporary issues and in
this sense performed its function in a society eager for information and the “just” interpretation of
the occurred. The art expressions followed another line in transmitting the spirit of time.
The ideologically engaged literature was dominated by similar issues that were primarily expressed through the narration of the Second World War events and the social changes arrived after
the war. The stories connected with the Second World War were full of the resentment towards the
Croatian side and the disproportionate Serb victims fallen for the common state. Once appreciated
partisans were marginalized as members of a new and rude society, with a strong accent on their
presumed ignorance and complete lack of city culture. The promoted ideologies were mainly connected to the rejection of the political situation and the resentment towards the population of the
Anti-ideological writing and the national question in the Serbian literature of the eighties
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other republics.
The ideal readers of such literature were to be searched among the large population, which was
able to understand the issues connected to the recent past and willing to accept the interpretation
offered by intellectual elites through the literary works which managed to obtain the effect of
“contemporaneousness” within the readers. The sense of loss, of injustice and disapproval was
offered to the public of the eighties, which was ready to finally talk openly about the undergone
sufferings during the last conflict and to be distracted from the strong economic crisis. The romanticised heroic past, the strong Orthodox clergy and the denunciation of the existence of the old
middle class before the arrival of the socialist system satisfied the needs of the population to feel
important and not only as a consequence of the communist ideology.
The system of symbols through which the human actions get represented uses symbolic
characters that become part of every individual in the society. The economic and political crisis of
the eighties brought disillusion among the people; through the literary characters and their social
symbolism, literature represented the individuals, social classes and whole nation in various periods
of its history. The common denominator of the social symbolism could be found in the concept of
victim and the broad rejection of the socialist ideology. The general consent among the public was
obtained by its successful identification with the characters, which forwarded political ideas
congruous to those of the political leadership. The feelings of loss, sacrifice, pain and injustice were
understood and managed to find a way towards the receivers of the message that, once arrived to the
destination, probably managed to undergo the transformation into values. The values in the eighties,
capturing the spirit of time, didn’t follow the direction of the mourning elaboration and the
recognition for all the victims of the war conflicts; instead they went towards the resentism and the
feeling of the just revenge against the internal and external enemy. In any case they were familiar to
the readers and easily accepted because expressed in simple and clear forms.
The difference between the interpretation of the social environment and the voluntarily creation
of the general atmosphere doesn’t seem too evident in the works. The old motives of war and
middle age battles reappeared in the new industrial society, unfamiliar with the historic truths and
ready for information that involved their still alive relatives or long gone ancestors. The literary reconstructions of recent history used the personal tragedies and the tragedy of entire nation to express their discontent with the official ideology. Using mostly Croats and Catholic clergy as opponents in the battle for salvation, besides reviving the war events, Serb writers obtained the “bird
prospective” in the understanding of the history. Simplification of parties and actions, with the
precise division of roles, re-established among the readers old memories in the “right” form.
The hypothesis from the beginning of this work found the probable answers in the space of
literary works. The first premise, the Serbian literature of the eighties was orchestrated by the political elites in order to bring the imagined heroic past into the conscience of the present, encountered
partially positive answer. It is not possible to determine the direct manipulation but the sharing of
the official political ideology is very present in most of the encountered works. The influence of the
political elites was without doubt present with very similar attitudes towards certain issues. The
same thematic line could be easily met in the novels and in the speeches of political elites but there
can be more reasons for such coincidence; it can’t be understood only from the literary works if
they were written in order to influence the receivers and achieve the silent political agreement or
they simply reflected the already existing atmosphere. The act of manipulation can be considered
existing at a certain level of analysis but it can’t be determined the line where the intention ends and
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the reflection begins. For a more precise response it would be necessary to enter the personal, or
public, life of the authors and search for a political involvement of any kind and according to those
information to create an opinion regarding the role of a determined author in the society and the
probable guideline regarding his/her work.
The second hypothesis, the Serbian literature of the eighties was a sufficient source for the perception of the awakening of the nationalist thought and the arrival of the conflict, receives a negative answer. In the literary works presented in the third section it wasn’t possible to detect an excessive presence of the Serbian nationalist thought and even less the resolution of the political crisis
in the form of armed conflict. The overall feeling present in the chosen novels could be defined as a
strong resentment towards the socialist ideology and a profound self-pity for the civil victims in all
previous wars. The conclusion from this observation could be more inclined towards the affirmation
that the political resentism could have produced the consequent change in the political life of the
state, from the single ideology towards the democratic changes and that the perceived nationalism
could have served as a necessary back up for the exit from the present ideology. The political life
didn’t accept the democratic solution and the chosen themes in literature became one part of many
elements that supported in some way the new official nationalist ideology.
The third hypothesis, in the Serbian literature of the eighties the weakening of the Yugoslav
national identity was expressed, gets confirmed without any doubt. The Yugoslav nation is practically inexistent; all the characters belong to other nations: Croats, Serbs or Muslims. The rare moments that describe the members of the new socialist society are not concerned with their national
belonging, but mostly with the definitions and descriptions of their presumed ignorance and primitiveness. A common solution as Yugoslavs was not even tried, there is no work that tries to build
the common future and maybe even fails. Serbs are defined as such together with Croats, with the
firm recall of the Second World War were many of them fought on the opposite sides; the period of
forty years of the common state and life is simply left out.
The contemporary literature journals weren’t particularly interested in the review of the politically engaged literature. Most of the texts were dedicated to the reflections over the previously
published works. The different literary prizes such as “NIN Prize” for the best Yugoslav novel or the
prize for the most read book of the year assigned by the National Library of Serbia, provided enough
information to confirm that the politically engaged literature found its way towards the critics and the
readers. Authors like S. Selenić, A. Tišma, M. Kovač and R. Pavić were the most read authors of
those years, together with others who also treated political issues. The choice of the critics for the
best novel surely influenced the choice of readers but since the awards were annual it could be
deduced that the awarded novels were also well accepted and further recommended for reading.
The reflection of reality or its new creation in the imagined space of literary creation allowed the
unlimited expression of the new visions of idealism with a strong accent on the denial of the present
condition. The feelings of loss, rejection and injustice were perceivable in those works read by
thousands of people and shared among them who lived in a strong economic crisis. It’s not possible
to imagine that those works caused any direct attack on other members of the Yugoslav society, but
the negative sign easily detected in the writings probably left, among the readers, a sort of internal
justification for the political actions in the nineties.
Anti-ideological writing and the national question in the Serbian literature of the eighties
295
Editions used for quotations:
BM = Popović, Danko, Knjiga o Milutinu (A Book about Milutin), Književne Novine, Belgrade, 1985.
BC = Propalo Društvo (Broken Company), in: Kovač, Mirko, Nebeski Zaručnici (Heavenly fiancés), Bigz,
Belgrade, 1998.
DK = Pavić, Milorad, Hazarski Rečnik (The Dictionary of Khazars), Prosveta, Belgrade, 1992.
DN = Dan i Noć (Day and Night), Kovač, Mirko, Nebeski Zaručnici (Heavenly fiancés), Bigz, Belgrade, 1998.
ED = Kiš, Danilo, Enciclopedia dei morti (The Encyclopaedia of the Dead), Adelphi, Milano, 1988.
F
= Selenić, Slobodan, Prijatelji (Friends), Prosveta, Belgrade, 2000.
K = Drašković, Vuk, Knife, The Serbian Classics Press, New York, 2000.
TM = Selenić, Slobodan, Timor Mortis, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1991.
WD = Tišma, Aleksandar, Široka Vrata (Wide Doors), Nolit, Belgrade, 1989.
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Mulino, Bologna.
Escarpit R. (1994), Sociologia della letteratura, Newton Compton, Roma.
Galtung J. (1996), Peace by peaceful means, Sage, London [trad. it.: Pace con mezzi pacifici, Esperia, Milano,
2000].
Gellner E. (1983), Nations and nationalism, Ithaca Press, New York.
Hermet G. (2000), Nazioni e nazionalismi in Europa, Il Mulino, Bologna.
Hobsbawm E. (1991), Nazioni e nazionalismo dal 1780, Einaudi, Torino.
Katunarić V. (2003), Sporna Zajednica, Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Hrvatsko Sociološko Društvo, Zagreb.
Kellas J. (1993), Nazionalismi ed etnie, Il Mulino, Bologna.
Palavestra P. (1991), Književnost - kritika ideologije, Srpska Književna Udruga, Belgrade.
Perić I. (2005), Nacionalizam na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, Vlastita Naklada: Sofija Perić, Zagreb.
Pešić V. (2002), Srpska Strana Rata- trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju, edited by Nebojša Popov,
Samizdat B 92, Belgrade.
Ramet S. (1996), Balkan Babel: Politics, culture and religion in Yugoslavia, Westview Press, Boulder (Col.).
Sekulić D. (2004), Sukobi i Tolerancija, Naklada Jesenski i Turk, Hrvatsko Sociološko Društvo, Zagreb.
Sofos S., B. Jenkins (1996), Nation and identity in contemporary Europe, Routledge, London.
Udovički J. (1995), Nationlism, Ethnic Conflict and Self-determination in former Yugoslavia, in B. Berberoglu (ed.), The national question: Nationalism, ethnic conflict and self-determination in 20th century,
Temple UP, Philadelphia.
Wachtel A.B. (1998), Making a nation, breaking a nation, Stanford UP, Stanford (Cal.).
Waldenberg M. (1994), Le questioni nazionali nell’Europa centro-orientale, Il Saggiatore, Milano.
Literature works:
Albahari, David, La morte di Ruben Rubenović, Hefti Edizioni, Milano, 1989.
Drašković, Vuk, Knife, The Serbian Classics Press, New York, 2000.
Kiš, Danilo, Enciclopedia dei morti, Adelphi, Milano, 1988.
Kiš, Danilo, Una tomba per Boris Davidovič, Adelphi, Milano, 2005.
Kovač, Mirko, Nebeski Zaručnici, Bigz, Belgrade, 1998.
Pavić, Milorad, Hazarski Rečnik, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1992.
Pavić, Radovan, Predeo slikan čajem, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1990.
Popović, Danko Knjiga o Milutinu, Književne Novine, Belgrade, 1985.
Radulović, Jovan, Golubnjča i druge priče, Rad, Belgrade, 1989.
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Selenić, Slobodan, Timor Mortis, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1991.
Selenić, Slobodan, Prijatelji, Prosveta, Belgrade, 2000.
Tišma, Aleksandar, Široka Vrata, Nolit, Belgrade, 1989.
Secondary Bibilography:
Anzulovic B. (1999), Heavenly Serbia: From myth to genocide, Hurst & Co, London.
Banac I. (1984), The national question in Yugoslavia, Ithaca Press, New York.
Brubaker R. (1996), I nazionalismi nell’Europa contemporanea, Editori Riuniti, Roma.
Dogo M., G. Franzinetti (2002), Disrupting and reshaping. early stages of nation-building in the Balkans,
Longo Editore, Ravenna.
Gellner E. (1993), Culture, identity and politics, Cambridge UP, New York.
Glenny M. (1993), The fall of Yugoslavia, Penguin Books, New York.
Glenny M. (2001), Balkans, Penguin Books, New York.
Ramet S. (1992), Nationalism and federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, Indiana UP, Indianapolis.
Ugrešić D. (1998), The culture of lies, The Pennsylvania State UP, University Park.
Web resources: www.gbns.ns.ac.yu
Annex - Serbian Literary Awards
Annual Literary Award of the National Library of Serbia for the most read novel:
1978
Dobrilo Nenadić - Dorotej (Dorotej)
1979
Mirko Kovač - Vrata od utrobe (The doors of intestines)
1980
Saša Božović - Tebi moja Dolores (To you my Dolores)
1981
Slobodan Selenić - Prijatelji (Friends)
1982
The award was not assigned
1983
Meša Selimović - Krug (The circle)
1984
Dragoslav Mihajlović - Čizmaši (Those in Boots)
1985-1988 The award was not assigned
1989
Milorad Pavić - Predeo slikan čajem (The Land painted with Tea)
1990
Dobrica Ćosić - Vernik (The Believer)
NIN Award for the best Yugoslav novel of the year
1978
Mirko Kovač - Vrata od utrobe (The doors of intestines)
1979
Pavle Ugrinov - Zadat život (The Inflicted Life)
1980
Slobodan Selenić - Prijatelji (Friends)
1981
Pavao Pavličić - Večernji akt (The Evening Act)
1982
Antonije Isaković - Tren 2 (The Moment 2)
1983
Dragoslav Mihajlović - Čizmaši (Those in Boots)
1984
Milorad Pavić - Hazarski rečnik (Dictionary of the Khazars)
1985
Živojin Pavlović - Zid smrti (The Wall of Death)
1986
Vidosav Stevanović - Testament (The Testament)
1987
Voja Čolanović - Zebnja na rasklapanje (Unfolding Anxiety)
1988
Dubravka Ugrešić - Forsiranje romana reke (Fording the Stream of Consciousness)
1989
Vojislav Lubarda - Vaznesenje (The Ascension)
1990
Miroslav Jošić Višnjić - Odbrana i propast Bodroga u sedam burnih godišnjih doba (Chosen
and the Ruin of Bodrog in seven turbulent seasons)
THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION: THE OLD AND THE NEW ONE
Svjetlana Kovačević
Abstract: The research issues are the nature of the conflicting identities which the two main ethnic groups in
Macedonia (Macedonians and Albanians) have constructed and the identification of effective policies for the
integration at regional and national levels. From the theoretical contributions, there seems to be enough
evidence to assert that the national identities are not as sound and unitary as nationalist ideologies maintain
and that they are, in addition, multiple, hybrid and ongoing forms of identification which involve the
individual level as well. The fieldwork focuses on families with three generation who, regardless of their
ethnic belonging, have experienced several dramatic socio-political changes during the lifetime of their
middle-aged and older citizens; family members have been approached with semi-structured interviews,
stimulated by a selection of photographs and images showing symbols, social practices and important events
from different historical moments of the community life. In the case of the Macedonian community, the
interviewees are generally convinced to belong to the Macedonian nation and speak Macedonian language;
sixty years of common state and the process of state-building have erased the substantial differences that
existed among them in the past. With regard to the Albanians, their community seems much more ‘imagined’
than the Macedonian one. From the analysis and testimonies reported, there seems to be enough ground to
confirm that a deep divide between the Albanian and Macedonian population - that concerns almost all
aspects of life - exists and continues in post-Ohrid Agreement Macedonia as well. Despite the fact that the
Agreement was perceived as a possible solution to the ethnic conflict, actually - according to both sides – it
seems to have created even a greater gap between them: the majority of the Macedonian interviewees
perceived the Agreement as a severe loss of security and a threat to their national identity; the Albanians, on
their side, argue that the Agreement did not grant them the rights they asked for and are filled with suspicion
and haughtiness toward the Macedonians.
►► ◄◄
1. Conflicting identities and integration policies in Macedonia
1.1. Introduction
This research deals with the topic of group identity: ethnic groups, minorities, nations as well as
the modern political phenomenon of nationalism.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern
Europe the nation state became the main claim of many people, and ethnic nationalism became the
main tool for the founding of political parties, for mobilizing masses against the communist regimes
and for the striving for the independent international status of the countries. The concept of “class”
as the main element in the communist discourse was replaced with the concept of “nation” in the
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nationalistic discourse. The result of this renaissance of nation states is that today we can distinguish some 70 interstate frontier areas inside of the area of the Council of Europe. The border between the former Eastern and Western Germany collapsed reuniting the territory which was previously divided, but like in the case of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the Western Balkan
countries, the political changes caused the dismemberment of the former federations and the creation of new national states and borders.
This renaissance of national states in Eastern Europe and the closure of the national borders and
symbols are in contrast with the process of the European integration which aims to eradicate
borders and create a new Europe which is more than an administrative entity for its people. A
Europe which is socially cohesive whilst respecting the national cultural traditions, and which
overcomes the painful traditions without pretending to create superficial solutions, which builds on
tolerance and respect of others without ignoring the problems which mutual mistrust and resentments cause, and which encourages co-operation and economic prosperity . In this new Europe, that
aims to guarantee a peaceful coexistence amongst its inhabitants, there is no place for ethnic nationalism. However, recent events in Eastern Europe and especially in the Western Balkans reveal that the
“unsolved national question” still represents a serious threat to the European and regional stability.
The 20th century was extremely dynamic for all the peoples living in the Balkans. It was extremely painful as well. The 20th century started with the national emancipation of the states and
peoples previously dominated by foreign rulers, and was followed by a series of wars. The Balkan
wars opened the century and marked the beginning of the modernization and the liberation of the
region. Initially fought against the Turks, these wars later turned into a conflict among the Balkan
states. Through the involvement of big powers, these wars were followed by the First and the
Second World Wars which resulted in the emergence of newly shaped states and a new socialist
system. Finally, in the last decade of the 20th century, the peoples in the Balkans experienced the
fall of the socialist system, the dissolution of the federation and the internal political and territorial
reshaping of the region. This was again done through wars, and in a certain sense, the Balkan
history repeated itself.
In Yugoslavia of the 1990’s, the idea of ethnic belonging had retained a primordial power, a
transcending allegiance to a multicultural state and driving otherwise ordinary people to support
dangerous ideologies. The ethnicity turned out to be the basic characteristic of division, separation,
segregation and secession. The result of this “ethnic revival” was a series of wars, which led to the
creation of new states. Although constituted as nation-states and conceived as culturally homogeneous, they have rarely been such. All the new states that emerged from the violent break-up of
Yugoslavia had a considerable number of minorities which began to challenge the majority of the
population’s exclusive right to the state.
This research focuses on the Republic of Macedonia. In 2001, the newly formed state embarked
on the path toward European integration, and was the first country in the Western Balkans to sign a
Stabilization and Association Agreement. In 2004, it submitted an application for the EU membership and was formally accepted as a candidate country in November 2005. It is supposed that
negotiations for accession to the EU should open in the near future, and that the country might join
the EU in the next few years. In the process of the EU integration, which implies that the economy
and the society gradually merge into a larger identity, the existence of strong national identities and
competing nationalisms can represent a serious obstacle. In order to counteract people’s negative
feelings and attitudes, which in this region range from resentment to outright hostility, we must
The Macedonian question: The old and the new one
299
understand how people construct their identities.
The Republic of Macedonia - due to its peculiar historical development and the complex ethnic
composition - gained prominence on the international scene. In the sphere of the identity research,
Macedonia has been interesting only with regard to the origins, nature and stability of the
Macedonian ethnic identity. Little, however, has been said on how the Macedonian citizens, both
the Macedonians and the Albanians, deal with the new political situation which occurred after the
proclamation of independence in 1991 and the armed insurgency of 2001 and how the members of
both communities perceive and construct their identities in relation and possibly in contrast to each
other and to the official state policy.
Despite the rhetoric of the Macedonian and Albanian politicians of the ruling parties that
continue to speak of relaxed interethnic relations and their commitment to build an integrative
multiethnic society, I argue that the ethnic nationalism that lay at the heart of the Macedonian
conflict is still the predominant factor in the Macedonian society. The ethnical subdivision of the
society and the lack of trust that existed between the ethnic Macedonians and Albanians before the
2001 conflict still continue in today’s Macedonia.
1.2. The goals of this work
This research addresses two issues in today’s social sciences: the formation of identity and the
creation of social cohesion. I will try to identify the nature of the conflicting identities which the
two main ethnic groups in Macedonia have constructed and to identify effective policies for the
integration at regional and national levels.
I decided to focus my research on families with three generation who, regardless of their ethnic
belonging, have experienced several dramatic socio-political changes during the lifetime of their
middle-aged and older citizens. They had to embrace a major shift in their public allegiance. The
members of the middle and the older generation of the Macedonian citizens experienced the life in
two (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and independent Macedonia) or even three different states during their lifetime (individuals born in the inter-war period were subjects of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as well). My research focuses on such families and aims to compare how their
members perceive and construct their identities in relation and possibly in contrast and opposition to
the great socio-political changes which occurred in the last fifteen years.
By choosing the families with three generations, both the Albanians and the Macedonians, I will
be able to gain a deep insight into both communities and to follow the identity formation of communities in the past and the present. By focusing on the members from three generations in the
same families, I will also be able to compare similarities and differences in the identity construction of
people of different gender and age groups, which may cut across the national or regional allegiances.
In detail, my goals will be:
− to identify the ways in which members of the two communities perceive and construct their
identities in relation and possibly in opposition to each other and the official state politics;
− to identify how the establishment of the independent Macedonia affected the everyday life of
both communities;
− to identify the similarities and the differences in the identity formation of individuals and groups
of different ages and gender and how they interact with the differences in nationhood, experience and memory;
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Svjetlana Kovačević
− to investigate whether and to what extend the Macedonian citizens perceive their neighbours as a
possible threat to the state stability (Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians and Kosovars);
− to investigate whether and to what extent the Ohrid Peace Agreement is perceived as a possible
solution to the ethnic conflict; if not, which policies -according to my interviewees - should be
adopted in order to combat tensions and promote the social cohesion;
− to investigate whether and to what extent the European integration process is embraced as a
solution to the perceived national or regional conflicts;
− to investigate whether and to what extent the Macedonian ethnic society moves towards more
civil forms of identification;
− to identify if and to what extend the cultural and civilizational differences between the two communities are perceived as insurmountable.
1.3. The revival of ethnic nationalism
The process of globalization, democratization and the creation of new supranational organizations offer a transnational redefinition of group identities. The result of these processes is the
creation of open and multiple identities which cannot be captured by any single state structure. But
paradoxically, the supranational institutions and globalization did not eradicate nationalism; rather
we can say that the nationalism became a global phenomenon which - together with the sense of
national belonging - is still a major force and a cause of conflict in contemporary Europe.
By the middle of the 20th century, much of the social and political science had confined nationalism to the dustbin of history. However, today it is no longer possible to sustain that argument and it
is clear that nationalism is far from dead in contemporary Europe. Contrary to the forecast of the
modernization theorists, who predicted a decrease in the salience of ethnic cleavages as societies
became more developed in the terms of urbanization, industrialization, communication and literacy
rate, the ethnic divisiveness shows no sigh of declining. On the contrary, the ethnically driven
conflicts in the recent years reveal that ethnicity as a political element cannot be confined to the
dustbin of the pre-industrial, agrarian history. The revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990, the
ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavian Federation and the demands for political identity and national self-determination of different ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union show us that the
“national question” is far from being solved, and that it has once again gained prominence as a politically important force.
Various explanations were given in order to explain this resurgence of ethnic nationalism. However, the most acceptable explanation can be found in the very nature of the nation state which is
characteristic for almost all European countries. The power of the nationalist ideologies tried to
seduce us with the myth that the European countries are ethnically homogeneous. However, a closer
examination reveals the existence of many politically mobilized ethnic groups that challenge the
majority of the population’s exclusive right to the statehood. The contradiction between the widespread theoretical acceptance of the right to national self-determination and the refusal of states to
tolerate their own dismemberment has been the major cause of this resurgence. Other contributing
factors can be found in the fall of the communist ideology, the uneven economic development of
minority groups and the improvement of mass communication.
The mass communications have enabled states to impose the mainstream culture on the lives of
the members of minority groups more effectively. Scholars like Connor and Anderson argue that
The Macedonian question: The old and the new one
301
ethnic nationalism thus can be seen as an attempt to avoid assimilation and to maintain a sense of
identity and community. In addition, the current revival of ethnic nationalism can be considered as a
continuation of a process that began in the 18th century with the French Revolution. In the first
decades of the 19th century the political concept of the nation spread over Europe. The 19th century
national movements were often directed against multinational empires and had a positive connotation of movements for national emancipation and unification. Moreover, in the 19th century the right
to self-determination was applied only to nations that were of sufficient size to form self-sufficient
political and economic units. However, the recent wave of ethic nationalism reveals that there is no
limit to how small the new nations can be. The new national movements are directed against the
states that have come into being as a result of earlier national movements and this time they have
the negative connotation of the separatist movements and are accused of destroying nations.
As I have already mentioned above, the main reason for the resurgence of the ethnic nationalism
can be found in the nature of the nation state and the process of the nation building, but before I
move on towards the analysis of this political phenomenon it will be useful to clear up the confusion which surrounds the use of the terms like: ethnic group, nation, state and national identity.
1.4. National identity: An accomplished fact or a context-dependent ongoing process
The identity search is a central theoretical concern of many disciplines in social sciences, from
psychology to politics and sociology. Despite the extensive literature on this issue there seems to be
one key idea that is pervading all research traditions. The concept of identity deals with the relation
between the self and the society, or the self and the others.
For a long time the concept of society dominated the sociological research in relation to state and
nation in such a way that these three became indistinguishable. “It may appear to matter little which
term we use: society, nation, state. But yes it does”. (McCrone, Kelly 2000). The older theories in
social sciences which affirm that the “genuine” societies are those in which social, political and
cultural dimensions are in alignment, are now opposed by scholars like Miller who in his Citizenship and National Identity argues “whatever terminology we use should convey the idea that national identity can exist at more than one level” (Miller 2000).
Due to the political, social and cultural changes of modernity, the peoples’ sense of belonging
has become ambivalent and yet put into question. This empirical fact is in a clear contrast with the
nationalistic perspective, according to which the national identity is not only a primordial indivisible part of our identity, but also has privileged status of being morally obligatory (this is a particularly important aspect of the Albanian nationalism). As emphasized by Gellner (1964), nationality
is a natural phenomenon. We bear our nationality in the same way as we possess weight, height or
blood group. This identity is something “inborn”, “natural”; it was always a part of the human consciousness, from “year one”. It exists in nature, outside of time (Smith 1991). It is one of the givens
of human existence.
The national identity is only one of the dimensions in our identity field, which consists of a large
number of overlapping identities. The privileged status of national identification claimed by nationalist ideologists is complex and dubious if we consider that every individual has a large variety of
identities and the national one is simply one of them. I can feel exclusively as a woman, a catholic,
or a member of the Croatian nation. The dimension of identity I will choose to mobilize depends on
the context - political, social and historical. When my country is threatened, I can feel a strong
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solidarity and allegiance to my nation even if before that national identity had not been very important to my self-understanding or in determining my actions. As in the famous Simmel-Coser dictum
(1956), the outside threat increases the internal solidarity of the group. “Conflict with another group
leads to the mobilization of the energies of the group members and hence it increased cohesion of
the group”. (Coser 1956). But in peaceful times each of us “moves in an indefinite number of communities, some more inclusive than others, making different claims on our allegiance” (Sandel 1982);
so, it depends on the context to which territory or to which community I will feel to be most attached.
It can be the city where I live, the region, the state or Europe. These always potentially present
competing claims for the attachment (regional, European and others) can under certain circumstances
become the primary political attachment. The nationalist discourse feels very uncomfortable with this
flexibility because it contradicts its main claim of primary nature of the national attachment.
In the beginning, the people’s identity was local, concerning the immediate surrounding. There
were limits, but there were no boundaries. «A world in which is natural to have natural identity was
meeting, and overrunning, an older world» (Billig, 1995)
W. Pfaff (1993) in his polemic book shows how identity and political loyalty were changing the
focus in different places and different historical times. «In the past there were local loyalties to
place and clan or tribe, obligations to lord or landlord, dynastic or territorial wars, but primary
loyalties were to religion, God or god-king, possibly to emperor, to a civilization as such. There was
no nation. To be Chinese was to belong to a civilization which was presumed to be universal, or if
not universal, to have only barbarians beyond it ... To be Mesopotamian or Roman was to belong to
an inclusive empire of undetermined borders ... Rome was not a nation; it was a city and empire
both. To be European in the Middle Ages was, for the vast majority, to be a Christian, with obligations and rights with respect to a landholding hierarchy dependent, in theory at least, upon the
Christian emperor, the Roman emperor's successor, and the Pope God's vicar on earth ....».
Arguing about the problematic aspects of people’s identities, Hall stressed that identity is not as
transparent or unproblematic as we think. «Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, with the new cultural practices they represent, we should think instead of identity
as production, which is never complete, always in process» (Hall 1990).
The preceding discussion should make it clear that the collective identities are context-dependent, multiple and subject to change. However, for analytical purposes it may be useful to distinguish
between different categories of collective identities. A. Hastings distinguishes in his “The Construction of Nationhood” three categories of collective identities. In his opinion, «an ethnicity is a group of
people with shared cultural identity and spoken language. It constitutes the major distinguishing
element in all pre-national societies, but may survive as a strong subdivision with loyalty of its own
within established nations» (Hastings 1997). For Hastings, a nation is a far more self-conscious
community than an ethnicity. It may be formed from one or more ethnicities, claiming the right to
political identity with the control of specific territory. Furthermore, the nation state identifies itself
in terms of a specific nation and there is thus an identity of character between state and people.
Guibernau, for instance, speaks about two basic identities and speaks of the nation as a cultural
community and of the state as a political institution, arguing «that a clear distinction needs to be
drawn between three main concepts: nation, state and nation state» (Guibernau 2004).
From the above analysis, we can deduct that it seems that there are at least three basic types of
identity: ethnic, national and state identity. The ethnic identity seems to be the basic one. The nation,
consequently, can consist of one or more ethnicities, and the state can consist of one or more nation.
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1.4.1. Ethnic groups and identity
In the literature, the definition of the term “ethnic group” is quite confusing. Ethnic groups are
usually understood to be social groups that share common origin, history, language and culture. A.
Smith in his Ethnic origins of nations argues that the ethnic group is a «named human population with
shared ancestry, myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a
sense of solidarity». In Smith’s opinion, many nations have originated in pre-existing ethnic groups,
which were pre-modern forms of cultural collective identity. «Collective cultural identity refers not to
a uniformity of elements over generation but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive
generation of a given cultural unit of the population …» (Smith 1991). In Smith’s opinion, the most
important criterion of ethnic identity is the sense of solidarity, but the common myth of descent also
plays an important role. Eriksen, following Smith, points that «seeing oneself as culturally distinctive, collectively and individually, from other groups, and acting accordingly, is crucial for ethnic
group to endure» (Eriksen 2004).
Other scholars have different accounts. W. Kymlycka’s definition of ethnicity does not agree
with other scholars and social sciences conventions. He argues that the term “ethnic group” should
be reserved only for indigenous communities in their homeland context. Fridrik Barth, for example
offers an alternative approach in which ethnic groups are defined as “category of ascription and
identification” that people use to classify themselves and others (Barth 1969). Barth’s approach
allows us to understand how the ethnic boundaries are defined and maintained even in situations
where there are no “objective” cultural criteria distinguishing between the groups.
In ethnic nationalism, the national identity is often perceived as «a reflection or awareness of
possession of primordial or inherited characteristic, components of ethnicity such as language,
customs, territorial affiliation and physical type» (Greenfeld 1992).
1.4.2. The nation and the national identity
The afore-mentioned discussion stresses that there are at least three types of collective identities
and that ethnic group and nation are discrete concepts. However, there is no agreement among
scholars about subjective and objective factors in the definition of a nation. Some scholars argue
that ethnic categories are older than nations, while others state that nations are a more recent phenomenon, not more than two centuries old.
According to Anderson and Gellner, nations are socially and culturally constructed through complex historical and political process. It is well known Anderson’s definition of the nation as «an
imagined community» and the Gellner’s statement that «nationalism invents nations where they do
not exist». These theories imply that the nations are created anew from absolutely nothing and do
not take into account that many regional, ethnic, religious and class identities existed much before
the rise of nationalism.
A. Smith argues that if nations were a totally new phenomenon, if national traditions were
completely unrelated to the past, than they would not exert such power over people’s lives. Smith
believes that many nations have originated in pre-existing ethnic groups and can be defined as “a
named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a
mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal right and duties for all members.
Weber as well affiliates nations to pre-existing ethnic communities, but in his opinion the nations
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are too various to be defined in terms of any criterion, but he continues, “What distinguishes the nation is the commitment to political project” (Weber 1994). Yet, the ethnic group with its symbolic
resources like history, culture and the myth of common descent constitute a necessary but insufficient basis for the emergence of a complete nation. They can be defined as “raw material”, and
they need to be politicized in order to be transformed into nations. The nation, in Schoplin’s words,
is above all a political category. This does not mean that the nations do not have cultural, sociological, anthropological or other dimensions. On the contrary, he argues, “without understanding the
political dimension, too much is lost” (Schoplin 2003).
Once politicized, ethnic group comes to define itself as a nation, and it may embark on a quest
for self-determination by seeking some degree of autonomy or even outright sovereignty over a national homeland. The territoriality - or the existence of a homeland - is one of the most important
characteristics of the nation. Hechter argues that the real or presumed homeland is properly regarded
as a defining feature of the nation. “Nations are territorially concentrated ethnic groups” (Hechter
2000). Another important characteristic of a nation and a national identity is the process of differentiation. “Our” group is conceived in a particular way. The real or perceived characteristics of a national group provide a sense of internal affinity and external difference. «If and when these differences
from “others” are expressed territorially, then the ethnic group becomes a nation» (Billig 1995).
Other scholars list other important characteristics of nation like a belief in common heritage and
destiny, existence of collective consciousness and cultural characteristics like key features that give
substance to a nation and to a national identity. Speaking about nation, Hroh defines it «as a large
social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kind of objective relationships
(economic, political, linguistic, cultural religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective
reflection in collective consciousness» (Hroh 1997). «I argue that national identity is a modern
phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature, one by means of which a community sharing a particular set of characteristics is led to the subjective belief that its members are ancestrally related»
(Guibernau 2004). Some authors claim that it is the belief in a common heritage and destiny which
is decisive in the construction of a national identity. Other authors claim that cultural characteristics
are the key features of a national identity. Still, there are a number of theories that treat the cultural
characteristics of a nation as problematic. According to Kymlycka, we have no grounds for speaking of cultures as “synonymous” with nation or people. The cultural markers need to be politicized
to serve as basis for claims of self-government.
The ideology of nationalism connects culture and politics. It establishes cultural distinctiveness as
a basis for political action. Culture and nation are discrete concepts, even if they are strongly related.
«Because culture is complex and multifaceted, what matters for the content of national identity are not
peoples objective cultural characteristics, but their subjective perception of these traits and how they
compare to the traits of other populations» (Shulman 1999)
In spite of the similarities that exist between the concept of ethnic group and that of the nation,
there are several important differences between the two that should be noted. These differences
generally involve size, degree of politicization, and the relationship to a specific territory. Nations
are large, politicized ethnic groups associated with specific territories over which they seek some
degree of autonomy. Nations, as opposed to ethnic groups, are people who exercise, or hope one
day to exercise, sovereignty over a given territory.
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1.4.3. The nation-state and the nation building process
The distinction between a nation and a state is extremely important. While a nation claims to be
a culturally homogeneous social group, a state is «a legal and political organization with a power to
require obedience and loyalty from its citizens» (Seton-Watson); it is the mayor political subdivision of the globe. While states (like the former Yugoslavia) can contain more than one nation,
there are nations (like in the Albanian case) who live in more than one state, and finally there are
nations (like the Kurds, for example) who live in several states, none of which is their own.
Nationalism is the political principle according to which “the political and national unit should
be congruent” (Gellner 1983). In other words, nations should have the right of self-determination
and the right to exist as a sovereign and independent state. Nationalist ideologies are based on the
assumption concerning «the existence of a geographically, historically, and culturally unique nation», which «is believed to be born of and indissolubly linked to a bounded territory and particular
history» (Handler 1988). The goal of nationalist movements is to «turn ethnic group into that more
abstract and politicized category, the nation; and then to establish the later as a sole criterion of
statehood» (Smith 1981). In other words, their goal is to create a territorially bounded political unit,
a state, out of a homogeneous cultural unit, a nation. A state that emerges from a successful nationalist movement is known as a nation-state - a state whose political boundaries are the same as those
of the nation, a state whose population is homogeneous; whose inhabitants are all members of the
same nation.
Once established, the newly formed nation-state has to consolidate its national identity. One of
the key elements of the national identity is the belief that all members of a given nation belong together, and in order to achieve this goal, the state has a variety of tools at its disposal. Anderson
points out the detrimental role played by the print-capitalism and the development of standardized
national languages (both of which create a national community of people who read the same print
language). Other scholars emphasize the importance of a new national culture, and the role that the
intellectuals have in this process. They have a task to create “the symbolic capital” (Bourdieu 1977)
out of disciplines such as history, linguistics, literature and folklore, which than is disseminated to
citizens through educational system.
As far as the role of intellectuals in the nation-building process is concerned, A. Smith writes, «The
intellectual is the interpreter, par excellence, of historical memories and ethnic myths. By tracing a
distinguished pedigree for his nation, he also enhances the position of his circle and activity; he is no
longer an ambiguous “marginal” on the fringes of society, but a leader of the advanced column of the
reawakened nation, the leaven in the movement of national regeneration» (Smith 1999).
The intellectuals have to give decisive answers to decisive questions: what are the origins of the
nation, who belongs to it and who does not. Among the intellectuals who propagate the national
identity, historians have the particularly important function of constructing the nation’s past and
present and presenting the nation as the inevitable outcome of a historical process. «The nations need
a myth of descent, origin, ancestry, a golden age» (Smith 1999). In other words, the nations need to
believe in common ancestry, shared past and shared history that will unite people in a national
community (Gellner), and the historians are invited to accommodate these claims. This is not an
easy task considering that a new nation’s history must be written from complex and sometimes
contradictory regional histories that had previously been told.
The nations are created out of different local cultures, pre-existing cultural forms, dialects,
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written history and collective memories. The main task of the national ideologies is to reshape these
elements and to create new identities and communities from them. The citizens of the newly created
nation-state are expected to learn their national language, their national history and to accept their
new narratives and national culture. In doing so, they must forget their local dialects and local
histories. As they are to remember the battles they fought together against the nation’s enemies,
they must forget the battles they fought against each other. And finally, as they try to remember,
what binds them together, they must forget what separated them in the past (Danforth 2002). However, the self-conscious and deliberate act, which aims to impose collective forgetting and acceptance of the new national narratives, is not unproblematic as national ideologists want us to believe.
Bell argues that the introduction of official national narrative is an attempt to impose a definitive
meaning of the past, on the nation and its history (Bell 2003). He adds that there will always be a
dissent and the story will never be accepted consistently and universally. This is the first problematic aspect of the nation formation process, because, contrary to the nationalist discourse, it seems that
the nation is not a unitary entity, in which all members think, feel and act as one. «Instead, each of
us engage in many different ways in making sense of nations and national identities in the course of
our interactions with others and in making the ideas of the nation and national identity accountable
to us» (Thompson 2001).
From the discussion above, we may assume that, even if such things as unitary culture and history
do exist, it is very unlikely that all members of a nation (even of the same ethnic origin), within the
state borders will share it. «Rather there will be a variety of cultural constructions from contestation
between conflicting interests in the formation or development of the group» (Gilbert 2000).
1.4.4. National minorities
The second problematic aspect of the nation-states is that the very process of creating nations
simultaneously creates national minorities.
If the state claims legitimacy by associating itself to a homogeneous cultural unit, than the result
is that any diversity of cultures, traditions and identities that coexisted under multinational empires,
becomes a threat to the national unity with the creation of a new national culture. Undoubtedly, a
limited degree of cultural diversity can survive the construction of national culture. This is possible
if the “diversities” are perceived as regional variants of one nation culture. Otherwise, if the
“diversities” have ethnic or national character, the nation states are usually less inclined to tolerate
them. The very existence of peoples whose culture differs from that of the majority dissolves the
myth of national homogeneity, and these peoples will inevitably be left at the margins of the nationstate. At one level, these people will be assimilated and merged into the mainstream culture, while
at another they will be rejected and excluded.
National minorities may seek to escape the minority status and claim to be accepted as full
participants in the life of the nation state. They do so, in order to combat social and economic
inequality, to gain access to resources and to improve their status vis-à-vis the majority. However,
in doing so, they must forget their history and culture and therefore they will be gradually assimilated and incorporated into a unified body - the nation. In other words, in this way the members of a
minority choose to change their identity. Otherwise, if the members of a national minority choose to
resist assimilation attempts, to retain and develop their own cultures, identities and histories, they
will not receive the same state support like the majority population. Without state sponsored schools,
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universities and mass communication, their economic and political positions deteriorate and they are
gradually marginalized. Some national minorities accept the minority status for their group and
participate in the majority society, while others, which are organized and self-conscious, emphasize
their ethnic/national identity and seek to establish political movements on ethnic/national ground. As
the national movements become better established, better organized and better financed, they begin to
acquire some of the capabilities initially available only to a state. This new situation almost unavoidably leads to reinforcement of the degree of struggle between the minority group and the state.
The ultimate outcome of such a struggle depends on various factors: the structural characteristics
of the national minority, like its size and compactness; the quality of the leadership and financial
resources of the national movements; the possible existence of an external “homeland” that seeks to
protect the minority from assimilation because there is a sense of shared nationhood across political
borders; as well as the policies pursued by the state itself.
The ability of a state to make credible promises to the minority regarding preservation of its
culture as well as of its political and economic rights, increase the possibility that the group should
seek less extreme goals of political or cultural autonomy within the borders of a larger political unit.
Most often states may accommodate such claims. Otherwise, if the state promises are not credible,
and the state government creates an image (real or perceived) of an “oppressive” and “alien ruled”
state that is attempting to homogenize the country and eradicate other cultural, ethnic and national
identities, it is more likely that the majority group will advance more extreme claims of political independence, or in some cases even the desire to join their already existing homeland. Considering that
almost all states try to resist their own dismemberment, the state response to such demands may range
from forced assimilation, deportation to more extreme solutions of genocide and ethnic cleansing.
However, we should not forget that the main goal of the national separatist movements is the
formation of new nation states that claim national homogeneity they have not yet created. In
addition, they are doing it in the name of ethnic nationalism, the same ideology in whose name the
state they challenge was created. Smith argues «in order to protect their unique cultures and
histories, they must create nation-states modeled precisely on those they struggled against. In doing
so, however they lay basis for inner erosion of the very cultures they seek to protect» (Smith 1981).
1.5. Civic West and ethnic East
Adam Smith points out that though most later-day nations are in fact poly-ethnic, many have
been formed in the first place around a dominant ethnic core, which annexed or attracted other
ethnic groups or ethnic fragments into a state to which it gave name and cultural character. In other
words, even in cases in which the state precedes the nation, the state seeks to develop the cultural
solidarity and the national unity within its population. However, the process of state building and
creation of national identities was different in Western and Eastern Europe. Hans Kohn (1961) was
the first to develop a systematic difference between the “Western” and “Eastern” nationalisms. The
Western type is the result of a long evolution where the state preceded the creation of the nation.
The social, economic and political conditions were created mainly through the state expansion and
consolidation, to transform the “people” into “nation”. This transformation was based mainly on the
liberal middle class concept enmeshed with its democratic ideas and ideals. The result is a “civic”
form of nationalism based on the citizenship, subjective choice and democratic ideas of the national
sovereignty. The main political goal was to redefine people as citizens and to create inclusive societies
where “anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race and color (Kymlycka 1996).
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On the other hand, the Eastern form was created in a completely different environment. The
nations were not created out of existing states but against the existing state pattern. The idea was to
redraw the existing state boundaries in accordance to ethnographic differences in extremely heterogeneous societies. The eastern nationalism is based on cultural identity and nationality as an “objective fact”. The people were not primarily citizens but “the Volk”. Where Western nationalism started as a political development the Eastern started as a cultural movement (Romanticism) that later
changed into a political force. The empirical fact of non-existence of national identity, of its
variability in space and time is interpreted by nationalists as the result of oppression and subjugation. The fact that many people did not express their national identity everywhere and in all historical periods with the same enthusiasm is the consequence of the simple fact that the foreign conquerors had successfully suppressed it. The role of the intelligentsia and of the romantic nationalists
of the XIX century was to awake and discover the forgotten national identity that was sleeping in
the deeply hidden parts of the human soul. In reality, it was not so much to discover the suppressed
identity as to create and consolidate identities from the existing components. The Religion, the
language, the historical memories and the political expedience were used to reshape the existing
collective identities, draw the boundaries towards the others and consequently and most importantly
to establish the right of self-determination of the “people“.
The civic identity is based on a well-defined territory, a community of laws and institutions,
equal rights for the members of the nation and common values, traditions or sentiment that bind
people together. In other words, the social unity is defined by the political boundaries. On the other
hand, in the Eastern type the affinity and the primordial ties are what hold people together. The ethnic
identity is based on the idea of a common descent and people are perceived as one folk with a fixed
identity, unchangeable and rooted in the natural distinctions between groups of people. The Primordial
types of collective identity appear to be ‘objective’ and unquestionable; the boundaries cannot be
moved, and crossing the boundaries seems to be extremely difficult (Eisenstadt, Giesen 1995).
About this civic - ethnic dichotomy, other scholars said: «The myth of ethnic nation suggests
that you have no choice at all in the making of your national identity: you are your cultural inheritance and nothing else. The myth of the civic nation, in contrast, suggests that your national identity is
nothing but your choice …» (Yack 1996). It seems that ethnicity is not chosen - not even a possible
subject of choice. «It is this, crucially, which distinguishes ethnic from civic nationalism; for on the
later, national identity is presumed either to be chosen or at least to be what it would be rational to
chose. Brown referred to these two bases of national identity as Cultural (or ethno-cultural) Nationalism
and Civic Nationalism. Ethno-cultural nationalism depicts the nation as a community of ethno-cultural
sameness, while civic nationalism depicts the nation as community of equal citizens» (Brown 2002).
Of course the East-West distinction can be subjected to criticism because some nationalisms in
the west are clearly expressing the elements that Kohn attributes to the eastern version and the other
way around some Eastern nationalisms are very “western” like in the Czech and the Hungarian
case. Regardless of the dubious character of the Kohen’s distinction, his civic-ethnic dichotomy can
be used as a useful distinction in comparing national identities. It is much more useful to treat it as
ideal types and not as examples of concretely existing cases. In every example there is a mixture of
civic and ethnic identities and this is valid for Eastern Europe as well. Greenfeld in his Nationalism in
Western and eastern Europe argues: «what does play a part, and especially in determining whether a
particular nationalism will be defined as civic or ethnic, is the perception of a nation’s status relative
to other nations, whether it is perceived as a part of west of not» (Greenfeld 1995).
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1.6. Theoretical background for the fieldwork
Many disciplines of the social sciences, from linguistics to politics and sociology, have considered the way in which national and cultural identities are forged and reproduced in time and space.
Actually, we may say that the national and cultural identity studies have become something very
fashionable to study, and literature on this topic abounds. One of the main reasons to focus on
collective identities is that they are in transition. Due to the social and political changes of modernity, people’s sense of belonging have in many cases become open, ambivalent, and yet put into
question. And as Bendle points out «though the identity is vital and problematic in modernity it is
still under theorized and incapable of bearing the analytical load that the contemporary situation require» (Bendle 2000).
Considering the different research approaches and the diversity in the area of identity studies, the
question is where to start from. In the social sciences, the nature of collective identities has been
considered by three different theoretical approaches: primordialistic, modernistic and ethno-symbolic
(Ozkirimli 2000).
The Primordialistic approach is marked by the vision of the nation as a natural part of human behavior, as natural as speech and smell. According to theorists of this approach, the identity is
considered naturally fixed within a person without possibility to change. Linnekin and Poyer argue
that «cultural affiliations reflect blood ties and have a predetermined quality of inevitability»
(Linnekin, Poyer 1990). The idea is that cultural forms from which nations are formed are in fact
“primordial” or “naturally given”, which is one of the nationalism’s most powerful and dangerous
constructions.
The Modernists are not homogeneous and there are many differences among them, but what
unites them is their conviction that the nations are a phenomenon of modernity. The theorists of this
approach assume that it was not the nations that created the states and nationalism, but it was the
state structures and nationalism that formed the nations. Among the most renowned and quoted
representatives of this approach are scholars like Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson.
For Gellner, nationalism is a marriage between culture and politics. In his view, “Nations as a
natural, God-given way of classifying man, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are
a myth, nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turn them into nations and
sometimes invents them, that is a reality” (Gellner 1983).
For Benedict Anderson, ethnicity and nationalism are essentially artificial constructs, «capricious
imagined communities that float out of the new formed of media that have spread with economic
modernization». Anderson’s description of the nation as an “imagined community” has been widely
quoted. It is imagined, he posits, «Because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in minds of each lives an image
of their community». It is community, he goes on because «regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship»
(Anderson 1996).
Finally, the third theoretical approach competing with the primordialism and the modernism is the
ethno-symbolist approach. It is represented by scholars, like Smith and Hutchinson, who ignore the
arguments of the modernists regarding the origins of the nations and in opposition to them focus their
interest on the role of the old ethnic groups and ethnic bounds in building and forming modern
nations. The Ethno-symbolist approach put emphasis on the subjective components of the national
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identity while simultaneously underlining the social bases of the collective cultural identities. For
ethno-symbolists what gives nationalism its power are myths, symbols, traditions and memories. It
is exactly studying these elements that we can learn much about division in social and cultural life
of a community experiencing rapid social changes, and the difficulties it faces in trying to achieve
social integration (Smith 1999)
I do not share the position of the primordialistic school and nationalist ideologies which consider
nations and national identity as natural phenomena of great antiquity and natural outgrow of shared
culture which is deeply rooted in history. Rather, nations are constructed from diversity of the ethnic
groups, social classes and regional identities, which is often a self-consciousness and deliberate political action. Nations and national identity are to be understood as historically and socially constructed human products which use building material from history, from collective memory, from
personal experiences and state institutions, and as such they are «continuously negotiated, revised
and revitalized» (Nagel 1994).
On the other hand, I do not share the positions of certain modernists, who argue that nations are
invented and artificial constructions, created anew from absolutely nothing, since the choice made by
nationalizing actors to found national culture and history is significantly restricted. As Brubaker points
out «nationalist make their own history, but not entirely as they please; not with cultures of their own
choosing, but with cultures directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past»(1994).
If we assume that nations are human constructs, this does not mean that they are artificial. If they
were such they would not exert such a power over people’s lives. They may be in a manner
“imagined” or “invented“, but the sense of national belonging is real and it is a dominant form of
political attachment in the modern world. For this reason, we must understand how the people perceive commonality, cohesion and continuity even if they do not know each other in person. This is
quite a complex process, emanated from above in a form of ideological engineering and state propaganda, as well as from below in the form of popular enthusiasm and national sentiment. Some of the
main strategies generally employed by the states are: “the construction and dissemination of a certain image of the “nation”; the creation and spread of a set of symbols and rituals charged with the
mission of reinforcing a sense of community among citizens. However, «while it appears that it is
the individual who has to fit in with nation, it is nevertheless evident that people make decisions
about nations, on the basis of their knowledge of “national cultures”, and locate themselves and
others accordingly» (Thompson 2001).
«Nations are dual phenomena constructed from above, but in order to be understood must be also
analyzed from below, from the ordinary people’s view, which is exceedingly difficult to discover»
(Gellner 1983).
When people think about “identity” they have in mind things like language, ethnicity, and culture.
But these symbolic resources, like everything that is historical, undergo constant transformation and
identities are “far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to continuous
“play” of history and power” (Hall 1990). For this reason, we may assert that national identity is a
provisional, hybrid, and ongoing form of identification which has to be continually produced and reproduced over time and across space, if it is to retain its cohesive force. Instead of thinking of national cultures as unified, which once established are fixed forever, we should think of them in continuous competition with other forms of identity. The unity of the nation seen from that perspective
is constructed through the narrative of the nation, by which stories, images, symbols and rituals
represent shared meanings of nationhood.
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At times of major socio-political changes when the official narratives of the nation may undergo
a radical re-writing or separating off, such discursive constructions of unity may come under
considerable stress. The significance of this for people living in the Republic of Macedonia should
be obvious if we consider the fundamental changes they had to undergo. For them the official
narratives of the nation were written and re-written. Not just once but several times.
1.7. Fieldwork methodology
From the above discussion there seems to be enough evidence to assert that the national identities are not as sound and unitary as nationalist ideologies sustain and that they are, in addition,
multiple, hybrid and ongoing forms of identification which involve the individual level as well.
But how to approach and comprehend this phenomenon? Different research methods have been
used in order to gain deep insight into the people’s complex, fragmented and sometimes contradictory process of identity formation. If we assume that collective identity is a relatively unified
concept, shared by all who adhere to it, makes it feasible to construct questionnaires. Thinking
about identity as stabile but not necessary conscious or context dependent but stabile under certain
conditions, this still allows quantitative methods or, in case a mix of qualitative and quantitative
research techniques.
According to Hall, there is no essence of identity to be discovered; rather cultural identity is
continually developing within the vectors of similarity and difference, of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. The points of difference around which cultural identities could form are interactive with the
socio-political context, they are multiple and subject to change. If we think about identity as an
ongoing construction, potentially full of contradictions, which people confirm and reconfirm during
their life-time, than in Somers and Gibson opinion this can be done through analysis of people’s
narratives (Somers, Gibson 1994) According to their theory, the narrative approach uses “relationality” as an important analytic variable and focuses on the various and fluctuating socio-cultural relations that an individual upholds during different life episodes. In Somers and Gibson’s opinion the
meanings of identities are embedded in the stories and relations that people themselves consider as
essential. Empirically this means that the analysis of people narratives is a convenient way to gain
deeper knowledge of the fragmented process of the identity creation. However, such experiences
cannot be elicited by questionnaires and opinion polls. They require a deeper understanding on how
people construct and confirm their identities and experiences in a concrete cultural and social context. For this reason, I have decided that my research had to be strictly qualitative.
I used a technique of semi-structured interviews guided through open questions and answers.
But, considering that people’s identities may be too complex, contradictory, context dependent and
only partially open to self-inspection and self-description, the oral narratives of my interviewees
were stimulated and partially structured by a selection of photographs and images showing symbols,
social practices, and important events from different phases in the community existence.
The technique of interviewing people on the basis of historical and contemporary photographs is
not new in sociological research. Photo-elicitation was conduced for the first time and classified as
such in 1957 by John Collier (see Collier J., M. Collier 1986). Since then it has been widely used in
anthropology and visual sociology.
The main reason for this technique is that, be they historical or contemporary, when used as a
basis for interviewing people, photographs can act as a powerful medium for triggering people’s
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personal feelings, experiences, memories and associated events and contexts, and for connecting
past and present through interviewees and researcher interpretation of both (Cronin 1998). Photographs can be used to trigger interviewee’s reflections and personal narratives which locate their
experience within historical, social and political context.
Another important advantage of this technique is that in talking about events that the photographs represent, interviewees do not have to answer direct questions, rather photographs provide
context of interviewee’s own choosing. In this way the interview becomes more informal, and
averts the strangeness of the interview situation (Schwartz 1989). Using photographs provides the
interviewee with a task similar to the viewing of the family album and enables them to talk, without
hesitation about their way of life and their experiences of changing realities.
Moreover, the photographs ask their own questions. On the one hand, this enables interviewee to
give alternative and sometimes opposite meanings to photographs; on the other hand it reduces the
role of the researcher to a minimum. In fact, only toward the end of the interview I was asking more
direct questions to ensure further set of data.
Bearing in mind that my interviewees belong to three different generations, I made a selection of
more than a hundred photographs which included: historical people, symbols, social practices and
events from three periods of community’s existence: the interwar period, the Socialist Federative
Republic of Macedonia and Yugoslavia, as well as images of the independent Macedonia.
All the photographic material regarding the Macedonian community from the interwar period
and the period of the Socialist Macedonia has been kindly served by the Museum of National
History of Macedonia. The photographic material regarding the Albanian community has been served by Professor Nazmi Dervishi and Professor Fadil Suleimani.
Considering the amount of photographs which has been used in this research, I will not draw up
a complete list of them, but all the photographic material is available on request for consultations.
In order to gain an insight into the complex process of identity formation, as well as experience
of social and political change, I chose a representative sample of five Albanian and five Macedonian families with three generations:
− the young generation: the 16-25 years old. Individuals who experienced only the most recent
changes in their country. For this generation the present situation of relative isolation of the
country has been a reality for most of their youth, and they have therefore experienced previous
situations mainly through the narratives of the older generations;
− the middle generation: the 35-55 year olds. Individuals who for most of their existence had lived in
the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. This generation had to face a complete redefinition of the state and of the socio-political environment of the society in which they grew up;
− the older generation: the 70-80 years old. Individuals who had lived in three, and in case of the
Albanian community, four different countries. They belong to the generation that has witnessed
numerous social and political changes during their lifetime.
The fieldwork was carried out in different parts of Macedonia, from February to May 2005.
During this period I made 46 interviews with people of different social backgrounds. My sample
included interviewees from rural villages and industrial towns with elementary, high school and
university education.
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2. The Macedonian question … again
2.1. Introduction
Historically, the Macedonians had never had their own modern state until the Yugoslavian
dissolution in 1991 and the proclamation of the independence in November of the same year.
However when the state was established, the state identity, its name, symbols, language and history
emerged as one of the most contentious issues in the Balkans. The challenges to its identity surged
from all its neighbors and were targeted against the major aspects that otherwise serve to consolidate the identity and the nation. Today’s members of the Macedonian people speak a Slavic language codified only after 1944 with less than two million native speakers. The Macedonians are, for
the most part, members of an Orthodox Church whose authority was established by a socialist
government in 1968. Their kin-terms, household structures and vernacular culture are similar to
those of neighboring groups. They are the descendants from people who consider themselves, and
were considered by others as Serbs or Bulgarians. Those who challenge the authenticity of the Macedonian national identity, as we will see in the next chapters are many and use these facts to assert that
its components are all newly forged, borrowed, or even stolen from the Republic’s neighbors.
The “Macedonian question” came into being in the last decades of the 19th century when the
aspirations of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia were focused on the Macedonian land. Using the Church
and school as the medium for conversion, Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs competed for the souls and
allegiance of the Christian inhabitants of Macedonia, who were largely Slavs and overwhelmingly of
the Eastern Orthodox religion. Predominantly sedentary farmers, there were a few who claimed to be
members of the Macedonian nation. Most saw themselves as peasants with local or regional identity
who belonged to the Bulgarian, Serbian or the Greek Church and consequently considered themselves
and were considered by others as Bulgarians, Serbs or Greeks. It was in that period that the church
affiliation became a major indicator in establishing national identity for the Macedonian Slavs. This
affiliation was subject to change depending upon local conditions and historical changes and
consequently this contributed to the myth of uncertainty of Macedonian national and ethnic identity.
At the end of 20th century when Macedonia declared its independence, the “Macedonian question” arose from its historical ashes. Seemingly resolved and forgotten for almost a century, Macedonia once again became a threat for Balkan stability.
Bulgaria, Macedonia’s neighbor to the east, recognized the state but still fails to recognize the
existence of a separate Macedonian national identity and language. In their view, Macedonians are
Bulgarians who lost their identity by virtue of artificial communist creation of a Macedonian
identity and the language spoken in the Republic of Macedonia is essentially a Bulgarian dialect.
The Serbian intellectuals remain skeptical about historian existence of any fixed ethnic identity
among Slavs in today’s Macedonia before the 20th century. However, the main Serb challenge to
Macedonian identity comes from the lack of recognition of the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church. The existence of a national separate church in Balkans is an important basis for the
separates of the people.
Greece imposed an embargo on the land-locked country from April 1994 to October 1995 and
temporarily blocked its membership in the international organizations, because, it claimed that the
name Macedonia and the use of the flag (Alexander’s Star of Vergina) imposed territorial claims on
the Greek region with the same name. From the Greek perspective this was an attempt to appro-
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priate a part of the Greek history. The result was that international recognition came slowly and that
Macedonia still does not enjoy the normal recognition of an independent European state as so far as
only some countries have recognize it under its constitutional name, while others use the temporary
United Nation term of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, abbreviated in FYROM.
Even if some of these claims are only symbolic, in a view of historic experience the antagonism
received from the Macedonian neighbors aroused fears for the survival of the state, and by extension, the survival of the nation. Nevertheless, the problem with the neighbors and the revival of the
“Macedonian question” represents only one dimension of the problem since the newly created
Republic had to face up with serious internal problems as well.
In fact, Macedonia found itself confronting the issue of political and economic transition - the
transfer from one social system to another. It is a process of reforms in all areas of life and in the
case of the Macedonian society, the changes were radical. That disturbed the social balance that
existed for almost half a century.
The first government composed of experts (rather than constructed on party lines) was formed to
redirect a society and an economy that have been wholly entwined with that of the former fellowrepublics. These changes in economic and social life hardly affected the lives of many people. The
dissolution of Yugoslavia meant the loss of certainty on economic and social ground. Besides
economic hardship caused by economic transition and hard collateral effects that the international
imposition of the strict sanctioned against the Rump Yugoslavia had on Macedonia, its citizens
were also confronted with situations in which the taken-for-granted processes, institutions and
practices of every day life were questionable. New goals, new values and completely new ways of
living were promoted. Under such conditions those who were not prepared, like people with lower
education and peasants lost the most. At the same time the chances for work, for promotion and
progress of the younger generation decreased. Briefly, everybody lost something. Hence, it is
normal that among most of the population a fear and a feeling of insecurity, about the presence and
future appeared. Within that context in the Macedonian society, apart from the existence of economic insecurity, the political security as well was promoted through the slogan “Oasis of Peace”
However, as the first years of independence were passing, by increasing the economic insecurity as
well as approaching of the post-Yugoslav crisis toward Macedonia (Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo), the
feeling of general insecurity was growing. In these years, the initial enthusiasm of 1991 that had generated a massive participation of the Macedonian citizens on the September referendum turned sour.
Together with a strongly perceived external threat and the problems caused by the process of
transition, the newly established Republic had to face internal problems as well. The greatest threat
to the Macedonian stability was, and still is, the fragile interethnic potpourri within the country. The
1991 census demonstrated the extent of the Republic’s internal diversity. According to the official
data, the Republic of Macedonia had a total population of 2.074.196. That number includes 1.288.330
Macedonians (making up about 66.5 percent of population), 442.914 Albanians (22.9 percent), 77.252
Turks (4 percent), 43.732 Roma (2.3 percent), 39.260 Serbs (2 percent) and Vlachs (0.4 percent),
along with other small groups notably ethnic Macedonian Muslims (called Torbesh), Croats, Bosnians
and Bulgarians. As the data shows, Macedonians constitute the clear majority and their status is not
challenged by any but the Serbian minority and the Albanians.
Since 1991, the members of different ethnic and national minorities claim for more rights and
accuse the state for discrimination, especially in government employment and education, and have
tense relations with both the government and the Macedonian citizens. However, it should be noted
The Macedonian question: The old and the new one
315
that ethnic groups like the Turks, the Vlachs and the Serbs are relatively well integrated and are
considered to be loyal citizens among the Macedonians. However, they are neither with their number nor with the potential for ethno-political mobilization in similar position with the Albanians.
The ethnic relations of the Albanian minority with Macedonian majority have historically been
problematic. The Albanians lived and continue to live in compact settlements in the west of the
republic bordering on Albania, the north-west bordering on the predominantly Albanian province of
Kosovo and in Skopje where they make up over 25 percent of the population. They are a majority of
the population in many western areas like Tetovo, Gostivar, Kicevo and Debar district.
Even when Macedonia was a part of the Yugoslav Federation, the Albanians were never satisfied
with their position, as they felt they were treated as second-class citizens dominated by the Slav
Macedonian majority, discriminated against on language rights and education, public administration,
or in state institution such as the army and police. Albanians also expressed their dissatisfaction with
their minority status considering that the Albanian population, within the borders of Former Yugoslavia, outnumbered the Macedonian one. They have never been recognized as people but as nationality. In Kosovo and South Serbia live more than 1.5 million Albanians, with economic and family
ties to Macedonia’s Albanians and Albania, the kin-state, had an ethnically homogeneous population of at least 3 million. The dissolution of Yugoslav Federation, within which ethnic Macedonians
felt a certain sense of south-Slavic solidarity and the Macedonian quest for independence posed a
problem of the future status of Albanians and brought into question another contentious issue and
that is the future of the external and internal borders of the numerous and fragmented Albanian
community in the Balkans. While they had been divided in Tito’s Yugoslavia, and were, thus, an
easily manageable minority facing a powerful state, in today’s Macedonia they form a large and
territorially concentrated population in a problem-besieged state. This has reinforced the Macedonian perception that the greatest problem facing the state is the question of Albanian secession in
western Macedonia. A number of events in the 1990s seemed to confirm such anxieties. With the
disintegration of Yugoslavia and following the examples of Slovenia and Croatia, the Macedonian
leaders felt the need to separate from the Rump Yugoslavia. The painful decision to separate from
the former Yugoslavia and to embark on the path toward independence was taken by Macedonian
leaders in order to avoid the wars, which had already started in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to escape the threat of returning to interwar subordinated status, which would be almost
guaranteed in the new Serbo-centric state. On this, both Macedonian and Albanian leaders agreed.
However, while the Macedonians contemplated an independent state, some Albanians embraced the
idea of the autonomy for all Albanians in Yugoslavia and Macedonia. These claims can sound
strange to external observers but the Albanian leadership actually feared a further fragmentation of
the Albanian community. With the Macedonian quest for independence, the Albanians saw long established ties with Kosovo threatened and little prospect to improve their status in the new republic. In
the 1990, the Macedonian Albanians from Tetovo region, who traditionally have strong ties with
Kosovo, organized demonstrations in which participants demanded a Greater Albania state. The next
year, most Albanians boycotted the Macedonian’s referendum on independence and the vote on the
constitution, and held their own alternative referendum in January 1992. The result was overwhelming
support for the creation of “Ilirida”, an autonomous Albanian political entity. The Albanian political
parties used this popular support to press for increased cultural and political rights for their constituency. Their claims ranged from guarantees of cultural right to the elevation of community to a
status of constituent nation of the Republic of Macedonia. Specific claims were largely focused on
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reform of the constitution, education (most notably at university level) as well as proportional representation in the public administration. From the Albanian perspective, satisfying these requests
would have remedied their perceived condition of second-class citizens and avoided the conflict.
Still the Macedonian perception of these claims was different. In their opinion, all the necessary
cultural rights of the Albanian community had been granted, both by the law and in practice. The
Albanians had granted rights for primary and secondary education in their mother tongue, as well as
independent and state media. In addition, the electoral system guaranteed that the Albanian electorate would always be proportionally represented in parliament, and it was the practice to include
the Albanian parties in forming a coalition government. The Macedonians feared that satisfaction of
any further claim would lead to federalization and consequently to the disintegration of the state. It
was in this climate that many Macedonians expressed their fear and distrust of their Albanian fellow
citizens. This mutual fear and distrust has a long history. In fact, certain historical developments of
the past century and a half influenced ethnic relations between two communities and created a
fertile ground for possible problems and conflicts. Here I will briefly describe some historic events
and developments that shaped the different ethnic groups’ perceptions most notably during the late
Ottoman period, the inter-war years, the Second World War, the Yugoslav Communist era and the
independent Macedonia. However, the real origins of the interethnic conflict in Macedonia are
recent. The two communities have been living in this region for centuries and there was no conflict
until February 2001.
2.2. Historical background
2.2.1. Group identity in the Ottoman Empire
In order to understand the cultural differences and tense interethnic relations that existed in the
Macedonian society even before the conflict it may be useful to describe the ethnic background of
both groups. Like most of the Balkan nations, the Albanians and Macedonians both have multifold
and complex identities, as well as their own contradictory and difficult fate.
The Albanians are believed to be descendants of ancient Illyrian tribes that settled in the Balkan
Peninsula before the Slavs’ arrival in the 7th century. The Albanians are divided into two mayor dialectal and cultural groups: the Ghegs and the Tosks. The Ghegs are historically pastoral people who
settled in Kosovo and Macedonia during the 17th century. The reason of their migration from northern
Albania in a new place of residence was prompted not only by poverty but also by scarcity of land and
pastures. There was one more important reason, the blood feud in which most of Albanian clans were
involved (Zhelyazkova, 2000). Predominantly shepherds and peasants, the Ghegs tended to be tribal,
bellicose and unruly (Perry 2000).
The Tosks, on other hand, lived in today’s southern Albania and were more exposed to urban
influences and Ottoman control. Consequently, they were less prone to warfare than their clannish
northern cousins. By the 17th century, the majority of the Ghegs and Tosks converted to Islam and
only a small part remained either Catholics or Orthodox (Zhelyazkova 2000).
The Macedonians are descendants of the Slavic tribes that settled in the broad geographic region
of Macedonia in the middle of 7th century. Considering that they settled mainly in territories of the
old state of Philip and Alexander the Great, they were named Macedonians. Unlike the Albanians
who are almost entirely Muslims, the Slavs in Macedonia are overwhelmingly of eastern Orthodox
The Macedonian question: The old and the new one
317
religion. Between the Slav arrival and the Ottoman conquest, this region that we have come to know
as Macedonia, was divided and ruled by Byzantium and afterwards by Bulgarian and Serbian
medieval rulers. The Ottomans arrived at the end of the 14th century and ruled for five centuries
until the Balkan wars in the early 20th century. Along with the Ottoman conquest, in Macedonia and
in the Balkans, a large number of Turkish settlers arrived and with them, Islam. With the arrival of
new Islamic people, there were many who adopted the new religion. In Macedonia they were Albanians in the majority and small sectors of the Slav-speaking population.
In the Ottoman Empire religious affiliation was very important. The population of the Ottoman
Empire, which ruled Macedonia from the fourteenth century until 1913, was organized into communities or administrative units, known as millets, based on religion rather than on language or
ethnicity. Muslims were recognized as equal first class citizens in the Muslim millet. Other “peoples
of the book” like Christians and Jews, were tolerated and organized into separate millets. Faith and
not ethnicity or language was the main differentiator.
The different millets were treated as corporate bodies and had their own internal structure and
hierarchy. The millet leaders had wide jurisdiction over their people, who were bound by their own
regulations. Included within these structures was the educational system, which allowed the subject
Christian people to retain their own separate identities and cultures, rooted in their respective churches (Poulton 1995). Therefore, the religious communities - the millets - became the prime focus of
identity outside the family and locality.
In the Ottoman Empire, being a Muslim had its advantages and the Albanians in Macedonia had
enjoyed it, because of their Islamic religion, in the position of privileged ruling class with respect to
the Slav Christian masses. Indeed, during the Ottoman period many semi-independent feudal lords
(chiflik-sajibii) were of Albanian origin. These potentates, who controlled the large estates, became
the law-makers in Macedonia. The peasants’ land was taken away and incorporated into chifliks,
and having been made dependant, the peasants were obliged to pay taxes to the local chiflik-sajibii,
in addition to already heavy taxes levied by the central Turkish authorities. The already hard life of
Christian peasants became even harder, and the reason was not only the taxes they had to pay to
feudal lords but also the Albanian outlaw groups who were looting Macedonian villages. Christian
Slavs were easy prey for bands of Ghegs from neighboring Muslim areas. In order to preserve the
home and the family many Christian peasants left their fertile law loud in exchange for more secure
life in remote, but safer areas. The Slavs along the border of Albanian areas, like in the Tetovo,
Kicevo and Ohrid regions, suffered the most (Perry 2000).
The Macedonian collective memory concerning this period is filled with resentment. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these negative collective memories were not enough to create a relationship of mutual resentment partly because the Macedonian collective memory has been dominated
by resentment toward the five centuries of Turkish presence in Macedonia rather than towards the
Albanians themselves.
The millet system deeply influenced the identity formation of the Albanian and Macedonian
community. Indeed, neither Albanians nor Macedonians developed their separate national consciousness until the 20th century. The Muslim Albanians tended to see themselves as Ottomans,
though nevertheless members of a given clan and inhabitants of a specific region. On the other
hand, the Slavs in Macedonia were overwhelmingly of Eastern Orthodox religion. Predominantly
agriculturists, there were but a few who claimed to be members of the Macedonian nation until the
20th century.
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Until the 19th century, the Slav inhabitants of Macedonia were members of the Rum (Orthodox)
millet controlled by the Greek patriarchate in Istanbul, and then, after the Tanzimat reform, members
of the Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian Orthodox church. Being a Christian, a member of the Orthodox
millet, as opposed to being a Muslim, was the most important aspect of identity of most of the
inhabitants of Macedonia. Another important aspect of their identity was their status as a member of a
certain family, inhabitants of a certain region and members of a certain socio-economic class.
The millet system allowed almost complete control of the population by the Church and its
leaders. For centuries, the Greeks utilized the Istanbul patriarchate to Hellenize the Orthodox population of Macedonia: Slavs, Albanians and Vlachs. Therefore, it can be argued that until the national
revival in the 19th century, the Christian inhabitants of Macedonia faced a great threat of assimilation from the Greeks, who controlled the religious service and education. The illiterate peasants in
the countryside continued to speak the vernacular, but the urban educated class spoke Greek and
gradually became Hellenized (Poulton 1995).
By the end of the 18th century, the Ottoman elite had finally become aware of the weakness and
deteriorating conditions of the Empire and attempted to replace old institutions with new and
modern ones. The Tanzimat embodied a whole series of reforms dealing with almost all aspects of
interaction between the Ottoman state and the individual. As already noted, Muslims were seen as
the first-class citizens and other religious communities were tolerated but not treated as equals. The
Tanzimat introduced full religious equality, abolished the extra taxes for non-Muslims and allowed
the carrying of arms for all the subjects of the empire (previously this was allowed only for
Muslims). The Tanzimat reforms took the first steps toward ending the millet monopolistic control
over the lives of their followers. Indeed, in the new system, the millet had become more of a religious organization rather than one dealing with all aspects of the relations between the individual
and the state (Poulton 1995). The new system allowed establishment of secular institutions of education, law and justice and crucially put an end on the monopoly of the Istanbul patriarchate. In
1833, the Church of Greece unilaterally and uncanonically proclaimed its independence from the
Patriarch of Constantinople. In this way, as Kitromilides (1989) points out, the Church of Greece set
an example worth following for other churches in the Balkans.
In 1870, Russia successfully pressured the Ottoman Empire to allow the formation of a separate Bulgarian Church or Exarchate and afterwards the establishment of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1878.
Despite the significant changes introduced by the Tanzimat, the decline of the Ottoman Empire
continued in the 19th century. Even if the Ottoman state began to change its fundamental basis and
treat all its citizens equally regardless of religion (and thus moved toward the creation of the
Ottoman citizen), the impact of Western nationalism deeply affected the way the Christian groups
identified themselves. The millet became progressively identified with national groupings.
In the late 18th and early 19th century, nationalist ideologies began to penetrate the Balkans. This
was the beginning of the age of nationalism in the Balkans. In this period an “imagined community”
based on a shared Orthodox faith gradually broke up into several “imagined communities based on
a shared history and a common language (Danforth 2001). The term “Bulgarian”, which had earlier
been used to refer to all the Slavs of the Ottoman Empire (Friedman 1975), or as a virtual synonym
for “peasant” without any political significance at all (Wilkinson 1951), took on the meaning of
“Bulgarian” in a national sense. Similarly, the term “Greek”, which was used in the early nineteenth
century to refer to members of the Orthodox Christian merchant class regardless of their “ethnic
origin” or the language they spoke, started to mean “Greek” in a national sense (Stoianovich 1960).
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319
The 19th century found much of the Balkan Christians in revolt. Strong national movements
among Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs led to the creation of the new national states in the Balkans.
These newly formed states began the process of nation building by cultivating a common national
identity with all the means at their disposal. However, in the Balkans, the most important step in the
nation-building process was the establishment of autocephalous national churches along with
military service and education system.
Once established, each of these new states tried to acquire additional territory, at the expense of
the sultan. By the end of the 19th century, the aspirations of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia were focused on the Macedonian land.
With the establishment of an autocephalous Bulgarian church in 1870, the “Macedonian question” came into being. The Macedonia (as geographic term) found itself in a contest between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, over which country would gain control of its territory and allegiance of
the Christian inhabitants. Each of these countries sent their priests, teachers and bands of guerilla
fighters to terrorize the local Macedonian population and force them to adopt a respective Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian national identity. In this struggle for the souls and allegiance of the Christian
Slavs, the schools and the church were the most important mediums for conversion. From 1870,
Orthodox Christians in Macedonia had the choice of affiliating with the Greek patriarch, the Bulgarian exarch or the Serbian Orthodox Church. Through the construction of schools and assignment of
priests and teachers these three countries conducted intense propaganda campaigns whose main
goal was to “reawaken a dormant national identity” of the Christian peasants of Macedonia, in order
to justify their claims to the territory. Factors that became increasingly important in the construction
of collective categories of identity were whether a family or village was affiliated with the Greek
Patriarchate or the Bulgarian Exarchate and whether they were Greek speaking or Slavic-speaking.
These factors of religious affiliation and language use were given a national interpretation by
proponents of both Bulgarian and Greek nationalist ideologies.
While the Slavic-speaking Exarchists and the Greek-speaking Patriarchists were easily claimed
as “Bulgarians” and “Greeks” by their respective nationalist camps, the issue was much more complicated in the case of the Slavic-speaking Patriarchists. They were claimed by both sides, by the
Bulgarian on the basis of their language and by the Greek on the basis of their religious affiliation.
Many disinterested observers at the time concluded that the Slavic-speaking inhabitants of
Macedonia were “Bulgarians” (King 1973) and that the term “Macedonian” was not used to identify
people as belonging to a distinct “Macedonian” ethnic or national group. Rather the term “Macedonian” was either used in a general regional sense to designate all the inhabitants of Macedonia regardless of their ethnicity, or it was used more specifically to refer to the Slavic-speaking Christians
living in the geographic area of Macedonia. If pressed to assert some other form of collective
identity, these people may well have said they were “Bulgarians” (Perry 2000).
However, it was not until the 20th century that any national identity was adopted by these people.
National identity was something that was imposed from outside and the result was that the identity
of the Christian Slavs tended to be muddled and mixed among Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek and
emerging Macedonian identity. As Wilkinson points out (1951), any expression of a national identity that was encountered among the Macedonian peasantry «was purely superficial, and owed its
existence to religious or educational propaganda or even to terrorism».
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2.2.2. The question of the separate Macedonian identity up to the Balkan wars
Before 1870, the literate Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Macedonia and Bulgaria were engaged
in a common struggle against Greek cultural and linguistic domination in the Balkans. During this
period the Slavs of Macedonia called their language Bulgarian. The intellectuals hoped to create a
single Macedo-Bulgarian literary language based on some kind of compromise among the various
dialects of Macedonia and Bulgaria (Friedman 1993). Nevertheless, it was not until the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the increasing attempts by the Bulgarian intelligentsia to impose an eastern Bulgarian-based standard language of the people of Macedonia that efforts to establish a single Macedo-Bulgarian literary language were abandoned and the first signs of a Macedonian linguistic separatism appeared. This is the period when dictionaries, grammars and textbooks
began to be published in what was specifically referred to as “Slavo-Macedonian” or the “Macedonian language”. According to the Macedonian official historiography, the second half of the 19th
century is to be considered as a “Macedonian national renaissance”. Actually, in this period a small
number of Macedonian intellectuals like Georgi Pulevski, Konstantin and Dimitar Miladinov and
Krste Misirkov began to form organizations and publish newspapers and journals asserting the existence of a unique Macedonian language, culture and nation. However, their work and “Macedonian” ideas did not reach large segments of population.
For modern Macedonia and the nation’s collective experience the most important steps in affirmation of the Macedonian identity were the founding of IMRO, the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization in 1893 and Ilinden Uprising in 1903, which for an average Macedonian
citizen in Keith Brown’s words “combines something of the flavor of France’s Bastille, England’s
Runnymede and the United State’s Alamo.
However, historical interpretation of the Ilinden Uprising which led to the establishment of the
Krusevo Republic, results as one of the most contested issues in the Balkans. Who were the members
of the VMRO and what were their goals?
The political goals of the IMRO were the liberation of Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire and
the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia, but according to the official Bulgarian historiography, the ultimate goal of this organization was the annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria. In fact, the
IMRO's leadership never seemed to have doubted «the predominantly Bulgarian character of the
uprising and population of Macedonia» (MacDermott 1978). Even Gotse Delchev, considered by
the Republic of Macedonia as the Macedonian national hero, refers to the Slavs of Macedonia as
“Bulgarians”. In his correspondence Gotse Delchev often states clearly and simply, “We are Bulgarians”» (ibidem).
Regardless of the Macedonian and Bulgarian conflicting claims over exclusive ownership of this
event the historical fact is that in 1903, the IMRO fomented a revolt and led the Slav-speaking
Macedonian peasantry in the Ilinden Uprising. The result of this uprising was the establishment of
the Krusevo Republic, in the town of Krusevo, where the leaders of IMRO invited all people of Macedonia, regardless of their religion, to join them in fighting for an independent Macedonia. However, the Krusevo Republic was short-lived. Ten days later the Ottoman troops defeated the revolutionaries. It should be noted that in the Ilinden Uprising even a small number of Albanians had participated. Nevertheless, it seems that far more numerous were the Albanians who made up ranks of
the Ottoman irregulars known as bashibozuks, who together with the regular troops suppressed the
Ilinden Uprising. In the years that followed, conditions for the Slav peasantry deteriorated, as well
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as the relationship with the Muslim Albanian population.
After the failure of the Ilinden Uprising, the struggle for Macedonia continued. In the period
leading up to the Balkan wars 1912-13, Serbia became increasingly involved in what until then had
been primarily a conflict between Bulgaria and Greece. In their attempt to achieve the “ethnographic reclamation” of Macedonia (Wilkinson 1951), the Serbs first had to refuse the Bulgarian
claims that Macedonia belonged to Bulgaria because the Slavs of Macedonia were Bulgarians. The
Serbian position, which was effectively articulated by Jovan Cvijic, one of the most respected
human geographers of the Balkans at the time, was that the Slavs of Macedonia were a transitional
group located linguistically and culturally somewhere between the Bulgarians and the Serbs. Cvijic
gave this group the neutral name of “Macedo-Slavs”. From the Serbian perspective, because the
“Macedo-Slavs” did not exhibit any permanent national consciousness, they should be considered “incipient Serbs” (Wilkinson 1951).
2.2.3. The Albanian community up to the Balkan Wars
While for the Macedonian Slavs church affiliation became a primary indicator in establishing
national identity, for the Albanians language and culture were the bases for a national consciousness. Like most Slavs in the Balkans, Albanians too were uneducated folk who, no matter what their
religion was, did not develop a national consciousness until the 20th century. The growth of a
unifying spirit was confronted in the first place with the traditional distinction between the Ghegs
and Tosks. In addition, there were religious differences and a presence of a large Muslim community, which had a strong sense of affiliation with the Ottoman Empire (Zhelyazkova 2000). The Albanian Muslims held high position in the Ottoman army and in the central and local administration.
Along with this, the Albanian elite was educated in Turkish language and felt associated with the
Ottoman statehood. For this reason, the rise of the national consciousness and patriotic ideas came
late. In fact, until the 20th century, the Muslim Albanians tended to see themselves as Ottomans,
though nevertheless the members of a given clan and inhabitants of a specific region. On the other
hand, among Christian Albanians the striving for establishment of their statehood, an independent
church and distinctive cultural identity remained immature and fragmentary. This made them
objects of claims of their neighboring young nations. The Orthodox Albanians were members of the
Rum millet and like their Slav neighbors; they faced a threat of assimilation from the Greeks. They
studied at Greek schools and were educated in the spirit of pan-Hellenism. The Catholic Albanians
studied in Italian and Latin, and the students were instructed into loyalty to the Papacy and to a
generally pro-Western identity (ibidem).
However, even if a unifying spirit and the Albanian national consciousness were generally missing among Albanians, expansion of the Greek state to the south and the Serbian state to the north
raised fears of the Albanian Muslim community that the Ottoman Empire might not be strong enough
to protect their interests from their rapacious neighbors. In 1878, a group of Albanian intellectuals
founded the League of Prizren that aimed to create a sense of common identity among the conservative, illiterate mountaineers of the north - who had no national consciousness and who were bound
to clans, Islam, and the empire - and the less fractious Muslim and Christians Albanians of the
south. In 1878, the leaders of the League of Prizren in order to assert Albanian national consciousness by promoting the use of the Albanian language and to protect Albanians from the threat of the
country’s partition between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, called upon the Porte to unite four vilayets
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into unique autonomous administrative unit which would include all Albanian-inhabited lands. The
League members exported their ideas to the Albanians of the Macedonian vilayet, including the use of
the Albanian as official language, autonomy for all Albanian populated provinces within the empire
and the formation of an elected council of Albanians, which would represent Ottoman state in the
Albanian territories. However, with precedents like Greece and Serbia before it, both of which
seceded from the Empire, the Porte was unwilling to accord another autonomous region, which
eventually, would become an independent state. In 1881, the League of Prizren was banned and its
leaders fled abroad. However the pressure for greater cultural rights continued within the Empire
and a number of schools were opened in the southern Albania using the Albanian language as a medium of instruction. While this was still confined to some intellectual circles and not a mass movement, it was an important step forward in the affirmation of the Albanian national consciousness.
2.2.4. The Balkan Wars and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
By the turn of the century, a new factor had arisen in the already complicated Balkan situation.
Before the 1890, the new Balkan states were small, weak and practically dependant on a Great power
patronage. Now this situation was changing and the new states themselves began to play a diplomatic
game themselves by building up their own military strength. In 1912, the new Balkan states formed a
military alliance against the ailing Ottoman Empire and the result was the outbreak of the Balkan
Wars, which irrevocably changed the map of the peninsula. Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro
declared war to the Empire with the aim to divide the Macedonian lands (Poulton 1995).
In the meantime, noting the empire’s weakness, Albanians declared the founding of an Albanian
state. Using the language and the culture as the bounds with which to create a national consciousness, the Albanian leaders made an effort to unite the Ghegs of Kosovo, Macedonia and northern
Albania with their Tosk cousins in the south (Perry 2000). In 1912, an assembly of 83 delegates
proclaimed the independence of Albania in Vlore. This proclamation was a hurried answer to the
advances of Serb and Montenegrin troops in Macedonia and of Greek in Epirus. The European
powers quickly endorsed this move, though its borders were not finally agreed until 1921, following
World War I. The new Albania comprised only a part of the Albanian-inhabited lands while the rest
was divided by the neighboring Slav states and Greece. A third of the Albanian population remained under the Serb and the Montenegrin administration, including the western coast of the
Scutari Lake, Kosovo and the western part of today’s Macedonia. Greece kept southern Epirus.
Thus from the Albanian point of view, the Balkan Slavs should be held responsible for the division
of the Albanians, representing one of the primary sources of Albanian resentment.
In 1913 at the conclusion of the Balkan Wars, the Macedonian lands were “sliced” as well.
“Instead of becoming a free and independent country, Macedonia was partitioned and occupied by
Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. In this way “the Macedonian people” was divided and the geographic
and ethnographic unity of Macedonia was destroyed” (Mincev 1972). From this point until the end
of World War II the Macedonians in all three regions of Macedonia (Vardar, Pirin and Aegean
Macedonia) were subject to violent campaigns of assimilation whose goals were to convince the
local Macedonian population that they were actually Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks. The Macedonian Slavs in each state were thereupon “enlightened” about their national identity by the authorities. In spite of possessing a language and culture different from that of the majority, those who
found themselves in Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia) became “Bulgarians”, those residing in Greece
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(Aegean Macedonia) became “Greeks” and those in Serbia became “Serbians”. Serbian Macedonia,
known as Vardar Macedonia, was treated more like the conquered territory than lands that were being “reunited” with the motherland.
In the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes the Macedonian Slavs were not
recognized as a people with distinctive national identity and the new rulers started with the policy of
assimilation and forced Serbianization. The Serbian language was compulsory in schools and for
official purposes in both Macedonia and Kosovo while the Vardar Macedonian Orthodox community fell under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Bulgarian priests and teachers
were outset and societies and organization closed. The Names were once more compulsorily serbianized and there was an inevitable wave of repression followed by arrests, detentions and internments. In this period the Serbian colonists settled in large number both in Macedonia and Kosovo in
order to dilute the local population and to justify the Serbian claims to the territories.
The Albanians, who found themselves in the newly created first Yugoslavia, quickly learned
that theirs was an inferior status. In fact the Yugoslav state was from the beginning bitterly hostile
to the ethnic Albanians. Yugoslavia literally means “land of south Slavs” and the Albanians of
course knew that they were not. I have already argued that neither Slavs nor Albanians had national
consciousness until the 20th century, but each of them knew that they were not members of the other
group. A Slav was not a “Turk” (the name to describe a Muslim majority that included the Albanians as well), and a Turk was not a Gavur, a non-Muslim subject, an infidel. However the Slavs of
Macedonia were in better position than their Albanian fellow-citizens. Even if they were not recognized as people and were considered by the Serb authorities as bumpkins with Serbian roots
(Perry 2000), they at least were the south Slavs while the numerous Albanians from Macedonia and
Kosovo were usually portrayed as vile and alien “Turks”(ibidem). The Albanians found themselves
in a hostile state and in response, eventually sought to create their own homogeneous national land.
After 1918 all Albanian schools were shut down in Kosovo and Macedonia and the Albanian population was faced with state-sponsored assimilation policy through the Serbian education system.
This policy was seen by the Serbian authority as useful in keeping the Albanians in the state of
ignorance. Indeed, as data show, in the first half of 20th century the illiteracy rate among the Albanians was about 90 percent.
Between 1912 and 1918, the Serb military undertook legally sanctioned resettlements, colonization, persecutions and deportations in Kosovo, Sanjak and Macedonia. The 1914 law-decree on
Agrarian Reforms and Colonization adopted by the Serbian government is an example of the
government sponsored repressions. The law permitted and supported emigration, expropriation of
the Albanian ownership and colonization of the Albanian-inhabited lands by Serbs and Montenegrins. Consequently, the 1930s saw a worsening in the interethnic relations between the Slavs and
the Albanians, which was seen as a proof that policies had to be strengthened with more drastic
measures. Such measures were most notably suggested by Cubrilovic in his project titled “The expulsion of Albanians”, in which he recommended the state authorities to force all Albanians to emigrate to Albania or Turkey. In fact, because of a Serbian repressive policy, many Albanians decided
to migrate to Turkey. Those Albanians who decided to stay in Yugoslavia were engaged in armed
resistance and founded the Albanian religious schools that became the center of nationalist activity.
Throughout the war and inter-war period that followed, the Albanians and Macedonian Slavs coexisted peacefully. In the cities they sometime lived side by side, meeting and trading in market
places, but never mixing. In the countryside, the tendency was to live in separate villages or in sepa-
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rate quarters within the villages. The Albanians and the Macedonians seldom mingled socially and
even if they were both faced with the same state-sponsored repressive assimilation policies and
were engaged in sporadic and violent resistance against the Serbian authority, they never joined
forces, even if they were fighting a common enemy.
2.2.5. The Second World War
In 1941, when World War II started, Macedonia once again changed its rulers. The Macedonian
territory was soon occupied by the German troops and sliced between the Bulgarian and Italian
authorities. Bulgaria had repeated its World War I decision to join Germany, both times with hope
to gain the Macedonian territory. Even if Hitler did not allow the Bulgarians to formally annex parts
of Macedonia, they had the full liberty in the areas which they controlled. The Bulgarian occupation
administration controlled almost an entire territory of Vardar Macedonia with the exception of the
predominantly Albanian regions of Tetovo, Gostivar and Kicevo which were under Italian authority.
There is no doubt that the initial reaction among large sections of the population of Vardar
Macedonia, who had suffered so much under the Serbian authority, was to greet the Bulgarians as
liberators. Like the Serbs who sought to Serbianize Macedonia before the war, the Bulgarians as
well adopted the policy of Bulgarianization. The Bulgarian policy was that the Macedonian Slavs
were somehow “back warded Bulgarians” who needed to “reawaken” and repeated the Serbian
policy of assimilation through the education system and the Orthodox Church. Indeed, in two years
the Bulgarians opened about 800 schools and established Skopje University. The Bulgarian language was introduced as official language and the Serbian forms of last names were replaced with
the Bulgarian ones. So the Balkan history repeated itself!
Initially the Macedonian Slavs welcomed the opening of schools and the return of the Bulgarian
priests but this honeymoon period did not last long. The Bulgarian authoritarianism, corruption and
arrogance toward local population led to the alienation of the Macedonian Slavs. Resentment
against the Bulgarians grew and led to a number of uprisings in 1942 and deeply influenced the
decision of many Macedonian Slavs to join the forces of the Yugoslav Communist leader, Josip
Broz Tito. The numerous adherences to the Partisan movement were reinforced by the decision of
the Yugoslav Communist Party to finally recognize the Macedonian people as a separate nation. In
fact, in 1943 at the second AVNOJ (Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) congress the Macedonian nation was affirmed and given equal status as the other five federal units: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. In 1944 the Partisans liberated certain
areas and the first ASNOM (Anti-fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Macedonia) was held
at the Prohor Pcinski monastery. On the symbolic date of the 2nd of August (Ilinden) the president
of the first ASNOM Metodije Antonov-Chento, proclaimed “Macedonia as a federal state in the
new Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia” and issued a manifesto which described its position
under the old Yugoslavia as that of a colony. The manifesto also stated the equality of all the nationalities in Macedonia and invited the Albanians, the Turks and the Vlachs to join the Macedonians and other Yugoslav people in the national liberation struggle.
During the war the Albanian-inhabited territory has been mostly under the control of Italy and
the kingdom of Albania. In 1939, the fascist Italy annexed Albania and by doing so, Italians inherited a nationalistic conscience in formation together with nationalistic aspirations. In 1941, Italy
entered into war against Greece and Yugoslavia and hence annexed Kosovo and western Macedonia
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325
to the Kingdom of Albania. The Italian occupation forces were presented as liberators of the Albanian people from the oppressive regime of old Yugoslavia and were generally joyfully received by
the Albanian local population. This new political situation made the birth of a “Greater Albania”
possible. The occupation administration was divided between its Italian and Albanian segments.
The military sector was under the Italian control while the civil sector was entirely under the Albanian jurisdiction. Administration, police and judiciary had numerous persons of the Albanian origin
who introduced oppressive policies toward the local Macedonian population. They established the
new media and schools with compulsory use of the Albanian language.
The Albanian community had mixed feelings about where to place their allegiance during the
war. Some of them joined the partisan movement led by the Albanian Communist party and fought
against occupying forces, while others joined the Balli Kombetar, the National Front, which was the
anti-communist nationalist group. Under the Italian sponsorship, the Balli Kombetar aimed to create
a “Greater Albania” which would include Albania, Kosovo, western Macedonia and other Albanian-inhabited territories which were “stolen or occupied” by the neighboring Slav states. This policy was very attractive to Albanians given the treatment of Kosovars and Macedonian Albanians
under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. For this reason, many Albanians joined the Balli Kombetar and
fought against the partisans, turning themselves into enemies of Macedonia too.
Consequently, the image of an Albanian ambition to create a “Greater Albania” was firmly imprinted in the Macedonian consciousness. Unfortunately, when the war ended not only culture and
history separated the Albanians and Macedonians but also distrust and animosity (Perry 2000).
2.2.6. The Socialist Federative Republic of Macedonia from 1944 to 1991: Ethnogenesis
The question if a Macedonian nation actually existed in the 1940s when the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia decided to recognize it is difficult to answer. According to some scholars «even at this
time it was doubtful whether the Slavs of Macedonia considered themselves to be a nationality
separate from the Bulgarians» (Palmer, King 1971). Other scholars as Barker argue that «the feeling
of being Macedonian, and nothing but Macedonian, seems to be a sentiment of fairly recent grow,
and even today is not deeply rooted» (Barker 1950). The truth is that even if the Macedonian national
consciousness existed until World War II, it was expressed only by a small circle of intellectuals.
In 1943, Tito recognized a separate Macedonian national identity with a subsequent creation of
what was first called the People’s Republic of Macedonia and later, the Socialist Federative Republic of Macedonia. The new republic was constructed as the national state of the Macedonian
people and for the first time in history the Macedonians had sovereign control over a particular territory. So the republic was established but the nation had still to be created (Brunnbauer 2004). The
recognition of a separate Macedonian nation had important political reasons (Danforth 2000). With
recognition the communist party of Yugoslavia was able to gain control of Vardar Macedonia and
justify the Yugoslav claims to the Macedonian territory. According to the first Yugoslavian constitution each of the “nations of Yugoslavia” had a right to self-determination including the right to
secession. During World War II, the pro-Bulgarian sentiments developed because of the closeness
of the language and culture and as a reaction to the Serbian assimilation attempts. Even if the
Bulgarian arrogance toward the local population led to disillusionment within the population, the
sense of Bulgarian national identity was shared by many inhabitants of the area. So if the inhabitants of Vardar Macedonia were Bulgarians, then they would have the right to join the Bulga-
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rian state. Since this was in the interest of Yugoslavia, the only solution was to recognize the Slav
inhabitants of Macedonia as Macedonians (Danforth 2000). For this reasons all expressions of the
Bulgarian identity had to be suppressed.
The new leaders began to foster the development and affirmation of the new nation through a
process of nation building, employing all the means at their disposal. The new republic, which was
perceived as a national state, needed a shared history, language, religion and culture in order to
disseminate the Macedonian national consciousness.
The new nation needed a written language and the establishment of standard literally Macedonian
as the official language in 1944 was a major contribution to the construction of a distinct Macedonian
identity. In order to stress the difference from the Bulgarians, the Macedonian leadership decided to
base the new language on the west-central dialect which was the most different from the Bulgarian
standard language. In addition the Macedonians did not accept the Bulgarian alphabet but developed
some distinctive letters that led to the standardization of a distinctive Macedonian orthography.
In addition to the language the new republic needed a history as well. Tracing the origins of the
nation became a primary task for historiography. Since in the sources “Macedonians” are rarely
mentioned as an ethnic group, the Macedonian historians employ a device already known to their
Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian colleagues, namely to replace the term “Christian/Greek Orthodox/Bulgarian Exarchists”, usually used for the designation of the Orthodox population during Ottoman times, with “Macedonian” (Brunnbauer 2004). It was extremely difficult to make space for
the Macedonian national myths and narratives. «In the Macedonian case, there are few historical
symbols utilized by the Republic of Macedonia that are not disputed by conflicting historical
traditions in neighboring states» (Frusetta 2004). The Macedonian historiography was a latecomer.
All significant events and personalities were already included in the national histories of neighboring countries - Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia - which has substantiated their territorial claims to
Macedonia by their particular interpretation of the history of the region and the ethnic identity of its
population. «Any Macedonian national narrative came into conflict with these older historiographies. The Macedonians, in turn, had to begin from scratch in their efforts to present a long history
of their nation» (Brunnbauer 2004).
The first generation of Macedonian historians traced the emergence of the Macedonian nation
back to the nineteenth century. «Macedonian national history was traced to the nineteenth century,
with its most prominent expression being the revolutionary struggle for freedom, equality and independence» (Frusetta 2004).The intellectuals began to articulate “Macedonian” national consciousness. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO), which was established
in 1893, and the Ilinden Uprising against Ottoman rule on 2 August 1903, were the first significant
political manifestations of the Macedonian national consciousness. Later, thanks to the efforts of the
Communist Macedonian partisan movement during World War II and the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia, whose role was particularly emphasized by the socialist Macedonian historiography, a
Macedonian state was established within Yugoslavia. The official discourse created a semantic
chain between the Illinden Uprising (2 august 1903) and the first session of Antifascist Assembly of
national liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) in 1944, which established the Macedonian Republic
and also happened to take place on the 2nd of August. ASNOM became perceived as the “Second
Ilinden” which completed the unfinished business of the Macedonian revolutionaries.
The first important shift in tracing the myth of origin was the attempt to find the origins of the
Macedonian nation further back into history, namely in the Middle Ages. «Now, the medieval
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327
empire of Czar Samuil and his successors, whose capitals were Prespa and Ohrid lake in Macedonia, was re-evaluated as a Macedonian state although existing scholarship has regarded it Bulgarian» (Brunnbauer 2004). In this way the Macedonian history separated the Macedonian ethno genesis from the Bulgarian one.
The religion was another important step along the path to nationhood. For this reason, the Yugoslav authorities decided to separate the Orthodox Church in Yugoslav Macedonia from the Serbian
control and to establish an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church. However, in the field of
religion, developments were slower because of the opposition of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In
1958, the ancient archdiocese of Ohrid was restored and in 1967 the Macedonian Orthodox Church
finally gained its independence.
In the first decades of the establishment of the republic, the Macedonian national identity was
growing. The new authorities overcame much of the residual pro-Bulgarian sentiment among the
population and the nation building process seemed to be successful in affirming a distinct Macedonian national consciousness.
2.3. The Albanian community in the former Yugoslavia
Despite the efforts of the Yugoslav authorities to overcome nationalist sentiments and to bring
together Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, Bosnians, Albanians and other peoples of the new
Yugoslavia into a state based on the socialist rhetoric of “Brotherhood and Unity”, it seems that the
Albanians have never felt to be a part of the Yugoslav federation.
The Albanian community, after the end of World War Two, went from being a majority in an
Italian-sponsored Greater Albania to a minority status in each Yugoslav republic in which the
Albanians resided (Perry 2000). Since the beginning, the Albanian perception of ethnic policies in
Tito’s Yugoslavia had been one of a continuation of the Slav oppression. Not only did the new
Yugoslav state separate its substantial Albanian community from the Albanian state, but also it did
not provide equality with other Yugoslav people by granting the Albanians the status of republic.
From the Albanian perspective this was discriminatory since the other people, like the Bosnian
Muslim and Macedonians, were given such status. Despite the fact that the Albanians made up almost ten percent of the former Yugoslav population, they have never been recognized as the nation
but as a nationality (ethnic minority) without republican status. For this reason, according to the
Yugoslav constitution which permitted the right to secession only to republics, the Yugoslav Albanians did not have the right of self-determination. Along with this, the numerous Albanian community was fragmented between Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro.
However, as a national minority, the Albanians were granted some cultural and education rights.
They had a right to elementary and secondary education in the Albanian language. There were also
some Albanian newspapers and magazines, as well as radio and television programs. However,
these rights were not enough to grant equality of the Albanian community and to foster integration
into the Yugoslav and Macedonian society. Throughout the Yugoslav period, the Albanians were
concentrated in the rural areas and their level of education, especially among women, was generally
low. They were also underrepresented in the state positions and employment. Because of such
policy, many Albanians emigrated to the republics that were more prosperous or abroad in search of
better economic prospect.
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2.4. The growth of the Albanian nationalism
The 1960s represented the turning point for the Yugoslav Albanians. In 1966, Aleksandar
Rankovic head of the Yugoslav security forces, famous for its pro-Serbian and anti-Albanian
policy, was discharged and even more important, the Yugoslav state moved toward greater decentralization, by which the federal units received more power. Encouraged by this new situation, the
Yugoslav Albanians increased their national consciousness, and some of them began to strength
their muscles demanding more group rights.
In 1968 there were large-scale demonstrations in Prishtina, where the Kosovar Albanians demanded the granting of a republican status for the province of Kosovo and Metohija and the
establishment of an Albanian language university. These demonstrations were followed by similar
demonstrations in Tetovo where Albanian nationalists demanded to join Kosovo in a seventh
republic. Of course, the Albanian demands were firmly denied by the authorities in Skopje and Belgrade. However, the Albanian demonstrators achieved a part of their objectives. In 1970, Prishtina
University was established and in 1974 the new federal constitution provided for a virtual self-rule
to the Autonomous Region of Kosovo. What Kosovo gained with this constitution was «a republic
without republican status» (Judah 2000). For the Macedonian Albanians, however, this decentralization did not mean much since they continued to be considered as a minority in the Republic of
Macedonia and as such had been granted only cultural rights. Kosovo is very important for the Macedonian Albanians. Most of Albanian intellectuals from Macedonia attended university in Prishtina
and have family ties in Kosovo. Through such ties, events and situations in Kosovo are usually
reflected in Macedonia as well.
In 1980, Josip Broz Tito died and the Albanian national movement gained strength. Even if, in
the period between 1968 and 1981, Albanians from Kosovo enjoyed broad range of cultural rights
and autonomy, which were granted by federal laws, it was not enough. The demonstrations took
place in 1981. Once again, the Kosovars rioted to protest their inferior status and demanded the
creation of a “Socialist Republic of Kosovo”. The events in Kosovo were mirrored by similar, even
if smaller scale nationalist manifestations by Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia. The proposed “seventh republic”, which was to include the Albanian-inhabited areas of western Macedonia,
was seen as a serious threat to the territorial integrity but even to the very existence of the Macedonian nation (Perry 2000). As an answer to the Albanian nationalist claims, the Macedonian authorities introduced some special measures which circumscribed considerably the rights of the Albanian community. The Albanian names “which stimulated nationalist sentiment and adherence to the
People’s Republic of Albania” were banned from the registrar of the Tetovo municipality, the Albanian folksongs were also banned and some Albanian officials were dismissed from the state administration for attending the Albanian weddings at which “nationalist” songs were sung (Poulton 1998).
For the Albanian population in SR Macedonia it was perhaps events concerning education and
language which caused the most opposition. At the beginning of the 1987 school year, the authorities canceled the Albanian language in secondary schools. The Macedonian and Albanian students
were integrated and a school lessons were in the Macedonian language. The next year, the authorities decided to introduce the bilingual education in the Albanian schools. The Albanian parents
protested, and many children were withdrawn from bilingual schools.
The same year, as reported by ATA, the official news agency of Albania, Tetovo municipality
introduced a “package of administrative measures” which aimed at restraining the birth rate among
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Albanians. According to these new measures, the families with more than two children were
required to pay for the health care of additional children (ibidem).
In this political surrounding the relations between the Albanians and the Macedonians deteriorated and mutual resentment grew.
As already mentioned in the first chapter, the Albanians were never satisfied with their legal and
political position in Former Yugoslavia. At the time of Socialist Yugoslavia, the then Socialist
Republic of Macedonia proclaimed the equality of all citizens and the principle of non-discrimination on national grounds. On the law, the existence of the minorities was recognized and was defined by the special laws. According to the 1974 Constitution, Macedonia had been a «state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities». The theoretical legal framework
provided by this Constitution at first sight enabled a vast area of rights and freedoms for the minority communities. But this was just a theory since the great formal rights just enabled partial covering
of the factual discrimination. The national minorities like the Turks, the Roma, the Vlachs, the
Albanians and others were neglected and did not enjoy the same support for development by the
state institutions like the members of the mainstream Slavic culture. This kind of treatment of the
national minorities created and emphasized the differences at the socio-economic, cultural and
educational level.
Fear of one another, poor mutual understanding and nationalist thinking kept the Macedonians
and the Albanians from cooperation. The new 1989 Macedonian constitution even worsened this
situation. While according to the 1974 Constitution, Macedonia had been a «state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities», the 1989 constitution said that Macedonia
was the “national state of the Macedonian nation meaning the Orthodox, ethnic Macedonians who
are the native speakers of Macedonian. Albanians saw this as a reduction of the status and rights,
while Macedonian officials viewed the change as a way to strengthen the national integrity of the
Macedonian people. Unwilling to accept this situation the Albanians formed political parties formed
on ethnic lines in order to improve their status and bring changes through all the means at their
disposal, democratic and none. The main goal of the Albanian politicians was to gain status of equal
partners in the state and to escape minority status. They demanded to make the Albanian an official
state language and to gain the right to fly the Albanian flag alongside that of the state flag.
3. Shifting identities: From multiculturalism to traditional nationalism
3.1. The Yugoslav state and identity
Despite the fact that the eastern-western dichotomy can be taken only as an ideal type, it seems
that the above described primordial type of nationalism is typical for almost all newly created Balkan states. «Almost nothing here happens in the same way and at the same time as in Western
Europe. It is not the formation of the state that makes up the nation (as in the West), but the nations
who make up states for themselves; it is not cultural differences that produce political conflicts; it is
politics using cultures that produces conflicts» (Svob Dokic 2001).
The specific feature of the Balkans is the concentration of diversities (geographical, historical,
ethnic, civilizational and cultural) in a comparatively small space. The Yugoslav Federation (established in November 1943) inherited cultural, ethnic and religious differences that had coexisted in
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the Balkans for centuries, and approached them in a new way. In an effort to integrate all peoples
into a new state, and new system of social justice and fast economic and social development, the
ruling elite decided, on one hand to recognize the existence of differences and on the other hand to
treat them as “specificities”, marginalized as much as possible, in order to create one state out of
many ethnicities and nations. The final goal of the Yugoslav leaders was to create a new man and
new socialist culture. In the first years of the state’s existence, the integrative efforts were based on
the idea of creating a Yugoslav nation based on similarities between the Slavic people. In its democratic version (Democratic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) the common state was perceived as
an instrument of gradual amalgamation of these commonness without the hegemony of any of its
constituent parts.
Considering the ethnic potpourri within the country, and the fact that most of the people who
joined the Yugoslav Federation had different political, social, cultural and religious backgrounds,
the state existence was not justified on the basis of its naturalness (as inevitable outgrow of shared
culture and history), but rather on its constructiveness, expressed trough a free will of different
nations to join together in the new state. There was no rhetoric of an ancient past and no suggestions
that the Yugoslav nation had existed in the past. It was acknowledged that the South Slavs had been
in the Balkans since the 6th century, but it was also acknowledged that their histories and fates had
been separated until 1918, when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established.
Nevertheless, the experience of the common state, which existed in the period between 1918 and
1941, played no role in the new state self-image. The Kingdom was labeled as a “dungeon of nations” and the communist party was careful not to repeat the mistake of the Serbian elite that antagonized all other national groups through the policy of domination. Rather, the new state made a
virtue out of novelty and non-conformity, and was constructed along very different lines. “The
Yugoslav political leaders understood that the policy of a unified nation state, based on an «imperialistic” attempt to deny the nationhood of many people making up Yugoslavia would fail» (Cohen,
Warwick 1983). Even if the ruling elite, in the first decades, was probably nostalgic towards some
form of Yugoslavism, they were very careful not to impose it on the nations of Yugoslavia (Sekulic
2001). In its socialist version (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) the state was constructed as a federal state based on the equality of its six constituent nations and divided according to
national lines. The national identity became one of the principal criteria for constituting the political
system and the idea of Yugoslavism was labeled as “artificial” and finally abandoned. However,
even if the state with the 1974 Constitution became less centralized, communist leadership was
hoping that through the policy of “brotherhood and unity”, unforced Yugoslavism and the expression of national aspirations through the federal system, the nationalist aspirations could be
satisfied and integrity of state consolidated and preserved (Sekulic 2001). Federalism and the decision of Yugoslav leaders to not link citizens together directly into a state identity, but to operate
through the ethnic medium, was one of the peculiar characteristics of the Yugoslav nationalism. Instead of being simply Yugoslav citizens and have a single mode of belonging to the state, the
peoples of Yugoslavia were above all members of Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian, Macedonian,
Bosnian and Montenegrin nation, associated with the particular territory of one of the countries republics. One may argue, as some do, that the definition of nations in primordial terms was more or
less taken for granted in former Yugoslavia, and that the national and not a state identity represented the primary political attachment. Still, with being Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes, the members
of different nations were also members and loyal citizens of the multinational and multiethnic
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Yugoslav state. This secondary, and in some cases even primary, focus of loyalty gained prominence, and the people of some constituent parts of Yugoslavia (Macedonia for example) felt a strong
affiliation to the Yugoslav state. The Yugoslav identity (both national and state) in the period from
the 60s to the late 80s represented the way of escaping ethnic essentialism, and overcoming traditional nationalism, and most importantly this kind of identification had some elements of civil
identity of western type. In the 1991 Yugoslav Federation broke up, and together with the state the
civil way of identification was lost.
The Yugoslav federation was a multinational and multicultural state, whose legitimacy was
based on a specific variant of socialism and its leading role in the non-aligned movement. Considering that the legitimacy of the state was strongly linked with the communist ideology, there was no
chance for the state to survive the dissolution of communism (Sekulic 1997). In fact, after the fall of
the communist ideology, the Yugoslav Federation and its particular state building pattern broke up,
but as Appadurai points out «by instituting a system of an intermediate stage of belonging, Federal
Yugoslavia could be said to have represented an attempt by its leaders to think beyond the nation»
(Appadurai 1993).
3.2. The independent Macedonia and the revival of ethnic nationalism
Only those Macedonians who feel to be direct descendants of Philip and Alexander
in unbroken continuity will remain eternally immune to the assimilation propaganda of the neighboring countries and will never betray the Macedonian race.
[“Makedonsko Sonce”, the weekly organ of the World Macedonian Congress].
After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia has passed through a period
of reinterpretation of its history and a strong nationalist reawakening. The Yugoslav identity disappeared and the identity became defined in primordial terms without other political principle mediating between identity and political legitimization. While a large segment of the legitimization of
Former Yugoslavia was socialism, in independent Macedonia, the national identity became the only
legitimizing principle, and the state’s existence was justified with the existence of a particular national identity that should be protected and nurtured by the state.
In order to support national group consolidation, which was politically very important in a short
period after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and being aware that the others perceive their identity a
bit tenuous, the Macedonians made a significant effort to assert separateness and uniqueness of the
Macedonian national identity and culture.
All nations like to present themselves as ancient, continuous and inheritors of a long honourable
pedigree, however in the Macedonian case, the definition of the nation in primordialist and essentialist terms can be partially explained with a general perception of Macedonia as a state threatened
by all its hostile neighbours. As noted by some scholars «Macedonian nationalism grows not much
from pride but, from desperation to survive» (Looms, Davis, Broughton 2001).
The nationalism spawns counter nationalism, and the Greek and Bulgarian attempts to demonstrate lack of “authenticity” of the Macedonian nation resulted in the aggressive assertion of Macedonian nationalism. After the claims advanced by its neighbours that their identity was an artificial
product of Titoist brainwashing, the Macedonians began to seek some kind of proof of their ethnic
and national existence through history. Having rejected the communist heritage, the Macedonians
took a step back in the search of their ethnic heritage, and in 1991 the version of their glorious an-
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cestry from ancient times emerged. In the first historical shift, as previously noted, Macedonian
historians attempted to trace the origins of the nation to the Middle Ages. But, in the early 90s, in
order to strengthen their claims to the name and the land they inhabit, as well as to make a clear
differences with their neighbours, Macedonian historians traced the birth of the nation back to the
4th century B.C. Namely to the days of Philip II of Macedonia and his son Alexander the Great. The
reason for tracing the origins of the nation back to the ancient times was twofold. On the one hand it
ensured the historical continuity of the nation, state and tradition which, according to the new
version, were created in the ancient times, continued in the medieval empire of the Czar Samuil and
were finally transmitted to the contemporary Macedonians. On the other hand, it tried to make a
clear distinction with those nations to which they are objectively most similar, like the Serbs and
Bulgarians, considering that the ancient Macedonians had been there long before their arrival on the
Balkans. With regard to the Albanians, belonging to an ancient and glorious race was considered a
strong argument in the game of the descendants of the Illyrians (Albanians) and Macedonians.
Finally, concerning Greece the main claim was that the ancient Macedonians were different, nonHellenic people, challenging in this way Greece’s exclusive right to the name, history and the
symbols of Alexander’s empire. However, the Macedonian national ideologists do not share a
homogeneous opinion. According to a more extreme version, the modern Macedonians are direct
descendants of Alexander the Great and his glorious people, while more “moderate” ideologists
claim that the ancient Macedonians joined into the ethno-genesis of modern Macedonians by
mixing with the Slavs who had come to the region in the 6th century.
The obsession with ancient heritage reached its peak in 1992, when the Macedonian parliament
selected the sixteen-ray star of Vergina as a state symbol of Macedonian continuity and placed it in
the center of the Republic’s new state flag. This decision set off, in Loring Danforth’s words a “cultural war” with Greece over the use of its name, history and its symbols, and caused strong opposition of the Albanian minority, that replied to on the grounds that Alexander’s star of Vergina is the
symbol of the Macedonian nation and therefore not an appropriate choice for the flag of a multinational state (Danforth 2001).
For decades the Macedonians believed that they originated from a pure Slavic stock and these
new theories about ancient heritage of the nation met quite confusing and mixed feelings among
Macedonians. They however had to face up with challenges and revisionist attempts coming from
the more recent past as well. After the fall of socialism, political and social changes freed some hidden versions of the national narratives. The main struggle was between the SDSM (Social democratic Union of Macedonia) and the VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity). While the SDSM stuck to the left-wing
version of the national history, which emphasized the role of partisans and communism in the establishment of the Macedonian republic within the Yugoslav Federation, the VMRO-DPMNE established an alternative version of the national past in which the anti-Yugoslav, anti-Serbian and anticommunist discourse served to legitimize the political agenda of this party (Brunnbauer 2004).
As previously noted, in the socialist and communist official discourse the ASNOM was portrayed as a “second Ilinden” and “a complete fulfillment of the ideals of Krusevo Republic”. The
creation of the People’s Republic of Macedonia constituted the “definitive recognition of the national individuality of the Macedonian people and of their sovereignty as a state on the basis of
complete equality with other peoples and nationalities in Yugoslavia (Taskovski 1976). According
to the left-wing version of the Macedonian history, during the Yugoslav period, Macedonians in
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Vardar Macedonia enjoyed complete political and cultural autonomy alongside with the freedom to
express and develop their national identity.
On the other hand, the right-wing version argues that the official policy of the former Federation
had a strong anti-Macedonian character. From the VMRO-DPMNE prospective the Yugoslav communist regime was nothing but a continuation of the interwar Serbian oppression. With regard to the
Macedonian history, the main claim of the right-wing position was that for half a century, the communist historiography distorted the historical record and marginalized or obscured certain figures
that were politically unacceptable in socialist Yugoslavia. Some Macedonian national activists who
had played important roles in the partisan movement and in the post war Macedonian republic were
excluded from the official national narratives for their presumed anti-communist and nationalistic
activities. The aim of the right-wing position was to reintroduce “forgotten” heroes in the official
narratives and to include them in the pantheon of Macedonian national heroes. The most prominent
rehabilitation concerned Metodia Andonov-Chento, the first president of ASNOM who in 1946
resigned from the government and was sentenced to eleven years of hard labor for presumed antiYugoslav propaganda and collaboration with Stalin‘s Comintern. In the new narratives Chento was
rehabilitated as a representative of the “national-bourgeois orientation” within the national liberation movement and as someone who had fought for independent Macedonia and that would unite
the three parts of Macedonia (Vardar, Pirin and Aegean) that had been divided after Balkan Wars –
and thus destroying in this manner the ethnic and geographic unity of the nation.
The revisionist efforts were not limited only to historical questions but concerned the language
issues as well. According to some linguists the Macedonian language standardized in 1944 had a
clear “Serbian stamp” and they proposed a complete revision of the Cyrillic script and orthography,
which according to some should be closer to the Bulgarian language and orthography.
In the early 90s, Macedonian national ideologists and their respective political parties had not
only different views concerning the past questions, but they had different views on the future as
well. More extreme nationalists of VMRO-DPMNE party called for a territorial unification of the
Macedonian people in one state, in which the parts “occupied” by Greece (Aegean Macedonia) and
Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia) would once again be reunited.
Because of the VMRO-DPMNE attempts to re-open the history issue and to re-think parts of
the national narratives, the questions about the nations past and future aroused: What are the origins
of the nation? Are the Macedonians really one of the most ancient peoples in Europe or are they
Slavs just like most Macedonians learned in school? Was it the socialist past and partisan struggle
that gave them the statehood or were the Macedonians the victims of the socialist system which
enforced a deviation of the national development? Was their language and orthography, standardized in 1944 and labeled by some scholars as Serbian invention, “an aberration from the natural and
historically normal path of linguistic development”? Were they to accept the strong influence of the
Serbian culture or should they find some alternative approach and seek a new approach with Bulgaria for example? The existence of these different identity options caused strong division within
Macedonian society and the unity of the nation together with a sense of cohesiveness was put under
considerable pressure.
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3.3. The Albanian community in Macedonia from 1991 to the Ohrid Agreement
Concerning the national minorities, the newly established political system in Macedonia started
with a negative balance with respect to the previous system. In the early 1990s, the reports of international organizations for human rights warned that in Macedonia, minority rights were not recognized in the field of education, culture and presence in the media. They also reported that the
authorities manifested the lack of flexibility and willingness to resolve the delicate inter-ethnic
problem. According to the statistical data for 1992, the major part of the Albanian, Turk and Roma
population lived in the rural undeveloped region of the state with the lowest social product per
capital in the country and their social position and living standards were very different compared to
those of the Slavic population. Only ten percent of Albanians had a job in the public administration
and their presence in the police force or in the army was even lower. The newly established Albanian political parties owed their participation in the government rather to their own political
activities, and to the “external” political pressure, than to the readiness of the Macedonian politicians to enable them to participate in the political life and power.
The key demands of the Macedonian Albanians, which became a cause of disagreement with the
central government, were: the reform of the constitution, greater representation of the Albanians in
the civil sector, provision of a university education in Albanian and the decentralization of state
power. The Macedonian authorities did not take into account these claims and continued with the
policy of “one nation state”, trying to disregard the fact that “non-Macedonian” population forms
one third of the population and that the new Republic cannot be considered a national state of
“Macedonians and others”.
There were great discrepancies between the majority and minority concerning education as well.
The Macedonians argued that, in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, the elementary and secondary education in Albanian had been granted, both by the law and in practice, and that university education in the Albanian language could have been acquired at the University of Prishtina. Concerning
this issue, the Macedonians failed to consider that the political situation in Kosovo significantly
changed in the period between 1980 and 1989. That was the period of the biggest reaction on the
raising claims of Kosovars for more autonomy and more cultural rights, and in 1989, the Serbian
authorities decided to shut-down the Albanian university in Prishtina. Under Serbian pressure and in
order to protect the SFRJ from so-called irredentist ideas, the Macedonian government decided to
decrease the number of teachers and classes in Albanian schools and to derogate the instruction in
Albanian in the Pedagogical Academy. Albanians still had the right to use their language in public
life, but some newspapers, which were financed by the state, were either canceled or their edition
was diminished.
3.4. The Macedonian Constitution and the minority rights
We cannot say that the Macedonian government did not recognize some specific collective
rights. For example, they recognized the cultural rights of persons belonging to minorities, mentioned by Article 27 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, who speaks about the
rights of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture. These rights are mentioned in a
chapter on economic, social and cultural rights of Macedonian Constitution. Besides basic cultural
rights like the right to education accessible to everyone under equal conditions, and the rights to in-
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formation and academic freedom, the Constitution has also recognized some special rights and freedoms for national minorities as groups. According to the Constitution, they are as follows:
1. The right to freely express, foster and develop national identity and national attributes This right
belongs to the national minorities as a group and it is supposed to be exercised through various
institutions and organizations established by them and supported by the state. The essence of this
right is not to be disturbed by the state authorities and the other national groups, especially not
by the dominant one, in expressing, fostering and developing the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and
religious particular aspects of the minority group. The rights of national minorities are accompanied by the duty of the state to protect ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities. The guarantee of this right, as well as:
2. The right to establish institutions for culture and art, as well as scholarly and other associations
for the expression, fostering and development of the identity of national minorities. The main
goal of cultural and artistic institutions is to preserve the cultural treasure and traditions of national minorities. This right also includes launching newspapers, radio and TV stations and makes possible for members of national minorities to establish religious and other kind of
organizations, as well as to distribute and receive information in their mother tongue.
3. The right to instruction in the language of national minority in primary and secondary education.
This right to instruction in the language of the national minority goes along with the duty to
study the official language but was limited only to the elementary and secondary education and
it was not extended to the higher university education.
According to the Constitution, national minorities have also:
4. The right to use the language of the national minority as an official language in addition to the
official language of the state.
The main goal of these rights is to preserve the unique characteristics and traditions of non-dominant groups in society with distinct ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural and other characteristics
that differ from those of the majority of the population.
However, even if the Macedonian Constitution officially recognized special cultural rights and the
principle of “equality” for all its citizens, it should be noted that the Macedonian state was structured
as a nation state. This implies that the state is not understood as the state of all its citizens, but as the
state of the Macedonian people and other minorities. The idea and structure of a national state cannot
guarantee justice and equality for all citizens in ethnically heterogeneous and multicultural states. In
order to guarantee the basic principles of equality and justice, the state has to be understood as a conation state, and it has to foster a sense of unity and common belonging among its citizens. The
state cannot be identified with a single favored nation but must consider the political community of
all ethnic/national groups living on its territory, and show respect for their culture. Only in this way
the state can earn their loyalty and give them the courage and confidence to interact with other cultures. Unfortunately, the Macedonian society failed in this task and it did not create a homeland for
all its citizens.
Macedonian Constitution did recognize some cultural rights of the persons belonging to the
national minorities, but the concession of collective rights does not guarantee the integration of the
members of national minorities into society. Instead of the union of ethnic and national groups who
live together and consider the territory of the state like their homeland, the Macedonian government
offered its minorities the so called Millet system. The millet system is a kind of a federation of communities, where the communities are free to pursue their traditional way of life and engage in
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necessary social, political and economic interaction. The state usually does not interfere with their
internal affairs and therefore the members of these communities owe their primary loyalty to their
respective communities and just secondarily to the state.
In the early 90’s, Macedonia was characterized by a fierce nationalism and the very Preamble of
the first Constitution of Independent Macedonia did not promise anything good to the minorities
living in the state. Like the constitution of other former Yugoslav republics, the Macedonian constitution revealed a tension of constitutional nationalism and a principle of democracy. According to
the principle of constitutional nationalism, the dominant nation, in this case the Macedonian one, is
privileged over others, which is in opposition to the principle of democracy, according to which all
citizens of the state, regardless of their nationality, are sovereign. The preamble of the Macedonian
Constitution promulgated on January 6th, 1992, stated that:
«Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality
for citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians,
Turks, Vlachs, Romanies, and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia».
The preamble explicitly recognizes the role of the national minorities in the country, but on a
symbolic level it recognizes the primacy of the Macedonian nation over other minorities, who are
only guaranteed a “full equality of citizens”. This preamble gave reason for complaints from all
citizens of non Macedonian nationality because they were not equally valued as the majority nation.
Another problem with the Macedonian Constitution was the position of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. According to Article 19:
«The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are separate
from the state and equal before the law.
The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions, by way of a procedure regulated by law».
Even if the Constitution did not discriminate among the citizens of the country, and recognized
the freedom of religious confession and the right to express one’s faith freely, it clearly ranked the
Macedonian Orthodox Church symbolically higher, or as being special, in relation to the other
religious communities.
3.5. The Albanian claims
For the Albanian community the most important issues were the right to use their language in
public life and the right to higher education in their mother tongue. The reference to language is
typical of the Albanian nationalism; unlike the other nations of the Balkans, which formed around
the Orthodox religion, the Albanians, divided into three religious communities (Muslim, Orthodox
and Catholic), founded their nation on the Albanian language. Throughout the entire political separation between Albania and Yugoslavia, the Albanians of Yugoslavia always adopted the
linguistic reforms established in Albania. In 1973, at the time of the political separation between the
two countries, the decisions of the conference on spelling held in Tirana were also applied by the
Albanians of Yugoslavia. The Albanian language is the main marker of the Albanian nation. From
the Albanian point of view an Albanian remains Albanian as long as he speaks the Albanian
language; if he loses his Albanian due to the exclusive use of the Macedonian language, he becomes
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“assimilated”. Thus, the Albanians demanded that the government endorse the widest possible use
of the Albanian language. The position of the Albanian political parties was that the Albanian language should become the country’s second official language, equal in status to Macedonian. However, the Albanian demand was judged as unacceptable by the Macedonian government and seen as
a possible threat to the surviving of the state. The Albanians complained that they cannot carry out
administrative procedures in their mother tongue: all letters addressed to an administration - even
local - had to be written in Macedonian or else they were likely to be rejected. Albanian names had
to be transcribed into the Cyrillic alphabet, which was not always possible. At post offices, train stations and police headquarters all forms and signposts were in Macedonian, sometimes also in English and in French, but never in Albanian, not even in the towns where the majority of the population was Albanian.
The law on municipalities (1995) recognized the right to use two languages, Albanian and Macedonian, in the documents of the municipalities in which over 50 percent of the population is other
than Macedonian (Article 89). Likewise, in towns where Albanians were more than 50 percent of
the population road signs could be in both languages (Article 90). In reality, however, since very
few activities were entrusted to the municipalities (mostly water and power supply, garbage
collection, road maintenance) these provisions had little effect. On the other hand, the fact that
Macedonians did not learn and did not speak Albanian made it virtually impossible to enforce the
law, at a meeting of the municipal council, if there was just one Macedonian and ten Albanians, the
deliberations were in Macedonian rather than in Albanian. Since Macedonian was the only official
national language, and since the Macedonians were and still are unwilling to speak Albanian, in
practice, they always had the upper hand.
Language claims were also made in the area of education, especially higher education. In the
1990s, Albanian primary school students were taught in Albanian. Up to the third year of school, all
Albanian students were expected to learn Macedonian. In higher education, only the Faculty of
Pedagogy in Skopje offered courses in Albanian. Albanian students who enrolled at other faculties
had to follow courses in Macedonian in all subjects. Since they have studied only in Albanian until
that time, it was not surprise that they had a hard time at university and did less well than Macedonian students. This is one of the reasons that led in 1994 to the founding, by the Albanian community, of the Tetovo University, a decision strongly opposed (but tolerated) by the government.
Another cause of disagreement was the demand of the Albanian minority for greater representation of Albanians in public administration. Even if, according to the official data, they represented
almost 25 per cent of the total inhabitants of Macedonia they were represented only with 10 per cent
in state institutions and police forces.
In Macedonia, politicians and public opinion expressed their fears that satisfaction of Albanian
demands would lead to federalization and perhaps, the disintegration of the country. These worries,
however, seem to be unfounded since the demands for more cultural and representation rights are
usually a demand for inclusion and not exclusion from the society. The cultural factor is very important and can be a source of internal conflict, but this happens only if, the cultural rights are
violated. On the other hand, the recognition of these rights can be an important element in the prevention and resolution of conflict.
Since Macedonia become independent at the end of 1991, there were several armed conflicts between the official state administration and the local Albanians. In February 1995, in a village called
Mala Recica, the police prevented by force the opening of the unrecognized university in Albanian.
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On this occasion one demonstrator was killed, several were wounded and the heads of the controversial university went to prison for a long time. Two years later, during the demonstrations in
Gostivar three ethnic Albanians who claimed more cultural and political rights were killed and the
Mayor of the town who hoisted the Albanian flag on the Town Hall was sentenced to reclusion in
prison. However, the most outstanding event was the armed conflict of the National Liberation
Army (UCK) with the government forces in the spring 2001, which brought the country on the
brink of civil war. The armed conflict lasted seven months and ended with the Ohrid Agreement,
which warranted the Albanians and other communities considerably broader collective rights than
the Constitution had granted them until then.
3.6. Minority rights after the Ohrid Agreement
The Ohrid Framework Agreement, which put an end to the armed conflict between Albanian National Liberation Army and Macedonian police forces, was signed in August 2001. Neither the
Macedonian nor the Albanian signatories of the so-called “Ohrid Agreement” were completely
satisfied with it. Nonetheless, it was accepted by political parties on both sides of the conflict as a
necessary element of the peace process to stop further bloodshed.
However, what did the Framework Agreement stipulate? The accord provided for a series of
political and constitutional reforms designed to accommodate demands of Albanian community for
equal standing and representation. According to this agreement, Macedonian government accepted
the following conditions: to amend the Preamble to the Constitution, to institute double majority
voting in parliament, to increase the representation of Albanians in the police force and to stipulate
the use of the Albanian language in official proceedings.
As already mentioned above, the multicultural society cannot ignore cultural differences. In
order to guarantee equal treatment to all its citizens, the state has to accommodate the claims of the
persons belonging to minorities to enjoy, preserve and develop their culture. Only in this way the
state earns their loyalty and enables them to integrate into society. The Macedonian Constitution
promulgated in 1992 had already recognized some cultural rights to the minorities, but it was unwilling to promote the Albanian language to a level of an official language. In Ohrid, under the
pressures of the international community, the parties found a compromise and reached a general
agreement on the language issue. The Macedonian language remained the only official language for
government sessions and for international relations. Any other language spoken by at least 20
percent of the population was also recognized as an official language, and can be used for personal
documents, civil and criminal proceedings, by institutions of local self-government and in communication between citizens and central government. This legislative package also permitted persons of
Albanian origin to speak in their mother tongue in the parliament. Government ministers were not
granted this privilege since they were not elected, but appointed as political officials. For the Albanians, the official recognition of their language as a second official language represented a symbolic
affirmation of equality in the Macedonian state.
Another sensitive issue was the representation of the Albanians in the state institutions and especially in the police forces. Even if the two sides had irreconcilable positions on this issue they found
the compromise and agreed that the ethnic composition of the police should mirror the ethnic composition of the Macedonian population. According to this agreement the Macedonian legislation
adopted the so-called “quota system” which guarantees a proportional representation of Albanians
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and other minorities in the public administration based on their percentage of the population.
The Framework Agreement recognized veto power of the minorities in fields that concern education and linguistic rights. Thus, all legislation with a cultural or linguistic significance, as well as
the laws on local finances, local elections, boundaries of municipalities and the law on local selfgovernment are to be passed not only by a two-third majority of the deputies in parliament, but also
by the consent of a majority of the deputies that are not members of the largest ethnic group in the
country. This system of double-majority voting was designed to protect minority interests in parliament. The Albanians had only 25 of 120 seats in parliament and (were not protected against decisions of the majority nation) could be easily overwhelmed under a simple majority rule. The agreement also provided for the creation of a new institution, the Committee on Inter-Community Relations, charged primarily with resolving any disputes arising from the double-majority voting.
In Ohrid, the Macedonians and Albanians had to deal with another sensitive issue and that was
the status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. In the previous version of the Macedonian Constitution, Article 19 had given the Orthodox Church a symbolically privileged status and the other religious communities were not even mentioned:
«The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions, by ways of procedure regulated by law».
The Ohrid Agreement stipulated that the name of the Macedonian Orthodox Church would
remain in Article 19 of the constitution but, other two main religions in the country «the Islamic
Community, the Roman-Catholic Church and other religious communities …» have to be mentioned as well.
The problematic Preamble of the Constitution, which was the chief bone of contention between
the government and the Albanian community, was replaced by a constitutional declaration that
stressed the civil character of the Macedonian society. The initial demand to elevate the Albanians
to equal status with Macedonians, as a “constituent nationality”, was not accepted by the Macedonian side, but the important step forward was made and instead of “national state of the Macedonian people and other nationalities” Macedonia became the
«state of citizens of Macedonia, of Macedonian people as well as of the citizens that live within
its borders, who are part of the Albanian people, Turkish people, Vlach people, Serb people,
Roma people, the Bosniak people, and others ….».
However, the changes in the text of the amendment emphasized one more time the importance of
ethnic/national belonging, and the citizens of Macedonia were automatically and principally regarded
as the members of ethnic/national groups rather than simply considered as citizens of the republic. The
decision of the Macedonian government to consider its citizens as members of the ethnic/national
groups rather than simply citizens of the republic can be highly problematic, since it underlines one
more time the national character of the state and incapacitates the members of the minority groups to
integrate themselves into society and consider the Macedonian state as their homeland.
The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed five years ago and there is no doubt that it
improved the legal status of the Albanian minority in the Macedonian state. But the question is
whether this agreement really solved the delicate interethnic problem within the country or mistrust
and suspicion between the two communities remained widespread. In further analysis, I intend to
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show that there was little trust between two ethnic communities before the 2001 conflict, and that it
should come as no surprise that the gap in trust has become even wider today, even if the conflict
was very limited and two communities found a solution from which both claim to have benefited.
4. The two communities today
4.1. The Macedonian community: Macedonian - Macedonian Dialogue
The fieldwork on which this research is based was carried out in different towns and villages and
included the municipalities of Tetovo and Gostivar in western Macedonia, the capital Skopje,
municipalities of Ohrid and Struga in the south-western Macedonia and the town of Strumica in
eastern Macedonia. Through my work, I made every effort to work closely with people, in order
that I could understand both the Albanian and Macedonian perception on past and present events.
In this section, I intend to show the fluid and ongoing nature of national identities through the
narratives of my interviewees. I did not focus on the construction of national identity on a large
scale and as a long-term historical process, but rather my research was focused on the short-term
biographical process that takes place over the lifetime of specific individuals.
When the peoples of the Balkans talk about their identities, they usually share the position of
national ideologies which consider national identities as something perennial and biologically granted. In the case of Macedonia, the national ideologists portrayed the national identity as collective
factor that has existed for time immemorial. The historical evidence that this identity has not been
expressed across time and space was explained as a consequence of a foreign oppression. According to the official narratives and governing myths the Macedonians through history had to endure
enormous suffering and the long period without an independent state was described - in the words
of one of the most influential Macedonian historians, Ivan Katardziev as a «permanent struggle for
liberation from the suppression and enslavers and for the creation of an independent state».
For obvious reasons I was not able to gather data in relation to the national sentiments of
Macedonians from the past, but in regard to more recent history I found some people who agreed to
tell me about their personal experience and feelings, which sometimes, differ from official narratives and governing myths. On the other hand, the myths are constructed by deliberate manipulation and intentional action, and as Bell point out: «a memory can function in opposition to the myth;
it represents a distinct category» (Bell 2003).
4.1.1. The question of the Macedonian identity in the interwar period
When I showed him the photographs of towns and social practices from the inter-war period, and
asked him to tell me about his personal experience, S., a man in his eighties said: «I will be honest
with you. If you ask me whether I felt like a Macedonian in this period, I must say I did not. I was
born in a small village near Tetovo and my parents were illiterate peasants. The question about who
we were, in a national sense, never arose, and was never a topic of discussion. We were concerned
about our local, village problems and we did not know, or more to the point we did not care, about
events in Skopje or in other towns. Concerning the Serbian rule, I know that my father welcomed
their arrival. They were Slavs and Orthodox Christians unlike Turks who were Muslims. I went to a
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Serbian school as well. All my teachers were Serbs and Montenegrins and the Serbian language was
compulsory, but it did not bother me at all. Of course, we all knew that we are not exactly the same
people and that Serbian language was different from our local language we used to speak at home,
but still it was similar and comprehensible to us. Now I know that the Serbs tried to assimilate us,
but at that time, nobody in my village had Macedonian national consciousness .We considered ourselves to be Macedonians from a regional perspective and Serbs in national sense».
In reply to my question whether his family changed the last name, he answered: «the situation
was such. Serbs were on power and we changed our last name by adding a typical Serbian suffix
“ic” but we did not pay much attention to this. The first time I heard about Macedonian identity in
national sense, was when I joined the partisan movement. In 1943, I was told that I am a Macedonian and that we should foster our national identity and distinctiveness from Serbs and Bulgarians.
The Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party issued an order to first open schools in
the Macedonian language in liberated territories; and this we did. When World War II ended, I
heard that some intellectuals, in their 20s and 30 were asserting the existence of a separate Macedonian national identity, but I argue that their ideas did not reach large segments of the population,
at least not in my village». S. also referred to the process of Macedonian “national enlightenment”
in the second half of the 40s and that this was not an easy one. «After the war, the new leadership
introduced the new Cyrillic script and alphabet and I was not very comfortable with new orthography. In fact, for a long time I continued to use the old one that I learned as a boy». He also mentioned that his family changed again their last name: «It was very modern to add the typical Macedonian suffix “ski” so we added it».
In eastern Macedonia, people have similar accounts. They all told me about the hard economic
conditions, illiteracy and “backwardness” of their surroundings. They also reported about themselves and their communities who were between “hammer and anvil”, terrorized by the different
irregular armed groups. Many members of these groups were local people, but - as reported by my
interviewees - there was confusion among them about their real goals and objectives. One of my
interviewees said that the members of these groups claimed their pro-Bulgarian orientation but he
added: «in my opinion they were simple brigands who were looting villages and burning houses and
churches». Concerning the Serbian occupation, he stated: «We did not have any problems with
Serbs. Rather our collective memories are dominated by resentment against these irregular groups.
Serbs were generally well accepted and their presence did not disturb us. “You know“, he continued, “Serbs are Slavs, they are all Orthodox Christians and use Cyrillic like we do». This statement echoed similar statements that I frequently heard made in the course of my research.
Concerning the perennial existence of the Macedonian national identity, K., an eighty-four year
old man from Skopje said: «Maybe we did not identify ourselves as Macedonians in a national
sense, but» he added «at that time we were not allowed to express our genuine beliefs and sentiments. We were a south Serbian province and if some people identified themselves as Serbs that
was dictated by the conditions of the time».
Of course, not all my Macedonian interviewees share the same vision of the past and their
personal experiences differ. A man from the village in the south-western Macedonia reported that
his village, even at that time had “ progressive Macedonian ideas” and unlike my interviewee from
western Macedonia he declared himself as descendant of five generations of self-conscious Macedonians who fought against Serbian terror in order to preserve their distinctive language, customs
and traditions. When asked to explain to me the main differences which distinguish them from
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Serbs, he was not able to describe them, but he said, «I do not know how to explain you this, but we
simply knew that we are different from both Serbs and Bulgarians». «I believe that the language
was the main differentiator. I went to a Serbian school and I had serious problems with language
and teachers, we were not allowed to speak our language, not even in the schoolyard; if discovered,
we were beaten. We were not allowed to freely express our identity, they tried to assimilate us, but
the Macedonian “gene” resisted and today we exist as a distinct nation».
Concerning this period, members of the middle and younger generation of Macedonians generally admit that they do not know much. They all however seem to be unanimous in describing this
period as “dungeon of the Macedonian nation” when - oppressed and ill-treated - Macedonians
were not allowed to freely express their national identity. They all tend to exclude family memories
and build their narratives on the “facts”, which taken for granted, they learned at school. Regardless
of this latest testimony it is difficult to escape the general impression that during the inter-war
period the sense of belonging to a unique and distinctive Macedonian nation was undeveloped and
shared by all its present members.
4.1.2. World War Two and the socialist past
The interpretation of events from the World War II and the socialist past reflect wider, and
above all, generational split within Macedonian society. The collective experience of World War II
and the struggle in the anti-fascist coalition is seen as a crucial moment when finally Macedonians
took their fate into their own hands and changed their subjugated position. The official history still
keeps alive the myth of a glorious partisan resistance, but from a contemporary perspective there are
varying and different perceptions. While the majority of my older interviewees tended to emphasize
the role of the communist party in the Macedonian anti-fascist struggle, some middle aged and
younger interviewees claimed that during the war Macedonian partisans fought against fascist
occupiers but also for the independent status of the country, which according to them was their main
goal. Still none of my interviewees, who took part in the resistance, reported about national character
of the Macedonian partisan movement. Some of them initially fought with Bulgarian partisans and
only in 1943 joined the first Macedonian units, under the guidance of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
The First Session of ASNOM is considered as an event when for the first time in the history the
right to freedom of the Macedonian people was recognized. However, as I have previously mentioned, since 1991 there have been different interpretations on the effects that ASNOM had for the
Macedonian people. While the overwhelming majority of older and middle aged interviewees emphasize the role of the communist party and of Tito in the establishment of the state and consider
ASNOM as the most important event in recent history, the younger generations are more radical
and refer to this event as a great injustice where the communist leaders sacrificed the “eternal ideals”
of independent Macedonia and accepted a new form of Yugoslav and communist domination whilst
neglecting the other two parts of an integrated Macedonia. This supports the argument about the
attempts by VMRO-DPMNE to reconsider some events and “heroes” from the Macedonian past.
The generation gap within Macedonian society is also reflected in narratives concerning the
recent socialist past. Even in this case the difference in national feelings is very clear. In the narratives of older and middle aged interviewees, the period of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia is
portrayed as a “golden age”; anecdotal evidence and the personal experiences of my interviewees
reflected their strong affiliation to the former state and its symbols. When I showed them images of
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the former state flag, photographs of pioneers and Tito’s trips to non-aligned countries, they were
all deeply touched and the vein of yugo-nostalgic feelings ran through their narratives.
However, even during this time the perceptions of the younger generations were quite different. As
M., a twenty-five year old man with a university education said: «I cannot understand my parents at
all. They still live in the past. They still watch Yugoslav movies, listen to Yugoslav music and they
keep talking about “brotherhood and unity”. Well, if it was really like that, why they did what they did
to each other? I was young when the country fell apart and the only thing I remember was a picture of
war destruction. I remember terrible scenes from Bosnia and Croatia, and they talk about “brotherhood and unity”. I am really glad that country fell apart. You know, they still say we Macedonians enjoyed the same rights as other nationalities. If it was really like that, why don’t you speak Macedonian? You speak in your own language and you expect us to understand you. That is because my
parents had to learn Serbo-Croatian, and you did not have to learn Macedonian. Yugoslavia was one
Serbo-Croatian country, the Serbo-Croatian culture was dominant and we Macedonians were treated as pets in a south Serbian province».
4.1.3. About independence …
Some observers argue that Macedonia gained its independence without demanding it, or more
precisely that today’s Republic of Macedonia is not the result of systematic work by a Macedonian
national movement, but rather a by-product of Yugoslav disintegration. Despite the fact that the
official narratives portray this event as the Third Ilinden and the historic day when Macedonian
citizens decided on their future without Yugoslavia, it is difficult to escape the impression that
Macedonians did not feel very confident or secure about the idea of achieving independence.
It is acknowledged that Macedonians voted overwhelmingly in the referendum held on the 8th
September 1991. However, it is less widely known what they voted for. Even the way in which the
referendum question was formulated indicates that there was a noticeable dose of reluctance and
lack of self-confidence. The ambiguous question “Do you favor an independent and sovereign
Macedonia with a possibility to enter a union with other Yugoslav republic or not?” was backed
because it was seen by some as a clear vote for independence, while for others it was not a definite
farewell to Yugoslavia. Only a small percentage of my interviewees, who took part in the referendum, consider independence as accomplishment of the century’s long dream while for the overwhelming majority it was more merely accepted rather than actively sought. According to some
interviewees they voted for independence because they had no choice and it because it was the only
means to escape conflict and war. Others were very categorical in asserting that they were betrayed
by the government, because as M., a man in his seventies said: «If I had known that the main goal
of our leaders was secession from Yugoslavia I would have never voted “yes”. I voted to stay in
Yugoslavia and I still believe that the union with other Yugoslav people was the best solution for
Macedonia». However, regardless of the fact as to whether they voted for independence because
they wanted to or because they had to, the independence put Macedonia in a precarious situation.
Alongside economic deprivation runs a strong sense of status loss. They were no longer the citizens
of a large and powerful country, but rather an enfeebled and poor state.
In reply to my question whether she voted for the independence of Macedonia, a middle aged
woman said: «We were proud to be Yugoslavs and considered that country as ours and other Yugoslav people as our compatriots. We Macedonians believed in “brotherhood and unity” and I was
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really sorry when the Slovenes and Croats voted for independence. I voted for independence as well
but I must admit that I was convinced that the politicians would find a suitable solution for all the
republics that would keep the country together; perhaps in some form of confederation. It was only
in 1992 when the Yugoslav Peoples Army withdrew from Macedonia that I realized that the country
had definitely fallen apart and that the Yugoslav dream was over. That country gave us a sense of
dignity and economic security. During the time of Yugoslavia, we had jobs, weekend houses, we
used to travel with red passport and we were well accepted everywhere in the world. Now we need
visas for all counties except Serbia and Bulgaria, which is very humiliating. However, the biggest
problem concerning an independent Macedonia is unemployment, especially amongst young people. They are all discouraged and do not see a future in this country».
4.1.4. About Macedonian Society ...
With reference to the current situation in Macedonian society, the majority of my interviewees
are conscious of a deep crisis that the country has undergone in the last fifteen years and they all
referred to a deterioration of the economic conditions, and drop in the standard of living; poverty
and the relative isolation of the country. In such a situation Macedonians have identified four
crucial areas of responsibility for blame: the Macedonian political elite, the international community, the surrounding Balkan and the Albanian national minority.
Macedonians all tend to see their politicians and government as incompetent and corrupt.
However, according to my interviewees if the Macedonian politicians have no clue about how to
lead the country it is not exclusively their fault. As D., another young Macedonian with a university
education puts it: «If we do not have a competent cadre and politicians in Macedonia, that was a
fault of the former federal state. We had, and we still have bad universities and we still study from
Serbian textbooks dating back to the 1960s. The same thing is with the politicians, if they have no
concept of how to lead the country that is because they did not have leading positions in the former
Yugoslav institutions. The crucial positions in the army, parliament, foreign affairs and diplomacy
were held by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes but never by Macedonians».
The accounts of the victimization of Macedonia during and after Yugoslavia were the dominant
themes that ran through the interactions with a wide range of people of Macedonian origin. However, as previously noted, Macedonia has also thrown the blame for its destiny onto the Balkans as a
region, or more precisely, as other states and peoples. The region is blamed for Macedonia’s material instability and lack of progress at a European level, or indeed the recent internal challenges
coming in the form of inter-ethnic wars. From a Macedonian perspective, someone else is always
guilty for their misfortune and they are never victims of their own actions, but of the national aspirations of their neighbors, their irrational reliance on history and political aspiration. This is the
typical Macedonian self-perception that portrays the other Balkan countries and national agendas as
unjust and aggressive whilst considering their own to be noble and democratic. The example often
given by my interviewees was, for instance, the Greek embargo on Macedonia and its refusal to recognize the state under its constitutional name, or all regional conflicts that erupted in the 1990s.
With reference to the international community, the majority of my interviewees, regardless of
their age, education or political affiliation expressed deep distrust toward European Union, NATO
and the United States. The overwhelming majority of my interviewees feel betrayed by the European Union who pushed them away despite all their attempts to fulfill the necessary criteria for EU
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membership. According to some of my interviewees, Macedonia did its best to stabilize its economy and undertook serious economic reform, whilst demonstrating its commitment to respecting
human rights and the rights of all its communities. Macedonia based its external relations on
cooperation and approached all problems through dialogue, nor was it involved in any conflict that
followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia. However, despite the widespread belief that Macedonia has
been a good pupil of Europe, acceptance into the prestigious European family did not follow. In reply to my question concerning what he thought about European Union, N. - another young man in
his thirties who spent most of his life in United States - said: «I do not believe them anymore, after
the Second World War, both Japan and Germany did not have to fulfill any criteria, the Americans
helped them to rise from the ashes, we instead, like pets, did all they asked of us».
Another perception widespread among Macedonians is that the European Union, the NATO and
the United States do not care much for the integrity of the Macedonian nation and state, and all are
considered to be mostly on the side of the Albanian minority. In contrast with Macedonian interests,
representatives of the international community wish to mould Macedonia into a multi-cultural state
where no ethnic group has dominance, and where a civic approach to statehood predominates
among all communities. From a Macedonian perspective, however, such a scenario would undermine the security of the Macedonian nation. As N., my young interviewee said: «In the official
discourse, EU and United States wish to transform this country into a Balkan version of Switzerland. Nevertheless, this is not Switzerland and the international community knows this. I believe
that we Macedonians are some kind of experiment - like an US/EU guinea pig to test whether such
a form of multicultural and multiethnic country can survive».
However, despite the widespread resentment toward EU policies (which is more a consequence
of a European refusal than a real aversion from Macedonians towards the EU institutions) to my
question “do you believe that Macedonia should join the EU” all my interviewees, regardless age,
answered positively. From the Macedonian perspective, it is only the membership in the EU that
can guarantee the survival of the Macedonian state and nation and it is exclusively through the
process of EU integrations that regional conflicts and differences can be solved. They also expressed the hope that the Macedonian people might achieve some kind of cultural union with their
compatriots who live in Greece and Bulgaria in the context of the “Europe without borders”. Still
the majority of my interviewees expressed serious doubts that Macedonia might join the EU within
the next ten years. They believe that Europe is not ready to accept them. As E. said: «Europe does
not want to see Europe in the Balkans. Europe wants to see Balkans in the Balkans».
4.1.5. Macedonians, ancient or not? Historical roots of the Macedonian nation through narratives
Macedonia in the former Yugoslavia was more of a consumer than a provider of services. The
former state did not only provide large parts of the population with employment in the state administration and industries, but it also provided the Republic in terms of security. Without the protecttion of the powerful state, Macedonian found its security weakened and as a response to Bulgarian
and Greek attitudes a more assertive Macedonian nationalism emerged. As Poulton points out, the
aggressive assertion of Macedonian nationalism was «a means to hide the potential weakness of the
Macedonian state and its identity» (Poulton 1995). As previously noted, the Macedonians, after
independence, saw their national identity contested from several directions, most notably from
Greece and Bulgaria but also from within. The Albanians do not object to the name Republic of
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Macedonia, which they consider «as being territorial without any specific Slav connotation»
(ibidem). In reference to their identity, it is not uncommon to hear Albanians claiming that Macedonians are not a distinctive nation and referring to them as Slavs. As one of my Albanian interviewees puts it: «Macedonians have never had their own state in the history. Therefore, they cannot
be called a nation. They are actually Bulgarians and some of them may even be Serbs, but that are
not a separate nation. If they find concrete proof that they existed as a nation before 1944 we will
recognize them, otherwise they were and will remain only Slavs”. “In addition”, he continues, “here
in Macedonia Slavs are not unified among themselves, they do not have single vision of who they
are nor of their origins. Some will say that they are Slavs, whilst others claim to be the descendants
of ancient Macedonians. You cannot consider a nation people who are not sure about their origins.
On the contrary, we Albanians know who we are. We settled this region 3000 years ago and today,
it is generally recognized that we are the most ancient people in Europe».
Under such circumstances, and in order to assert the separation and uniqueness of the national
identity, Macedonians began to seek some kind of verification of their ethnic and national existence
through history and contemporary narrative concerning the historical roots of the nation were
introduced. Guibernau (2004) points out that the most relevant quality of national identity components, including myths and memories, is whether they are felt as real by those sharing a common
identity. So what are the implications of these new narratives and myths on the Macedonian
national unity?
All my interviewees were shown photographs representing powerful symbols like: Alexander
the Great, the Star of Vergina, the monument to the Krusevo Republic and a cannon from the same
period, the first Session of ASNOM and the celebration of independence on the main square in
Skopje. My interviewees were free to express their feelings and impressions about these symbols
and only at the end they were asked to answer which of these symbols they considered to be the
most important and where, in their opinion, lay the historic roots of the Macedonian nation and
state. As I expected, the feelings and perception about this issue varied significantly.
While my older interviewees were unanimous in asserting the Slavic origin of the Macedonian
nation and consider ASNOM and less often Ilinden as the birth date of the nation and state, my
middle age and young interviewees generally have serious doubts about this. They all believe that
ASNOM and Ilinden are powerful symbols and important events on the path toward statehood, but
according to them, the real historical roots of the Macedonian state and nation are much more
ancient and can be traced back to the ancient Macedonia. In the 1990s, historical research of ethnic
origins became increasingly important, not only for intellectuals and for historians but also for
ordinary people. «The question of Macedonian origin is the biggest problem in contemporary
Macedonia. If we were sure who we were we would not have all these problems with Albanians and
with our neighbors» remarked a young man in his early twenties. Even a woman whose father told
me that during the inter-war period he and the people from his immediate surroundings did not feel
consciously Macedonians (at least not in the national sense), was very categorical in asserting that
the Macedonians are descendants of Alexander the Great. «I was a child when I heard for the first
time that we are the descendents of ancient Macedonians. My father told me thus and I do not
question it. He also told me that the Star of Vergina has been our flag since time immemorial». The
last statement is however hard to believe considering that the Sun (also referred as a Star) of
Vergina was unknown to the public and had no political or national significance until it was
discovered in 1977.
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Despite the fact that some of my interviewees claim their ancient heritage, I had the impression
that beliefs and sentiments about ancient past, rather than “genuine” are more dictated by their Balkan surroundings, because as P., my young interviewee from Tetovo stated: «Here in the Balkans
you must be ancient if you wish to exist and to be recognized. We Macedonians are surrounded by
the ancient Greeks and Illyrians and by the glorious medieval Serbian and Bulgarian kingdoms. We
have no other choice than to be ancient like our neighbors. It is the only way to survive in the
Balkans».
Dealing with this topic, it was not my intention to show an absence of authenticity into the
Macedonian nation and its identity. On the contrary, I share Barth’s theory that one of the most
important elements of the national identity is self-description. Self-identification means only what
the people themselves say, irrespective of whether they are historically accurate or not. Today, the
majority of the population in Macedonia is firmly convinced that they belong to a Macedonian
nation and speak a Macedonian language. In this regard, the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians and Albanians claim that Macedonian identification is somehow inaccurate and carries little weight. As
Miller points out, national identities are constituted by belief: «a nationality exists when its
members believe that it does» (2000). Consequently, the existence of a nation depends on a shared
belief that its members belong together.
The feelings and perceptions that I reported above were used in the past by the nationalists from
neighboring countries as a proof of no authenticity of the Macedonian nation. On the contrary, I
argue that the Macedonians are a community of individuals where each of them engages in different
ways in making sense of nation and national identity. Different perceptions about a nation’s past,
accounts of my interviewees about the present and the future are not proof that the Macedonian
nation is an artificial construction. Until 1944, the identity of my interviewees was not developed
and deeply rooted in their consciousness but we should not forget that they all stated that, even if
their identity was not clearly expressed, they all knew that they were, in a manner, different from
both Serbs and Bulgarians. In 1944, these differences were politicized, territorially expressed and
the ethnic group became a nation. In addition, different opinions and emotions about the nation’s
past and present prove that nations are not unitary entities where all their members think and act as
one. Nations, both old and young, often do not have a single history, but there are competing tales
to be told and the existence of these rival versions is a proof that collective identities, both national
and others, are neither fixed nor final. They are always in progress and are connected to cultural,
political and state influences. Carens argues that identities are partly subjectively determined and
partially objectively imposed, and that the mix of these two varies from one context to another.
«People sometimes experience their identity as given, sometimes as chosen, and sometimes as a
combination of the two. The meaning and salience of a given identity varies from one person to
another among those who share the identity and may shift over time on both of these respects both
for a group as a whole and for individual members within it ...» (Carens 2000).
4.2. Whose is the State? Macedonian and Albanian claims
4.2.1. About Albanians…
In the previous section I tried to describe the feelings and attitudes of three generations of
Macedonians toward the Macedonian contemporary society, their neighbors and the international
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community. As we have seen they all reported about unemployment, the sense of insecurity and in
general about the deep crisis that that the Macedonian society has undergone in the last fifteen
years. But whenever I asked my Macedonian interviewees, what is in their opinion the biggest problem of the contemporary Macedonian society, for the firs time they were unanimous in replaying
“the Albanians”.
Some scholars argue that the attitudes of Bulgaria and Greece, and to a lesser extent Serbia,
toward the Macedonian nation, had significant impact on the inter-ethnic relations in the Macedonia. However, I argue that this statement is only partially true. It can be argued that the claims of the
lack of authenticity of the Macedonian nation caused the “explosion of nationalism” towards the
Macedonian’s neighbors, but it did not influence the negative attitudes toward Albanians. The negative attitudes and stereotypes toward the Albanian community, which already existed in the past,
continue on a negative trend in today’s Macedonia as well. Based on real or perceived bad personal
experiences, collective historical memories, and - I argue - above all on ignorance, the stereotypes
and prejudices from the past were simply handed down to a new generation of Macedonians.
Considering that I did not find substantial differences in the narratives of my older, middle aged and
young interviewees, in this section I decided to present undivided Macedonian point of view about
what they call the “Albanian problem”.
As previously noted in the second chapter, the policy of the socialist leadership guidance and
steerage gave the Macedonians all the attributes of a self-confident nation (language, church,
history, ancestry). This process led to an almost fitting identification of the Macedonian nation with
the state, in which the Macedonian majority constitutes the culturally and politically dominant
group. The various constitutions of the Republic paid tribute, in varying degrees, to a multicultural
and multi-religious country, but, as previously noted, the state policies (before and after 1991) were
clearly aimed at fostering the Macedonian national identity, while the minorities were treated as
guests with certain rights.
In the course of my interactions with a wide range of people of Macedonian origin, it was not
uncommon to hear Macedonians claiming that the state is exclusively theirs. The majority of my
interviewees firmly believe that they, as a nation, have fought for centuries for their own state, and
now they do not want to share it with anyone else. Concerning the inter-ethnic relations with the
Albanian community in the past and present, D., a man in his thirties said: «Until 1991, we never
thought about Albanians. They were considered peasants who use to do logging and grow cabbage.
In the early 90s, when the Albanians asked to participate in the political life of the country, we
were, actually, very surprised. Until then, we knew only that they existed, and lived in this country,
but we did not consider them a part of the state».
With the arrival of independence in Macedonia things changed radically. Albanians, who gained
a much higher lever of political representation in the state than before, began to challenge the Macedonian’s exclusive right to the state. Albanians did not accept their treatment as a minority because,
according to their sources, they constituted about 40 percent of the population. Even though this is
an exaggeration, it is quite clear that such a large minority cannot be accommodated with the same
status as minorities which constitute two or three percent of the overall population. The Albanians
therefore demanded to become the second constitutive people of the republic and to have equal access
to the state resources. Along with these requests, as I have already mentioned in the previous chapters,
the Albanians also demanded to make the Albanian language the second official language, to gain the
right to fly the Albanian flag and to open a state-sponsored university in the Albanian language.
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From a Macedonian perspective, such demands were seen as excessive, because, as some of my
interviewees pointed out, the Macedonians in the past had never had their own state that would
protect them, and now when the state is established and they eventually gained the recognition from
the world (although not from their neighbors) they do not understand why they have to share it with
anybody else. As B., a man in his fifties said: «The name of this state is Macedonia. This implies
that this country is the homeland of the Macedonian people, in which we are the only constituent
people. I do not have anything against Albanians, some of them have been living here for a long
time, and as far as I am concerned, we can continue to live together. However, if they wish to continue to live in our country they must accept that here we are the majority. Otherwise, if they are unwilling to accept this they are free to leave. Macedonia is the only homeland we have, while the
Albanians have two other external homelands, Albania and since 1999 even Kosovo».
In the narratives of my Macedonian interviewees, the Albanians on the whole emerge as a threat to
the country’s territorial integrity, national security, economic development and the prospect to join the
European Union. According to many Macedonians, they are not loyal to the state and are not sufficiently integrated into the Macedonian society. This is, in their opinion, mainly due to great cultural
differences which prevent such an integration of the Albanian minority into the Macedonian
Christian society. The Macedonians firmly believe that the cultural and historical differences between them and the Albanians are insurmountable. Macedonians consider that they, as Orthodox Christians rightfully belong to the European civilization. The Albanians, by contrast, are considered by
many as a part of an Islamic, alien civilization. In order to support this thesis, many Macedonian interviewees reported about the Albanian traditional society where the women are still not equal to the
men and life is unchanged from previous centuries. According to my interviewees there is also significant discrimination toward the female children who, against their will, get married at a very
young age and are usually denied the right to continue with their education. «The Albanians accuse
the Macedonian state for their poor level of education, but it is not our responsibility if they do not
send their children to school. I have an Albanian colleague at work who prefers to pay a heavy fine to
the state than to send his female children to school», said a middle age man from a village near Gostivar.
With regard to education, whenever I asked the people of Macedonian extraction, whether of not
the Albanians have the right to higher (university) education in their mother-tongue the answer
tended to be negative. From a Macedonian perspective, the university in Tetovo has rather political
than educational goals, and among Macedonians there is a general perception that this institution
can create a state within the state, playing the same role as the Prishtina University, which in the
past decades was the cradle of the Albanian nationalism and insurrection. Such perceptions seem to
be reinforced and fomented by the presence of numerous Albanian students from Kosovo, Montenegro and Albania who attend the University of Tetovo and the private South-Eastern European
University. About this issue, M. a 23 year old interviewee said: «You know, I’m wondering who is
the minority in this state, we or the Albanians. While we have only one university in Skopje, they
have two, one state-sponsored and the private one. You know we are a poor country and we have no
money for such expensive projects as Tetovo University. Our corrupted government instead of improving the University of Skopje decided to finance these peasants. Come on…Albanians as
students??? Just have a look at these photographs and tell me whether you see a single one of them
who deserves to be called a student!?! Look at those stupid faces! You can see from a mile that they
are total illiterates, shepherds who have been guiding sheep up to yesterday, and are now sitting in
the classrooms spending our money! If they were really up for studying, they would be at Skopje
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University like we are. But you cannot buy your exams in Skopje like you can in Tetovo. You have
to learn hard here. But they do not care about education, all they want is to get some diplomas so
they can enter ministries and state institutions, as they cannot gain access there having only primary
education, regardless of their numbers».
Concerning the language issue and the use of the Albanian flag in the public life my Macedonian
interviewees were categorical in asserting that in the Macedonian state the only official language is
Macedonian and the only flag that can be flown in public is the Macedonian eight-ray sun. However, while the Albanian demand for the right to fly the red flag with the eagle is seen as a direct
attack to the state sovereignty and proof of Albanian disloyalty and was consequently rejected by
all my Macedonian interviewees; with regard to bilingualism the rejection was more restrained: although the majority of my Macedonian interviewees believe that the only official language should
be the Macedonian, they all recognized that in today’s Macedonia the knowledge of the Albanian
language is very important. Quoting a young man: «I like neither the Albanians nor their language
but in the future, for practical reasons, maybe we will have to learn it».
The issue of bi-nationality or federalization of the Macedonian state is on the list of the most
rejected Albanian demands. Among my Macedonian interviewees, there is an almost absolute
conviction that any kind of the decentralization of the state power would mean, at the same time,
the division of the state and a mass migration from Western Macedonia. They also fear that Macedonian identity would be under threat in those areas in which the Albanians constitute the majority;
and that the Albanians cannot provide for the protection of the cultural diversity of other ethnic
communities. In their narratives, they gave the example of Kosovo where in their words «the wild
and unruly Albanians ethnically cleaned powerless Serbian inhabitants». They also often cite the
Albanian practices toward Gypsies, Turks and Macedonian Muslims who are considered the subject
of Albanian assimilation. The Albanian claims that Islam in Europe and especially in the Balkans
should be modernized and that national languages should replace Arabic in religious practices, are
reported as a clear proof that the Albanians are seeking to subjugate and assimilate all Muslims in
their surroundings. Among the Macedonians, there is a widespread perception that the process of
federalization, and the consequent ethnic cleansing of Macedonians from the majority held Albanian
regions, have already begun. When referring to these (real or perceived) events they often use “military” terms like “Tetovo is Albanian”, “Bitolja is in the enemy surrounding”, “Struga is lost”, etc.
When referring to their Albanian fellow citizens, Macedonians conventionally employ the pejorative term Siptari. However, it should be noted that the term Siptari refers to the newcomers, “immigrants”, from Kosovo who mainly live in the rural areas gravitating toward the Kosovo border,
and who, according to my Macedonian interviewees, in the past two or three decades significantly
changed the ethnic map and balance of Macedonian society. According to many Macedonians, they
do not usually speak any Macedonian and their family and social relations are a hundred percent
Albanian. “The invaders” from Kosovo are portrayed as an uncultivated, wild and aggressive mass
who spoiled so-called “domestic” Albanians (term employed to refer to Albanians who were born
and raised in Macedonia) and filled their minds with absurd ideas about minority rights and a Greater Albania. During my fieldwork, I often heard Macedonians saying that all Macedonian problems
with Albanians are imported from Kosovo and that so-called “Albanian issue” is artificially created
by Kosovars and domestic political leaders in their search for power.
Although Macedonians usually tend to distinguish between “our Albanians” and Kosovar newcomers, the Albanians as an ethnic/national community, in the narratives of my Macedonian inter-
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viewees, are usually portrayed as a “conservative”, “compact” and “impenetrable” homogeneous
mass where all members think, feel and act as one. I must admit that at first sight they seem to be as
the Macedonians describe them, but after some time, as I socialized and talked with them I realized
that there are many differences among them. The Albanians are also considered to be closed and
unwilling to admit any external influence and it is widely assumed that Albanian communities can
not be studied, because even if the Albanians accept to be interviewed they will not be truthful or
forthcoming and only provide information imposed from above. This proved to be only partially
true. The Albanians are very hospitable, open to contact and usually willing to discuss their traditions and habits, although I found them less inclined to self-description and it was quite difficult to
hear individual points of view.
In the narratives of my Macedonian interviewees, the Albanians are also charged to force their
wives to wear veils and treat them as “machines for giving birth”. Macedonians are preoccupied
with the allegedly high birth rate among the Albanians and tend to interpret such rate as an indicator
of Albanian aggression, expansionism and irredentism. These preoccupations with high birth rates
are not, however, completely groundless. According to the official statistics, although the birth rate
among Albanians has declined in the last decades, it is still much higher than among Macedonians.
In addition, the Albanian population is highly concentrated in the western part of the country, in the
villages but also in the towns, where few Macedonians remain. Concerning the demographic changes in the western Macedonia, N., a fifty-six years old woman from Tetovo said: «These Muslims
will sweep over us. They all have a large number of children; five maybe even more, unlike us who
have one maybe two. I was born in this town and I have spent all my life here. Since the early 90s,
this was a mixed but predominantly Macedonian town. Now Tetovo is mainly Albanian and their
population has noticeably increased over the last fifteen years. A few Macedonian families who still
resist this occupation are confined within two or three districts and we live like we are in a ghetto».
The demographic changes that the inhabitants of the western Macedonia have experienced in the
last two decades are not due entirely to high birth rates amongst Albanians. Actually, the number of
Albanians has not increased, but unlike in past decades, the Albanian chances to migrate to Western
European countries have decreased significantly. Considering that the Albanians were underrepresented in all fields of the formal economy, and that, according to my Albanian interviewees, they
could never rely upon the state for support, since the 1970s they began to migrate mainly to Croatia
and to Western European countries. Consequently, they were relatively wealthy, as evidenced by
the fact that in the Albanian villages houses are more modern and comfortable than in the Macedonian villages in the same region. Macedonians, on the contrary were less inclined to migrate and
have always relied on jobs in industry and the administrative machinery of the Republic.
However, since the independence the economic and political situation has changed significantly.
As reported by my Albanian interviewees, the independence of Macedonia broke the ties that Albanians entertained with the outside world. Albanians, like their Macedonian fellow-citizens, were
now citizens of a weak and poor state and the introduction of a visa system (which were hard to get)
seriously affected their lives and above all significantly reduced their job opportunities. In the
meantime, the Yugoslav market, to which the Macedonia exported agricultural goods, collapsed. In
this way, both Albanians and Macedonians lost most of their income sources. The subsequent
strained economic situation, with high unemployment rate, made the Macedonians even less prone
to share significantly reduced economic resources. This new economic position, together with preexisting prejudices and real or perceived bad personal experiences and historical memories, almost
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inevitably led to the reinforcement in the level of conflict between the Macedonians and Albanians.
However, it should be noted that in the struggle over little resources left from the socialist system,
the Albanians were disadvantaged. This is mainly due to their low level of education, which prevents them from seeking well-paid jobs.
4.2.2. About Macedonians…
To Macedonian claims that the state is exclusively theirs Albanians reply that, if somebody has
the right to Macedonian land, then these are not Macedonians but Albanians. The Albanians in Macedonia are seriously convinced that they are descended from the Illyrians and like to portray themselves as “the oldest nation in the Balkans” as opposed to the Macedonian nation, which is said to
be an artificial construct. In other words the Albanians in Macedonia claim that the Macedonian
land has always been their homeland and insist on the Slav origins of Macedonians and on the fact
that the latter cannot claim to have been in the Balkans longer than the Albanians. In order to
support their thesis about the native nature of Albanian people in the region the many Albanians
interviewees often give an example of toponyms which in their opinion all have Albanian origins.
They also frequently cite the fact that the biggest Albanian national hero Skenderbay fought against
the Turks in the Tetovo region. Along with a “historical right” the demographic argument is also
put forward to claim the status of constitutive people of the state. The Albanians in Macedonia
strongly insist that the two censuses in 1991 and 1994 were manipulated to make Albanian inhabitants less numerous than they in fact were. According to their own estimates the Albanian population
in Macedonia varies between 35 and 50 percent. Concerning the “newcomers” Albanians insist that
these are not Albanians from Kosovo but “domestic” Albanians who in the past moved to Kosovo
due to official pressure against them Macedonia. In addition, Albanians argue that there has been a
return of thousands of Macedonians who used to work in other parts of the former Yugoslavia and
that many of these immigrants have now returned home.
The Macedonian attempts to recover their history and to introduce narratives and myths about
their ancient heritage are habitually ridiculed by the Albanians and they often claim that Greece was
right when they insisted that the Macedonian government replace the Star of Vergina with a new
state symbol. As my young seventeen year old, Albanian interviewee said: “In school, I learned that
these Slavs are not real Macedonians. The history teacher told us that the Slavs came here from
Russia in the 6th century so they have no right to be called Macedonians and to use the Star of Vergina as the state symbol”.
This conventional use of the term “Slav” or “Slav Macedonian” allows Albanians to dissociate the
state from the majority population. Considering that, there is no such thing as the Macedonian nation
and that the term Macedonia has purely geographical connotations, Macedonians are not the only
legitimate citizens of the state. As the Albanian see it, the state is just as Albanian as Macedonian.
In their narratives the Macedonians are not the only ones who embark on virulent stories and
depict the “others” in the light of negative stereotypes. The Macedonians in the narratives of my Albanian interviewees apart of being “artificial” are also considered to be “inhospitable”, “unpredictable”, “two-faced” and generally “bad people” who do not treat others as equals, but instead look
down on others and expect Albanians to work in their service. As to “Slavs” they are also attributed
many other characteristics. To begin with, the Macedonians are like all other Slavs, Orthodox Christians and consequently “non believers” and like other Slavs pursue the same goal and that is to
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spread the Orthodox faith at the expense of Islam. According to my Albanian interviewees another
typically Slav characteristic is their incompatibility with democracy and they often give the example of communism which originated in the Slav world. Many Albanians also reported that within
the framework of the former Federation Albanians were not only oppressed as a nation but also
persecuted as political opponents under communism.
The reference to Slavs as a homogeneous mass that pursues the same goals and share the same
characteristics, was particularly accentuated in their narratives concerning Kosovo to which they
draw direct parallels between the situation in Macedonian and that in Kosovo before 1999. In the
Albanian collective experience the Serbs and the Macedonians are actually the same people who
share the same characteristics (brutal, aggressive and double faced) and their main objective is to
overwhelm the Albanians. In order to support the thesis about Slavic Orthodox threat an Albanian
man from Struga said that in the period between 1986 and 1999 the photos of Slobodan Milosevic
were displayed throughout Macedonia, even on busses cruising Ohrid and Struga. «They did so», he
added, «in order to show us that they Orthodox Christians are of one body and soul, and that if
necessary they will join together to solve what they call “Muslim Albanian question”».
This statement recalls similar statements I often heard people make on both sides and I believe
that there seems to be sufficient argument to state that the members of both communities perceive
the current conflict, in Samuel Huntington words, also as a “clash of civilizations”.
With regard to the socialist past, it was no surprise to me to discover that the perceptions and
feelings of the Albanian community about this period were negative. Whilst all my Macedonian
interviewees referred to this period as the “golden age” of their community, the Albanians, on the
contrary, all reported about the state repressive measures and their inferior status. Many interviewees from Tetovo and Gostivar told me bitter stories about their close relatives who in the early
1950s experienced political pressure to declare themselves Turks and were encouraged to immigrate
to Turkey. Other interviewees told me about hard times they had at the University of Skopje. «You
are an Albanian, it is better for you to study in Prishtina, you know that you will never graduate
here in Skopje», remembered the word of his professor, my fifty years old interviewee when I asked
him to tell me about his experiences from his student days.
«I worked for 20 years in a same, so-called parallel school in Skopje», said N., ex high school
teacher, «We, Albanian professors, out of respect for our Macedonian colleagues, spoke Macedonian. But the Macedonians never learned a single word of Albanian, not even good afternoon. They
did not consider it necessary, although it would mean a lot to me. We were treated as guests in their
school although the number of Albanian students was greater than the number of Macedonian students. This is really symptomatic and tells a lot about our relationships».
For most Albanians the construction and experiences of such events as indicative of the social
exclusion and political repression has created a strong sense of community, woven around the idiom
of suffering. Older and middle age generations of Albanian interviewees tend to identify with
people of their own ethnic/national extraction and experience present day life as members of a
group that has allegedly held low social status and suffered continuous social and political discrimination within the former Yugoslav and present day Macedonian society.
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4.3. The Albanian community: About themselves and others living across the border
Whilst the Macedonian community, with regards to the current situation in Macedonian society,
tend to be pessimistic and deprived of faith, as they do not see any perspective for a normal development and still less do they see any prospect for their individual prosperity for the Macedonian
nation as a whole. The perceptions of the Albanian community are quite different. They are quite
optimistic with regard to their future and almost filled with enthusiasm and a conviction in their
abilities, tested and confirmed in the crucial moments of the community existence.
The decades of state-sponsored repressive measures, lack of trust in formal institution as well as
historic memories of discrimination and alienation held by Macedonian Albanians in their compact
and economically self-sustainable community. This is not only my personal opinion but also the
groups’ own evaluation. Concerning the contemporary situation of the Albanian community in Macedonia, a thirty year old university educated interviewee said: «We Albanians are strong and capable. Considering that in our bitter history we could never rely on state support, we learned to cope
with every situation and we became self-sustainable. Even if the Macedonians still consider us to be
illiterate peasants, in the last fifteen years we showed them who we are. Despite strong Macedonian
opposition we opened an Albanian university in Tetovo, in 1999 we defeated the Serbs in Kosovo
and finally in 2001 we took the guns to get what belongs to us. It is really sad what occurred in
2001 but» he continues «we simply had no other choice. For many years we have looked for our
rights but the Macedonians did not consider our requests. After 2001 the Macedonians have learned
that they should listen to us».
In response to my question “Do you think that the Ohrid Agreement granted you Albanians the
rights you asked for”, he replied: «No, not yet, there is still a lot work to be done there. We want to
become a constituent people of this state and to be granted all our cultural rights. After all, I don’t
think we actually ask for much. We only want for this country to finally become ours too. We want
to study in our own language and to have access to leading positions that have, until recently, been
accessible only to Macedonians. For example, Macedonians are very concerned about the University in Tetovo, but I do not understand why. They are the ones who actually claim that these people
are uneducated and instead of being glad that they will finally receive education, they sent in the
police in 1995. They say we have to study in Macedonian, but we do not want that. There are 40%
of us here and I do not understand why we should study in Macedonian. I also do not see why we
should study in Prishtina when we can do it at home». To my question: “What has changed in the
interethnic relations since the Ohrid Agreement?” he replied: «After the Ohrid Agreement, we became more and more distant. Until yesterday, it was only them who held high level positions. Now,
we too can be doctors and ministers, but Macedonians do not accept that, they are afraid of us. It
creates greater gap between us».
Along with these positive group self assessment, it should be noted that the Albanian community
is heavily concentrated in the north-western and south-western parts of the country, the latter bordering Kosovo and the former Albania. This “ethnic continuity” and close ties with other Albanian
communities, who live just across the border, provide the Albanians with the sense of being a part
of a great Albanian nation, and according to many Macedonians, foment their dreams about Albanian national reunification.
«The Albanians can be labeled as “the teenagers” of the Balkans» said a well known Macedonian political scientist. “If the Macedonians have no other option except Europe, Albanians do have,
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and that is their reunification and then integrating with Europe. They have an intermediate phase,
which they would probably like to achieve before joining Europe”.
This view is widely shared by many Macedonians and many people that I interviewed assume
that the Albanian community in Macedonia has a hidden agenda. «What the Albanians really want
is not collective and cultural rights but the secession from the Macedonian state and the creation of
a Greater Albania», said a seventy-eight years old Macedonian interviewee from a village near
Tetovo. These assumptions do not come out of the blue and are not completely unfounded. In the
collective experience of numerous Macedonians from the western part of the country there still lives
the image of a “Greater Albania” which actually existed during the World War Two. Other middle
aged interviewees reported about the 1968 Albanian demonstrations in Tetovo and the 1981 demonstrations in Prishtina when the “separatists and irredentists” explicitly demanded the granting of
republican status for the province of Kosovo. Moreover, in the early 1990s, radical Albanians pursued a policy of federalization with a perspective of secession. In the discussion with my Macedonian interviewees, all these events seem to confirm a long tradition of a Greater Albanian ideology
among the Albanians of former Yugoslavia.
But is this what the Albanians from Macedonia really want?
Concerning this issue, an Albanian professor from Tetovo University said: «It is doubtless that
the process of the Albanian reunification has already begun and that it cannot be stopped. However,
this reunification has above all, a spiritual and not political character. In 1913, the Albanian community was divided by an international border and since then we Albanians have lived in a different
political and social system. Alongside this in the last fifty years we have had almost no contact with
the other side and today we can not deny that the differences between as are substantial. We
Albanians from Macedonia are less educated and far more conservative and traditional in comparison with Albanians from Albania and Kosovo. So the plans for reunification, made by some rightwing political parties are premature and unrealistic. Moreover, any change to international borders
can be achieved only through conflict and as far as we Albanians from Macedonia are concerned I
believe we have had enough of it».
Leaving aside the official and elite discourses, above all I was interested in the feelings and opinions
of ordinary people concerning the issue of Albanian national reunification and these are my findings.
Like other nationalisms of the “Eastern type”, Albanian as well is defined in primordial terms
and the Albanians perceive it as something deeply rooted and biologically granted. During my fieldwork I frequently heard my Albanian interviewees saying «Albania is not the state of three but a nation of seven million» or «We Albanians from Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania have
the same language, the same blood, the same flag and the same customs. We are one and the same
people, are we not?»
The references to the language and the flag are typical of the Albanian nationalism. The language is the main marker of the Albanian national identity and the only tie that bonds different Albanian communities in the Balkans but also worldwide. The reference to the flag is also very important and gives some substance to the nation. All the Albanian families I visited have at least one
Albanian flag in the house and in western Macedonian towns and villages Albanian flags are displayed every where. To my remark that all these flag may actually disturb Macedonians, Albanians
replayed “Why should the flag disturb them? This is not the flag of the Albanian state but the flag
of an entire nation”.
However, despite the fact that the Albanian myth of unity (also referred to as the myth of ethnic
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homogeneity and cultural purity) has been explicitly and constantly asserted in the narratives of my
interviewees, through speaking with the people I met I realized that the prospect of the Albanian
reunification is scarcely believed by the Albanians themselves.
Almost all Albanians interviewed in Macedonia have visited Albania at least once since the fall
of communism and although grudgingly, most admit that their perceptions and opinion about
Albania (often referred as the “mother country”) were, quoting a young university educated man
from a village near Gostivar, “maybe mythological and imaginary”. Instead of the cradle of the nation, which they had envisioned for a long time, what they found was a “backward, poor and dangerous state”. Concerning the people from Albania (often referred as “those from Albania”) they
also have a poor reputation with Albanians from Macedonia and are often referred as idlers, smugglers and - which was quite surprising for me - “non-believers”. The fact that “those from Albania” eat
pork meat and drink alcohol was felt unacceptable by the majority of my Albanian interviewees. After
fifty years of separation and dreams about their compatriots who live just across the border, when the
two communities finally met they discovered that they have substantial differences. And more
surprising still, that they did not like each other, contrary to their initial expectations.
With these negative perceptions toward “those from Albania” (even if these negative perceptions
are never overtly declared) the religious issues have a very important role and emerge as a source of
contradiction in the narratives of my Albanian interviewees. On one hand when they talk with non
Albanians (like in my case) they all seem to adhere to the Albanian myth of indifference to religion
(which is, together with the myth of unity, one of the main characteristics of Albanian nationalism)
and in their narratives they seem to appreciate the weak religious sentiment of “those from Albania”. On the other hand, they tend to criticize unconventional behavior of other Muslim Albanians.
The Albanians from the south, mostly Orthodox and Catholic, have an even poorer reputation and
my interviewees portrayed them as “those from the south” and they are accused of selling the state
to foreigners, mostly Greeks and Italians.
Concerning Kosovo the feelings and perceptions of my interviewees were quite different. Many
Albanians I met have close relations with Albanians from Kosovo and all tend to identify themselves more with Kosovo and Prishtina then with Albania and Tirana. Such attitudes are understandable considering that the two populations were not separated by a state border and many Albanians studied and even married in Kosovo. Kosovo is also an important political ally and many
Albanian interviewees reported that (in the prospect of an imminent independence) they can rely
more on Kosovo than on Albania to exert pressure on the Macedonian state. Still, even if the Kosovars and Albanians from Macedonia consider themselves as one body and a soul, many (but not all)
Albanians interviewed in Macedonia do not appear to be particularly anxious about changing
borders. In their accounts Kosovo is portrayed as chaotic and violent. Concerning its inhabitants, an
Albanian employee of Tetovo University said: «You can recognize from a mile students from Kosovo. They are different from our students. You know they are arrogant, presumptuous and sometimes, how to say, maybe even wild».
I cannot conclude this section without mentioning Tetovo University, portrayed by many
Macedonians as the “cradle of Albanian nationalism”. During my fieldwork I had close contacts
with that institution as well as with its professors, employees and students. The establishment of
that university is considered, by all my interviewees - regardless age, gender or political affiliation as the brightest moment in the history of the Albanian community in Macedonia. The very fabric of
the University has a highly symbolic meaning for Albanians. In that building, in 1944, many
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Albanian civilians were killed, and today, according to the Dean of the University, many young
people, especially women, are being educated and emancipated there. The symbol of Albanian suffering has turned into a symbol of emancipation for the entire Albanian community. The attempt to
close the faculty through police intervention caused sharp protest from the entire community and
created a fertile soil for the growth of the Albanian nationalism, even among that part of the Albanian population which used to consider themselves as “apolitical”.
Still, that symbol of emancipation does not have a purely educational character (although all
Albanians deny this). Through the establishment of this University, the foundation was set for
Albanian spiritual unity, this is the place where, for the first time in history, Albanians from different areas have an opportunity to meet and possibly, get closer together. Nevertheless, from the narratives of my young Albanian interviewees I realized that despite the hopes of professors and
parents, it has not produced the expected results.
The testimonies I cited above are aimed to show that the Macedonian anxieties about a possible
Albanian secession are unfounded. Although some right-wing parties sometimes actively cultivate
Macedonian fears of an Albanian secession, the majority of my Albanian interviewees believe that
the Albanian question could be settled within the framework of the Macedonian state. Moreover,
many people that I interviewed expressed the hope that the “Albanian question” will be definitely
solved within the process of European integration.
Conclusions
The aim of this research was twofold. Firstly, I was interested in the process of identity formation and the manner in which the national and cultural identities are forged and reproduced in time
and space. Building on the vast literature and previous works of Hall, Paff, Billig and other theorists
of nationalism and identity creation, in the first chapter I argued that group identities are not, in
Hall’s words, «fixed for ever in some essentialist past but rather subject to the continuous play of
history and power». In order to support this argument I described the history of identity formation
of the Albanians and Macedonians from the Ottoman Empire to the present time. As I have noted in
the second chapter, the Albanians and Macedonians who today both like to present themselves as
ancient and continuous inheritors of a long and honorable pedigree, in the past considered themselves, and were considered by others, as Turks, Serbs, Bulgarians or simply Christians and
Muslims. The historical evidence that these identities have not been expressed across time and
space was explained by nationalist ideologists on both sides as a result of foreign oppression. As explained at the beginning of chapter four, for obvious reasons I was not able to gather data in relation
to national sentiments of both Albanians and Macedonians from the past, but with regard to more
recent history I found some who agreed to tell me their personal experiences and feelings. In the
case of the Macedonian community, I demonstrated that the discourse and personal experiences of
my interviewees sometimes substantially differ from the governing myths and official accounts.
With regard to the Albanian community, for reasons of time and space, I did not report the feelings
and memories of my older Albanian interviewees about the inter-war period. Such as with the case
of the Macedonian community, some of my Albanian interviewees explicitly asserted the perennial
existence of the Albanian national identity, others, like a ninety-five year old man from Ohrid said:
«I do not know who we exactly were in the 1920s and 1930s. I remember that at home, we use to
358
Svjetlana Kovačević
speak the Albanian language but the language spoken by the majority of inhabitants here in Ohrid was
Turkish. I do not remember well, but I believe that my father used to declare himself as a Turk».
I have already cited Miller’s statement that “national identities are constructed by belief and nationality exists when its members believe it does”. In the case of the Macedonian community, I contest that despite the fact that the single members of the nation do not have a common vision neither
of who they are nor of their origins, today they can be called a nation. Not only all my interviewees
are convinced to belong to the Macedonian nation and speak the Macedonian language, but what is
more important, sixty years of common state and the process of state-building erased the substantial
differences that existed among them. The socialist slogan of “Brotherhood and Unity” was widely
embraced by Macedonians. It did not only develop strong affiliation toward other southern Slavs
but above all, I suggest, it helped them to forget the battles that different factions of Macedonians
fought against each other in the past.
With regard to the Albanians, I argue that, their community is much more “imagined” than the
Macedonian one. When events made it possible to different Albanian communities to finally get
closer to each other, the two most important myths of the Albanian nationalism - the myth of unity
(also referred as the myth of ethnic homogeneity and cultural purity) and the one of indifference to
religion - came under considerable stress. I also argue that the Macedonian anxieties about a possible Albanian secession are exaggerated. Through the accounts given by my Albanian interviewees,
I realized that the Albanians from Macedonia do not seem inclined to seek an extreme “exit” solution from the Macedonian state. Rather the majority of my interviewees reported that the Albanian
question could be settled within the framework of the Macedonian state. This is not because the
Albanian nationalism is just non-aggressive as they like to portray it to be, but simply because the
Albanians from Macedonia have no other choice; they are conscious that the dream about national
reunification is unrealistic. According to some Albanian interviewees, this cannot happen unless it
is a common decision and a platform of the political elite of the three communities, aggressively
imposed and supported by external factors. According to the group own assessment, the consequences of such a project would be unforeseen.
As already noted, Macedonians usually portray Albanians as “compact” and “impenetrable” and
I partially agree with this point of view. The rural lifestyle of many Albanians contributed to their
marginalization and to the continuity of patriarchal values. For this reason, external observers perceive them as close-knit and virtually impenetrable. Unlike the Macedonians who are open to contact and willing to divulge everything about their feelings and perceptions and often the four members of the same family have different opinions about the nation’s past and present, Albanians are
less forthcoming with self-description. I worked very hard to gain the confidence of the Albanian
community and it was only after long time, as I socialized and talked with them that I heard for the
first time an individual point of view. So I discovered that not all Albanians feel a strong attachment
to the Albanian flag and Albanian nation, not all Albanians think that is impossible to live with Macedonians and not all Albanians from Macedonia think that “those from Kosovo” are their brothers.
In other words the Albanians are not a homogeneous mass and there are very real and actual
divisions amongst them.
When I showed him the image of the Albanian flag, a middle aged Albanian man said: «Please do
not cite my name. If my Albanians hear what I have to say about the flag, I would end up in trouble. I
would be a target. I never comment on political issues in the company of other Albanians. It has been
a long time since I have not felt so free to speak my mind about the whole situation. You are asking
The Macedonian question: The old and the new one
359
me what the Albanian flag means to me. Well, I will tell you. I do not give a damn about the flag. To
me, it is important that my country provides me with normal life and standard of living - if they do
not provide me with that, I do not give a damn about the flag».
About an impossible coexistence with the Macedonians, an Albanian middle aged woman said:
«Today, we live well with Macedonians, and during the conflict in 2001, we used to seek shelter together with one old Macedonian woman, but we were afraid that Albanians would find about it. What
can I say? We have been neighbors for 40 years. She is alone, an old woman, I could not leave her
alone. Nevertheless, my Albanians do not understand that. If you want to survive here, you have to
think as they do. An individual is not important. Collective is important».
The second aim of this research was to identify the way in which the Macedonians and Albanians perceive and construct their identities and to investigate whether and to what extent the Ohrid
Framework Agreement is perceived as a possible solution to the ethnic conflict. From the analysis
and testimonies reported in chapter four, there seems to be enough ground to confirm that a deep
divide between the Albanian and Macedonian population - that concerns almost all aspects of life exists and continues in post-Ohrid Agreement Macedonia as well. Actually, according to the majority of my interviewees from both sides, the Ohrid Framework Agreement created even a greater gap
between them. The majority of my Macedonian interviewees perceived the Agreement as a severe
loss of security and a threat to their national identity. The Albanians, on their side, argue that the
Agreement did not grant them the rights they asked for and are filled with suspicion and haughtiness toward the Macedonians.
The attitudes of the two big communities that constitute the Macedonian society are dangerous
for civil peace in Macedonia. In order to fight ethnic tensions and to give Macedonians and Albanians the feeling that both have a stake in the development of their country, a realistic perspective of
integration into the European Union must be open. Along with this, the international community has
to give Macedonians also the feeling that their identity is not threatened any more and the country
should be recognized under its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia).
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SUPPORT TO THE INTERETHNIC COHABITATION AND POSTWAR
RECONCILIATION BY THE REACTIVATION OF RURAL ECONOMY
Alice Formagnana
Abstract: The project Raspberries of Peace has been carried out by the Zemljoradnička Zadruga
"Insieme" (Farmers Cooperative "Together") of Bratunac, a town located on the eastern border of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and part of the Republika Srpska Entity, whose population – according to the 1991
census - was 64.2% Bosniak and 34.2% Serb and where during the war everything associated to Bosniaks
and other non-Serbian ethnic groups was destroyed. Starting from the birth of the original idea, the
efforts and steps made to realize the project are depicted and an assessment is made of its impact both on
the local interethnic cohabitation and on the life quality of the inhabitants of Bratunac. The work presents
an interesting example in the peace-building field realized in post-war Eastern Bosnia and analyses the
conditions under which the experience can be implemented in other places.
►► ◄◄
Introduction
The aim of this work is the presentation of an interesting and significant project in the peace
building field realized in post-war Eastern Bosnia. The project called Raspberries of Peace is an
idea carried out by the Zemljoradnička Zadruga “Insieme” Bratunac (Cooperative “Together” of
Bratunac). It was conceived in Bratunac, near Srebrenica, a place chosen on one hand for the
consequences of its recent history, on the other hand for the links between the creators of the
project and the Forum Žena of the Bratunac group. The presentation is the result of research
and, above all, of direct interviews both to Forum Žena of Bratunac, and to Zemljoradnička
Zadruga “Insieme” Bratunac members.The main goals of this study are:
- to understand how the idea was born,
- the background and the efforts made to realize the project,
- the impact over the quality of cohabitation,
- the quality of life for the inhabitants of Bratunac,
- to find out whether it is possible to export a similar experience to other places in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
A look at Bosnian history of the 1990s will help us understand the atmosphere in which this
idea was conceived, the real difficulties met in building it, the importance and the changes for
the local inhabitants.
1. A brief view of the last decade of the 20th century in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The war in the former Yugoslavia started on 1992 and caused thousands of murders and
massacres. Entire villages were destroyed from both sides.
Before 15th October 1991, date of its parliamentary declaration of sovereignty as the Republic
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Alice Formagnana
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1), the country saw the three major ethnic groups (Bosniak, Serbian
and Croatian) cohabiting peacefully. After the declaration, the three groups began a war for
territorial control. The conflict was particularly violent in the Eastern part of Bosnia, on the
Serbian borders. The Serbs wanted to maintain Bosnia and Herzegovina within their own
borders. Since the area of Central Podrinje (Srebrenica region) was the link between the two
regions of the Serbian Republic, it was particularly important for them.
Eastern Herzegovina and the Serbian Republic were primarily inhabited by Serbian population, whereas Central Podrinje was primarily inhabited by Bosniak population (2).
This was an obstacle for the Serbian Government which wanted to reinstate the control over
the region. When the fight for the control started, it was particularly fierce.
Some of the towns which suffered the worst atrocities were Srebrenica, Cerska (west of
Srebrenica), Kravica (where Bosnian forces from Srebrenica killed several dozens of Serbian
soldiers and some civilians), Bratunac, Konjević Polje, Goražde and Žepa (3).
Fig. 1 - Map of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991
1. The independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized by the EC on 6 April
1992 and by the United States of America the following day.
2. Cfr. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srebrenica_massacre and the “Report of the Secretary-general
pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998) – Srebrenica Report”, http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/UNsrebrenicareport.htm. The population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (4.4
million) was composed by 44% Bosniaks (known until 1993 as Muslims or Bosnian Muslims), 17%
Croats and 31% Serbs.
3. Cfr. Report of the Secretary-general pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998) Srebrenica Report; http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/UNsrebrenicareport.htm
Support to the interethnic cohabitation and postwar reconciliation……
365
In 1992 all these towns were part of the enclave of Srebrenica (900 km²) predominantly
inhabited by Muslim Bosniak population.
After 1992 Serbian military and paramilitary forces gained some territory reducing the enclave of Srebrenica to 150 km (4). The Bosniak population converged in Srebrenica town,
which increased to a number between 50.000 and 60.000 units.
Since March 1993 Srebrenica had been under the protection of the UN. On 16th April 1993
Srebrenica and its surroundings were declared “safe area” by the United Nations Security Council [resolution 819 (5)].
In doing that, the UN Security Council «Demands that all parties and others concerned treat
Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or
any other hostile act; Demands also to that effect the immediate cessation of armed attacks by
Bosnian Serbian paramilitary units against Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal from the
areas surrounding Srebrenica; Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the
Bosnian Serbian paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina» (6).
Fig. 2 - Present map of Bosnia and Herzegovina
4. Cfr. footnote 3.
5. Resolution 819 (1993) - http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930416a.htm. It is interesting to underline as
Security Council resolution 819 was taken against the deterioration of the situation in Srebrenica and its
surrounding areas as peacekeeping operations. But the resources made available to implement this
resolution (as the following resolutions n. 824 and 836) were insufficient. Not only: the interpretation of
the term “safe area” was not clear to the Security Council, as well as what actions to take in a similar
peacekeeping operation. Moreover, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR declared that the nature of the
safe area mandate proposed was incompatible with peacekeeping. To protect the safe area against Serb
attack was rather a peace-enforcement operation.
6. Resolution 819 (1993). www. nato.int/ifor.un/u910925a.htm.
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Alice Formagnana
But the “safe area” agreement was violated by both parties: Srebrenica found itself inside the
domain of the Drina Corps, the name given (on geographical basis) to the military forces of the
Army of the Serbian Republic (VRS) on the place and Serbs attacked the Srebrenica civilians
daily, because they said Srebrenica was used by Bosnian forces to launch counter-offensives
against the VRS.
It is also true that the no-fly zone was used by Bosnian forces to dispatch helicopters with
ammunition for their divisions.
In March 1995 the situation got worse: the President of the Serbian Republic (Karadžić)
ordered the VRS forces to separate physically Srebrenica from Žepa, making the communication between the two enclaves difficult, creating a state of unsafety and no hope to survive for
the inhabitants of Srebrenica.
Serbian forces entered the UN Safe Area in July 1995 with little resistance from the largely
demilitarized Bosnians and with no significant reaction from the international community.
At this point on 9th July 1995 President Karadžić ordered the VRS Drina Corps to capture the
Srebrenica town. But this was not a simple war plan: the two highest ranking Bosnian Serbian
politicians, Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, in contrast with the Bosnian Serbian
military commander General Ratko Mladić, decided to allow the Serbs to stay in this part of the
country, removing all others ethnic groups, even if this meant genocide.
Before the arrival of Serbian troops, the evening of 11th July 1995 a column of Bosniak men,
between 10.000 and 15.000 including members of an Army Division of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, decided to reach Tuzla in the north of Bosnia, trying to escape through the
woods.
Other Bosniak from Srebrenica found a shelter in Potočari, where Serbian soldiers executed
hundreds of men and women.
In the morning of 12th July, Serbian forces entered Srebrenica promising the Muslim people
that were planning to take the Bosniak refugees to Kladanj, a territory under Muslim control.
Serbian TV was called at Srebrenica and, during the shooting women and children were
separated from the men, put on buses and reassured by General Ratko Mladić that everybody
would be reunited with their relatives once arrived at destination.
However, when the cameras were turned off the men were deported, tortured and killed by the
Serbian army. The buses which had already left were stopped and the soldiers searched for men
among the passengers. No men ever arrived in Kladanj. Sometimes the buses did not arrive at all (7).
The mass murder in Srebrenica in 1995 had been planned and more than 7.800 people were
killed, mainly men between the ages of 16 and 60.
The coordination and the methodical nature of the execution are the proofs of this plan. The
execution fields were usually in isolated areas. Among these areas there were Bratunac,
Kravica, Sandici, Tišca, Petkovici, Orahovac, the Branjevo Military Farm, Kozluk, Zvornik (8).
It is believed that the inhabitants of Kravica took part in the killings.
The first large-scale mass executions began on the afternoon of 13th July 1995 in the valley
of the River Cerska, west of Konjevic Polje (9). The majority of prisoners were from Bratunac
and when some of the soldiers recognised acquaintances from Srebrenica, they beat and humiliated them before killing them.
Corpses were massed in graves dug with excavators. In a second time, the majority of the
7. Cfr. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srebrenica_massacre.
8. Cfr. http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf.
9. Ibidem.
Support to the interethnic cohabitation and postwar reconciliation……
367
corpses were exhumed and relocated in an area of 50 km² around Srebrenica in order to delete
the proofs of the crime. Often the corpses were cut in parts and buried in different graves.
«By 2006, 42 mass graves have been uncovered around Srebrenica and the specialists
believe there are 22 more mass graves» (10).
The Srebrenica massacre has been the greatest massacre in European history since the end of
the Second World War.
The special court for war crimes, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY] (11), ruled that the Srebrenica massacre was an act of genocide. This is the first
legally recognised case of genocide in Europe (12).
A Srebrenica Genocide Memorial was built in Potočari, near Srebrenica, in memory of the
victims. 8.373 names are written on the stone inside the Memorial - which opened officially on
30th September 2003 - but the exact number of the victims or of the missing people will never be
known.
Fig. 3 - Potočari: the memorial stone reporting the Fig. 4 - Potočari: the plaque at the entrance of
8.373 names of the killed or missing Muslims
the Muslim cemetery
The Army of the Serbian Republic under the command of general Ratko Mladić, the special
state security forces of Serbia known as the “Scorpions”, the civil police and voluntaries from
Bratunac, different military forces also from Bratunac, all took part in the massacre.
In September and October 1995 the Brigade of Bratunac together with the civil authorities
carried out the exhumation of the victims, their dismemberment and relocation in smaller
common graves.
The most appalling fact is that a lot of participants at the massacre were from Bratunac (13),
they knew the victims and the survivors.
10. Cfr. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srebrenica_massacre.
11. It is interesting to learn about the following cases and sentences: Blagojevic and Jokic’s (Dragan),
Momir Nikolic’s, Dragan Obrenovic’s, Deronjic’s, Rajic’s, Krstic’s. In particular, Momir Nikolic’s case
helps to understand the dynamic and the cruel tragedy of Srebrenica and Bratunac. www.un.org/icty.
12. Http://www.un.org/icty/.
13. Cfr. Nicolić (Momir)’s case, http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2004/index.htm.
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Not only. Serbian troops entered Srebrenica on 11th July, in the evening. Only one night passed
between the decision to kill all the men and the take over of the enclave. In the following seven
days everything was prepared, organized and done.
The organization was mainly made by Bratunac nationalists.
On 24th August 2006 the Bosnian Serbian government wrote a secret list of Bosnian Serbs
who participated in the Srebrenica massacre.
892 of those are probably still in a power position or employed by the government of the
Serb Republic.
Fig. 5 - Potočari: the Muslim cemetery
Four and a half years after the event of Srebrenica, the UN has publicly admitted responsibility for not preventing the tragedy.
When the Dutchbat commander made clear that the Bosniaks could not defend themselves,
and the Duchbat troops could not protect them without air force support, his requests were
ignored by his superiors, either at local level, or higher (14).
The reason why the request of Dutchbat commander for urgent air force support was ignored
is still unclear.
In declaring Srebrenica a safe area (and in a second time a demilitarised area) the consensus
in the UN Security Council was limited. There was consensus to follow a policy of relatively
passive enforcement, a diplomatic measure that would exclude the UN forces from an armed
confrontation with the Serbs.
The Dutch battalion did not do enough to protect the refuges in Srebrenica, and when at the
beginning of the Serbian offensive the Bosniaks asked UNPROFOR to have the weapons back,
the request was rejected by UNPROFOR because it was UN responsibility to defend the
enclave. UN failed in implementing a peacekeeping action in an environment in which there
was no ceasefire and in allowing the Army of the Serbian Republic to use this action to reach
their goal.
14. Http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/srebrenica.justice/ASUN.htm.
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369
2. Bratunac
Bratunac is a town located on the east border of Bosnia, in the southwest of the Drina river
and in the north of Srebrenica (15). It is administratively part of the Serbian Republic.
According to the 1991 census, its population was of 33.375 inhabitants composed by
Bosniaks (64.2%), Serbs (34.2%), others (1.6%) (16).
During the war everything associated to Bosniaks and other non-Serbian ethnic groups was
destroyed.
The ethnic cleansing campaign was successful and has resulted in an almost exclusively
Serbian town of Bratunac, since the town was settled with the Serbian refugees from Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, the town and the surrounding villages are believed to be a
stronghold for nationalism and extremism and the area is believed to have harboured several
war crimes suspects (17).
During the war in Bratunac 4.221 houses over a total of 5.205 were destroyed or damaged.
In 2002 an esteem shown around 22.000 inhabitants, more than 60% of which were women.
The population of Bratunac is currently composed as follow: 12.000 Serbs from Bratunac, 2.000
Serbian refugees from other towns and 7.000 Bosniak Muslims who have recently returned (18).
Only since 2001, when the local authority changed and policies in favour of the return of the
refugees and evacuees started, the reconstruction has begun.
Projects to sustain these policies were financed with European funds and with the contribution of European and North-American NGOs; the United Nations started a programme to encourage the refugees to go back home by delivering the necessary materials to reconstruct their
houses.
The political and economic situation improved. Consequently, the request to return increased.
Reconstructing the houses is not enough though. People need the essential things, primarily
financial aid in order to start working their land again, so to be able to live with dignity and independence. The economy is based on agriculture, some cows for the milk and the domestic
production of cheese.
Thanks to the climate and to particular environmental conditions, Bratunac has become an
area specialized in the cultivation of fruits of the forest: until 1991 over 1.500 tons of raspberries and a similar quantity for what concerns bilberries, blackberries and strawberries were
produced per year (19).
Since 2003 the Zemljoradnička Zadruga “Insieme” Bratunac puts together Serbian and
Muslim producers with the aim to encourage the economic growth of Bratunac and its surroundings as the pre-condition to start the dialogue between the resident communities again, since it
had been violently interrupted in 1992 by the war.
Local people are aware that the only way to live together is to rebuild together the socioeconomic tissue. And this is the only solution to local problems.
15. The Drina river marks the border between the Republika Srpska and Serbia.
16. Http://www.answers.com/topic/bratunac.
17. Ibidem.
18. Ibidem.
19. Ibidem.
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3. The idea
Raspberries of Peace was born to support the existence and the work of the Farm Cooperative “Insieme” of Bratunac, in order to give a concrete aid to the returned refugees.
The idea of the project has been developed from the experience of Radmila Žarković and
Skender Hot (two active pacifists with a long experience, who worked for several peace associations and that also during the war continued in their activity for re-establishing peace conditions) together with some Italian NGOs and Associations.
The experience “Carovana di Pace” (20), having as one of the main aims a responsible tourism,
in order to understand and to dialogue with population of the former Yugoslavia, was fundamental.
“Carovana di Pace” is a project realized by Assopace (an Italian Association). It encourages
interaction among the local population.
Citizens from Italy and other countries can visit different villages and towns of former Yugoslavia and take part in the conferences organized by the promoters.
During the period 2001-2004 the project touched also Bratunac. This stop was proposed for
the first time by Radmila Žarković in 2001.
The stop and the conference were organized in collaboration with Forum Žena of Bratunac.
More than 100 women from Bratunac participated.
It was during the dialogue with them that the direction and the idea of the future project
“Raspberries of peace” was conceived.
Women at the conference told about their experience before, during and after the war.
The majority of them had in common the refugee camp experience.
After the beginning of the international programmes for the reconstruction of the houses,
they were able to go back home and to have their properties back. But after a while they understood it was not enough.
There were a lot of socio-economical problems due to friction between the different ethnic
groups and to unemployment.
At the time in the country, there was no dialogue between Muslims and Serb Orthodox, there
was no concrete opportunity to remain for the returned refugees, it was very difficult to find
funds to create and to continue an activity.
It is not easy to come back and to live in a climate of diffidence and fear, with no money to
buy food or to pay for the heating in winter because there were no jobs.
For these reasons a lot of women returned to the refugee camp, where it was possible to have
food to live.
Most Muslim women who had been evacuated from Central Podrinje already lived in the
surroundings of Sarajevo and Tuzla, with no possibility to have a job, to get micro credits, to go
back home, where the situation was critical and with no chance to get financial independence.
The majority of the refugees returned just to sell their properties.
In seeing the situation Radmila Žarković, Skender Hot and some Italian Associations decided
to do something to give an opportunity to the dialogue and to help these women to find a job.
When the pacifist movement Forum Žena of Bratunac was contacted, they agreed to cooperate in a project with the aim to sustain and facilitate the refugees’ return and the multiethnic
cohabitation.
The first steps towards the right direction were moved.
It was difficult to understand what exactly to do and how: it was necessary to give the tradi20. For more information you can visit the website. Http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/3300/1/42/.
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tions and the pre-war economy a closer look in order to identify the most suitable activities for the
area.
A problem was that the majority of the population was composed by women with children,
old people and people with physical problems caused by war. Furthermore, people were and are
poor, and most of the houses in Bratunac had all been destroyed or damaged.
This meant finding a suitable opportunity for these people, granting continuity and sustainability to the families.
Moreover, it was necessary to understand if there was an interest in the project and to
proceed to the trade analysis.
A further step to be taken was to find funds and to proceed with a sensitization campaign.
In any case, to start any activity, it was clear that people could not be asked to provide with
too much money or to ask for loans for a long time.
Table 1 - The phases of the project
2001-2003
2003-June
2004
2005
2006
Typology of cultivation
Is there interest in the project?
The way for finding funds
Sensitization campaign
Establishment and registration of Zemljoradnička Zadruga "Insieme" Bratunac
Technical experiments with open nurseries and a greenhouse
Rent of a warehouse and a freezer installation
Purchasing of premises where to gather, refrigerate and store the products, and
where to place the offices
Technical assistance
Cultivation of a new variety
The experience of the active pacifists and the experts of the organizations involved with
“Carovana di Pace” allowed to create the guidelines and to identify the leading principles for the
realization of the project.
In order to reach the goal it was decided that a Cooperative of Farmers should be the means
to realize the project.
An Italian NGO (A.C.S.: Associazione di Cooperazione allo Sviluppo) and three Italian Associations (Agronomi senza frontiere, Associazione per la pace and Cooperativa Sant’Orsola)
sustained the project.
The interest showed by the P.A.T. (Provincia Autonoma di Trento - Italy) was also extremely
important. Through its councillor for International Cooperation, the P.A.T. found a bank ready to
grant a loan to the cooperative for the beginning of its activity and the purchase of a shed.
By explaining the project to other Italian town councils the P.A.T. obtained their consensus
and the security necessary to obtain the loan.
P.A.T. played an important role gaining trust in the project from several institutions, thus
allowing its realization.
The main steps of the project were the following:
♦ 2001 The idea to support an activity which could represent a substantial aid for the
people who decided to live in Bratunac was carried out by Forum Žena of
Bratunac.
♦ 2001-2003 Researches showed that before the war, the growing of fruits of the forest was a
typical activity of the area and, because of the environmental conditions, it could
be possible to obtain products of a very high quality (the first researches were
conducted by ICS Sarajevo and Forum Žena of Bratunac).
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Particularly, raspberry trees could produce fruits for ten years at least and their
growing did not require a strong physical effort.
The market studies revealed a great request of raspberries at worldwide level: this
meant that the raspberry production was an activity really able to produce an
income for the local families.
The refugees had a possibility to go back home and to stay there and, without
large investments, a family could become economically independent.
It was decided that the raspberry production was the best solution to start a new
activity in Bratunac.
Some Muslim women decided to try the new experience, and the project took off.
♦ 2003 In May 2003 the idea to establish a Cooperative was born: Zemljoradnička
Zadruga “Insieme” Bratunac.
♦ 2003 In June 2003 the Zemljoradnička Zadruga “Insieme” Bratunac was established
and registered in order to allow the realization of the project.
A sensitization campaign was carried out by Forum Žena of Bratunac members.
A free meeting was organized in order to list the aims and the opportunities of the
cooperative, and to explain that it was open both to Serbs and to Muslims.
It is important to highlight that at that time, there was no dialogue at all between
Muslims and Serbs.
It frequently happened that when two neighbours of different ethnic groups
cultivated their own land close to each other, they did not even greet each other.
♦ 2004 With the help of an Italian agronomist, technical experiments were made: two
open nurseries and a greenhouse were built in order to obtain raspberry trees to be
used by the Cooperative members and to start the production.
♦ 2005 A warehouse and a freezer installation were rent: the Cooperative started to produce and to sell the products.
♦ 2006 In 2006 the Cooperative found the funds to purchase the premises where to gather, refrigerate and store the products, and where to place the offices.
The premises were renovated and ready in two months and opened at the beginning of July.
Since 2006 the Cooperative has also guaranteed technical assistance to all its members and it
has started a limited cultivation of a new variety.
The following year currants, bilberries and others fruits of the forest could also be planted.
4. A brief history of Radmila Žarković and Skender Hot
Radmila Žarković has been an active Serbian pacifist since 1993. She began her activity with
the group Forum Žena of Belgrado.
Thanks to her work inside the ICS - Sarajevo (Consorzio Italiano di Solidarietà Sarajevo), she
was in contact for a long time with the Muslim women of the pacifist movement Forum Žena of
Bratunac. She was an activist of Forum Žena of Mostar, where she lived with her family before
the war. She was married to a Serbian General and they had two daughters together. The marriage
ended due to their different lifestyles. Consequently, Radmila had to leave Mostar, where she still
cannot return.
Radmila is now living in Sarajevo, where she collaborated with the Ministry of Defence to
pass the law that allows conscientious objection and set up the Civil Service.
Her honesty and her zeal for peace have created the basis for confident relationships with all
peace groups.
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Skender Hot lives in Tuzla with his wife and his daughter.
He worked for ICS Sarajevo for a few years and at that time he met Radmila.
These people are sacrificing their families to the success of Zemljoradnička Zadruga “Insieme”
Bratunac: they spend almost all their time in Bratunac.
They know that many people count on them and that their behaviour is helping the Bratunac
people to rebuild their lives.
Fig. 6 - Radmila Žarković and Skender Hot (September 2006)
5. How people were involved in the project and how it started
When the project began and the cooperative was founded, the members were only ten.
The main goal of the initiative was to support dialogue and to provide the local population
with a job opportunity.
Apart from that, thanks to their experience, the founding members knew that the only
successful way to isolate the extremists and nationalists was through the implementation of the
economic activities. The consequence would be a new peace process.
At the beginning, the project was looked at suspiciously. People from both sides (Orthodox
Serbs and Muslim Bosniaks) did not believe it was a valid project for a serious job, a real opportunity to remain in Bratunac.
On one hand nobody took action against the plan, but on the other hand nobody seemed
interested in it.
The first associates bought their plants of raspberries with a loan guaranteed by the cooperative. The loan had to be given back in the following years, as the production of raspberries and
the income of the families increased.
The activity began, the production of raspberries took off and people started showing interest.
The neighbours, who had not said say a word, started to ask for information about the trees,
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the kind of cultivation and the production. At first with shyness, almost fear, then with less
hesitation. The first step towards the dialogue and the cohabitation was taken.
By their own initiative, the inhabitants of Bratunac and its surroundings began to ask the
cooperative to became members.
In September 2006 the associated families were 341, for a total of more than 3.500 people
involved. The cooperative grants micro-credits to the associates to purchase the raspberry plants
and supplies them.
Fig. 7 - Two frontal views of the shed Zemljoradnička Zadruga “Insieme” Bratunac
Fig. 8 - A behind view of the shed and some workers during the job time inside the shed
The members cultivate autonomously and produce fruits. The cooperative guarantees the
purchase of the production. The Cooperative purchases also the production of non members,
should the conditions be favourable.
The Cooperative supplies free technical assistance too, sending the agronomists - employees
or volunteers - to help the growers. Currently the numbers of people directly employed by the
cooperative are:
stable:
Eight (4 Serbs + 4 Muslims): 1 president (Skender Hot), 1 manager (Radmila
Žarković), 3 agronomists (Nermina Husić since 2005, Muslim; Marjana Beatović
since 2006, Serb; Dragan Malović since 2004, Serb), 1 agronomist responsible of
the internal production (Predrag Marković), 2 security guards.
seasonal:
Seventeen (12 women: 11 Serbs and 1 Muslim + 5 men: 1 Serb and 5 Muslims)
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for the picking, the selection, the freezing and storing of the raspberries. The
number can change according to necessity.
ten drivers:
who go to the producers to take the plastic cassettes containing the productions.
The criteria of positive discrimination to hire staff are: the job is given to those who return,
to the widows with children, to people without an income.
ACS, Assopace and Agronomi Senza Frontiere are still cooperating with the Forum Žena
Bratunac and the municipality to encourage the take off of the economy on solidarity and sustainable basis, the reconstruction of a social tissue based on cohabitation and reciprocal recognition.
6. The reaction of the people in Bratunac
As already said above, at first the inhabitants of Bratunac showed no interest in the project.
Their doubts were mainly caused by the fact that the project was financed by non-governmental organizations and international aids.
In general, projects financed in this way live a short life and the international community helps
for food or home reconstruction, but it does not give a tangible opportunity to become independent.
The Zemljoradnička Zadruga “Insieme” Bratunac is a project which gives a serious possibility to the refugees (from both sides) to return home and stay there.
The success of this experience is proved by the fact that in Bratunac there is the higher
percentage of people who decided to remain: they try to rebuild their own lives together with
civil and multiethnic cohabitation.
The rebirth of the rural economy on sustainable basis and the creation of a microeconomic
system based on domestic cultivation of fruits of the forest is particularly suitable for the social
and economic conditions of this area.
Indeed, this economic activity is suitable for the current demographic situation in Bratunac:
firms are small, the activities do not require great equipments, therefore they are good either for
families of women only, or families with aged members.
Moreover, picking fruits in June and July, allows the older boys to give a hand without
interrupting their school routine.
The main goal reached by Zemljoradnička Zadruga “Insieme” Bratunac is the level of
partners’ consciousness: they know (in the real sense of the term) that the cooperation between
the different ethnic groups and the dialogue can stop and isolate the nationalists.
In order to solve the mutual problems, it is necessary to re-establish the local production, to
cooperate to create self-confidence, dialogue and reciprocal attention. All this will help to find a
feeling of safety for everybody.
7. Zemljoradnička Zadruga Insieme Bratunac: System, costs, organization
The Cooperative wants to sustain the producers in the cultivation, picking, conservation and
sale of fruits and processed products, at the best conditions for its members.
To reach its aim, the Cooperative has built a 3.000 mq nursery for the production of new
varieties and fruit trees.
A 400 mq greenhouse, with microclimatic conditions suitable for intensive fruit cultivation,
and the basic structures for fruit growing were built.
In the first half of 2006, a shed in Bratunac was bought.
Once the shed had been renovated, a half was converted into a refrigeration system, and the
other half into offices and warehouse.
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Alice Formagnana
Fig. 9 - Different moments of the harvesting and collecting process
The refrigeration system is composed by three cells. Fruits are placed into a cell (capacity:
150 tons) at 0°C and then into a second cell (capacity: 300 tons) arriving at -20°C. Once they
have reached the temperature, goods are stored there for 12 hours and then put in a warehouse
cell (capacity: 350 tons) at -30°C. 6 refrigeration motors placed outside make the refrigerator
cells work. The shed and the refrigerator system cost around 700.000 euros.
Currently the production is being sold to the premises of Sarajevo, Zvornik and Serbia. The
cooperative has bought everything which was necessary to follow the EU regulations.
The official opening of the new complex together with the Raspberry Party at the beginning
of July 2006 was an opportunity for several actors to get to know the initiative, both economically and socially.
What became clear in my interviews to the workers, was that at the beginning they became
members because of their need to work, in order to eat and live with dignity. However, this
simple fact was a way to create a dialogue.
People directly involved in planning and implementing the project know this process and
exploit it to build the foundations for cohabitation. The final step is to reach the dialogue between Muslims and Serbs.
When people ask for work, they only think to get an income. They are not willing for peace.
Only later they become aware that they can live better not only because they have an income.
They understand that the conditions for a peaceful cohabitation exist.
A significant example is given by the experience of two female agronomists, a Serb one and
a Muslim one. Initially they did not know each other and they were there just to work. Now they
are friends, work together all day and think that a peaceful cohabitation between Muslims and
Serbs is possible.
Among its goals, the cooperative wants to reach salaries able to cover the standard cost of
living. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the average cost of living is 500 euros, but an average salary
is only 250 euros.
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Fig. 10 - Four steps of the nursery setting up; two pictures of the cultivation of raspberry trees inside
the nursery; a view of the nursery; the refrigeration system; the offices
Other goals of the cooperative are:
●● to enhance the production of fruits of the forest through modern and eco-sustainable cultivation techniques;
●● to train local agronomists;
●● to build nurseries in order to obtain very high quality reproductive material;
●● to introduce new raspberry and strawberry varieties (resistant and adaptable) in order to have
a longer period of life and vegetation and to reach a more effective use of work force;
●● to create a laboratory to transform part of the harvested product.
How can they obtain this?
Agronomi Senza Frontiere played an important role helping to build nurseries and to teach
modern and eco-sustainable growing techniques.
Even if nobody in this association is on the place, internet contact is available between the
parts, to clarify what kind of problem the trees have, what is the best solution to solve it, to suggest new grafts. In September 2006 a little cultivation of raspberries and currants for a second
harvest in autumn was tested. Having two harvests means to have more work and seasonal workers for longer period. But it would be wrong to think that in the autumn and winter period people relax. After the harvest, it is time to sow the fruit trees inside the nursery. After a while, it is
necessary to plant them separately. In March, it is time to start open cultivation.
There are also training courses for local growers and agronomists, and training for the new
financial rules (taxation) introduced in ex-Bosnia.
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Alice Formagnana
Fig. 11 - Nermina Husić and Marjana Beatović
8. How the experiences of the experts influence the project
The experience of the active pacifists and the involved organizations allowed the realization
of the project “Raspberries of piece” and the achievement of important goals.
How? From their experiences, the experts know how to approach a similar problem. Peace is
a long process that has to involve the local people, and without dialogue is not possible to build
peace conditions.
They know that using basic needs (food, work, a sense of security), they can create the
network for having a peaceful cohabitation.
When the economic conditions improve, people are unlikely to look for fights or revenges.
Initially people were not enthusiastic for the project, they were sometimes indifferent.
Only when the first trees had grown, curiosity became stronger than diffidence.
People started to ask for information about cultivation, hoping to find a job: a channel for
exchanging experiences was opened.
The more the Cooperative grew, the more the process of asking information was like a circle
expanding itself. Even the inhabitants of the villages around Bratunac asked about the project.
Once the people had entered, new links with other people became easier. As a consequence of
the process, fear and rivalry decrease.
Now, after only six years since the birth of the project, living in Bratunac is very different.
The refugees have an opportunity to remain, they do not feel the hostility and the sense of
revenge as they did before.
The social tissue is more compact: there is more cooperation between the inhabitants.
The indirect victims of atrocities have often met the families of the criminals who had
committed the crimes (with difficulties, understandably).
There is the will to rebuild a dialogue, but a lot has still to be done.
9. Possibility to export “Raspberries of Piece” experience to other settings
The success of “Raspberries of peace” and the possibility to start it was mainly due to the
experience of several experts in the field of peace building and the will of some inhabitants of
Bratunac to rebuild a new social tissue to live together.
When the project was proposed to the Forum Žena of Bratunac (a pacifist movement of
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Muslim women existing for several years with peaceful proposals) there was no dialogue
between Serbs and Muslim and there were several socio-economic problems.
The Forum accepted the proposal and accepted to cooperate with the Serbs in order to reach
a peaceful, liveable context.
Serbs and Muslims started the project together, implemented it together and are working at it
together. From the beginning, the Mothers of Srebrenica movement has also cooperated in the
project. Only reading paragraph 2 of this work, it is easy to understand how hard for a mother of
Srebrenica can be to cooperate with the mothers or the relatives of the murderers of their children
or their entire family.
The main factors of success in the project are the cooperation between the experts and the
local people, and the will of the inhabitants to create a new opportunity to live together, in a
peaceful context.
An important role was played and it is still played by Radmila Žarković and Skender Hot,
with their will to realize the project, their passion to reach the goals.
Exporting this experience is possible and advisable.
Key elements are the availability of people with a remarkable background in the field of
peace building, the existence of good channels to obtain loans and the necessary guarantees for
the local people involved, the will of the local inhabitants to start the project. It is also important
to plan a project for a long period of time. Peace is a long construction process.
Conclusions
The war in former Yugoslavia was fierce and caused a lot of personal tragedies.
For the first time in European history after the Second World War, a genocide was committed and the international military intervention showed its failure.
The international programmes for reconstruction in former Yugoslavia too have been seen
from local inhabitants as a failure: too often, when the mass-media move their attention to other
countries or emergencies, people who live difficult situations are abandoned to themselves.
Too often international aids are focussed on house or school reconstruction instead of
helping local people create the basis to avoid other wars or fights, to rebuild a society based on
reciprocal respect and on dialogue, to help people to be independent from external aids.
Raspberries of Peace testifies how the involvement of the local population is important to
achieve the goals, and it shows the guidelines to re-establish the conditions for a peaceful cohabitation in post-war territories.
It is also true that the international programme for the reconstruction in Bratunac allowed
legal owners to have their houses and lands back, and the ICTY intervention for the persecution
of war criminals was crucial to remove the politicians in Bratunac and Srebrenica who took part
in the ethnic cleansing.
In my opinion, the key elements for the success of the project, are the following:
- the arrest of people involved in the massacre by ICTY;
- the international reconstruction plan which allowed the refugees to get their properties back
and (even if under armed control for the first period) to stay in their native towns;
- the intention of a part of the local population to assert the conditions for peaceful cohabitation;
- the experience of the Italian NGOs, of Radmila and Skender and of the Forum Žena of
Bratunac: the intervention of those people who strongly believe in peace, who have experience in the field is fundamental to help a peace process.
Bratunac is currently the ex-Bosnia town with the higher percentage of refugees who came
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back and settled, and where nationalists are more and more isolated and blocked.
This means that only when the projects for the reconstruction of dialogue and peace are
planned over a long period, with proper skills and local people actively involved, it is possible
to help.
Furthermore, planning a sustainable project, independent from foreign aids and able to encourage self-esteem in the local population is highly important. Independence for local population is necessary in order to maintain a real and lasting peace building process.
It is possible to re-establish contact between two parties and to reduce the hostility, through
economic activities. Economical factors as means to achieve peace are also a way to be independent from foreign aid.
For this reasons I think there should be more grants to support projects of this kind. Projects
need to be financed even after the first emergency period.
Web resources:
http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/srebrenica.justice/ASUN.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srebrenica_massacre
http://lists.peacelink.it/balcani/msg01377.html
http://www.agronomisenzafrontiere.it/newsletter/Newsletter2_2006.pdf#search=%22Skender%20Hot%2
2 hot
http://www.answers.com/topic/bratunac
http://www.ecn.org/reds/mondo/europa/balcani/jugoslavia/balcani0306srebrenica.html
http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/UNsrebrenicareport.htm
http://www.icsitalia.org/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid=162
http://www.macondo3.org/appro/srebr.htm
http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930416a.htm
http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/2309/1/68/
http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/3300/1/42/
http://www.un.org/icty/
http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2004/index.htm
http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf
THE CONTRIBUTORS
Lorenzo Degrassi graduated in Foreign Languages and Literature at the Trieste University in
2003 and achieved a MA degree in International Peace Operators in 2006. In 2005 he
carried out a stage, and in 2006 acted as assistant coordinator, with the Pec (Kosovo)
local office of the “Tavolo Trentino con il Kosovo”, a cooperation initiative run since
2001 in Kosovo by the Autonomous Province of Trento.
Alice Formagnana, born in 1975 in the Biella province, graduated in “Economics of International Trade and Currency Markets” in 2004 and achieved a MA degree in International Peace Operators in 2006. Since then, she is actively interested in problems connected with post-conflict conditions, especially in the Balkan area.
Svjetlana Kovačević graduated in Foreign Languages and Literature at the Trieste University
in 2003. For the MA degree in International Peace Operators she has conducted fieldwork in Macedonia and Kosovo where she also cooperated with a local NGO specialized in the development of civil society and conflict resolution. At present she is a
PhD candidate in “Transborder Policies for Daily Life” at IUIES-International University Institute for European Studies and works with an organization providing services
to immigrants.
Lidija Opačić graduated in Italian and Croatian Languages and Literature at the Rijeka University in 2003 and in Foreign Languages and Literature at the Trieste University in
2004; she achieved a MA degree in International Peace Operators in 2006. She cooperated into a research project on the local economic development in Serbia, involving also fieldwork in Serbia.
IUIES JOURNAL
The Journal of the
International University Institute of European Studies (IUIES)
August 2008 – volume 2 – number 2
Guest Editor: Anna Maria Boileau
197
Presentation, Anna Maria Boileau
201
Il Kosovo come mito e identità fra serbi e albanesi, Lorenzo Degrassi
249
Anti-ideological writing and the national question in the Serbian literature of the eighties,
Lidija Opačić
297
The Macedonian question: The old and the new one, Svjetlana Kovačević
363
Support to the interethnic cohabitation and postwar reconciliation by the reactivation of rural
economy, Alice Formagnana
381
The Contributors
Euro 20,00
ISSN: 1971-9876